[00:00:01] [SPEAKER_01]: Due to the themes of this podcast, listener discretion is advised.

[00:00:07] [SPEAKER_02]: I think the Iranians and the Axis of Resistance and even Lebanese Hezbollah were victims of

[00:00:13] [SPEAKER_02]: their own propaganda.

[00:00:14] [SPEAKER_02]: And I think they were victims of their own successes or what they perceived as successes.

[00:00:19] [SPEAKER_02]: And because of that, they never gave the other side a true vote.

[00:00:23] [SPEAKER_02]: And the Israelis had a vote-ness.

[00:00:26] [SPEAKER_01]: Lock your doors.

[00:00:27] [SPEAKER_01]: Close the blinds.

[00:00:29] [SPEAKER_01]: Change your passwords.

[00:00:30] [SPEAKER_01]: This is Secrets and Spies.

[00:00:45] [SPEAKER_01]: Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics,

[00:00:51] [SPEAKER_01]: and intrigue.

[00:00:52] [SPEAKER_01]: This episode is presented by Matt Fulton and produced by Chris Carr.

[00:00:57] [SPEAKER_03]: Hello everyone and welcome back to Secrets and Spies.

[00:01:00] [SPEAKER_03]: In today's special episode, Phillip Smyth returns,

[00:01:03] [SPEAKER_03]: mere days after his last appearance on the podcast,

[00:01:06] [SPEAKER_03]: to unpack another seismic event in the Middle East,

[00:01:08] [SPEAKER_03]: the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in a targeted Israeli air strike.

[00:01:14] [SPEAKER_03]: Nasrallah's death has sent shockwaves throughout Lebanon, Iran, and the Islamic Republic's web

[00:01:19] [SPEAKER_03]: of militia groups, raising urgent questions about the future of Hezbollah

[00:01:23] [SPEAKER_03]: and its place in the region's power dynamics.

[00:01:26] [SPEAKER_03]: As he's done several times now during this conflict,

[00:01:28] [SPEAKER_03]: Phillip will help us understand the players, their backgrounds,

[00:01:31] [SPEAKER_03]: and the potential consequences to come.

[00:01:33] [SPEAKER_03]: Together we'll explore Israel's strategic motivations, Iran's response,

[00:01:37] [SPEAKER_03]: and what this means for the already tense situation in the Middle East.

[00:01:41] [SPEAKER_03]: We'll also look at the broader regional impact,

[00:01:43] [SPEAKER_03]: including Israel's ground offensive and Iran's retaliatory ballistic missile attack.

[00:01:48] [SPEAKER_03]: It's a complex and fast-moving situation,

[00:01:50] [SPEAKER_03]: so stay tuned as we break it down and discuss what might come next.

[00:01:55] [SPEAKER_03]: As always, a couple housekeeping notes first.

[00:01:57] [SPEAKER_03]: If you enjoy the show, please leave a five star rating and review on your podcast

[00:02:00] [SPEAKER_03]: streaming app of choice.

[00:02:02] [SPEAKER_03]: And if you're not already, please consider supporting us on Patreon.

[00:02:05] [SPEAKER_03]: It's super easy.

[00:02:06] [SPEAKER_03]: You just go to patreon.com forward slash secrets and spies.

[00:02:10] [SPEAKER_03]: The generosity helps keep this podcast going.

[00:02:13] [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks for listening, and I hope you enjoy our conversation.

[00:02:16] [SPEAKER_01]: The opinions expressed by guests on secrets and spies

[00:02:18] [SPEAKER_01]: do not necessarily represent those of the producers and sponsors of this podcast.

[00:02:38] [SPEAKER_03]: Phillips, my friend, what brings you back so soon?

[00:02:43] [SPEAKER_03]: Did something happen?

[00:02:45] [SPEAKER_02]: No, nothing really that crazy over the past week.

[00:02:48] [SPEAKER_02]: Nothing at all.

[00:02:48] [SPEAKER_02]: Or a week and a half.

[00:02:49] [SPEAKER_03]: No, nothing at all.

[00:02:50] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I was not planning to do this again so soon in less than a week,

[00:02:56] [SPEAKER_03]: as I was editing the last episode that you appeared on.

[00:03:01] [SPEAKER_03]: Something happened.

[00:03:02] [SPEAKER_03]: I'm like sitting at my desk looking at CNN right there going,

[00:03:07] [SPEAKER_03]: oh, okay.

[00:03:10] [SPEAKER_03]: And I hadn't recorded the intro yet, so I had to sort of rework that

[00:03:13] [SPEAKER_03]: and note that this happened, but not say the man's state because it was not yet known.

[00:03:19] [SPEAKER_03]: And I didn't want to walk out on a limb or anything.

[00:03:23] [SPEAKER_03]: But now we have more answers and more of an idea of what's going on

[00:03:26] [SPEAKER_03]: and what may be happening in the future.

[00:03:28] [SPEAKER_03]: So yeah, here we are to do part two of the crazy last two weeks.

