Announcer (00:00:05): Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton. Chris Carr (00:00:25): Hello everybody and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you? Matt Fulton (00:00:29): I'm good, Chris. I am happy to be here, but I'm not going to sugarcoat it; I'm a tired boy. Chris (00:00:34): Oh dear. Yeah, you've been a busy one this week. You've been doing lots of interviews. That's good. So we will benefit from your tiredness in some respects. Matt (00:00:41): Yes, it was for a good cause. Yeah, so I spoke to Shane Harris earlier in the week. That has been out by the time this airs, it'll been out for a couple days. We talked about the Iran Intelligence pre- and post-strike, and also Tulsi Gabbard's sort of quagmire that she's in over at DNI. And then yesterday, as we're recording this, I interviewed Joe Cirincione, who's a well-known arms control and nuclear non-proliferation expert in DC. He's been in all kinds of think tanks, appears on CNN once in a while. So I got sort of in the weeds with him on the details of what parts of the nuclear program were destroyed and if Iran rushes for a bomb, what's their most, path of least resistance to do so? So that's really cool. I'm excited for folks to hear that. That'll be out next Wednesday and then coming up the following weekend -- we haven't recorded this yet, but I don't anticipate any scheduling issues here -- talking to Tim Weiner about his new book, his sequel to Legacy of Ashes. It's called The Mission: The CIA in the 21st Century. So I'm still working on that, but I'm excited to talk to him. So lots of good stuff coming up. Chris (00:01:56): Yeah, well congratulations on both your interviews and I'm looking forward to the Tim Weiner one, and I thought the one with Shane Harris was very good. Matt (00:02:02): Thank you. Chris (00:02:02): And it does sound like that Tulsi Gabbard's days may be numbered, so listeners should go and check that out. And also, it was very interesting just listening about some of the intelligence summaries about the Iran nuclear program and the idea that even though they had got it to 60% enrichment that you kind of like there's a situation where you don't really, it's definitely not for peaceful means, that enrichment. There's definitely something going to happen with it. And it's just a question of will it happen or won't it? And so yeah. Matt (00:02:32): It's coming right up to the line and doing everything you would need to do to build a nuclear weapon without actually making the decision to do so. And you could see how that is sort of still not a great position to be in if you're looking at this from the Israeli or the US point of view. But yeah, really great conversation there. I encourage folks to go check it out if they haven't already. Chris (00:02:56): Yeah, yeah, do. Thank you for that. So our first story is about the NATO summit. So I'll just quickly draw from an article by Chatham House, which is titled the "Five key priorities for NATO after the ummit." So as the NATO summit in The Hague concluded, European leaders likely returned home relieved. There was no major upheaval, and even Trump appeared warmer towards his NATO peers. This year's summit had low ambition. The agenda was deliberately shortened to minimize potential disruption, and Ukraine was decoupled to avoid public clashes between Trump and Zelensky. The Netherlands and NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, gave Trump a warm welcome. Allies agreed to spend 5% of GDP on defense, including 3.5% on core defense and 1.5% on resilience, cybersecurity, and infrastructure. The summit also marked the start of shifting the burden of European defense from the US to Europe. However, Spain sparked controversy by stating that it won't be able to meet the agreed upon 5% NATO spending target and instead committed to just 2.1% of its GDP. And this has fueled concerns about burden sharing and the alliance unity. (00:04:15): Looking ahead, the article from Chatham House proposes that NATO needs to focus on five key issues that weren't addressed at the summit. So the first issue is the support for Ukraine, then it's continuing the review of NATO's strategic approach to Russia as agreed at last year's summit, then preparing for possible US troop reductions in Europe, then building industrial capacity. Ukraine has shown how vital it is to have a defense industrial base ready to innovate and scale in a crisis. And then deepening engagement with NATO's Indo-Pacific Four partners, which is South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, especially as relations appear to be cooling in that area at the moment. This summit was all about footing the bill for the return to collective defense and beginning the burden shift to Europe. But the real work begins now, planning, implementation and execution. NATO must tread carefully and the alliance can't afford unnecessary risks with President Trump ahead of next year's summit. And the article even calls whether there should be a summit next year or whether they should make them more less frequent to avoid any problems with Trump. So Matt, what are your thoughts on all of this? Matt (00:05:25): Did you hear the text message that, or did you see, I guess, the text message that Rutte sent Trump right before the summit? Trump posted a screenshot of it on Truth Social. It wasn't good form. Do you want to hear it? Chris (00:05:38): Yeah. Matt (00:05:40): All right, I'll read it. Chris (00:05:40): That sounds interesting. Who sent the text message? Matt (00:05:43): Mark Rutte, the secretary general of NATO, sent this text to Trump while Trump was on his way to the summit. And Trump posted a screenshot of this on his Truth Social, which is bad form, but that's what he does. So it says, "Mr. President, dear Donald, congratulations and thank you for your decisive action in Iran. That was truly extraordinary and something no one else dared to do. It makes us all safer. You are flying into another big success in The Hague this evening. It was not easy, but we've got them all signed on the 5%. Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe and the world. You will achieve something NO -- all caps -- no American president in decades could get done. Europe is going to pay in a BIG way -- again, all caps -- as they should, and it will be your win. Safe travels and see you at His Majesty's dinner. Signed, Mark Rutte. Chris (00:06:40): Wow. We have a term for that in the UK, if you want to hear it. Matt (00:06:44): What is that? Chris (00:06:45): Brown-nosing. Matt (00:06:47): Yeah. So he took, Rutte took a lot of flack for this, at least as I saw. I think this might be, I have thoughts on the policy of the summit as well, but I mean the Trump factor here, will there won't there be an issue was sort of looming large over the whole thing. And thankfully there really wasn't an issue with him there. So this might be an unpopular opinion, but I think what Rutte is doing there, navigating and handling Trump is really smart. If you're the NATO secretary general, your first job is to keep NATO alive, right? I mean that text where he basically says, "Congratulations on being the biggest, smartest, most specialest boy," yes, it was sycophantic and brown-nosing as you said. Yes, it was cringe, especially for folks in Europe to hear, no doubt. But I think it was also shrewd. As I've said on here before, the transatlantic alliance has to keep its eye on a much longer game right now, or at least a game that lasts longer than three and a half years. (00:07:59): Putin and all these authoritarian goons flatter and manipulate Trump constantly. Why shouldn't Rutte do the same for good? I mean, Macron does it pretty well. I mean, you don't have to like it, and I don't like it, it's annoying and exhausting, but I get it. With Trump, everything is transactional. Everything is about personal vibes. If you don't have that relationship, if you don't play that game, then you're cooked. And it's that chumminess, that feigned subservience -- and I think Rutte is smart enough to know what he's doing there, even if Trump doesn't know what he's doing -- that feigned subservience that might linger in Trump's mind if and when JD Vance starts musing about blowing up the whole alliance. So I see some merit there. Chris (00:08:49): Yeah, yeah. No, I agree with you. And Politico actually stated that Mark Rutte has cracked the code for a successful leaders summit involving President Trump. "Call him daddy," basically is what they said. And so, yeah. Matt (00:09:03): Yeah. Chris (00:09:05): Sadly that's kind