[00:00:00] Announcer: Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton. [00:00:27] Chris Carr: Hello, everybody, and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you? [00:00:31] Matt Fulton: I'm doing good, Chris. How are you? It's, it's, it's good to be back from our little, our little spring break. [00:00:35] Chris: Yeah. Had a nice little Easter break, plenty of chocolate and a bit of barbecuing. How about yourself? [00:00:40] Matt: Yeah, same. It was pretty, it was, it was, you know, low key, chill, um, same kind of usual people were there. Not, no, no offense to, to anyone who was involved in my Easter, yours looked a lot more exciting from the pictures that I saw. [00:00:55] Chris: Well, I was the official photographer of mine. It was actually, um, my wife's cousin's 30th birthday, so it became quite a big event, Easter. And, and a lot of barbecuing took place that, uh, gosh, it took about -- how much? Oh, God, we did, we cooked a lot of chicken that day, and I, and I've lost track. It, I felt like it was about two hours of cooking, straight, I think, is what we achieved that day. Um, so yeah. Uh, but there's plenty of photographs of everything. Um, and I was testing out a, a new flash gun, um, and, uh, blinding everybody but managing to get quite good flattering pictures of everybody. [00:01:27] Matt: Nice. [00:01:27] Chris: So that was good. [00:01:28] Matt: Nice, nice, nice. [00:01:28] Chris: That was cool. [00:01:29] Matt: Yeah. [00:01:30] Chris: Yeah. So, um, well, we've got an interesting episode lined up, haven't we? So we've got a bit more on Pete Hegseth and Signalgate. Um, we've got some information on a Russian spy who's been leading negotiations in the ongoing, and I'll call it, so-called peace talks to end the, russia's war on Ukraine. Um, and then we've got some listener questions to finish us off today. So, uh, let us kick off with the Pete Hegseth, Signalgate, which is one you've been following Matt. So, yeah, I'll let you tell us about this. [00:01:57] Matt: Yeah. So this is, uh, this, this segment here is gonna be a bit of a, a, uh, amalgamation of a whole bunch of stories recently that have been swirling around Pete Hegseth and his, his tenure as secretary of defense since we, since, since we've been away. Um, some of it's fallout from Signalgate, some of it are other, you know, internal office squabbling and stuff. This is one of those stories where, preparing for it is one of those, like, I could have just kept sending you link after link after link for the last few days. Like, we're gonna add this and this. [00:02:26] Chris: Oh, I know. It's difficult to keep track. [00:02:29] Matt: Yeah. It's, it's a, it's a moving target and, so I'm sure this is one of the cases where, you know, by the time this episode airs, there will be some, maybe new context or, or, or information out there. I, for one, would be shocked if, if he was not still secretary of defense by this time, the episode airs. But, anyway, um, so here's, here's, here's sort of where we are. So, um-- [00:02:50] Chris: Give it our best stab, yeah. [00:02:51] Matt: Yes. Uh, as of this recording on Thursday morning here, um, on the East Coast. Uh, so the scandals surrounding Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has deepened, throwing the Pentagon into chaos and raising new questions about his fitness to lead. After initially coming under fire for sharing sensitive details of US airstrikes in Yemen in a Signal group chat that inadvertently included The Atlantic's editor-in-chief -- covered that plenty on here -- it's now emerged that Hegseth disclosed the same strike plans, down to the launch times of US fighter jets, in a second Signal chat with his wife, brother, and personal attorney. None of them had any clear operational need to know the information. Uh, the details were first relayed to Hegseth by General Michael Kurilla, head of US Central Command over a secure military communication system. Within minutes, Hegseth took that information and sent it out over Signal using his personal phone, despite internal warnings beforehand not to do so. The fallout has been swift and destabilizing. At least three top Hegseth aides have been fired or escorted from the building, uh, in recent weeks over allegations of leaking to the press and others are considering resigning. Reports describe screaming matches in Hegseth's inner circle, bureaucratic gridlock, and a general distrust of Pentagon staffers, some of whom -- these are career Pentagon staffers -- some of whom have been asked to prove their patriotism through resume reviews, even after serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Defense Department priorities like Trump's "Iron Dome for America" have stalled, and Elon Musk's cost-cutting crusade to slash up to 200,000 civilian defense jobs has only added to the dysfunction. While the Trump White House insists Hegseth still has the president's full support, the chorus of concern is growing louder. GOP Rep. Don Bacon, uh, has become the first from Trump's own party to publicly call for Hegseth's resignation, telling Axios, "If a Democrat did this, we'd be demanding a scalp. I don't like hypocrisy. We should be Americans first when it comes to security." And a bipartisan push from the Senate Armed Services Committee has prompted a DoD inspector general review into whether Hegseth violated security protocols. On Monday, NPR reported that the White House was looking for Hegseth's replacement, uh, according to a US official who was not authorized to speak publicly. The White House has denied this. Press Secretary Karoline Levitt posted on Twitter that President Trump stands strongly behind him. For now, Hegseth remains defiant, blaming the media and "disgruntled former employees," even as the walls close in and questions about his fitness for office grows. Uh, Chris, what'd you think about this? [00:05:26] Chris: Yeah, it's difficult to know exactly where to start because it's become, um, I think the, the fire hose of news is kind of what's going on here. There's so many things from so many angles, it's getting harder and harder to keep track of it, and it's only been -- how long has he been defense secretary? Six weeks, or? [00:05:42] Matt: Uh, no, we're coming up on a hundred days. Um, he was-- [00:05:46] Chris: Oh, are we? Wow, yeah. [00:05:46] Matt: We're coming up on a hundred days, so it was a little bit less than that. I forget exactly when in February he would've been, he, he was, he was officially confirmed, but, um, you know, under a hundred days, he's, he's, he's, he's been in office. [00:06:01] Chris: Yeah, and it's just been crazy. So, I mean, one of the things that stood out for me, I mean, we, we've sort of talked about this previously with the whole Signalgate scandal, but there's a slightly, there's an addendum to the scandal now where apparently he'd been messaging his wife and brother on his personal phone, on his personal phone with like minute-by-minute classified information about these airstrikes, which is a big no-no, isn't it? Because if you use your personal phone, it's, especially as defense secretary, highly likely to be a target of foreign intelligence. [00:06:32] Matt: Right. [00:06:33] Chris: And no matter how secure Signal is, I'm assuming that it doesn't matter because if they've got access to your phone, they can kind of just read the screen, can't they? With the various technologies out there? [00:06:43] Matt: Yeah, I mean, if you're, if, if you, um -- I mean when we had Shane Harris on a couple weeks ago to talk about, you know, Signalgate 1.0, this is a question we asked him, um, directly. You know, how how easy would it be for a, um, a foreign intelligence service, not to say, you know, a major hostile foreign service such as the Russians or the, or the Chinese, to, um, compromise a personal phone of a senior cabinet official? You know, if they weren't taking the right precautions to do so. And it's, it's fairly easy. I mean, there are, um, there's, uh, Israeli software programs-- [00:07:15] Chris: Yeah. [00:07:15] Matt: That have been developed that you can buy, um, if you have the resources. They're not cheap, but hey, we're talking about nation states here. Um, you know, you can even buy that off the shelf. It's not like you have to have, you know, specific Russian or Chinese, um, programs or software to do. And, you know, those services, no doubt have their own stuff. But to just underscore that point, you can buy commercially available software to, you know, burrow into someone's phone and just, you know, sit there and, and, and read the activity. That's completely possible. [00:07:43] Chris: Yeah, or hire even a company to do it for you which is staffed by former spies, you know, as has been happening in, uh, Qatar, I believe. Certainly, I know in London there's certain private spy firms that, uh, have connections to all sorts of stuff. So, with the right money, you can get at whatever you want. [00:08:00] Matt: Yeah. [00:08:00] Chris: So, so this is, you know, I, I remember asking Shane, well, what's the sort of standard thing that's supposed to happen in this situation? And usually a person would be investigated and, and heavily reprimanded, or, they'd be made to resign. And I think that, um, Hegseth, the longer he stays in, it's making it harder and harder for America's allies to justify sharing sensitive information because you've got somebody who is clearly not being good with classified information. Um, you've got also, it sets a bad precedent for future cases involving breaches of classified information, because if you don't hold Hegseth to account then people can always sort of cite him as a, a, an excuse or, um, for, you know, how they should be dealt with. And then, for members of the military, I also wonder how they can have faith in the operational security of critical and dangerous missions that they're asked to undertake for the US government. Because if the head of the Pentagon is just, you know, shooting the shit with his family members saying, "Oh my God, look at what we are doing! Isn't this great?" kind of thing, um, he's putting those lives at risk. And, and they're very lucky that, with regards to the Yemen strike, I think I said this before, I don't believe the Yemeni, um -- uh, well, the Houthis, sorry -- I don't believe the Houthis got any word of the strike prior to it happening, which is more luck than anything. [00:09:20] Matt: We have no, um, yeah, we have no, there's no indication out in the open that the Houthis did know of these strikes in advance or that potentially, you know, a third country such as Russia or China