[00:03:33] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm sorry that given you cover a ton of other additionally important things,

[00:03:39] [SPEAKER_02]: I genuinely actually feel bad coming back and constantly discussing this issue,

[00:03:44] [SPEAKER_02]: not that I have trouble talking with you, but it's like it never ends.

[00:03:50] [SPEAKER_03]: No, this is a corner of the world and a few groups and characters that

[00:03:55] [SPEAKER_03]: have been near and dear to me.

[00:03:58] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, maybe not near and dear to me, but they've been sort of floating in my orbit

[00:04:01] [SPEAKER_03]: for many years as you know.

[00:04:03] [SPEAKER_03]: Well, let's get into it.

[00:04:05] [SPEAKER_03]: I'll give some background notes on the situation.

[00:04:07] [SPEAKER_03]: And then yeah, we'll do our usual thing here.

[00:04:11] [SPEAKER_03]: So to start us off on Friday evening, September 27th,

[00:04:15] [SPEAKER_03]: Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah alongside the IRGC Kuts forces commander for Lebanon

[00:04:21] [SPEAKER_03]: and other senior officers were killed in a massive airstrike on a command bunker

[00:04:26] [SPEAKER_03]: buried some 60 feet beneath a residential block in South Beirut.

[00:04:30] [SPEAKER_03]: The French newspaper La Parisian reported an Iranian agent informed on Nasrallah's

[00:04:35] [SPEAKER_03]: whereabouts. However, according to Ronan Bergman who for listeners who are unaware is like the

[00:04:41] [SPEAKER_03]: unofficial chronicler of Israeli intelligence.

[00:04:45] [SPEAKER_03]: So Ronan Bergman said that Israeli intelligence had tracked Nasrallah's location for months

[00:04:50] [SPEAKER_03]: and struck an eliminated window before he was to move again.

[00:04:54] [SPEAKER_03]: Israeli F-15s dropped over 80 munitions including U.S.-made 2000 pound bombs

[00:04:59] [SPEAKER_03]: to fully destroy the complex which coincided with BB Netanyahu's address to the UN General Assembly.

[00:05:06] [SPEAKER_03]: Deputy Secretary General Naim Qasem was named as Hezbollah's interim leader.

[00:05:10] [SPEAKER_03]: On the 29th, Al Arabiya reported that Hashem Safedin, head of the group's Executive Council

[00:05:16] [SPEAKER_03]: and Nasrallah's cousin, was appointed his successor.

[00:05:19] [SPEAKER_03]: Follow on air raids by the IDF throughout the weekend targeted Hezbollah command and

[00:05:23] [SPEAKER_03]: control nodes and weapons storage facilities where the continued focus as before on the

[00:05:29] [SPEAKER_03]: group's long-range missile, rocket and drone forces.

[00:05:32] [SPEAKER_03]: On September 30th, the IDF informed the U.S. of their intent to carry out a limited ground

[00:05:36] [SPEAKER_03]: offensive into southern Lebanon designed to clear Hezbollah positions.

[00:05:40] [SPEAKER_03]: Beginning with special forces raids, Israeli troops have continued to mass along the border

[00:05:44] [SPEAKER_03]: clashes with Hezbollah forces inside Lebanon that resulted in Israeli casualties

[00:05:49] [SPEAKER_03]: were reported this morning and I believe that continued a bit throughout the day.

[00:05:53] [SPEAKER_03]: Then yesterday, October 1st, in retaliation for the assassinations of Nasrallah

[00:05:57] [SPEAKER_03]: and Hamas' Ismail Hania in Tehran in July, Iran fired approximately 180 ballistic missiles at

[00:06:04] [SPEAKER_03]: military and government targets throughout Israel, twice the number previously launched in April.

[00:06:10] [SPEAKER_03]: Israeli air defenses with the assistance of U.S. and allied forces in the region

[00:06:13] [SPEAKER_03]: intercepted many although some caused relatively minor damage on the ground.

[00:06:18] [SPEAKER_03]: A few air bases were hit but are still operational and judging by videos I saw

[00:06:23] [SPEAKER_03]: yesterday, Iran really wanted to hit Mossad's headquarters just north of Tel Aviv.

[00:06:28] [SPEAKER_03]: One Palestinian man was killed by a falling missile in Jericho.

[00:06:32] [SPEAKER_03]: A few other civilians were wounded in Israel and Jordan.

[00:06:35] [SPEAKER_03]: As of this recording, so late afternoon eastern time on Wednesday the second, Israeli officials

[00:06:41] [SPEAKER_03]: say they'll launch a significant retaliation within days possibly targeting oil facilities

[00:06:46] [SPEAKER_03]: or other high value sites within Iran. It's worth noting that tomorrow or the day of this

[00:06:51] [SPEAKER_03]: release is Rosh Hashanah and next Saturday is Yom Kippur which may have some bearing on the timing

[00:06:58] [SPEAKER_03]: of Israel's response. Philip, are there other Jewish holidays right around now that I'm missing?