of the age we live in. And I get what you're saying. It is frustrating that it's going to come to that, but I think like you have said about how authoritarian leaders like Putin, et cetera, always manipulate Trump. So it's better manipulate him for good. I think the problem is for some people is obviously there's still no guarantee that it will work. And then you lose a lot of, should we say, personal capital by brown-nosing in that way sometimes. So it worked for him on this occasion, but it could in another occasion backfire. But that's his job. It's his job, yeah. Matt (00:09:42): It's certainly not guaranteed to work. I think it's objectively better than the alternative, which would almost certainly result in nothing good for the alliance. So I mean, getting through a NATO summit with Trump, without drama, without chaos, without anyone lighting the curtains on fire, I mean that's a win. It functioned, it was almost boring. Take that win. That's also now one fewer summit where European leaders have to white-knuckle their way through the agenda and hope he doesn't tweet something insane. And I think maybe even what we saw is a model for how these summits, especially as far as NATO is concerned, which Trump historically has a lot of skepticism and reason to be -- well not reason, but is want to be prickly towards. I think this is a good model for maybe how to handle it productively. And while the political summit was basically just a well choreographed effort to keep Trump from blowing the place up, there was a productive summit also happening in parallel off-stage. (00:10:49): So first, as you said in your intro, Europe is finally starting to build some real defense muscle. NATO members, as you said, committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense and resilience by 2035, which, yes, believe it when we see it, but if it happens, it's a big deal. It won't replace the US, but it does get Europe closer to the point where they can hold the line in the Baltics without having to wait and see if a US president doesn't feel like answering the phone. Hopefully not, but it's a reality we have to contend with as long as we find ourselves in it. Second, Ukraine's defense industry is becoming central to Europe's, and I love that. There's a growing push behind what's being called the Danish model -- so, directly investing in Ukrainian arms production. It's fast, it's scalable, and the stuff Ukraine builds today might help re-arm Europe tomorrow. It might help us, help the US in Taiwan at some point in the future. And third, there's also a quiet recognition that the US footprint in Europe is going to shrink. Maybe not this year, maybe not next, but I think the writing's on the wall there. Those post-invasion of Ukraine numbers that surged toward NATO's eastern flank under Biden in 2022 and onward, I don't think that probably wouldn't have been sustainable indefinitely, even under a different administration, far more friendly to the transatlantic relationship there, especially if the Pacific gets more dicey in years ahead. So that means Europe's got to start covering for some of the US enablers there: intelligence assets, refueling, airlift, missile defense. Stuff absolutely critical in a great power war. So that's the meat, the policy side that I liked from this. Chris (00:12:44): Yeah, I agree with you. I think the conference wisely focused on getting Europe in better shape for its defense against Russia because there is still open talk about there might be direct confrontation with Russia in the next decade, which is a worrying thought. And obviously getting Europe in better shape for its own defense has been at the forefront of Trump's foreign policy. And I'll give the Trump admin credit for that as I think we both agreed, and you just said it, that this was needed and Europe has become way too reliant on America for its collective defense. And post the 1990s, many domestic defense capabilities had been allowed to slide as governments made cutbacks, thinking that defense was no longer a priority in the way it was during the Cold War. Obviously Russia's annexation of Crimea for some was a warning and then its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 became a direct threat. And thankfully, many governments have realized this. I don't think Trump's threats in the past to withdraw US support from NATO or even come out of NATO completely have been helpful. He always does appear to take these maximalist positions to get what he wants, which is not unlike Vladimir Putin, who has been using the same tactics during these sort of so-called peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which appears have gone a little bit quiet as of late. (00:14:03): And I have huge concerns on the public reaction to this sort of 5% GDP commitment. At least in the UK, I've seen many left-leaning commentators, sort of my age group and slightly older who seem to suffer from what I call late-90s thinking or post-Iraq cynicism in which they view any increased defense spending as war mongering and just lining the pockets of the industrial military complex. These people somehow believe we do not live in a world of increased military risks, which we have seen over the last decade, and they view any risks as just sort of manufactured in some way by our governments akin to Orwell's 1984. And I think all of that's not very helpful. The current UK government, the Labour-led government are obviously at the moment having issues with regards to their domestic social security spending, they've been having um-ings and ah-ings about that. And I think that kind of unfortunately plays a little bit into the idea that there's always money for weapons, but never enough money for social issues like the NHS, et cetera and social security. So there's definitely going to be similar conversations in other European countries too. And I think there definitely needs to be a concerted effort to get the public on board with defense because increased military spending will probably be unpopular across quite a few European countries as domestic welfare and the cost of living increases. And I'm interested to see how each member is going to be able to spend this 5% GDP on defense and justify it to the populations. So yeah, there's a lot of interesting choppy waters to navigate between now and when those defense commitments due to kick in because they're not due to kick in until, is it 2030 something? (00:15:52): I actually can't remember now, somewhere in the 2030s that they've actually got to commit to spending this 5% GDP. So it's a little bit of a way to go just yet. One other thing as well, cost of living. So cost of living is a massive debate in Europe, and it's obviously a big debate in the US at the moment. And I think we've said this before, I've certainly said it before, I think we need to treat it, the cost of living crisis should be considered a national security threat, or at least a threat to democracy, because history has shown, and current events have shown populations struggling financially to survive increasingly turn to authoritarianism to resolve those issues. It didn't end well for Germany in the thirties and it's not going to end well for any of us now. Matt (00:16:37): I think one can make that same argument here in the US. Chris (00:16:40): Yeah, yeah, exactly. And I don't see that getting any easier because we've got the effects of climate change, which is going to disrupt food, energy and water supplies. And governments and individuals can put their heads in the sands about this for as long as they like. But time is running out on that side of things too. And I'm just worried that during the 2030s and 40s we're going to see an open conflict for basic resources. And some argue that is already going on, and I partially agree with that. The desire for minerals and possibly fuel is definitely a factor in some conflicts we see right now. So yeah, so I think there's a lot of interesting things ahead really, that ultimately, tying it back to NATO, is just regarding these 5% defense commitments, I believe each member nation faces the challenge of persuading its population that defense is an essential and as worthy of an investment as healthcare, education and social support. We have a lock on our front door for a reason as to protect what matters to us. And in the same way defense spending is a bit like that lock on the nation's door. So there we go. Matt (00:17:50): On the defense spending issue, I know it certainly gets more popular, polling on this, it gets more popular the farther east you go in