had, had knowledge of this in advance because of this. We don't know that. But again, to your point, um, just because we don't know, it doesn't mean it doesn't, it didn't happen. Um, and also if not, it's purely just by chance and kind of the grace of God that it didn't happen, you know? And of course, all those services and all those -- just one more point here -- all those services know, if you wanna know what's going on, maybe try and get inside Pete Hegseth's personal cell phone, if they didn't think of that already. [00:10:00] Chris: Exactly. And in fact, there was an article, which I've completely just only just remembered and forgot about in my prep, so forgive me, but there was something just the other day about how Russian intelligence have been focusing on Signal for some time, trying to penetrate it. So, it doesn't surprise me, um, if, if they already have access via, you know, to Signal, via a backdoor or something. [00:10:20] Matt: Yeah, yeah. And you don't have to, it's not a matter of, you know, accessing a backdoor into Signal's servers. You can get onto the, the device itself and read it from there. It's not, you know, like you don't have to necessarily compromise Signal itself to be able to do this. [00:10:35] Chris: No, exactly. And this is the thing, uh, uh, you know, a leading intelligence service -- it could be the NSA, it could be the Russians, could be the British -- there are ways for them to penetrate pretty much any app from WhatsApp to Signal to Telegram if they want to. Um, it is very, I mean, encryption is not perfect, and obviously with AI it's probably getting even easier to break through encryption now, because if you have an AI that's just dedicated to breaking encryption codes, surely it's almost near impossible to keep a secret any longer. But, um, you know, that's for maybe people with greater knowledge than I do to answer whether that's the case or not. But, um, but it still, I think it must be very hard for any member of the military to really have faith in leadership if this is sort of going on. Um, and there was a really great opinion piece in Politico by John Ullyot titled "The Month From Hell Inside the Agency," which is the Pentagon, not the CIA, I'm not quite sure they're called the Agency, but there we go. Ullyot worked for the Pentagon for one month under Hegseth as chief Pentagon spokesperson. And Ullyot was a big supporter of Hegseth and felt that he was the best candidate for the job to shake things up at the Pentagon -- which were his words and not mine -- um, and Ullyot reports that there was a, there's been a near collapse inside the Pentagon's top ranks. Um, and despite his loyalty to Hegseth, he actually feels that the last month that the Pentagon has been a full-blown meltdown and it's becoming a real problem for the administration. As he says, there was Signalgate, then there's been, um, a situation in which, uh, Hegseth has been bringing his wife to sensitive meetings -- and I'll go into that a little bit more in a sec. Um, we've got the, you know, Pentagon set up a top-secret meeting for Elon Musk on China, which is a big no-no, and deeply problematic because of Musk's business ties to China. And then we've got staffing purges as well, which is obviously causing all sorts of issues. Um, and institutional knowledge is being lost as people get fired or walk out the door. [00:12:36] Matt: Right. [00:12:36] Chris: So, Ullyot is very much a Trump loyalist, and he's still a friend of Hegseth, even though he might not be after that political art, Politico article. But, um, if you do read the piece, keep those bits in mind. Now, um, he brings up, he brought up Hegseth's wife, Jennifer Hegseth, and she has apparently been in sensitive meetings. Um, and she was also included in Hegseth's additional Signal messages that included the war plans. And CNN wrote an interesting piece asking why she is with him at the Pentagon, especially as she has no national security background and no reported security clearance at this time, which makes her presence highly unusual. Now, CNN report that multiple sources have said that Pete Hegseth has grown increasingly paranoid about the potential of leaks to the media within the Pentagon and has begun largely depending on a small circle for council, including his wife. Now, Jennifer apparently attended at least one official meeting with her husband. She joined him in a bilateral meeting at the Pentagon in March between Hegseth and UK Defence Secretary John Healey. Um, officials have stated that she exited the meeting before any sensitive or classified discussions occur, and I will hope that's accurate, but we don't know for sure. One official said that I have never seen in my professional life a spouse sit in on a meeting with counterparts from other countries where they talk through sensitive matters related to our relationship with foreign militaries. "Both her presence in the Healey meeting and her inclusion on the Signal chain where Hegseth was discussing military operations could raise concerns among foreign leaders about Hegseth's ability to keep sensitive information to himself," said Greg Williams, who is the director of the Project On Government Oversight's Center for Defense Information. Williams also went on to say, it raises serious concerns that Hegseth doesn't understand the boundaries between his personal life and his professional life. Um, and, the strength and safety of the United States depends very heavily on, you know, uh, your relationship with close allies and if they don't believe that the defense secretary has a reasonable understanding of boundaries between his personal life and professional life, it'll be very difficult for them to share sensitive information. Um, and then, just to one final bit, the Daily Mail -- which is obviously not the most reliable source, but sometimes their defense stuff can be quite good -- but, um, they report that Jennifer Hegseth has earned the nickname Yoko Ono-- [00:15:04] Matt: Hahahaha! [00:15:06] Chris: And the Mail went on to report that, the sources who spoke to the Daily Mail said that Hegseth relies on his wife to prepare and supervise him like she did behind the scenes on Fox News. [00:15:18] Matt: She's a former Fox producer. [00:15:20] Chris: Yeah, and she, she apparently has to keep an eye on his sobriety. Um, and maybe also from his wandering eyes and making sure his pants zipped, apparently. So, make of that what you will. So-- [00:15:32] Matt: Woke Daily Mail? The woke-- [00:15:34] Chris: Yeah. [00:15:35] Matt: Liberal Daily Mail said this? [00:15:37] Chris: Yup, the Daily Mail said that. Yeah. [00:15:38] Matt: Wow. Must be a cold day in hell today. [00:15:41] Chris: Yeah. Well, I think, I think JD Vance ruined the Daily Mail's relationship with the Trump administration. [00:15:48] Matt: Oh, good point. Good point, good point, good point. Good point. [00:15:51] Chris: So, yeah, it's, it's crazy stuff really. So what are your thoughts on all of this? [00:15:55] Matt: Yeah, okay. There's, as you said, there's so much-- [00:15:58] Chris: Yoko Ono aside. [00:16:00] Matt: Yeah, that really threw me. I did not know that. Um, I reacted to that in real time, for sure. Um, no, it's true though, I can see that. Um, anyway, uh -- I'm thinking back to some friends groups and stuff that I had before where there was a Yoko situation and it was not, it was not good. The Yoko situations in your friends group never goes well, and, and none of those guys that I'm thinking of were ever, uh, secretary of defense. Anyway, um, yeah, so let's go back to, to Signalgate 2.0 and sort of unpack that one a bit, right? So there was, um, in the first, you know, Signalgate 1.0 that we'll say that -- you know, The Atlantic broke and we talked with, with Shane about that and everything -- um, there was some, I guess, assumptions, suspicions that the, um, that the really specific, um, operationally sensitive, if not outright classified -- and I do, I don't see how it wouldn't be classified according to, you know, every professional that has sort of commented on this -- um, that, that really, uh, operationally sensitive information, like the specific times that, you know, the F-18s were gonna take off from the, from the Truman, um, I believe it was. Um, that stuff was put into that group chat by Hegseth, right? And it was sort of thought that, or, or suspected that he had basically, considering, you know, the, the verbiage and the specificity and the formatting and everything, like he just sort of copy and pasted it directly from, you know, an official, like, high-side or classified kind of system, right? Um, and this, you know, Signalgate 2.0 essentially kind of, um, confirms, uh, uh, the same thing, you know. So this, this, uh, information came, um, directly from -- I don't know specifically what military communication system -- um, but it was, you know, for sure a, a high-side, secure, um, system coming from the commander of US Central Command. Um, which, you know, tracks with how the chain of command of the US Armed Forces goes. It's um, you know, the president and the secretary of defense are jointly considered the National Command Authority, right? So, the chain of command goes from, um, now, uh, goes from the president to the secretary of defense directly to the combatant commander that oversees the area of operations where whatever's happening is going on, right? Which in this case is, um, is CENTCOM. The Joint Chiefs, uh, sort of play a planning, advisory, coordinating role. Um, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is officially the president's chief military advisor, but he's not in the chain of command, right? Um, so yeah, that completely tracks that you're, you know, about to launch these airstrikes on Yemen and the commander of CENTCOM would be forwarding this to the secretary of defense. Um, I would guess, I would guess this came through the NMCC in the Pentagon. That's the National Military Command Center. Um, but that's just my hunch, I don't know that for sure. But that's totally normal. Um, even, I guess, you know, there's the Signal part using a commercial, a commercially available app that, you know, in, in Signalgate 1.0, that was Mike Waltz, the national security advisor, who started that, but this one I think is just far more egregious because we know that, that Hegseth now put this into, um, on his personal phone for sure, a Signal group chat with, um, you know, you said his, his, his wife who you've talked about, um, her, her sort of unusual role in the, in the Department of Defense now. Um, also his brother, Phil, Phil Hegseth, who officially has, um, the