[00:07:04] [SPEAKER_02]: You got Rosh Hashanah, I think it's going on right now.

[00:07:08] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, yeah, it's past sunset over there. Yeah, so it's actually already Rosh Hashanah.

[00:07:13] [SPEAKER_03]: But yeah, so that essentially brings us up to speed, Philip. Any major details that I

[00:07:19] [SPEAKER_02]: missed before we start talking? Yeah, so there are a few key things that are in there.

[00:07:25] [SPEAKER_02]: There has been, it's interesting, you mentioned Nahum Qalsim. So Nahum Qalsim is the official

[00:07:31] [SPEAKER_02]: number two within Lebanese Hezbollah. His book's on my shelf right over there.

[00:07:35] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, he wrote that there were a ton of really fascinating factual errors that are in it,

[00:07:39] [SPEAKER_02]: deliberately placed for propagandistic purposes. But again, really interesting

[00:07:44] [SPEAKER_02]: book to actually read through for a certain historical take in time for what Lebanese Hezbollah

[00:07:50] [SPEAKER_02]: was trying to push out at that time. So it's good that you have it, but keep in mind when it was

[00:07:55] [SPEAKER_02]: written and why it was written for which purposes. But kind of going forward, you mentioned Nahum

[00:08:01] [SPEAKER_02]: Qalsim and he is an old school Lebanese Hezbollah guy. And even though he's kind of the

[00:08:07] [SPEAKER_02]: official number two, there's a serious doubt in my mind that he would actually ascend to

[00:08:12] [SPEAKER_02]: truly being a number one because he never really functioned like that. He was markedly more public,

[00:08:16] [SPEAKER_02]: he was not as popular obviously as Nahum Qalsim did not really have the same connections but

[00:08:22] [SPEAKER_02]: was an old hand to the group but kind of did other stuff. But this kind of brings us to

[00:08:27] [SPEAKER_02]: Hashem Safi El-Din who was, you mentioned that he's a cousin. I think he's a cousin on,

[00:08:33] [SPEAKER_02]: it's like Nahum Qalsim's mother's end because I literally have a chart for this

[00:08:37] [SPEAKER_02]: because Hezbollah, there's been a lot of like kind of intra-family links that go with a lot of kind

[00:08:44] [SPEAKER_02]: of the command structure. And he's a really interesting figure that you're going to hear

[00:08:49] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of the same stuff repeated about him constantly now that he is probably going

[00:08:54] [SPEAKER_02]: to be in the cat bird seat. So there's only like so much that was known but interestingly,

[00:08:58] [SPEAKER_02]: I would say that since around at least end of 2006 to 2008 it became pretty apparent

[00:09:06] [SPEAKER_02]: that he was being kind of groomed to be the successor to Nasrallah. So I want to kind of

[00:09:11] [SPEAKER_02]: put that aside. There's another piece to this. Can we put a pin on that and go back to Nasrallah

[00:09:15] [SPEAKER_03]: for a second and then work our way back to him? Definitely. Okay, cool. So yeah, let's start with

[00:09:19] [SPEAKER_03]: who Hassan Nasrallah was, what impact did he have on Lebanese Hezbollah as an organization

[00:09:24] [SPEAKER_03]: and a movement and what did he represent for Iran's access of resistance more broadly?

[00:09:31] [SPEAKER_02]: So he was, it's interesting that you ask this because I should be having a piece coming

[00:09:35] [SPEAKER_02]: out that talks about this a little bit for an Arabic language publication, but I don't want to say

[00:09:41] [SPEAKER_02]: yet because you know, make sure it gets published. But he had a role that was so multi-fold and

[00:09:48] [SPEAKER_02]: so important within the broader and I put this in quotes, access of resistance that Iran had

[00:09:54] [SPEAKER_02]: tailored. And we're talking about with the access of resistance, it's a collection of

[00:09:58] [SPEAKER_02]: Shia militias, Palestinian groups, sometimes secular Marxist organizations. Bashar al-Assad

[00:10:03] [SPEAKER_02]: Syria is roped into that one. Sometimes the Russians are roped in, sometimes the North Koreans

[00:10:07] [SPEAKER_02]: are roped in with the access of resistance. But for all intents and purposes, it's an Iranian run

[00:10:14] [SPEAKER_02]: kind of network of what really amounts to their proxies. And they try to give them kind of

[00:10:20] [SPEAKER_02]: almost a nationalist sounding standing. But if they are ideologically loyal to Iran

[00:10:25] [SPEAKER_02]: and following the absolute rightful foci, you know, it doesn't really,

[00:10:29] [SPEAKER_02]: and that's their ideological thinking. That's what it's called in Arabic anyway.

[00:10:34] [SPEAKER_03]: So to put it simply, the access, all the groups that we've been talking about here together for

[00:10:39] [SPEAKER_03]: the last year, Hamas, Palestinian, Islamic Jihad, PFL, PGC, the Houthis, all the

[00:10:47] [SPEAKER_03]: myriad groups in Iraq and stuff, Lebanese, Zubbala, they all together are the access of

[00:10:52] [SPEAKER_03]: resistance. This network of militias that Iran has.