NATO. So, the closer to Russia, where they understand the threat far greater than folks in the farther west you go. I mean those tanks and missiles are going to be hitting there before they hit parts of London and France per se. But I think, I don't unfortunately don't have any exact numbers right in front of me here, I believe though that the increase in defense spending in Germany is at least not unpopular. Chris (00:18:29): Yes. Yeah, I remember you saying that. Yeah. Matt (00:18:31): Which is good. And I think at least for the continent, if the German public is on board there and the German government is sort of leading the way in that sort of increase in defense spending, that sort of re-armament, I think for the continent that, I mean the German industrial base, the German economy, it revs up the engine for the whole continent to follow suit. Chris (00:18:56): Yeah, it's interesting that change has happened because I think Germany, in a weird way, statistically was quite anti-defense spending for some time. And the population was, and also they were quite anti-American as well. I remember during the Snowden period, it felt like anti-Americanism reached quite a big peak in Germany during that period. And then I think the Ukraine War, mainly in mainland Europe, has shaken more people than may be in the UK. That's a bit of a generalization, but I think for people who are in mainland Europe is a lot more real than for us on England because we've got the channel, and the channel already protects us so much, but I think a lot more countries, and a lot more countries are realizing that this threat from Russia is no longer academic. Also, Russia has been very aggressive on the cyber side of things, and we've all seen how social media has been manipulated to cause infighting within our own communities, and we're still living through that now. (00:20:01): And I think a lot of people, if they're smart about it, are right to be pissed off about Russia right now. And so yeah, so the tide is turning a little bit at the moment about that sort of apathy, but I still feel it's quite popular, certainly in leftist circles in the UK and people who are very influential in filmmaking, et cetera, people who I kind of know, who do reflectively believe that somehow that defense spending is all just to make more money for the defense industrial complex and stuff. And I think that's quite a cynical view of it. But there we go. Matt (00:20:40): Perhaps this is a bit flippant of me, but I think maybe they don't know what we know. Chris (00:20:47): Quite possibly, quite possibly. I think the more time I spend on the, it's difficult. You've got to be careful, become paranoid or whatever. But yeah, the more time you spend looking at what's going on, you start to do, see how aggressive Russia is and how a lot of the time it's felt like we've been on the back foot for some time. And also I think collectively in UK leftist circles, I remember talking about this with Meredith Tax, my first interview, when we talked about how you get -- going a bit off topic here -- but we get leftists who end up supporting jihadists. And a lot of leftists still see America as the great imperial bad guy in the world. And so there's this sort of reflexiveness to just be a bit, anything America says or does, or anything Britain does, they're suspicious of it and they feel that there's always ill intent behind it. And there are times where we're not the good guys. Iraq probably being a very good case in point where we definitely had some very questionable reasons for going in. But yeah, you just got to be, I think you've always got to take everything on a case by case basis because if you just constantly believe that everything that Britain and America does is just flat wrong, you'll be right some of the time, but you're going to be wrong other times. And when you are wrong, it's going to be important to you because it'd be your community on the front line that faces the consequences of being wrong in that assumption, if that makes any sense. (00:22:25): So complex times ahead with that debate. I'm sure we'll come back to odd future episodes, and I wouldn't mind trying to maybe get some guests on to talk to us a bit more about defense spending and the industrial military complex. There's this term that gets thrown around, it's that famous Eisenhower warning about it and stuff that people like to quote. And there was a really good episode of War on the Rocks at about five or ten years ago about the Blob, and "In Defense of the Blob, which is this sort of defense complex. And I'd just love to go more into that on maybe future episodes and demystify some of the myths behind it that lead to some of these grand statements that people make about it. So, yeah. Matt (00:23:09): Yeah. Well, I think last point from me on this, and maybe also in line with that, just bearing in mind the complex times that we are in. Again, I know this will be unpopular with some, but I don't care. I will die on this hill. If Mark Rutte texting Trump every now and then to say, "Mr. President, dear Donald, how'd you get so cute?" is what keeps SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in Mons, the International Staff in Brussels, and the entire rest of the NATO command structure operating more or less undisturbed until January 20th, 2029, that is a massive win for the free world and Rutte will deserve a medal. And with that, you all may throw your rotten tomatoes at me now. Chris (00:23:56): No, that's fine. And if somebody can find a way to persuade Trump to turn down some of the pro-Russian rhetoric in MAGA and maybe some of the anti-NATO rhetoric in maga, that would be a good objective as well over the next three and a half years. Matt (00:24:12): Yes, yeah. Definitely. High task there. Chris (00:24:14): Well. It is, it is indeed. Very hard task, but there we go. Well, let's take a quick break and we'll come back for more. (00:24:39): Welcome back, everybody. So Matt, you want to chat to us about the presidential war powers, and you picked out two very interesting articles about this because there's been obviously a lot of debate about this since the US actions against Iran's nuclear program. So I'll hand over to you. Matt (00:24:54): Yeah. So of course, two weeks now after President Trump ordered a sweeping US military strike on Iran, coordinated across more than a hundred aircraft, a submarine, and dozens of precision guided munitions, we're circling back to a question we've gotten from listeners, especially our non-American listeners. "Did the president actually have the legal authority to do this?" Now, we didn't really cover this question in any detail during the last two Espresso Martinis that we discussed the Iran strikes. For my part, that's because we had plenty to handle already, I'm not a legal analyst, and this subject can get insanely complicated, and though it should, I don't believe this issue, just objectively, has any bearing on what happens now following these strikes. And I'll explain that at length going forward, but we can get more into that later, Chris, if you'd like. But if folks would like it addressed, I'll brush up on it and we'll make time to talk about it here. As you said, I've also left some helpful articles from the Project on Government Oversight and the National Constitution Center in the show notes. So definitely check those out for more. So here we go, an explainer on presidential war powers, as best I understand it. (00:26:12): So under the Constitution, war powers reside squarely with Congress. Article I, section 8 -- and again, so mainly geared towards non-US listeners, so there are seven articles in the Constitution. Article I lays out the legislative branch, which is Congress and all of its authorities and responsibility. Article II lays out the executive branch, which is the president, all of his or her responsibilities and powers, and all the federal government departments and everything that sort of flows from that authority. So for our purposes today, we're just focusing on Articles I and II. So Article I, section 8 gives the legislative branch, not the executive, the sole authority to declare war. The framers were explicit that decisions to use force should rest with the branch most accountable to the people. (00:27:07): That principle was tested, and many would argue breached, when the White House launched the B-2s without congressional authorization or even the customary advance briefing to leadership in the House and the Senate. Of course, this wasn't merely a drone strike or even some classified JSOC