role of a, he has a job in the -- so a lot of what we're talking about here, we're talking about like disorder in, in the Pentagon, but we're really talking about is the Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, right? So, just as an aside here, there's the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is a huge, sprawling organization that includes a number of under secretaries and assistant secretaries of defense and deputy assistant secretaries, and it, it's a huge bureaucracy and there's all kinds of, um, agencies and services and stuff that kind of feed into it. It, it's huge. And then you consider on top of that, uh, the org chart, um, the, the Joint Staff, um, the military, uh, service departments, so the Departments of, um, the Air Force, Army, and, and the Navy. The Space Force is under the Department of the Air Force, officially. Um, anyway, huge, colossal organization, like we're talking about like the largest and most complicated corporation essentially in human history, right? Um, but what we're focused on right now is the Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, so Hegseth's core staff, right? So in that, so Phil Hegseth, his, his brother, was named a senior advisor to the secretary and handling liaison duties with the Department of, of Homeland Security. He has no operational need to know about the exact time planes are launching to bomb Yemen. Nowhere in his job description does that fall in. Um, uh, the other, his, his personal attorney, um, Tim, Tim Parlatore -- Tim, Tim, Tim Parlatore, I, I believe is how you say it. But yeah, so previously one of Trump's attorneys also was, uh, is Hegseth's personal attorney. He was brought back in as a Navy commander by Hegseth and placed in the Judge Advocate General Corps to, sort of, like, reform that. But, also, no operational need to know what time the planes are taking off to bomb Yemen, right? It's sort of like, it's someone who just gets really excited about doing this for real, you know? [00:21:32] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:21:32] Matt: And wants to show off. [00:21:33] Chris: Yeah. [00:21:33] Matt: And I think you can see that also in the way Hegseth kind of pushes back against these reports in the media and says, um, you know, "These aren't war plans. I see war plans all the time, I was looking at war plans this morning." You know, "I get strike plans all the time." Like, "I know exactly what they look like and that's not what this is." Like, it's just a kind of, um, braggadocious, try-hard, kind of a thing that like-- Okay, so when I was in, when I was in high school, I did this, I got picked to go do this thing down in, down in DC for a week. It was the National Young Leaders Forum, right? And we got, uh, a bunch of people came and talked to us, we toured a bunch of government buildings and everything, and part of it, we did a couple different, like war games, right? Of, like, hypothetical international crisis scenarios, right? And we were all put up in groups, we were all sort of given positions on the National Security Council and we had to, you know, like war game this crisis scenario. Um, and in all of the ones that we did that week, I was the director of the CIA. Like, for the week, I was the director of the CIA, and-- [00:22:33] Chris: How was that? Was it a stressful week? [00:22:37] Matt: I loved it. Of course, I'm like, I'm like 16, I think? And I like, you know, I get pulled out by, you know, the, like the advisors of the, of the, of the program, whatever, were like pulling me out to like, you know, hand me intelligence reports that I had to go back into the president, you know, the guy who was playing the president. And it was, but I remember being a 16-year-old, like, "Oh my God, like I'm the director of the CIA now. This is so cool." Like, we get to actually do this for real, stuff that I was just sort of like academically and personally interested in at the time. That's the same kind of mentality that I, I see in Hegseth right now but, you know, if in the middle of that war game I, you know, whipped out my, you know, Nokia flip phone and texted my buddies back, you know, in chemistry class that morning and go, yeah, um -- I forget what, what the crisis was or something -- but, "Hey, I'm the director of CIA right now and this is what we're doing." Like, that's not real life, you know, that's not gonna get people killed, but that's the kind of mindset that he's in and it's just very kind of, um, kind of an amateur, an amateur, uh, thing there. I don't know if you would -- so that's, that's how I sort of see Signalgate 2.0. I dunno if you wanna get more back into the staff dysfunction and stuff as well, but-- [00:23:42] Chris: No, just an image popped into my mind as you were discussing the sort of bravado. [00:23:48] Matt: Mm-hmm. [00:23:49] Chris: There's a really, uh, famous photoshopped image of Tony Blair from the Iraq War. So basically, the image was Tony Blair standing to a phone with his thumbs up and an explosion behind it. Obviously, it's Photoshopped and it was kind of like a protest, but at the same time it kind of like, you could now change that image and put Hegseth there with his phone going, "Yeah!" you know, uh, with his explosion behind him because he's loving it. He's, he is, he's clearly loving being the, you know, in this position of power, authority and, you know, and it, it's, uh, yeah, it, it's amateur hour, sadly. I was just thinking, what would Tom Clancy make of all this? Because this is not the sort of thing that would fly in The Hunt for Red October. [00:24:30] Matt: I've thought, I've thought often what Clancy, if he was still around, how he would feel about things. I worry that he would've, he would've succumbed to the virus that many other conservative-minded national security people have in recent years, but I don't know. That's a hypothetical question that we don't need to worry about because he's not here. Um, but yes, I can imagine Clancy in the '80s and '90s, the stuff he was talking about, the stuff he believed in, um, you would not, he would, you're not supposed to do these things. [00:24:56] Chris: Well, yeah, it, it made me think about like, where are the kind of Reagan-era Republicans and stuff like that? And I think, like you were just saying about the virus, I think the problem is when it's a slow burn, by the time you get to this point, if you've been on the kind of the, the "MAGA train," none of this is particularly shocking. But if you come in cold, um, then it is shocking because of the blatant unprofessionalism that's going on and, and putting people's lives in danger. [00:25:21] Matt: Yeah. [00:25:21] Chris: But, um, it, it's astonishing that there are people out there who still are defending this stuff, um, in the name of "owning the libs" or whatever. [00:25:31] Matt: Well, so here's, you know, um -- so the, the, the, that's sort of the, the Signalgate is kind of the one, um, speaks to the broader issue of dysfunction and Hegseth's fitness to be secretary of defense, but that's sort of one part of this. There's also, um, in, in recent weeks, these, you know, leak investigations and everything that have resulted in a few of, um, a few key staffers in Hegseth's, uh, immediate office, um, being, you know, fired and escorted out of the building. And a lot of them, you know, John Ullyot is, is one of them, you know, go to Politico and write op-eds and, you know, knife Hegseth in the back. I mean, that's, that's -- what you were talking about with, with, with Ullyot, I don't doubt that what he's describing is true but, I mean, these are scorpions eating each other. [00:26:19] Chris: Yeah. Oh yeah, totally. And, and, and his concern was more about how bad it is for the administration, not for the country. [00:26:25] Matt: Right. He, he's still fully onboard with Trump and his priorities and stuff and just wants him to be served better. That's his purpose. [00:26:31] Chris: Yeah, exactly. [00:26:32] Matt: Um, so a couple of the people who have been fired -- so there's, uh, Dan Caldwell, who was a senior advisor to Hegseth. Um, he recently went on Tucker Carlson and was kind of whining about this and saying, oh, it's, you know, the deep state boogeymen, and, you know, whenever they bring up the deep state, they're just like, we have no agency against these people. Um, Colin Carroll, who's the chief of staff to the deputy secretary of defense. Um, Darin Selnick, who's Hegseth's deputy chief of staff, and John Ullyot, who you mentioned, who's, um, who was the assistant for public affairs, um, to the secretary. So, you know, these, there's also stories in a, in a -- I believe it's in one of the articles that'll be linked in the, in the show notes -- um, there's issues with Hegseth's own chief staff, right? Who, you know, nominally runs the whole Office of the Secretary of Defense. So there's been, uh, there is an, an anecdote in there about a staff meeting that, um, he sort of meandered off and started talking about, you know, going to a strip club in DC recently with, um, with, uh, someone else in the staff. Just really just, uh -- I don't think I need to explain to listeners-- [00:27:39] Chris: Spring break kind of stuff, isn't it? [00:27:40] Matt: Yeah, like, should we, should we not aim to be a bit better than this? Um, I don't know, but you know, to these, to this point, you know, Hegseth was asked about it on a Fox News interview recently and saying, you know, yeah, "These are all just leakers." You know, "Once a leaker, always a leaker." And it's sort of like these, these people who are being, who are being, you know, fired and, and escorted out of the building, these are not deep state functionaries burrowed deep down within the org chart. These are not Biden holdover appointees who are out to, you know, sabotage, you know, the emperor's, Emperor Trump's great agenda, you know? These are, these are his own people. These are in many cases, um, veterans -- I think a lot of them, a, a few of them, a few of the people I just named are, are former Marines, um, or they're all veterans in, in some case. Uh, some of them worked with Hegseth at his veterans' charity that he ran for a bit before going to Fox News full-time. Um, you know, these are, these are his people. So, if they're leakers and saboteurs and scumbags, they're leakers and saboteurs and scumbags that Pete Hegseth gave jobs at the top of the Pentagon. [00:28:46] Chris: Yeah, yeah. [00:28:47] Matt: It's, it's, it's total amateur hour, and when you hire an amateur to be the secretary of defense to, you know, day-to-day manage the operations and functions of the most powerful