[00:10:55] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, they're all in there. They're all in there and some are a little bit more equal

[00:10:58] [SPEAKER_02]: than others. That's kind of what I was getting at with the ideological bit.

[00:11:01] [SPEAKER_02]: And also, again, a lot of it, the way it's presented, at least kind of its outward face is,

[00:11:06] [SPEAKER_02]: oh look, there are all these different groups from different nations and they're coming together

[00:11:10] [SPEAKER_02]: and it's all kind of hunky dory and everyone has an equal seat at the table. No, it doesn't

[00:11:15] [SPEAKER_02]: really work that way. The Iranians take charge and very specific personalities and very specific

[00:11:20] [SPEAKER_02]: groups take that kind of leading position within the grouping itself. And this is kind

[00:11:25] [SPEAKER_02]: of a replication in some respects of what you've seen in Iraq with Al-Hashd al-Shabi or the popular

[00:11:30] [SPEAKER_02]: mobilization forces, which itself is a collection of 50 militias, mostly Shia militias, mostly Iranian

[00:11:37] [SPEAKER_02]: controlled militias. But there's some kind of, there's a level of diversity there.

[00:11:43] [SPEAKER_02]: But a lot of it comes down to who Iran can rope into their side. So where does Nasrullah

[00:11:48] [SPEAKER_02]: fit in with this? Or where did he fit in with this? Nasrullah kind of like Qasim

[00:11:52] [SPEAKER_02]: Sulamani or a bit like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was actually the officially

[00:11:59] [SPEAKER_02]: the second in command in Al-Hashd al-Shabi, but in truth he was really the leader of it and really

[00:12:04] [SPEAKER_02]: they kind of brought it all together. So the Iraqi militia consortium? Yes. And he was in Iraqi,

[00:12:09] [SPEAKER_02]: also married to an Iranian, spoke Persian very well. But he was kind of that main glue that

[00:12:13] [SPEAKER_02]: held those Iraqi groups together. Now think of it like Hassan Nasrullah. Hassan Nasrullah

[00:12:17] [SPEAKER_02]: didn't just hold together Lebanese Hezbollah and the Lebanese Hezbollah outgrowths in Syria,

[00:12:23] [SPEAKER_02]: or groups that were maybe kind of a little bit more prone to being pro-Hazbalah, let's say in

[00:12:29] [SPEAKER_02]: Iraq or elsewhere. He took on an even more unique position than Mahandis. He took on even a more

[00:12:35] [SPEAKER_02]: unique position than, say, Sulamani. Because Nasrullah had, we're talking four decades of

[00:12:40] [SPEAKER_02]: experience and growth within the wider network, within the Iranian proxy groups, and within

[00:12:45] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese Hezbollah itself. He had a claim to fame because of the 2000 pullout of the Israelis

[00:12:51] [SPEAKER_02]: from southern Lebanon, 2006, the so-called divine victory against the Israelis. And

[00:12:56] [SPEAKER_02]: it's arguable how victorious Hezbollah was, but they survived. And Nasrullah was not killed

[00:13:02] [SPEAKER_02]: during that conflict and it demonstrated that Hezbollah could still fight with a lot of metal.

[00:13:07] [SPEAKER_02]: And so there was kind of this panache that was built up with Nasrullah,

[00:13:10] [SPEAKER_02]: just regarding personality and leadership form and style, that a lot of other militia group

[00:13:18] [SPEAKER_02]: leaders, even if they targeted the Americans or even if they had tried to target the Israelis or

[00:13:23] [SPEAKER_02]: done a variety of different moves, they did not have that kind of same credibility that he did.

[00:13:30] [SPEAKER_02]: He also was an old school ideologue. The reason I brought up absolutely Laidat al-Falqi before

[00:13:35] [SPEAKER_02]: was because he was an early student of it, but he was far more youthful than any of the now

[00:13:39] [SPEAKER_02]: octogenarian leadership that you'd see in Iran or even in Iraq. He was one of those youthful

[00:13:44] [SPEAKER_02]: militants but a cleric, a Said, meaning he's related to the Prophet Muhammad. So you have

[00:13:50] [SPEAKER_02]: these different elements that are there that kind of outlined a strong figurehead that was

[00:13:55] [SPEAKER_02]: within this grouping, but it went more than that. It wasn't just kind of an outward face.