escapade, it was a highly choreographed, large-scale military operation targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, carried out in the midst of an ongoing regional war. As for the legal basis, it was the usual fallback used by every administration, Article II powers and the president's role as commander in chief. But that logic doesn't really withstand a lot of legal scrutiny. (00:27:47): So the key statute here is the War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed by Congress in the wake of Vietnam to reassert its constitutional authority. That law -- which was passed by two thirds of both the House and the Senate, overriding Nixon's veto -- says a president can introduce US forces into hostilities only under three conditions. So that's a formal declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, like an Authorization for Use of Military Force, or an AUMF -- I'll go more into that a bit later -- or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its armed forces. So that's not merely the threat of a potential attack in the future. It's an attack in actuality. And here's where a common misconception comes in. The idea that presidents can lawfully commit troops to combat for up to 60 days without congressional approval. That's not what the law says. The 60-day clock is not a free pass, it's a restraint. So it applies only after the president has already met one of those three legal justifications for deployment. If the president acts without that legal basis, then even the 60 days don't apply, and the action itself is unlawful from the start. (00:29:03): So here's a recent example of where I think the 60-day provision would've applied, also involving Iran. So in 2019, Iran, under Trump's first term, Iran shot down a Global Hawk surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranians said it was in their airspace. We said, no, it wasn't. Trump ordered retaliatory strikes on Iranian radar and missile sites. Relatively limited in isolation, but theoretically could have put us into an escalatory spiral, and he called that off 10 minutes to weapons release. So in that scenario, as stupid as risking a war over a flying camera would've been, downing the Global Hawk constituted an attack on US forces. Trump would've had 60 days to conduct operations and either cease them or seek Congressional approval to go further. In this case, Iran, did not -- in this case, so a couple weeks ago, Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran did not attack US forces first. That is not what happened. His legal footing then was much more solid than it is here. (00:30:13): So still, presidents from both parties have long side stepped Congress on questions of war and peace. Reagan in Granada. Clinton in Kosovo. Obama in Libya. Trump in Syria, and now Iran. Biden in the Red Sea. Now, each administration had elaborate legal arguments for why their specific operation did not need congressional approval under the War Powers Resolution. I won't get into the specifics on those cases because it's way beyond my comfort zone and probably the scope of this podcast. Lawfare's published reams on this if folks really want to get into the weeds there. In some cases, administrations leaned on threadbare or outdated AUMFs like the post-9/11 or 2002 Iraq War authorization. (00:31:03): So for some additional context there, the 2001 AUMF aimed at al-Qaeda and its affiliates is still used to legally justify our limited presence in Syria for counter ISIS-operations and protecting Kurdish-controlled oil fields. Because, remember, ISIS was born from al-Qaeda in Iraq, right? So it shares that same sort of cellular DNA. It's also been used to justify military deployments in, not just Afghanistan, but the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia. As to the full extent of which groups the Pentagon believes qualify as an al-Qaeda affiliate -- that's classified. So you see the opacity there. Expiration dates and precise language really matter with these things, as we've learned. In other cases, administrations argue that their Article II powers give them inherent authority to protect US interests abroad, such as the White House here in claiming that the Iranian nuclear program posed an imminent threat. (00:32:07): Congress, for its part, has often failed to challenge these moves, and each time it doesn't, the precedent deepens. So that pattern held here with Iran. In the immediate aftermath, before it was clear whether this would devolve into something bigger and more open-ended, a bipartisan handful of lawmakers introduced resolutions to block further unilateral action by the president. Those efforts went nowhere because congressional leadership are beholden to him, to the president, and didn't want to. So despite consistent concern, there's always little political will to confront the executive branch on war powers, especially when military action is sold as swift, successful, and limited. And that's the heart of the matter. Whether or not Congress would have authorized the strikes is almost beside the point. What's clear is that it didn't, and the Constitution still expects it to. The legal framework is there, the War Powers Resolution is on the books, but without congressional enforcement, these are little more than suggestions on pieces of paper. (00:33:10): The real question then isn't whether this strike violated the War Powers Resolution. I think it's whether a critical mass of Congress ever intends to enforce it, because as long as lawmakers treat war powers as optional, presidents will keep treating them as their own. So to anyone looking at this, perhaps from abroad, and asking, how could the Constitution allow this? It doesn't. But the only people with the power to enforce the law here have simply declined to do so. And come January 2027, they'll in all likelihood lose that power. But I want to underscore here that this problem in our politics did not begin with and is certainly not unique to Donald Trump. It goes back decades. A true bipartisan abdication and indulgence. So Chris, there you go. Chris (00:34:03): Yeah, an unfortunate precedent has been set up by former presidents who have abused their authority. And what Trump is quite good at is using those things sometimes as a justification for his own behavior. And critics of Trump sometimes make the mistake of making it out that Trump's the only one who does these things. So yeah, it's a kind of complicated situation really. One question I have is, so am I right that obviously the Operation Midnight Hammer is technically he has violated the presidential war powers, he's violated that. Is that right? Matt (00:34:43): Yeah. Yeah, the presidential War Powers Resolution. Yeah, he's violated the letter of it. I mean, every president has since Reagan. Chris (00:34:53): And so domestically at the moment, does he actually face any legal or political consequences for this? Matt (00:35:01): No. And that's why I sort of said at the top, I didn't really talk about it much earlier. I just think there's more important stuff to talk about and convey to people because he's not, like -- nothing's going to come of that. If Operation Midnight Hammer turned into a multi-week, multi-strike, coming back again and again and again, hitting different targets, bringing in additional forces, perhaps causing US casualties -- so, mission creep, right? If it was still going on, then I think even with the way Congress is, I think they would've sort of run into a wall eventually, and they would've had to pass some sort of AUMF. I also think the case is pretty good that they could have gotten the votes in Congress. Enough Republicans, even the parts of the MAGA base who are isolationists and skeptical of foreign entanglements, them aside. Also, there would certainly be in principle, I think many Democrats who would vote against it. But I think there would be plenty of sort of centristy kind of Democrats and everything who -- I could picture enough Republicans and Democrats voting for an AUMF right now on Iran's nuclear program to have passed it. But I mean, it was, as far as we know sitting here right now, it was Operation Midnight Hammer, and that's it. Yeah, to answer your question, simply, if it had kept going, then he would've ran into that issue and they probably would've had to pass something. I don't think they could have done it, they could have gone indefinitely with no justification. But no, just what we saw the other week, no, there's not -- nothing's going to come of it. Chris (00:36:58): Yeah, I think it's pretty fair