military in human history, this is what you get. And to that point, I mean, Hegseth got dragged across the finish line by JD Vance. Vance had to come in and break a 50/50 tie in the Senate to get him confirmed, which for a secretary of defense, that that, that, that doesn't happen. Secretaries of defense especially, even in Trump's first term, are often almost always confirmed almost by unanimous consent or by very large margins, you know? So, I don't, sort of wrapping up my analysis here, um, I don't, I would be surprised if Hegseth left in the immediate near future, I'm talking about a matter of like days to weeks or something. But I think all of these stories, um -- I mean, Trump personally likes Hegseth still. Hegseth is certainly loyal to Trump. Um, I think Trump likes the, the whole, you know, central casting thing that Hegseth has, as far as what he believes a secretary defense should, you know, look like, which is lethality means, like, how many pushups he can do. Um, but I, I, I think these are all, um, all strikes against, against Hegseth that are building up. Um, I do not expect him to last. When he will go, I don't know. Like I said, it's not gonna be, it's not gonna be before, I don't think it's gonna be before this episode airs. I don't think it's gonna be, you know, by, in the next month potentially, even. Who knows? But if he was still in office by the end of the summer, I would, I would be honestly surprised. I think it, it's just not working out. He's not, he's not cut for the job. [00:30:35] Chris: No. Well, I, I was just making a note, "Incompetence and bravado is more dangerous than anything else," and I think this is where we're at with people like Hegseth. [00:30:43] Matt: Yeah, that's a George Smiley quote right there. Could be. [00:30:47] Chris: Yeah. And I wonder what else there is, because obviously we've got Signalgate. I'm sure there's something else out there. [00:30:53] Matt: Yeah. [00:30:53] Chris: Waiting to happen. [00:30:55] Matt: Yeah, I mean-- [00:30:55] Chris: Or waiting to be discovered. [00:30:56] Matt: Are there more, are there more Signal group chats? Are there more, you know, um-- [00:31:01] Chris: Well, weren't there 20-plus by, um, I forgot his name now. [00:31:04] Matt: Mike Waltz? Yeah, yeah. That was, that was, that was Waltz, yeah. Were different, different global issues and everything that the NSC was dealing with. As far as Hegseth, you know, what he's doing with this stuff and other stories about his staff and everything? Oh, yeah. I'm sure there's, you know -- wolves are circling now, and, we'll, we'll hear more. I'm, I'm, I'm positive we'll hear more. [00:31:22] Chris: Yeah, indeed. Well, on that, let's take a break and be right back with more. Welcome back, everybody. So, our next piece is an interesting one from The Kyiv Independent about a Russian spy who's been leading the negotiations in the so-called peace talks going on between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. So, I'll summarize the kind of key points below. So, the Russian delegation for these peace talks has been led by a man named Sergey Beseda and another man called Grigory Karasin, who was the chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, but the interesting guy is Sergey Beseda. So, he was born on the 17th of May, 1954, and he began his career in the Soviet KGB before transitioning to the FSB following the dissolution of the USSR. In 2003, he was appointed deputy head for the Department of Coordination of Operational Information, and then by 2009 he ascended to lead the Fifth Service. So, he was the head of the FSB's Fifth Service from 2009 to 2024, and he played a crucial role in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. His Service provided flawed intelligence suggesting that Ukraine would not resist the Russian military, which contributed to Russia's miscalculated confidence in a quick victory. Uh, despite backlash, Beseda has remained with the FSB and is now serving as an advisor. So, the FSB's Fifth Service, formally known as the Service for Operational Information and International Relations -- obviously, I'll let you translate it to Russian -- but um, is a powerful arm of the Russian Federal Security Service and it's tasked with foreign intelligence operations, particularly in former Soviet republics. I believe you talked about them before, Matt. Um, and unlike the SVR, which handles global espionage, the Fifth Service focuses on political influence, destabilization and intelligence-gathering efforts in Russia's near abroad, such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Central Asia, and it plays a key role in shaping Russia's covert foreign policy, often through disinformation, recruitment, and support of pro-Russian factions. The Service has gained notoriety for its operations in Ukraine, and it's believed to have misled, obviously, the Kremlin leadership over a, over an overly optimistic intelligence lead up to the 2022 invasion, which we mentioned just before. Um, and then Beseda has been involved in Ukraine-related operations for over a decade. He was present in Kyiv during the deadly Euromaidan protest in 2014, and Ukrainian officials claim he helped coordinate law enforcement attacks on protestors. And his presence during the period is confirmed by the SSB, though they, they downplay his role. Ukrainian intelligence also described Beseda as a persistent and dangerous adversary to Ukraine, accusing him of causing significant harm and continuing to participate in operations against the country, even after his demotion. Um, so, despite being under Western sanctions and his controversial past, Beseda now represents Russia and the recent US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia. The discussions reportedly focus on the potential ceasefire efforts while documents linked to his former Service reveal maximalist Russian demands and a bleak outlook for peace in 2026. So, my question is: Is Beseda today's Karla? Could be. Matt, what are your thoughts on this? [00:35:03] Matt: Yeah. I, um, yeah, this is, I, I, I love these, I love these, these profiles of, of people -- you know, even just from like a, a fiction writer, these are, these are very valuable when you get these, these little bits of detail and color and stuff that you can pull from and everything. It is, um, it is interesting that the man who is perhaps, second from Putin, the man who is perhaps, you know, arguably the most responsible for the disaster that Russia has seen in Ukraine in, in recent years -- what was supposed to be, you know, a "three-day special military operation," as it's, as the joke now goes is now, you know, a million Russian soldiers dead and, you know, a large part of their armed forces just incinerated, um, fighting over inches of Ukrainian fields -- um, is now kind of quarterbacking the Russian ends of these negotiations. Um, I don't know. Uh, I'm kind of surprised that Putin would pick that guy to do this. Perhaps Beseda feels the need to sort of, um, make amends and, and, you know, vindicate his, his, his honor for how poorly the first year or so of the invasion went. Um, yeah, it's an, it's an interesting, it's an interesting, um, story to have, uh, an intelligence officer sort of involved these in these negotiations. But also, I mean, Bill Burns ran, um-- [00:36:26] Chris: Well, yeah. [00:36:26] Matt: You know, ran negotiations for the sort of Middle East crises in the last year of the Obama administration, and I think did, I've said this before, I think did a much better job at handling that than the secretary of state did at the time, Tony Blinken. But, you know. [00:36:39] Chris: Well, indeed. Yeah, as you're saying, it's not unusual for the presence of, uh, former intelligence officers to be involved in diplomatic talks. It was, um, Peter Earnest, who's one of the late directors of the Spy Museum and former CIA officer, once said that espionage is sometimes best understood as an extension of diplomacy. And as you said, Bill Burns has been involved in all sorts of high-level talks. He was there negotiating with the Taliban to get US forces out. [00:37:04] Matt: Right. [00:37:04] Chris: And I think why it's interesting that you've got a, a kind of, should we say a spy or an intelligence officer running things is, I guess he has some sort of institutional knowledge about Russian interests in Ukraine. And so, you kind of want somebody at the table who has that knowledge who, who doesn't necessarily have to keep stopping the meeting to go and call up whoever to get that information. "Can we give up this thing? Can we do that?" Um, and, and obviously it's been reported, he's pushing this maximalist agenda and asking for all sorts of ridiculous things, which it's looking like at the moment Russia's probably gonna get, or worse. Um, you know, it's-- [00:37:46] Matt: Yeah. Maybe we'll get into that in the, in the, in the next story, but. [00:37:50] Chris: Maybe. [00:37:51] Matt: I think those folks would, would claim otherwise, but you know. [00:37:54] Chris: Well, yeah, it depends, actually, because it depends if you think there is actually gonna be a peace process. Because at the moment, the way things are looking, it's very 50/50 whether the US are gonna stay involved. [00:38:04] Matt: If there is a peace process, I think the guys that we're gonna talk about next would not be happy with the deal, if that's on the table right now but, you know. [00:38:11] Chris: Well, yeah, totally. And you know, as JD Vance has sort of, um, put out there, basically he's saying that Ukraine have gotta, uh, accept giving up territory, uh, and not join NATO, et cetera. And it's like, well, you know, how is this, does any change to where we started many weeks ago when these negotiations or supposed negotiations even started? But, you know, that's a whole other thing. So, I think, you know, despite Beseda, who, who you know, has had a contentious relationship with the Kremlin, especially over the faulty intelligence, which Putin famously berated him over, um, and led to his house arrest in 2022 for a short period of time, um, and then Beseda officially retired from his post as head of the FSB's Fifth Service, he sort of, um, stayed on. Um, and he obviously has some political clout and, uh, confidence of President Putin to kind of handle these negotiations. So, I do think it's probably, he obviously has some sort of insider knowledge that's useful to this. [00:39:12] Matt: Beseda almost certainly has been and is now involved in back channels with US intelligence, as well. [00:39:21] Chris: Yeah, yeah. Indeed, indeed. So it's, uh, yeah. So with regards to, you