[00:14:02] [SPEAKER_02]: He was heavily invested and heavily involved whenever there is an issue within this network

[00:14:08] [SPEAKER_02]: with taking care of it. He was often the interlocutor who the Iranians would go to and say,

[00:14:13] [SPEAKER_02]: hey, we've gotten the issue. We know that let's say Muktada Sader. Muktada Sader is causing us

[00:14:18] [SPEAKER_02]: problems and Muktada Sader is the scabrous politico-come-cleric from Iraq. People may remember

[00:14:24] [SPEAKER_02]: him from the Mahdi army days back in the early days of the Iraq war. But for a time,

[00:14:31] [SPEAKER_02]: one could call him an Iranian proxy. But he, I want to say, even during the Iraq war,

[00:14:37] [SPEAKER_02]: split away from the Iranians quite a bit. This caused a lot of strife between him and Iran and

[00:14:42] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of the Iranian proxies, but he still had familial links in Lebanon. He'd go to Lebanon.

[00:14:48] [SPEAKER_02]: He also had a close connection with Hassan Nasrullah, a personal connection that was built,

[00:14:52] [SPEAKER_02]: bit like Qasem Soleimani or Mohandis, where they would often have this personal connection,

[00:14:57] [SPEAKER_02]: that panache that I was talking about, a certain cache that would go along with

[00:15:01] [SPEAKER_02]: their personalities. So a lot of these leaders would kind of go to Nasrullah. Nasrullah being

[00:15:05] [SPEAKER_02]: in Arab, meaning he's Lebanese. He speaks Arabic. He speaks colloquial Lebanese

[00:15:11] [SPEAKER_02]: when he is giving a speech often. He'll do that.

[00:15:13] [SPEAKER_03]: Studied in Tehran as well at the seminaries there, in Combe, not Tehran.

[00:15:18] [SPEAKER_02]: No, actually, Nasrullah, are we talking about Sader or are we talking about

[00:15:25] [SPEAKER_02]: Nasrullah? Nasrullah actually primarily studied in Najaf.

[00:15:29] [SPEAKER_02]: He actually studied with Abbas al-Musawi, the person that he replaced after Musawi was

[00:15:34] [SPEAKER_02]: killed. But that's actually where he kind of adopted a lot of the Khomeinist thinking and

[00:15:39] [SPEAKER_02]: the reason he brought it back to Lebanon after there were a lot of expulsions of people who

[00:15:43] [SPEAKER_02]: tended to like that ideology by this guy that I don't think we remember anymore named Saddam

[00:15:47] [SPEAKER_02]: Hussein. But interestingly, Nasrullah was this guy who could be the point man for the Iranians

[00:15:54] [SPEAKER_02]: without having... And it's interesting because there's this dual fold. It's very hard to

[00:15:58] [SPEAKER_02]: write about. Nasrullah was identified by plenty of his opposition as being an Iranian

[00:16:04] [SPEAKER_02]: Iranian lackey. He does whatever they tell him. But there was another element that was there too

[00:16:09] [SPEAKER_02]: that appeared far more autonomous. It appeared like his own little personality was kind of taking

[00:16:15] [SPEAKER_02]: it over. He allowed a certain level of autonomy for Lebanese Hezbollah. Again,

[00:16:19] [SPEAKER_02]: they are the crown jewel of the Iranian proxy network. And because of that, again, he carried

[00:16:25] [SPEAKER_02]: with him a very, very different style of invigorating different groups and leadership.

[00:16:30] [SPEAKER_02]: He was kind of the one that if you had his blessing to have a picture with him taken

[00:16:34] [SPEAKER_02]: when he was visiting you, that could really kind of make or break the group.

[00:16:38] [SPEAKER_02]: A good example of this is a group I actually wrote the first profile on them called

[00:16:42] [SPEAKER_02]: Harakat-Hazbal al-Nujaba or Harakat al-Nujaba, which is an Iraqi group did a lot of recruitment

[00:16:47] [SPEAKER_02]: for Syria. But their leader, Akram Kaby, met with him, I want to say from like 2015 on,

[00:16:54] [SPEAKER_02]: but the first public one was really 2017. And just because of those meetings, all of a sudden

[00:16:59] [SPEAKER_02]: that's the picture that was going out. That's how he got wider credibility. Who's this Iraqi guy?

[00:17:04] [SPEAKER_02]: For people in my position, I knew who he was going well back to the Iraq war

[00:17:08] [SPEAKER_02]: and kind of the targeting that he would do of American forces and the recruitment he was doing

[00:17:12] [SPEAKER_02]: for Syria. But for people who are not as invested in looking at this kind of microcosm

[00:17:17] [SPEAKER_02]: of Middle Eastern politics, that's like the thing that put him, really put him out there.