to say there's a reasonable amount of cross-party concern about Iran's nuclear program where they probably would've got the votes to take it. But I suppose what's kind of concerning as an outsider looking in, it does seem to be a pattern of behavior with the Trump administration of just bypassing a lot of checks and balances that like Biden, et cetera, made an effort to use the majority of the time when they did something. And this operation, I don't think it's as reckless as some people make it out to be, and I don't think it's as ill-thought-out as some people like to make it out to be either. I think it was actually quite well planned and executed, and it probably did its best to minimize casualties. It was focusing mainly on military targets. Matt (00:37:49): I don't think anyone on the ground was -- I mean, I think 600 people were killed in the Israeli strikes over the course of those two weeks, that I've heard -- but the US strike on those three nuclear sites, I don't believe anyone was killed on the ground. Those sites were long evacuated. Chris (00:38:06): No, indeed. So, yeah. So just back to my point, I think a lot of people were just concerned that it feels like that the Trump administration is just bypassing things, and there's way too much power with the executive branch at the moment. And I think, and it's not just over this, it's over a lot of issues that we're seeing. Matt (00:38:25): Well, let's take a look at how that happens and how we got there, where the executive branch has so much power. I mean, there's that, it's not really a joke, but I guess it's more of a critique that we elect a king every four years. And again, this is before, this predates Trump. It's not a Republican or Democrat issue, this is an every president issue. So yeah, so I think one of the clearest case studies in how this war powers debate tends to fall apart in practice and how the sort of situation that we're in here with it sort of calcifies, we could look at Syria 2013 and Obama's red line debacle, if you like. (00:39:08): So after Assad's regime carried out a massive sarin gas attack on civilians near Damascus, President Obama faced a quandary. He'd previously drawn a red line, chemical weapons use would change his calculus on US intervention in the civil war. And in the wake of that attack, his NSC signaled imminent strikes against Syrian targets. But here's where it gets interesting and also revealing. (00:39:35): So despite earlier actions like in Libya where Obama had bypassed Congress -- part of the administration's argument there was the operations in Libya where actually a NATO-run mission, not a US-led mission, which is you can debate that all you want, but that's what they were claiming. So this time Obama did something different. He paused and asked Congress to authorize a use of force. So legally the administration argued he could act under Article II -- remember, that's the executive branch and presidential powers for everything as previous presidents have done -- but politically, and I think in part out of his desire to do things by the book, right? This sort of cautious contemplative constitutional law professor that Obama is, he threw the decision back to Congress. And what did Congress do? Nothing. They froze, they punted. And it wasn't just that there wasn't consensus, it was that many in that building did not want to publicly be on the hook for a yes or a no, especially not after Iraq and Afghanistan. So public support for another Middle East intervention was low, and politically there was no upside. (00:40:49): Some Republicans went so far as to threaten impeachment if Obama struck without authorization. And these weren't just Tea Party kooks in the House. John McCain said Obama could be impeached if he put troops on the ground. And he's, Obama since said that was a major factor in his decision making here. But when Obama actually did that, when he asked Congress to step up, debate the issue and vote, they backed away. Members on both sides of the aisle didn't want to take the heat. They didn't want to be seen as weak on national security and US credibility, but they also didn't want to endorse military action that could have proven unpopular. So they chose the easiest option, which is paralysis, right? So, can't be criticized if you never pick a side. Smart. And with Congress ducking the question, Obama took a false diplomatic off-ramp, accepting a Russian broker deal to remove serious declared chemical weapons stockpile. Which was a scam. Numerous chemical attacks followed in that war. And let's be honest about what caused it. Congress had the opportunity to assert their constitutional authority and make a decision about war and peace, and it chose not to. So the result? The red line wasn't enforced, US credibility took a hit, and we added another entry to the growing list of precedents in which Congress abdicates responsibility and the president acts, or doesn't act, alone. (00:42:14): So, the second- and third-order consequences of that inaction reached far beyond Syria, too. It helped give rise to ISIS, stabilizing the entire region and necessitating another massive US-led war to stop them. It stoked a migration crisis for Europe, which surely was a factor in the outcome of Brexit and the broader, far-right populist movement sweeping the West. In many respects, we're still suffering from the fallout. But Obama was not the sole author of this failure. And I think history seems to be forgetting that a bit. It's easy to point fingers at presidents for executive overreach, and especially executive inaction, and often those criticisms are valid, but when Congress won't even take a vote, won't do the job the Constitution and their voters assigned to them, then their complaints are just hollow whining. If Congress wants to reclaim their authority to decide when and where we go to war, then they must assert themselves and demand it. Otherwise, we'll keep seeing the same pattern play out again and again. So put up or shut up, congresscritters. Chris (00:43:24): Yeah, indeed. And the more feckless Congress are, the more critics of government who want small government get ammunition to say that they're useless, and all the kind of stuff about bureaucracy, et cetera people love to cite to justify reckless actions or actions that don't take due process. So yeah, it's a complicated one, that. There was one other thing that came in via email that partially probably inspired what you have just shared with us. Do you think that these strikes were a distraction by Trump? Do you think he chose to do it to distract from other issues that are kind of going on domestically at the moment? Some people have accused Trump of doing that. Matt (00:44:11): No, because it didn't distract from that. Okay, what are the domestic issues that are... Chris (00:44:17): Not being talked about, yeah. Matt (00:44:19): I don't know if he would say they're causing problems for him, but they are causing problems for him. Look at like immigration, all these sort of domestic issues that are simmering in the background, they're still doing that. Iran didn't change that. I think he got sort of swept up in the Fox News, sort of triumphalistic coverage of the Israeli operations, didn't want to be left on the sidelines of that, and sort of was brought to believe that it would be in, out, 20-minute adventure, he would wipe out the nuclear program and that would be done. We of course know it's far more complicated than that. Where the nuclear program goes from here? Unclear. It's not a rosy assessment. Again, I talked to Joe Cirincione yesterday, it'll be out next week, for an hour about this exact issue. And again, the second- and third-order consequences of Operation Midnight Hammer. Yeah, but I don't think it was a distraction. I mean, I think they can do two things at once. Chris (00:45:32): Yeah. And do you think Trump has made Bush's mistake of saying mission accomplished before it was accomplished? Matt (00:45:39): Yes. Okay, so there's something interesting about this here, and right after I finished up with Shane the other day, I sort of thought about this and I was like, Yeah, shit, I could have wanted to run this by him and see what he thinks. But so the official line from the White House, and at least the sort of top level of the Pentagon, Hegseth's sort of staff, that the Iranian nuclear program, it was total obliteration. They don't have one anymore, this is done. Which was entirely born out of Trump and Hegseth coming out that very night and saying things about the damage assessments that they could