know, the wider picture, there's another story that kind of stood out that doesn't directly relate to Beseda, but it does sort of, um, link into the Russian thinking a little bit, or maybe what's on Putin's agenda with regards to Ukraine. So, um, there's a very interesting piece by New Lines Magazine, one of our favorites. [00:39:47] Matt: Mm-hmm. [00:39:47] Chris: Um, which is titled, "The Russian Nationalists Pushing for Ukraine's Destruction," and I'm gonna just summarize quickly below. Far-right groups such as the Rusich militia and the Russian Imperial Movement fight on Russia's behalf, but they're deeply critical of the state. So, despite contributing to the war efforts, they distrust the Kremlin and fear repression once their utility ends. So, Russian nationalist figures like Alexei Selivanov and Stanislav Vorobyev -- I hope I got that name right -- uh, view any ceasefire or territorial compromise of Ukraine as a betrayal of Russia's national interest and they believe only in total victory, including dismantling Ukraine's sovereignty. Um, and then leaders like Pavel Gubarev argue that oligarchic interests and political caution are preventing Russia from achieving victory. And they believe the war is being deliberately prolonged and that internal corruption undermines the military campaign. Some, uh, nationalist factions are turning their focus inward, targeting migrants and warning of civil conflict within Russia, and they blame lax immigration policies and postulate conspiracy theories about a population replacement further radicalizing the far-right. So, you know, like I've said before, my concern is, if the US do pull their support from pursuing a peace plan to end the war, I'm not seeing any impetus on the Russian side to stop their war. And it looks like, least from Putin's side, he politically probably can't stop the war either unless there's um, some pushback from, you know, the US and NATO to make it impossible for them to continue on. And it's at the moment looking like the US is going to cede ground to Putin, as many have suspected he would all along. Um, so I dunno what your thoughts on all of that are. [00:41:43] Matt: Yeah. I'm gonna hold off on the terms of the Ukraine peace agreement that have been sort of offered up in the press in the past few days. Maybe that's something to work on next, next, next week. [00:41:54] Chris: Yeah, that might be next week. [00:41:54] Matt: Next week, yeah. Um, but I mean, far-right nationalists are one of the few domestic pressure points left on Putin's rule, um, in Russia. You know, some of the fiercest criticisms of the war inside, inside Russia have come from Putin's right. You know, military bloggers on Telegram. Um, people like, uh, Yevgeny Prigozhin, God rest his soul. [00:42:19] Chris: RIP. [00:42:19] Matt: Yes. Yeah, so a, a lot of the criticisms against Putin's rule have come from those kinds of, um, people who, yeah, to, as this article claims are, you know, saying we're not going, you know, um, hard enough. It comes from this view that was, probably is still, definitely Putin's view, at least -- it certainly was when he started the prosecution of this invasion -- that, um, you know, that the Ukrainian identity of something that is separate from a Russian identity is a kind of recent Western fabrication, aberration of history, you know? It does not speak true to the long arc of Russian and, and Slavic history and kind of the way this part of the world has been ordered, right? Um, you know, they see Ukraine as, as an appendage, as a, uh, runaway, renegade, lost province, um, that has to be, you know, kind of smashed and essentially, I mean, ethnically cleansed. To an, to an extent, I think some of the stuff that they're talking about here in terms of, you know, um, beating out the Ukrainian identity, whether that's the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, um, how, how Ukrainian children see themselves as, you know, non-Russian. And not just doing that to -- remember when this invasion started -- not just applying that to the, uh, Crimea or the eastern provinces of Ukraine, which are, you know, historically Russian-speaking and have been under Russian, degree of Russian influence for over a decade now, plus, but doing that to the entire country, you know? [00:44:00] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:44:01] Matt: I think that's certainly a form of, of, of ethnic cleansing. You know, but that's also something that, that goal is not possible for the Russians, you know? However this war ends, even if it does end with, um, a surrender of the territory that Russia currently occupies, a recognition of Crimea and everything, um, Kyiv will not be a Russian city. Um, you know, Ukraine will still exist. A large part of Ukraine -- with a coastline, mind you, which was also one of the objectives that got lost in the, in the mix; they're gonna keep Odessa -- um, all of that, all of that is gonna remain. And I think a lot of these folks, uh, you know, these sort of far-right nationalist figures in Russia, as this article describes, um, I don't see how -- Russian state media will certainly try to spin it as a victory. And is, is it a net victory, would it be a net victory for Putin? You know, would he have gained territory? Yes. But he will have come far short of extinguishing the idea of a Ukraine that is separate of Russia, you know? Yeah, they're not, according to the terms of this deal -- I'm, I'm doing what I said we probably shouldn't do -- according to the terms of this deal, um, you know, yeah, Ukraine doesn't get NATO membership, but they are have the option open for EU membership. And in coming years there's gonna be a whole lot more coordination and defense spending within the EU itself, you know? Um, these are all ideas that, you know, a couple years ago would've been kind of, um, unthinkable. So, you know, that speaks back to, um, recent intelligence estimates and everything that for a long time have all kind of concluded that Putin, no matter what he says, Putin is not, um, interested in ending the war right now because he feels that he's winning. Also, I think there's, I, I'm not inside Putin's head, um, but I think there has to be a part of him that's worried that if he does end the war now, freezes it along the lines of what territory they currently occupy, um, that he'll have a revolt to his right. You know, that they'll say, like, "Wait a second. We wanted to exterminate Ukraine as an idea itself and we certainly have not done it." If anything, they have bolstered it for generations to come and, um, irreversibly pushed Ukraine into the arms of the West. [00:46:12] Chris: Yeah, yeah. Well, time will tell whether there is a deal or not because as of this airing, you know, um, Trump has sort of put an ultimatum out saying that he's gonna walk away, the US is gonna walk away from any peace agreement, um, unless, uh -- he, as always, he's more critical of Ukraine than he is of-- [00:46:31] Matt: Yes, he is. [00:46:31] Chris: Um, Putin. [00:46:32] Matt: Yes, he is. Yes, he is. [00:46:33] Chris: He, he has expressed some, uh, annoyance at Putin where he's asked Putin to stop bombing Ukraine. [00:46:39] Matt: "Vladimir, stop! This isn't you!" [00:46:41] Chris: I know. Uh, he said he is not happy with deadly Russian strikes on Kyiv. [00:46:46] Matt: Yeah. [00:46:46] Chris: I mean, many of us have not been happy about it for some time, so welcome to the club, president Trump. But, um, yeah, so I dunno, I have zero faith in the Trump administration with resolving this in any positive way. Um, and, and I, I do worry that we're gonna watch Chechnya unfold again. So, we'll see what happens. I just, that's my -- it's always been my biggest fear with Ukraine is it would just turn into Chechnya and you'll just see Ukraine pummeled into the ground and eventually some sort of stooge will takeover, uh, and, and sort of turn it into a satellite state of Russia. [00:47:21] Matt: Yeah. [00:47:21] Chris: Um, so we'll see what happens. I hope my prediction's wrong there because I'm, I don't wanna see that happen at all, but we will see. Maybe, maybe Trump can, uh, prove me wrong and come out with the best deal ever and make everybody happy and, uh, you know-- [00:47:35] Matt: Big, beautiful, perfect deal. [00:47:37] Chris: Exactly, exactly. That's what we want. Well, I think on that note, unless there's anything else you want to add, um, no? Well, well let's, let's take a, a break and then we'll come back with listener questions. Welcome back, everybody. So, we've got some really great listener questions coming up now. So, our first one is from Julie from Rhode Island, and, um, she's got a question that has kind of sections to it. So, um, she kindly says she really enjoys the podcast, so thank you Julie. Um, so her questions are about the feasibility of Europe delinking from the US defense, and, um, and she asked, are we talking about a matter of months, years, or decades, and there's a few specifics that she's curious about. So, the first specific is, to what extent are individual European countries defense capabilities intertwined with NATO and by extension US? And, if so, is it possible to kind of, uh, extricate themselves without formally dissolving the NATO alliance? Um, then the second part is, are there viable alternatives to US weapons systems like the Eutelsat, as seen as a Starlink substitute. Um, and then is it feasible -- the third thing is, is it feasible to maintain operability of existing US systems without continued American support? So Matt, what are your thoughts on that? [00:49:09] Matt: Well, thank you for your question, Julie. Um, I think, I mean, European militaries are certainly, um, heavily intertwined with the US military. Not to the extent that they're just unable to operate without the US, but it does get prohibitively more difficult depending on the size and length of the operation, you know, that Europe would want to do on their own. Um, I mean, especially when you consider, you know, issues of like intelligence gathering and, um, logistics, especially signals intelligence. Um, I mean, I'm thinking back to the 2011 intervention in Libya that exposed significant limitations in the supply and logistics capabilities of European NATO members. I mean, after, not very long at all, uh, a week or, a week or two, maybe, maybe a little bit more, um, European militaries were, you know, unable to sort of, would have been unable to keep pace with those operations without, um, US supply lines. You know, uh, airlift, aerial refueling, um, sea logistics and everything. And that's, you know, operating against