[00:17:23] [SPEAKER_02]: So, I mean, he carried that with him. That legitimacy going on even with ideology, and this is

[00:17:29] [SPEAKER_02]: I talk about this in part in that article, there's a lot of credibility that's being lost for Iran's

[00:17:35] [SPEAKER_02]: transnational ideology of absolutely la de del foque. There's corruption in their countries,

[00:17:40] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of other issues, there's repression. A lot of people think it's, you know,

[00:17:44] [SPEAKER_02]: a bunch of octogenarians who are just pushing around people who just don't really want this

[00:17:48] [SPEAKER_02]: system or setup anymore. And Nasrullah brought a very different character to it that even, I think,

[00:17:55] [SPEAKER_02]: his opposition would agree that it kind of felt a little bit more Lebanese, felt a little bit more

[00:17:59] [SPEAKER_02]: Arab. Oh, if the Arabs have an issue in the Iranian thinking, have them go to Nasrullah,

[00:18:03] [SPEAKER_02]: or maybe they would just go to Nasrullah on their own because that was the interlocutor

[00:18:07] [SPEAKER_02]: to get to the Iranians and maybe negotiate a deal in the middle. I mean, that's what

[00:18:11] [SPEAKER_02]: happened with Mecca to Sulder quite a bit. So, I mean, you have to think about Nasrullah

[00:18:15] [SPEAKER_02]: in this position where he was this key lynchpin, a guy who was marketed as having absolute and

[00:18:21] [SPEAKER_02]: total success against the hated Israelis and the hated Americans. Somebody who demonstrated complete

[00:18:28] [SPEAKER_02]: loyalty to the absolute la de del foque, albeit I will say more privately, he changed public

[00:18:34] [SPEAKER_02]: statements where he didn't really back away from la de del foque but he didn't emphasize it quite

[00:18:38] [SPEAKER_02]: so much. Like in 2009, Hezbollah did that, but it was still there, still kicking, they

[00:18:43] [SPEAKER_02]: still, that's like the primary system they use. But he had a very, very interesting place and it's

[00:18:48] [SPEAKER_02]: pretty much irreplaceable for the Iranians just like Soleimani is technically irreplaceable or

[00:18:54] [SPEAKER_02]: Mohandis is technically irreplaceable. This is the other person who I would say within that pantheon,

[00:19:01] [SPEAKER_02]: those three guys were this triumvirate of very powerful, interesting people who really kept

[00:19:08] [SPEAKER_02]: the ball rolling. And it's interesting, like what's the closest comparison one could have now?

[00:19:12] [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe Abdel Malik al-Houthi, but the Houthis have their own issues and they're also in Yemen

[00:19:16] [SPEAKER_02]: and it's like a whole bit of separation that's there even right down to the Shi'ism exhibited.

[00:19:22] [SPEAKER_02]: So I mean, it's a very different kind of guy.

[00:19:24] [SPEAKER_03]: I just want to jog Lister's memories real quick. Qasem Soleimani was an Iranian general,

[00:19:29] [SPEAKER_03]: longtime commander of the Quds Force. Abdel Malik al-Mahandis, as you said, was sort of

[00:19:36] [SPEAKER_03]: Soleimani's deputy for all the Iraqi militia groups. They were both killed in a US drone

[00:19:41] [SPEAKER_03]: strike outside Baghdad airport at the very beginning of 2020. Did you expect that Israel

[00:19:47] [SPEAKER_02]: would eliminate Nasrallah to do so now and in this way? So I would say 80% yes, but there's a 20%

[00:19:54] [SPEAKER_02]: no on that too. When we spoke about the pager attacks, I'm trying to put this into kind of

[00:20:00] [SPEAKER_02]: a grander formula for what the Israelis would want, try to spell it out for people listening.

[00:20:06] [SPEAKER_02]: When Fouad Shakur, to remind everyone was a senior leader within Lebanese Hezbollah,

[00:20:12] [SPEAKER_02]: very secretive. He was on the Jihad Council, really important old school guy, another one of the

[00:20:17] [SPEAKER_02]: irreplaceable type of people that have been there from the start, a guy who assisted with

[00:20:23] [SPEAKER_02]: bombing a number of American facilities in Lebanon, including the US embassy.

[00:20:28] [SPEAKER_02]: When that happened, that was a direct shot across Nasrallah's bout because I mean,

[00:20:33] [SPEAKER_02]: whatever the details were, and of course you're going to have a million journalists that are going

[00:20:37] [SPEAKER_02]: to say X, Y and Z and God only knows how much of this is deliberately peppered out there to

[00:20:42] [SPEAKER_02]: have a certain add-on effect for those reading it. So I tend to give it less credibility until I

[00:20:48] [SPEAKER_02]: get more collected and there's more time, which isn't always helpful when you got to do

[00:20:53] [SPEAKER_02]: this for a living and follow a lot of it. Yeah, it's a moving target.