not have possibly known at that time. But now, okay, they said it, we can't walk back on it. This is what it is. And to say anything other than the nuclear program is totally gone and obliterated is high blasphemy. The Spanish Inquisition will show up at your door if you say anything else. So the interesting thing here then is because of that, the total obliteration thing is injecting a lot of deescalatory pressure that I think without that the case to do another strike at Fordo, to say nothing of any of the other sites, but Fordo especially would be -- I'm not making this case, but I'm saying the case to do so would be being made by allies of the president and would be quite compelling, I think. It would definitely be part of a, it would be a thing right now if it wasn't high blasphemy, the Spanish Inquisition is going to show up at your door if you say anything other than it was totally obliterated. I think that's interesting. (00:47:28): It also, you see statements from Karoline Levitt, the White House press secretary, and everything, who's just very black and white. "No, the nuclear program is gone. They're never going to get a nuclear bomb." Present her and other Trump people saying this are potentially not doing any favors to future them because there's no guarantee at all -- I mean, they may insist this all they want, I don't give a shit, they're wrong about this. There is no guarantee that a year or two from now that there won't be some mysterious earthquake 10 kilometers underground under a desert in central Iran somewhere, or perhaps right up on the surface and just light a bomb off as a demonstration. So when that happens, what are you going to say? You were so confident, insistent that the nuclear program is gone, that they're never going to get a nuclear bomb. You're not doing yourself any favors by staking this impossible, totalitarian claim. It's just so, it's so shortsighted and just impulsive and just strategically dumb. You're not helping yourself. Chris (00:48:50): Yeah, it's very ego-driven and bravado, isn't it? I got to call it manchild kind of energy, really. It's very weird. And I guess then they'll have to go through the process of renaming the nuclear program and calling it something else just to save face. Matt (00:49:06): Right. It's not a nuclear program. Chris (00:49:09): Like a rapid disassembly, yeah. Matt (00:49:11): Right. It's not a nuclear program, it's an atomic critical mass weapons development project. Chris (00:49:21): Something like that, yeah, yeah. It was rapidly disassembled underground. Matt (00:49:27): Yeah, it was a mining accident on Jedha. Chris (00:49:33): Well, we'll take bets now and see what happens in a few years time and see what it either gets called and if it happens. But is there anything else you'd like to add or? Matt (00:49:43): No. Yeah, again, not a lawyer, not a legal scholar, not an expert in this, but that's sort of what I could put together on how this all works and why we are the way we are. Chris (00:49:55): Okay. Well thank you for that. Well, let's take another break, and we're back with more. (00:50:15): So welcome back everybody. So our final story there, we're going to be just talking a little bit about Ukraine. Which Ukraine, it's not been quiet for Ukraine, but certainly reporting's taken a bit of a back foot lately just with all that's been going on with Iran. So I want to just bring our attention back to Ukraine because, I think I've said this before, my goal with this podcast is to draw attention to many things and try not to forget stuff. We can get very focused in the new cycles, certainly in the UK and the US, about very particular things for weeks and then other things suffer. So just some key points from a War Zone article about some fighting going on in the northern borders of Ukraine. (00:50:59): So Ukraine has successfully stabilized the situation in Sumy oblast, halting Russia's summer offensive. Despite Russia committing 50,000 troops and some of its best units, Ukrainian forces have stopped their advance along the key frontline villages and pushed Russian troops further from Sumy city. Moscow's broader goal is to create a buffer zone along Ukraine's border regions, whilst trying to expel Ukrainian forces from Russia's Kursk and Belgorod. Although Russia claimed it had cleared Kursk of Ukrainian troops earlier this year, those claims were later disputed by both Ukraine and even some Russian officials. For now, President Zelensky says the Russian plan in Sumy is failing, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian forces. The battle for Sumy has come at a high cost. Ukrainian troops have had to dig fresh defensive positions under constant drone and artillery fire whilst retreating from Kursk, and they've been finding outdated trenches and weak fortifications, and there's been criticism of not actually placing mines for anticipating Russian tanks and artillery. So there's definitely, this battle for Sumy has sort of created some sort of internal debates with regards to Ukraine's military and certain tactics and things. I'm sure that will come up again at some point in the near future. (00:52:21): Meanwhile, Russia has suffered significant losses in troops and equipment, but it continues to pour in reserves and heavy firepower. And the article points out that Russia sadly has the manpower to keep throwing people at Ukraine whilst Ukraine doesn't. So Ukraine have to kind of fight a lot more carefully and smarter. Drone warfare remains fierce. Ukraine is using heavy-lift drones to drop artillery shells on Russian positions, and they continue to target Russian air defenses in Crimea to open gaps over the Black Sea. And on the flip side, Russia is advancing missile naval guns to target Ukrainian drone boats. Ukraine is frustrated by the delays in military aid, and it's now starting to develop its own ballistic missile, which it already apparently has in mass production. So well done for Ukraine for doing that. So I'm hoping that will probably become operational soon. Elsewhere along the front lines, fighting remains largely static. Small Ukrainian advances have been reported in the east, but no major breakthroughs. Meanwhile, Russia has launched its largest aerial attack of the war, firing hundreds of drones and missiles. And then Ukraine's air defenses have downed many, but at least 10 civilians were killed, and an F-16 pilot was killed defending against Russia's recent assault. So yeah, Matt, what are your thoughts on all of this? Matt (00:53:45): What stood out to me wasn't just the troop movements, it was how unprepared some of Ukraine's defenses reportedly were after their retreat from Kurk, what's left of that pocket in Kursk, back to Sumy. So outdated trenches, no overhead cover from drones, unmined terrain. I think it's a reminder that even Ukraine's best fighters can't hold without the right gear, especially when Russian artillery is creeping closer and closer and closer. And it comes, of course, as we're learning that the Trump administration, I think just came out yesterday or the day before -- it all sort of blended together for me this week -- so we're learning that the Trump administration is freezing, at least for now, key weapons shipments, part of a broader military aid review. The Pentagon says it's concerned about us stockpiles running too low. So reportedly, the paused shipments include PAC-3 interceptors, HIMARS munitions, 155-millimeter artillery shells, even Sidewinders that Ukraine retrofits into its so-called FrankenSAM air defense systems. (00:54:57): In short, it's exactly the kind of weapons that allow Ukraine to hold ground, survive drone and missile attacks, and keep units like the GUR commandos in the fight. I mean, that aid freeze isn't abstract. Its consequences are being felt in real time on battlefields like Sumy, and if this becomes a sustained push from Russia, the lack of resupply could mean the difference between a stabilized front and a breakthrough there in the northeast, I guess you would say. So Ukraine may be holding a line for now. They tend to make do and find a way, the rumors of their death are always sort of greatly exaggerated and over and overstated. But I mean, that's not to say that they can just be get through it no matter what. So yeah, Ukraine may be holding the line for now, but even elite units can only hold for so long without replenishment. And this is the kind of fight, the defense of Sumy, that I think policymakers at the top of the Pentagon need to see for what it is. Not just a shopping list from Kyiv, but a battlefield