Gaddafi's, Libya, uh, right across the Mediterranean. Right in Europe's backyard. And now of course, you know, that was in 2011. Um, Europe has come a long way since then, for sure. Um, since the 2014 seizure of Crimea. Definitely, um, since the invasion, the full invasion of Ukraine, you know, Europe's come a long way. They're gonna come much further in, in, in years to come. So, that's important to give them credit for that. Um, you know, as far as their dependence on, uh, I don't know -- ike there's, there was some, you know, discussion like there's a kill switch in the F-35s and everything that are operated by European militaries or anything where they can, like the US can, like, remotely take control of them. That's not true. There is no, like, kill switch in the F-35. I mean, yeah, they're gonna rely on, you know, Lockheed for, you know, maintenance, spare parts, maintainers, and of course, you know, software updates and everything. Um, when, you know, without those it gets harder to operate F-35s in the long run, but it's not as if there's a kill switch. And to my knowledge, that has not been threatened at all to withhold that support from, from Europe. Um, I don't know. I, I, it, it also sort of reminds me of, um, like a lot of supporters of, you know, Trump's tariffs and everything to sort of, I think wrongly, believe that this massive manufacturing capacity can just be on-shored to the US in a matter of months or a year without great difficulties or adverse consequences. Um, I think there is some, well-meaning European commentary that sort of also thinks that, you know, Europe can just quickly kind of spin itself off from the US, um, in no time. I mean, apart from, I think that would be a massive gift to, to Trump and Putin to do that, anyway. It's gonna be a long few years, but I'm not willing to play taps for NATO just yet. [00:52:16] Chris: No. Well, this is it. I think this would be the worst-case scenario. [00:52:19] Matt: It would be, yeah. [00:52:19] Chris: So, I'll just do my best to, to answer my bits here, as well, because um, it's, it's quite a complicated thing. But I, I really do, uh, you know, hope that, A, this isn't gonna be the future and this is the worst-case scenario. Um, but obviously I think some of the, the Trump administration, all this sort of uncertainty has brought at least one healthy thing, which is that Europe are now trying to work out how they can actually look after themselves without us support. [00:52:45] Matt: Yeah. [00:52:45] Chris: Because I think, you know, as you said, many-a time, there's a feeling in the US that you guys have sort of carried the burden for European peace for a very long time, and yet Europe are kind of benefiting a little bit, you know, with regards to the lack of tax burden in some areas, so-- [00:53:01] Matt: And for a period of time, you know, '90s, early 2000s and stuff, even through the War on Terror and everything, the, the world was to an extent where that was sustainable, you know? That was doable to a bit, but we're not in that world anymore, you know? And I've talked about scenarios on here before where, you know, a potential third world war scenario where you're fighting Russia and China all at once, where, you know, scenarios where we, we can't come defend the Baltics because we're bogged down all over the Pacific. And that's something that I, I, in my bones, do not believe that is an extreme request to say, "Hey, you guys gotta hold the Baltics for a bit because we're, we're with China." [00:53:39] Chris: No. [00:53:39] Matt: You know? [00:53:40] Chris: Exactly. And it's on our doorstep and we've got the experience, the territory, et cetera. [00:53:43] Matt: Absolutely. [00:53:44] Chris: But I think, I, I think for Europe to delink from the US military would take decades. [00:53:47] Matt: Yeah. [00:53:48] Chris: Um, and um, it's a combination of things. First, we've got of build up defensive and offensive capabilities, which will require significant investment. You know, we've seen, obviously I mentioned we've seen early signs now from the UK and Germany who have pledged to invest more in defense and their NATO obligations, which is all good. Um, then there's the political will to actually do this. Um, what it would look like. Um, I suspect the consensus might start to wane as Europe is obviously full of countries that have deep historical and political concerns. And I think it takes a powerful outsider like the US to act as a kind of power broker. So, once the US is out of the picture, you may start to find France, Germany, and the UK may take the lead on certain things and that might lead to resentment from other countries. [00:54:33] Matt: Mm-hmm. [00:54:33] Chris: Um, that's sort of traditionally kind of how it's gone in the past with European situations. Um, and then Europe is not immune to the political winds that brought us Trump. [00:54:43] Matt: Yes. [00:54:43] Chris: Um, so the situation we're in today, um, you know, there, there are lots of, been lots of gains by the far-right and populist movements in Europe and, likewise, there's a rising far-left to a kind of rising in response to the far-right. The far-left would likely want to reduce defense spending and then the far-right will either be isolationist or less cooperative with other nations. Or worse, they could become power hungry and start abusing their positions of power. Um, and we might start seeing small conflicts break out, which, God forbid, I hope doesn't happen, but it's not impossible. It's happened in the past. Then, with regards to, so your second concern, which is about the weapons systems. So, um, the US, in regards to its fifth- and sixth-generation fighter technology, are the leaders in the world on this. Um, but European aircraft manufacturers are currently behind on that technology, but there is a wealth of experience and if the will and the budgets are in place, they might be able to challenge that. They might be able to build their own sixth-gen fighters that could compete with or be better than US ones. Um, with regards to fifth-gen stuff, I mean there have recently been talks in European countries, and even Canada, of canceling their F-35 orders and going with the Saab Gripen E, which is a very capable fighter. And I'll, um, there's a link I'll give you, to Matt, to put in the show notes about the Gripen E. Um, and it has some positives and negatives with regards to the F-35. Um, I think there's a debate open about which one's actually better, but they're pretty, pretty capable aircraft, both of them. Um, and then Europe has a shortage of defensive missiles, artillery shells, and very few of its own nuclear-armed weapons that have not been supplied by the US or work in tandem with US systems. As far as I know, I think the French nuclear system is the only truly independent nuclear system in Europe. I could be wrong, but that's from what I saw. [00:56:36] Matt: That's true. [00:56:36] Chris: And then, you know, again, as I mentioned, the political will to do something about rebuilding the nuclear arsenal, um, is an issue. Because in the UK we always get into very silly public debates about our own nuclear deterrent and its replacement, um, in which those who favor an upgrade get equated with war mongers. And then there are some politicians who seem only to be able to deal with one threat at a time. So, in 2010, the then-leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, believed we no longer needed nuclear defense because the biggest threat was terrorism and not nation states. [00:57:11] Matt: Yeah. [00:57:11] Chris: But historians and recent history has shown us that threats change and there's usually more than one type of threat. You know, and, and as I said, there's now, I mean, there's a lot of, um, information -- talk about the rise of ISIS; you've already got into that earlier this year on the podcast. ISIS have not gone away, we just don't talk about them. Um, and there's even talk of America pulling embassies out of Africa, which could lead to a huge blind spot because Africa is the hotspot for ISIS right now. But that, that's probably for next week. [00:57:41] Matt: More groups than just ISIS, yeah. [00:57:43] Chris: Yeah, totally. Um, so that's a whole other thing there. So, you know, this is the problem. I think a lot of political leaders get swayed -- and the public, too -- just gets swayed by whatever's the loudest issue. And obviously terrorism for a long time was the loudest issue, but it's not the only issue. So, I think the political will is always the problem here. Um, obviously all of this provides a lot of, uh, opportunity for European, uh, companies and countries to step up and resolve these capability gaps. And you mentioned Eutelsat. Um, and you know, the, you know, Eutelsat is particularly, um, you know, it's, it's sort of a, could be seen as an alternative to Starlink and through its partnership with OneWeb, it is, uh, emerging as a viable European alternative now. Um, and it does have some trade-offs. So, Starlink offers low-latency and high-speed internet in its low-orbit satellites, whilst Eutelsat combines traditional geostationary coverage. And what that means is the satellite stays in a fixed position going 'round with the, the planet. Um, and, uh, you know, and it means it can provide strong regional coverage across Europe, Africa, and parts of the Middle East. So, um, yeah, so there are are things kind of in the works that might well, uh, start to fill certain gaps from US companies. Your third point, um -- hang on, what was your third point again? Your third point was, Is it feasible to maintain operability of US systems? So, there's something you brought up just earlier about this kill switch because that's a big debate in Europe at the moment. So you, you said it's not true and it might not be. Uh, but apparently Germany held closed-door discussions about whether there's a kill switch in fighter jets and in the software. So, it's like, I don't know. Um, because I've heard this, I haven't seen anything either way to confirm it or to say there isn't one, but it did lead to this discussion about the Gripen E. [00:59:37] Matt: If we're looking at, yeah, if we're looking at unclassified sources, there is no kill switch. I would think a remote software kill switch would be a vulnerability for a cyber attack that you would want to avoid in the design in the first place. But also, define "kill switch." You know, if you define a kill switch as you cut cutoff maintenance support, or software updates, it's a kill switch, but I don't think there's a button in the Pentagon somewhere that says, you know, if I push this