[00:20:56] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, constantly. But I would say after that moment, after his killing by the Israelis,

[00:21:01] [SPEAKER_02]: and they killed him in an apartment complex, again, I think this actually plays even higher than

[00:21:08] [SPEAKER_02]: when Ismail Hania was killed in Iran. That's the former head of Hamas. But I would say that killing

[00:21:15] [SPEAKER_02]: somebody at the literal core of Lebanese Hezbollah who had personal phone calls with Nasrallah on a

[00:21:22] [SPEAKER_02]: regular basis, personal meetings with him who was a true leader within the group that was

[00:21:26] [SPEAKER_02]: completely opaque. The only reason many people even knew about him was because of

[00:21:30] [SPEAKER_02]: the rewards for justice post that had gone up. And this is like they had put this up a couple of

[00:21:35] [SPEAKER_02]: years ago, but nobody really kind of beyond that. Nobody was writing profiles on the guy,

[00:21:40] [SPEAKER_02]: like they even were Nasrallah. But he was a core element that was there. And then there was this

[00:21:44] [SPEAKER_02]: rumor that came out that he may have actually been on the phone with Nasrallah. And if you

[00:21:48] [SPEAKER_02]: were able to get to Shakur, then clearly you'd be able to get to Nasrallah. And I looked at

[00:21:54] [SPEAKER_02]: that and part of me was going, okay, part of this is the Israelis calling the Iranian bluff

[00:21:59] [SPEAKER_02]: of, hey, we're going to posture. The Iranians saying we're going to posture and we're going

[00:22:04] [SPEAKER_02]: to give you these terrible reactions. We're going to blow stuff up. You guys are going to have a

[00:22:08] [SPEAKER_02]: terrible time. And I think the Israelis looked at this and said, yeah, there's a lot more bark

[00:22:13] [SPEAKER_02]: than there is bite. And beyond that, it's a golden opportunity now after the failures in 2006

[00:22:19] [SPEAKER_02]: after this kind of interwar war that was going on where you had logistical networks and

[00:22:25] [SPEAKER_02]: specialized weapon systems being targeted by the Israeli Air Force and by their intelligence

[00:22:29] [SPEAKER_02]: services that, you know what? Let's call it number one. Number two, let's hit very, very hard

[00:22:35] [SPEAKER_02]: because there is a certain, there's a political reality now going on where you have

[00:22:40] [SPEAKER_02]: the American administration, America being the strongest ally to the state of Israel,

[00:22:45] [SPEAKER_02]: where they're kind of on their way out. And also they've demonstrated a lot of,

[00:22:50] [SPEAKER_02]: I think you could pretty much objectively make this call and I realized more partisan people

[00:22:55] [SPEAKER_02]: would probably disagree with me. And again, I'm trying to say this is not a partisan

[00:23:00] [SPEAKER_02]: call from like how it looks. This is dispassionate. There have been a lot of weak decisions coming

[00:23:05] [SPEAKER_02]: from Washington and a lot of dancing around certain issues, even the way that figures with

[00:23:11] [SPEAKER_02]: groups that were targeting the US and Israel but primarily targeting in the Americans,

[00:23:15] [SPEAKER_02]: the way the Americans would actually hit back was in a way that was like to not really call

[00:23:20] [SPEAKER_02]: the Iranians out, hey, let's not escalate this. That was the key term. You keep hearing that now.

[00:23:25] [SPEAKER_02]: Well, there's escalation, escalation, escalation. And I think again, the Israelis looked at this

[00:23:29] [SPEAKER_02]: and said, okay, where's the escalation? Okay, let's try this. Let's try this. Let's try this.

[00:23:33] [SPEAKER_02]: And they kept seeing nothing was going to happen. So that was part one to this.

[00:23:37] [SPEAKER_02]: Part two with the Beeper attacks. And it's been coming out in my head a little bit more

[00:23:42] [SPEAKER_02]: clearly. And it's fascinating, I was actually on Twitter X, like the spaces that they have.

[00:23:48] [SPEAKER_03]: I saw you on there a couple of minutes ago. I almost jumped on.

[00:23:51] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, you should have. That would have been interesting.

[00:23:54] [SPEAKER_02]: I got to tell one of the people on there that I had a specific propaganda poster from Lebanon

[00:23:59] [SPEAKER_02]: on the wall because it was supporting my point, which is how esoteric can we get.

[00:24:05] [SPEAKER_02]: But anyway, I was just on there and the host of it actually had a wonderful point

[00:24:11] [SPEAKER_02]: that was clicking around in my head, but he summarized it a hell of a lot better than I could

[00:24:15] [SPEAKER_02]: have done it. And it was quite clear what the Israelis were doing with the pager attacks.

[00:24:19] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, there is the added on psychological benefit where you're saying to Hezbollah,

[00:24:24] [SPEAKER_02]: your internal comms that you fought for in 2008 because just to remind people,

[00:24:29] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese Hezbollah invaded Beirut and then also crushed a lot of opposition to

[00:24:33] [SPEAKER_02]: protect their internal communications fiber optic network.

[00:24:36] [SPEAKER_03]: You went into a lot of detail about that on the last one you were on.

[00:24:40] [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.

[00:24:40] [SPEAKER_03]: Last weekend.

[00:24:41] [SPEAKER_02]: The beepers were connected in with that and that was a highly guarded and secretive thing

[00:24:46] [SPEAKER_02]: that Hezbollah did. It was a really important piece of the puzzle for the group. And then here

[00:24:51] [SPEAKER_02]: the Israelis come in and nail all the beepers on there, but it's not just that. It's not

[00:24:55] [SPEAKER_02]: just the psychological reaction. You've now removed people who are of lower intermediate

[00:25:00] [SPEAKER_02]: and senior levels. Now the guys who are a little bit more low level and intermediate,

[00:25:05] [SPEAKER_02]: clearly these are trusted people. They're getting things like the radio systems that

[00:25:08] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah used because they also targeted these radios, these ICOM radios. And then also the beepers.