reality. One that shows exactly where this aid is going and what happens when it runs out. Chris (00:56:18): Yeah, yeah. It's incredibly disappointing to hear about the US have paused the delivery of crucial US air defense systems. And one of the talking points that come out as well is that the reasoning behind this is because the US wants to shift its focus to Asia, and apparently defense secretary, the under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, is a strong proponent of shifting American focus to Asia Matt (00:56:47): Son of um... Chris (00:56:48): Yeah. Matt (00:56:49): Son of a former CIA director. Chris (00:56:50): Oh, is it? Yeah. Oh, as in, is that William Colby? Matt (00:56:53): Yep. Chris (00:56:54): Yeah. Oh, wow. Interesting. Matt (00:56:56): Son or grandson. Chris (00:56:57): Yeah, it might be a grandson, maybe. Matt (00:57:00): Offspring. Descendant. Chris (00:57:01): Descendant. Yeah. And it's the thing, I mean, it's the classic kind of, America can't just suddenly just shift its focus to Asia and pretend that there aren't other problems in the world. And Ukraine is definitely still very reliant on American support and will be for some time until Europe can plug some of those gaps. But I think when it comes to missile defense, I don't think Europe will be able to plug that gap for at least a decade probably, because those systems, I don't think Europe really got any proper domestic missile defense at this time that isn't US-made. And to develop that off the cuff is going to be incredibly difficult. So the Patriot missile system is world-leading in that front, as is the Israeli Iron Dome as well. But yeah, sorry, you were going to say something. Matt (00:57:50): Well, it's also just willful ignorance on the part of the people in the Pentagon who are sort of making these decisions as, "Oh, we want to focus on Asia, so we're going to sort of pull this stuff out of Ukraine," as if the two are not inextricably linked, that what happens in Ukraine has absolutely an impact on China's calculus vis-a-vis Taiwan and islands in the South China Sea and the Philippines and Japan. It's not to say that I'm only going to focus on this and let this other thing go, and that's not going to have any negative consequences for this other thing that I want to focus on, is just like that's not, how do you not see that? Chris (00:58:30): No, exactly. And how will the people of Taiwan think about American support when things get tough? They might not be able to guarantee it anymore. If a president, may not be necessarily Trump, it's whoever succeeds Trump in five or 10 years time, if they have a very similar isolationist approach that's inspired by MAGA, they might decide, Oh, do you know what? Taiwan's too much of a risk to getting into a conflict with China. Let's just stop, let China do its thing. Because in a way, that's the message that they're sending about Ukraine at the moment. Things are getting tough. It's going on longer than Trump wants it to, it's making Trump look bad somehow. So let's just pretend it's not happening, a bit like COVID in some ways, because somehow COVID became a personal front to Trump. And that is dangerous when that happens, that's when politics gets very dangerous and people lose lives. So now I'm deeply frustrated about what's going on with Ukraine because I think the problem is, again, America stopped its support a little while back using it as a negotiation tactic in the ongoing peace talks -- with quotation marks, for those who are not watching -- and all that does is help Russia. It's not helping Ukraine. If anything, America should be increasing and maybe even doubling what it's giving to Ukraine, to force Russia to come to the table. But for some reason, when it comes to dealing with Russia, Trump becomes a bit soft. And not to imply that, I know some people think he might be a Russian stooge or whatever, I think he's just an admirer of Putin. Matt (01:00:08): Yeah. Chris (01:00:08): But I think Putin is outsmarting Trump, is what I think is going on. And I think Trump, just for whatever reason, gets very weak at the knees around Putin and hasn't done much-- Matt (01:00:20): Butterflies. Chris (01:00:20): To really push things. Yeah, yeah, exactly. Matt (01:00:22): Butterflies in his stomach. Chris (01:00:23): Butterflies in the stomach, and I just think that he needs to take a maximalist position, which is what Trump's famous for, against Russia, and see where we go from there. But I don't see that happening anytime soon. So there we go. So yeah. Matt (01:00:41): Well. It's interesting. There was, sort of before Iran sucked up a lot of the bandwidth -- and it seems like there's only one thing internationally that they're able to focus on at a time, and perhaps because the NSC is like Marco Rubio doing the dinner scene from the Nutty Professor. Chris (01:01:05): I feel sorry for him. Matt (01:01:06): Yeah. They can only sort of focus on one thing at a time it seems, which is objectively not good for a superpower. That's not supposed to be that way. But before Iran took up all the bandwidth, there was sort of a bit of a rumbling that Trump is sort of pissed with Putin and he's not happy with the way things are going, and yada yada yada, and then Iran showed up and that sort of, again, took the attention away. Let's get back there, guys. Let's revisit that. Chris (01:01:39): I agree. And I remember Keir Giles talking about that it requires a certain amount of period to try and deal with Putin before we get annoyed with him. Because Macron tried to deal with him and then it didn't work out. But my only thought on that is with Trump, he's already dealt with Putin once before, but I suppose he hasn't dealt with him in a conflict. So it's-- Matt (01:01:59): Not under these circumstances. I think the sort of the aspects of their relationship, the sort of pressure points and everything in the first term, it's just nothing like it, like it is here. Yeah. We'll see. Chris (01:02:15): And if we go by Trump's comments about Netanyahu and the Iranians when they violated the ceasefire that Trump had somehow brokered about telling anybody and it was violated quite immediately, maybe we'll see him pushing the F-bomb towards Putin. That would be interesting to see. But yeah, so, no, joking aside and stuff, obviously it's very serious for Ukraine. I always feel very concerned for them and I really wish them all luck. It just is an existential threat for them as a country at the moment. And I think you've talked about earlier about how they managed to somehow pull through and I guess it's just because they've got no other choice. And what is interesting is their use of drones is leading some very new, it is leading to new ways of warfare. There are already probably studies about Operation Spiderweb, et cetera, and I think that Ukraine, through its desperate measures, have been very innovative and effective. So, yeah. Matt (01:03:22): Well, the Ukrainians are fighting for something whereas the Russians are not. And I mean there are all sorts of examples throughout history of armies that have prevailed against impossible odds because they were fighting for something when their opponents fundamentally were not. Chris (01:03:40): Yeah, yeah, indeed, indeed. Is there anything else you'd like to add or are you happy there? Matt (01:03:45): Nope. Chris (01:03:46): Cool. I'll just sort of quickly, very quickly, do the stories of note and then we'll wrap us up. So just before we finish today, I just wanted to point out two stories of note that we're not going to cover but I think are definitely worth looking into and there'll be in the show notes. (01:04:03): So the first one is about MI5 in legal trouble. So the High Court has ordered a robust and independent new investigation into how MI5 gave false evidence to multiple courts after rejecting two official inquiries provided by the Security Service as seriously deficient. The two reviews took place after the BBC revealed MI5 had lied to three courts in a case concerning a neo-Nazi state agent known publicly as Agent X. And Agent X was accused of abusing women. So Agent X is an undercover source for MI5, presumably recruited due to his access to a neo-Nazi group of interest. And it appears MI5 gave false evidence to prevent details of Agent X becoming public despite the BBC reporting of him being a serial abuser of women. So that's definitely a case to keep an eye on and I'm hoping maybe in time in future episodes we might well cover that because a kind of ongoing story in the UK at the moment and quite a concerning