button, every European F-35 is gonna fall out of the sky. That I don't think exists. [01:00:09] Chris: No, no. Well, no, and, and it would be, I think, I think also European intelligence services would've done their homework to check if that's the case or not. But we will see on that one. But, uh, certainly there's been concerns in Europe about that. But to your other point, um, about parts, look at Iran and their use of the F-14 Tomcat and US aircraft from the '70s. You know, you kind of can cobble stuff together, but they're not very effective anymore. [01:00:35] Matt: I mean, yeah. I mean, those F-14s would be destroyed in the first hours of a conflict anyway, but you know, yeah. [01:00:40] Chris: Yeah, totally. [01:00:41] Matt: They, they have managed, for the F-14s that they have, they have managed to keep them running. They, um, the Iranian Air Force, uh, uses those F-14s to, um, they're earmarked to defend their nuclear facilities. [01:00:52] Chris: Yeah, indeed. So, anyways, all of that, I hope it's all the worst-case scenario because, we've said this in the past, I think, um, a lot of this division does play into the hands of Vladimir Putin. [01:01:03] Matt: Absolutely. [01:01:03] Chris: And I'm, for one, deeply concerned about the kind of cost of the next four years with Trump at the helm. Um, you know, with his discussions of annexing Greenland, Canada, and building a resort in Gaza. Um, I think if the US did take Greenland by force, which, I will say now, I hope is very unlikely, but I'm gonna place it as a medium possibility right now, the way I feel about it. But I hope, I dunno how you feel about that, but, um, it feels like a medium to me, currently. [01:01:29] Matt: Less than medium, I would say. [01:01:30] Chris: Less than medium. Okay, cool. Yeah, that's good. We should put it on Nando's scale, shouldn't we? Of the flavors at Nandos, if you-- [01:01:36] Matt: Right, right, right. [01:01:37] Chris: If you ever been to a Nando's-- [01:01:37] Matt: Not in many years, but yeah. [01:01:40] Chris: Yeah. [01:01:41] Matt: We don't have them here, but-- [01:01:41] Chris: So, hopefully that does never happen. But if it did happen, that would take a wrecking ball to NATO and European relations. [01:01:47] Matt: Yeah, that would be it. That would be curtains. [01:01:48] Chris: That would, that would be a disaster. [01:01:49] Matt: Yeah. [01:01:49] Chris: So, um, so I totally understand, um, you know, everybody's sort of interest and concern about, um, Europe and America right now because I share that concern, too. It's, it's, it's worrying. Um, so I, I really hope this worst-case scenario doesn't happen. [01:02:06] Matt: My concern -- and we've talked about this before in previous episodes -- my concern has been that a lot of this talk and, and rumination has the danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy after a while. [01:02:17] Chris: Yes. [01:02:17] Matt: And also to your point, I mean, yeah, Putin and, you know, the sort of nationalist, MAGA forces behind Trump would love nothing more than for Europe to just get up and leave themselves, right? Um-- [01:02:28] Chris: Yeah, yeah. [01:02:28] Matt: It's gonna be a long and frustrating four years, it's gonna be a very annoying four years, but, you know, to your point, the, you made this claim earlier, the, the runway that it would take for Europe to completely spin itself off is, um, longer than Trump is gonna be around. Whether that's, um, you know, in, in four years through normal political, constitutional means, or a bit longer through more natural means, um, he's not gonna be around forever. And he does not -- it's, he, it would take Europe longer to fully spin itself off than he's gonna be around, however, however he leaves the scene. [01:03:07] Chris: Indeed, indeed. Well, uh, thank you, Julie, for that. We'll move on to Sam from Finland who has a question. So, um, Sam's a frequent listener from Finland -- so, thank you, Sam -- and, um, he asks, "Are there a lot of Bulgarian spies operating for Russia and Europe, or are they just unprofessionals who have been caught and therefore seen often in the headlines? Um, and then if there are a lot of Bulgarian spies for Russia, uh, why is Russia recruiting especially Bulgarian as spies?" So, Matt, I don't know if you have any thoughts on this. [01:03:39] Matt: Yeah. So I, I do. I had a whole bunch of notes on this, um, for when we discussed that UK-Bulgarian spy ring-- [01:03:47] Chris: Yes. [01:03:48] Matt: Um, a couple weeks ago and we ran out of time on the show, didn't have time to get into it. But, so, I went back and I dug up those notes and here's, here's what I got for you. Uh, so, um, that practice of using Bulgarian nationals as intelligence assets goes back, um, decades. You know, back to Cold War-era cooperation between, um, the KGB and Bulgarian State Security. Um, Bulgaria was one of the Soviets' most loyal Eastern Bloc, um, satellite states. Uh, so some of those key factors that have made Bulgarians attractive to Russian intelligence over the years, so, you know, um, during the Cold War, the Bulgarian State Security was called the KGB's, uh, little brother. Um, you know, acted as a surrogate for the KGB, handling stuff that the Soviets wanted deniability from. So, one example of that would be the assassination of Georgi Markov in -- was that Waterloo Bridge in London? [01:04:40] Chris: It was Waterloo Bridge, yeah. With a poison umbrella. [01:04:43] Matt: Yeah, getting on a bus, going over Waterloo Bridge with the tip of a, the umbrella that had -- was it ricin? [01:04:48] Chris: It poked in the, the ankle, I think it was. And it was ricin, yeah. [01:04:51] Matt: Yeah, ricin and, right. So, that was the Bulgarians. [01:04:54] Chris: I could take you to the bus stop next time you come to London. [01:04:56] Matt: Oh, definitely, definitely, for sure. Um, so, uh, that's, that's one example of this sort of thing. There's also Bulgaria's, uh, strategic position in Europe. So, nowadays, former Eastern Bloc country, of course, um, sits at an important, you know, crossroads between Russia, the Balkans, Turkey, the EU. Um, since joining NATO and the EU, Bulgaria's become a prime target for Russian, um, infiltration and, and influence operations. I think it's just sort of seen as, like, the soft underbelly for Europe, you know? [01:05:27] Chris: Mm-hmm. [01:05:28] Matt: Um, the Russian, Russian intelligence has this kind of, you know, institutional memory and long-running cultural kind of connections, I guess, with, um, certain Bulgarian networks and everything, and, uh, nowadays, um, those, those folks have, have EU passports and can easily travel about Europe, um, visa-, visa-free, um, border check-free, at least within the Schengen zone. Um, yeah, so it's just sort of a, these are old, um, old contractors that the Soviets have, have used for a long time for a number of sort of, you know, um, cultural, geographic, uh, uh, uh, reasons, yeah. [01:06:09] Chris: Part of Karla's black book. [01:06:11] Matt: Yes. Yeah, yeah. [01:06:13] Chris: No, no, no, totally. One thing I was gonna say on this one actually was, um, yeah, obviously Bulgarian nationals are heavily involved, but let's not forget the Moldovans as well. Um, they've also become a, a favorite of recruitment for espionage and sabotage. And, um, just before the Olympics in Paris last year, there was a Moldovan man who was arrested in a flat in Paris and he had explosives and all sorts of stuff. Um, so yeah, and, and Moldova's espionage efforts are kind of similar to the Bulgarian one. There is a sort of deep history there. Um, and then recently Russian espionage efforts have been intertwined with attempts to exert political influence and destabilize the pro-European government. Um, the presence of Russian military forces in the breakaway, breakaway region of Transnistria provides a strategic foothold for intelligence operations, and former-President Igor Dodon currently faces charges of treason after evidence emerged of his communications with Russian security officials and accepting funds from pro-Russian oligarchs. Moldovan authorities have dismantled spy networks orchestrated by Russian agents. And, um, yeah, uh, so these operations include spreading disinformation, organizing protests to undermine public trust in state institutions. And obviously they've been involved in some of these sort of sabotage operations that are kind of going on at the moment. So, I think Bulgaria and Moldova should be considered with regards to this. Um, and I'm hoping, um, I'm in the works at the moment on a Bulgarian spy special soon with Florian Flade. So, hopefully that'll be coming up in the next sort of few weeks. [01:07:47] Matt: Cool. [01:07:47] Chris: Um, so, just negotiating that currently. Um, so there may be more to follow this. Um, oh, and one last thing. [01:07:54] Matt: Yeah. [01:07:54] Chris: There's a, there's an interesting article by Mark Kramer for Harvard University titled "A Weak Link in NATO: Bulgaria, Russia, and the Lure of Espionage." I'll put that in the show notes as well. Um, I, I won't summarize it, but there's some very interesting stuff in there. It's from 2021, but the majority of it's still quite relevant. So, um, there's a bit of further reading on Bulgaria and it's sort of, uh, history of all this. So, um, we'll move on to our final question, but thank you very much Sam for that, that was really good. Um, so our final one is from Richard in the UK. So, thank you, Richard. He's seen a few articles about Hungary being expected to take Russia's side within the EU and an attempt to block or water down ongoing efforts to put pressure on Russia. Is there a sense that Hungary is Russia's "inside man" or do Hungarians', uh, interest just simply align with Russia's? And secondly, um, whereas the UK voluntarily left the EU, does the EU have any mechanism for expelling or suspending members? So, uh, Matt, I dunno if you had any thoughts on this. [01:08:58] Matt: Yeah, I mean, Hungary under Orbán has been described as an, um, illiberal democracy. Um, uh, you, you know, um, it comes into power through democratic means, and then uses the democratic system to subvert itself -- to to, to subvert that system and make it much harder, um, to be removed through democratic means, which I think is especially shitty. Um, just do a coup, you know, the old fashioned way, if that's how you wanna go. But, uh, yeah, I mean, they're, they're part of, uh, or Orbánism is part of the same kind of, you know, far-right nationalist movement that Putinism is a part of, that the MAGA movement is a part of. You know, they're all kind of the same confederation, I