one. And yeah, I dunno if anything has come across in America about that at all, but it might be just a very domestic story at this time. Matt (01:05:13): Yeah, no, we were on the phone the other day and you mentioned this to me and that was the first I heard of it. Of course, I haven't been looking for it, but I have not seen it come across my radar. Chris (01:05:23): In many ways that doesn't surprise me. It does seem quite a British story that, but it's definitely one for us to keep an eye on. And the last one to keep an eye on are Chinese ekranoplans. So there's new reporting from Naval News indicates that China is building ekranoplans. And we mentioned this just a few weeks ago on Espresso Martini, that Russian intelligence was suspicious of Chinese espionage efforts, especially around military secrets, and one point of interest was apparently ekranoplans. And lo and behold, a few weeks later we find out China are actually building them. So presumably this is for their ambitions to take Taiwan by force or at least to show that they've got the capability to do it. But we will see what happens with China's ekranoplan program. And for those who don't know what and ekranoplan is, it's a type of low-flying aircraft that skims just above the water surface using ground effect to achieve high speed, and it can take heavy loads. And it looks like a cross between a plane and a boat, and it's ideal for moving troops and equipment under radar. And there's a really great documentary which I think you can find on YouTube that I believe from memory to BBC made, called the Caspian Sea Monster, and it goes into the ekranoplan program because honestly, fascinating. It really is. And the Chinese ones that I've seen look very similar to the later Russian ones that never became operational. The Caspian Sea Monster, I think it was known as. So, yeah. Matt (01:06:50): We'll have to look more. Chris (01:06:52): Yeah. Matt (01:06:53): Well, yeah, we'll have to look into this more in the future. There was also, I don't know enough about it off the top of my head to sort of go into it right here and now, but there was a reason why the Soviet, that ekranoplan program failed. I mean it was a sort of good ambitious idea, but there was a reason why it didn't work. Chris (01:07:14): Curious timing as well. It was kind of late in the seventies to mid-eighties that it finally was successful and then obviously things fell apart. So there was an element of that, too. But yeah, maybe we should do an ekranoplan special. I'm well up for that. Just got to find the right experts on them. I dunno how many experts there are on ekranoplans these days. Matt (01:07:34): There's got to be a guy for that. Chris (01:07:36): Yeah, there's got to be. So we'll find the ekranoplan person, and if anybody knows an expert on ekranoplans, please drop us an email. (01:07:43): So yeah, thank you, Matt, for your time today. Thank you everybody for listening. That is us for today, but don't forget, you can connect with us on Bluesky and Instagram. Those are our main socials that we operate on, but we are also on Threads and officially our accounts on X is mothballed, but you never know. It may or may not get reactivated in time, but there we go. So thank you for your time, Matt. You up to anything exciting this weekend? Matt (01:08:13): Tomorrow as we're recording is the 4th of July. Chris (01:08:15): Yes, happy Fourth. Matt (01:08:16): Thank you. Thank you. Chris (01:08:17): I completely forgot about that till you just... Matt (01:08:19): Yep. Don't forget it. Chris (01:08:21): Don't worry, I'm sure we'll be reminded of it over social media. I won't be able to forget it. But yeah. Matt (01:08:27): My favorite 4th of July -- I think I've told this story on here before -- my favorite favorite 4th of July ever was getting really drunk at a pub in London. And it was like everyone knew that it was 4th of July and I was there. And everyone was in on the joke, too. We all had a good laugh at it and everything. But yeah. Chris (01:08:43): What year was that? Because I remember getting drunk in a pub in 2013 with an American friend of mine and then getting involved in some sparkler instant that could have got way out hand, that thankfully didn't. Matt (01:08:55): No, this was 2011. Chris (01:08:56): Okay, so years before mine, because I think that's my happiest 4th of July memory as well. I was in a pub drunk somewhere in London. Matt (01:09:03): Everyone in Central London within earshot of me knew damn well that it was the 4th of July and that I was here. Chris (01:09:11): Excellent, excellent. Well, you'll have to take that to the Mayflower Pub next time you come here, so that's a good place for that. But there we go. So anybody out there who's celebrating 4th of July, have a wonderful weekend, do not get sunburnt and behave responsibly and consume a safe amount of hot dogs, if that's what you're going for. I dunno, what is the sort of staple for 4th of July food? Is it hot dogs or something else? Matt (01:09:34): It's the sort of classic Americana barbecue food. I think you could kind of loop any of that into there. I think we're doing some ribs in the oven and corn and baked beans and some other... Chris (01:09:53): Any potato salad, because I can hear that gets quite political if you're not careful. Matt (01:09:58): I think that's on the menu. I think. Chris (01:09:59): Yeah, there's some strong opinions about potato salads, but yeah, Matt (01:10:02): I recall hearing that come up in conversation. But yes, there are, people have very different ways of making potato salad, some far more barbaric than others, and everyone sort of has their preferred way and don't you dare try to variate from it. Chris (01:10:18): Yeah, no indeed. What's your preferred method? Matt (01:10:21): I like potato salad. I, I've never really made it, I've never really had to, so I don't know. As long as there isn't weird stuff in there, you know? Of course, I'm not even going to say what weird stuff I mean when I say that because someone's going to hear that and be like, "What did you mean? My--" Chris (01:10:36): Might be a prawn or something, yeah. Matt (01:10:38): "My nana made it that way for 50 years and how dare--" I'm not even going to go there. You can imagine what I-- What do you think I mean when I say weird stuff in potato salad? That can be your reality of what you think I mean there. I'm not going to go there. Chris (01:10:52): Yeah, yeah. Indeed, indeed. Well, my mother used to make a lovely one. Well, I used to think it was lovely, but it's one I could have grew up on, which is obviously cooked potatoes that now diced up with a little bit of onion and salad cream and then all mixed together because salad cream's quite sweet. It is different from mayonnaise, it's kind of sweet and it's a sort of mustardy sweet thing and it gives it a yellow color and it's actually quite nice. But again, many people probably hear us and are thinking, "My God, that's the worst sounding thing I've ever heard of." So yeah, each to their own potato salad. What about beer of choice? Any beers or drinks of choice? Matt (01:11:32): I'm going to have to stop tomorrow morning. I'm not sure what I'm going to get, probably stick with beer. In the summer, I'm sort of a Corona guy. In the winter, in the colder months, I sort of stick to Guinness, and in the summer I sort go with go with Corona. I'm sort of, it's either one or the other for me. It's just sort of my standard go-to. Chris (01:11:53): Yeah, nice. I've always been a big fan of Sierra Nevada Pale Ale. That's a nice, I've got a nice flavor to it and very refreshing when cold and yeah, I love Guinness. And then I've recently got into Woodford Reserve, which turns out to be one of the FBI's drinks of choice I found out. So yeah, that's quite nice. Matt (01:12:14): If I could turn this camera that way, you would see a bottle of Wood Reserve over there. Chris (01:12:19): Oh, nice. Yeah, not for the faint hearted. It's quite strong in flavor, but you definitely feel it once you've had some, but I like it. I like it a lot, yeah. Matt (01:12:27): Yeah. Chris (01:12:28): Well there we go. So potato salad, whiskey, and beer recommendations right there for you. And we're not sponsored by anybody, so in that regard. Yeah, so we should be, but there we go. Right. Well on that note, thank you very much everybody for listening. Have a great weekend, 4th of July or not, and we'll catch you on the next one. Take care. Matt (01:12:48): Bye. Chris (01:12:48): Bye, bye. Announcer (01:13:02): Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.