guess you could say. Um, and yeah, certainly has been, um, a thorn in the side of Brussels for, for a while. Um, you know, Orbán has officially condemned the invasion, um, of Ukraine but, you know, his actions like, uh, lobbying to remove Russian oligarchs from sanctions lists and staging, you know, these sort of solo peace missions or whatever, um, align with the Kremlin's interest for sure, and definitely undermine EU unity. Um, it's an issue in NATO as well. Of course, you know, NATO decision making, um -- Chris, did I lose you? Oh, no, okay. [01:10:16] Chris: No, I'm still good. [01:10:16] Matt: You were just, you were just holding very, you were holding very still for a minute, I thought you had frozen. [01:10:26] Chris: Shall I let you pick? [01:10:27] Matt: If I was a, if I was a dinosaur, I would've, I wouldn't have even seen you there. [01:10:31] Chris: My sniper training. [01:10:35] Matt: Anyway, where, where, where was I? Um, yeah, so it's been an issue for, um, NATO as well at times. You know, NATO, officially, their decision making process runs on, on consensus. You know, so every member has to agree -- or at least, um, every member has to, has to agree on a proposal or at least agree not to object to it, right? [01:10:55] Chris: Mm-hmm. [01:10:55] Matt: Um, that's called the "silence procedure." I won't get more nerdy on, on NATO's decision making, um, than that, but, uh, anyway. Um, but, you know, some argue that Hungary's alignment, of course, is more, you know, opportunistic than, than conspiratorial. Um, as far as what the EU can do about it. Um, so the EU has no mechanism to expel, um, a member state. Uh, even suspending, um, Hungary's voting rights in Article 7 requires unanimous support from other members, um, which is something Hungary has so far avoided thanks to political allies within the union, such as Slovakia. Um, so a radical alternative that was sort of floated -- and this is purely, purely hypothetical; it's not gonna happen -- um, would be to, like, invoke -- for, for every other EU member other than Hungary to invoke Article 50, which is the Brexit clause. So essentially is, like -- this is, this is crazy. When I read this, I was like, this is insane. Um, every EU member-- [01:11:58] Chris: Dissolve the EU and start a new one? Is that what it is? [01:12:00] Matt: Right. [01:12:00] Chris: Bloody hell. [01:12:01] Matt: You would basically say, we're gonna close this EU and we're gonna start another one without Hungary in it. [01:12:06] Chris: EU 2.0. [01:12:07] Matt: That's the only way you could -- right. That's the only way you could procedurally-- [01:12:10] Chris: Could Britain join that? [01:12:11] Matt: Call up Keir. [01:12:15] Chris: Oh, God. Who suggested that? Fucking hell. [01:12:17] Matt: But if, if you're looking for, for a-- [01:12:19] Chris: Let's talk about the nuclear option, yeah. [01:12:21] Matt: Right. That's, yes, if you're looking for a, a procedural way to get Hungary out without it choosing to leave, that's it. You would have to, um, nuke the EU and start up, like reboot it-- [01:12:36] Chris: Wow. [01:12:36] Matt: Without Hungary. [01:12:37] Chris: Wow. [01:12:37] Matt: That's it. So, it's, it's un, it's unfortunate. I mean, I was, um, my sort of like hypothetical, you know, dream sort of situation for, for current geopolitical issues that I was thinking of, you know, back in the summer and the fall and stuff when, you know, if the election went another way, I'm thinking, you know, yeah, we gotta, we gotta do something about, about, about Orbán. Um, that's an issue, that's a serious weak point, um, in NATO. I mean, you're not gonna have US support to do that. If anything, I think if Brussels got serious about really punishing Orbán, um, you, you're gonna have the Trump administration, you know, pissing in the tent from the outside. Um, anyway. It's, it's, it's a, yeah, Orbán is, Orbán's Hungary is a, is, is an issue. It is frustrating. It is concerning. It is, you know, we've talked about issues, uh, stories of, you know, uh, him inviting Chinese, uh, State Security in to sort of, you know, use Hungary as a base to spy on Chinese dissidents throughout Europe. I think that's a huge issue, um, that is not taken seriously nearly enough. But, procedurally, within the EU the way it's constituted, there's, there's really, there, there's nothing realistically that, that, that you can do about it, if Hungary does not choose to leave on its own. So, it's a problem. [01:13:54] Chris: Yeah. So as you said, yeah, there's no formal mechanism to remove a country from the EU and the reason is, um, because they're worried that mechanism could undermine the EU's legitimacy and open a door to political abuse or trigger massive legal and constitutional complications. [01:14:10] Matt: Right. [01:14:11] Chris: Um, the most serious thing they have is a tool called Article 7, which allows the EU to warn a member state of violating kind of core EU values, and they can suspend certain rights such as you were saying earlier about voting rights in the EU Council. Um, and apparently the has, this has been triggered against Poland and Hungary in the past. Um, but full sanctions require unanimous agreement and obviously if one member has, uh, partners or allies that can undermine that. So, it's a bit of an issue. I think the whole idea of nuking, uh, the EU and starting a new one is a bad, in some ways a bad idea because the thing is, yes, Hungary under Orbán is a problem, but hopefully things might change. And there is, there is, um, some glimmer of hope at the moment. [01:14:57] Matt: Great point. [01:14:58] Chris: Um, because, this is the thing, isn't it? If we just expel people because we don't like 'em all the time, it becomes this, you know, then we could let 'em back in, then we kick 'em out. [01:15:06] Matt: Right. [01:15:07] Chris: And it just becomes a bit dysfunctional, doesn't it? It's tricky. [01:15:10] Matt: Yeah. [01:15:10] Chris: It's a bit like family. It's, it's tricky sometimes. [01:15:14] Matt: It's, it's also, I think honestly it's a way of -- and I've asked European listeners to this podcast to look at the US in the same way, you know, a, a couple weeks ago when we were talking about this -- in the sense that, yeah, you may be pissed off at the government and, and, and at the top, and you have every right to do so. But don't ignore the, the pushback and the feeling of ordinary people within that country that are trying to push back and say, "This is not what we want. This is not who we stand for, and we're not gonna let you be in power forever." You know, that's happening here in the US all the time. Um, picking up more so now. And I think, as you were saying, that's happening in, in Hungary also, you know? So, I mean, yeah, Orbán would love nothing more than the Western club to, you know, kick him out so he can fully align himself with Putin and everything, but yeah. [01:16:01] Chris: Yeah. Well, the greatest opponent of Orbán at the moment is a man named Peter Magyar, and I hope I got his name correct there. Um, and he's sort of positioned himself, um, you know, as a clear contrast to Orbán, especially in foreign policy, and is expect -- and he's expressed strong support for the EU and he is calling for a return to democratic norms and closer ties with Brussels. Unlike Orbán, who has maintained friendly relations with Russia and often clashes with the EU, Magyar has criticized the government's alignment with Moscow and its confrontational stance towards the EU. So, yeah. So, the, the 2026 election will be one to keep an eye on. [01:16:37] Matt: Yeah. [01:16:37] Chris: I would expect significant Russian influence operations, as I suspect they'll want to not lose  Orbán. Um, and you may also see some money from America connected to MAGA giving support for Orbán as well. [01:16:52] Matt: You should expect JD Vance to get involved in that and, you know, people like -- I mean, I don't know how, how much political capital Musk is gonna have in 2026. He's, he's is dwindling rapidly right now. [01:17:03] Chris: Good. [01:17:03] Matt: But -- thank God -- but, yeah, you will definitely see, um, far-right US personalities try to influence that, for sure. [01:17:12] Chris: Oh yeah, totally. And, I don't know if it'll go as far as Fox News and stuff supporting Orbán or something, but, uh, we want to keep an eye on, so, uh-- [01:17:21] Matt: I mean, Tucker Carlson will. [01:17:22] Chris: Yeah, yeah. [01:17:24] Matt: Openly. Steve Bannon will, yeah. [01:17:26] Chris: Totally. Yeah, so it, there is a glimmer of hope, but you know, the glimmer of hope is like a candle. It, it, it, depending on which way the wind's going, could either keep the flame going or blow it out. But, uh, we'll see how that goes. Um, so, yeah, thank you, Julie, Sam, and Richard for your questions there. And we'll definitely do this again next month. So, please send us an email to Secrets and Spies Podcast at gmail dot com or DM us on our social channels. Just in your message, include your question or topic, and if it's a topic with a relevant news or online publication link. Um, and also let us know how you'd like us to read out your name and location online, because I don't want to give anything away accidentally. So, uh, that is us done for today. So, thank you very much, Matt, and, um-- [01:18:11] Matt: Thank you. [01:18:12] Chris: Thank you very much, everybody, for listening. You know, obviously, if you enjoy these episodes, please share them. The more you share them, the more new people come and listen to it and the more that helps us keep going. So, thank you. And, um, if you wanna go ad-free, please go to Patreon dot com forward slash Secrets and Spies and uh, you can select what level works best for you, and then you'll get free access to all our -- sorry, you'll get access to all our episodes that are ad-free. Um, we also have a merchandise store where you can buy a really cool Secrets and Spies cup or tote bag, water bottles, and even coasters, and you go to Redbubble dot com. Uh, if you go to the link in our show notes, you can do that. And also, we're on YouTube. Uh, please support our YouTube page. Just go to Secrets and Spies Podcast on YouTube, and you'll find us there. As I was saying, all the links in the show notes, as are our social media links as well on Bluesky, et cetera. So, thank you very much, Matt, for your time today. [01:19:05] Matt: Thank you. [01:19:05] Chris: And thank you, everybody, for listening, and we will catch you on the next one. Take care. [01:19:09] Matt: Bye. [01:19:23] Announcer: Thanks for listening. 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