[00:25:14] [SPEAKER_02]: If you have a beeper, then hey, you're connected and it's like being a doctor at a hospital.

[00:25:18] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, I got the special beeper. But now what you've done is you've removed their arms.

[00:25:21] [SPEAKER_02]: In some cases, you may have decapitated them. You may have removed a chunk of their leg.

[00:25:26] [SPEAKER_02]: It's really hard to pull the trigger on an ATGM, an anti-tank guided missile

[00:25:32] [SPEAKER_02]: or wire guided missile. It's really hard to do that when you have all your fingers blown off

[00:25:36] [SPEAKER_02]: because you're picking up the pager. So there was a tactical benefit to doing this,

[00:25:42] [SPEAKER_02]: because you're getting the guys who would be leading those units. And I think I mentioned

[00:25:46] [SPEAKER_02]: this in the last one. It may look like a low level guy got hit, but that was for the five

[00:25:51] [SPEAKER_02]: guys in his village of 500 in the Bacaw. It's still technically a command position.

[00:25:56] [SPEAKER_02]: You lose a guy like that. It's not good.

[00:25:58] [SPEAKER_02]: He was their point of entry to the rest of the organization.

[00:26:00] [SPEAKER_02]: Correct. And also kind of their de facto commander in some respects.

[00:26:05] [SPEAKER_02]: So when you have that, you see this run up and it's the run up to, okay, how do you disable

[00:26:10] [SPEAKER_02]: senior levels of leadership? That's one. Two, how do you hurt people who are most likely going

[00:26:15] [SPEAKER_02]: to hurt you if you try rolling into the country or you try disabling an organization militarily?

[00:26:22] [SPEAKER_02]: Then there's this kind of third point going in. And how do you cause pain within the

[00:26:26] [SPEAKER_02]: organization that reverberates for a long time to come if you can't completely destroy the

[00:26:31] [SPEAKER_02]: group? And I think the Israelis are not in the mindset that they believe they can just kind of

[00:26:35] [SPEAKER_02]: roll into Lebanon and magically know Hezbollah will be there because they've wiped it out.

[00:26:40] [SPEAKER_02]: I think we can already see that by today. And I think one of the things I said to you,

[00:26:43] [SPEAKER_02]: and I know I said this to another journalist, look for early casualty results from the

[00:26:47] [SPEAKER_02]: Israelis and you'll see how well Hezbollah at least is trying to stack the deck

[00:26:53] [SPEAKER_02]: so that they can get some hits in. Well, what happened today? I think it was seven or eight

[00:26:58] [SPEAKER_02]: Israelis that were killed fighting in Southern Lebanon. And again, I'm not saying that couldn't

[00:27:03] [SPEAKER_02]: be for a variety of other reasons, but my point is it doesn't mean that Hezbollah is out of the game

[00:27:06] [SPEAKER_02]: and it doesn't mean that they're just kind of completely going to vanish because no

[00:27:10] [SPEAKER_02]: Swalla happened to be killed. But I do think that there was this run up that really all

[00:27:14] [SPEAKER_02]: of these pieces were fitting together and it's just a massive decapitation strike.

[00:27:20] [SPEAKER_02]: And with that decapitation strike, I mean, I was trying to mention Niamh Kossam before

[00:27:24] [SPEAKER_02]: and talk about him. There was somebody else who I would have actually put into the networking with

[00:27:30] [SPEAKER_02]: Niamh Kossam, who a lot of people I think have forgotten, and he was also killed literally

[00:27:34] [SPEAKER_02]: a couple hours after Nasrallah and it just it maybe got an AFP article, maybe got like a Reuters

[00:27:39] [SPEAKER_02]: article, I don't know, like a 400 word piece. And that was of Nabil Kaouk. Nabil Kaouk is

[00:27:46] [SPEAKER_02]: somebody that I had written quite a bit about really early in my career, kind of the official

[00:27:51] [SPEAKER_02]: career when I was in an academic institution. In Pakistan? Yeah, in Pakistan. But this is a guy

[00:27:58] [SPEAKER_02]: who was kind of the always the number three in Hezbollah and like a really prominent and important

[00:28:04] [SPEAKER_02]: one. He was actually the one who was at the Iranian president's funeral. That's the one that

[00:28:08] [SPEAKER_02]: they had standing in the front row as a representative from Lebanese Hezbollah.

[00:28:13] [SPEAKER_02]: Old hand in the organization, really important in terms of managing things in the south. He

[00:28:17] [SPEAKER_02]: was on their central committee, their executive committee. Like he just he was always there.

[00:28:21] [SPEAKER_02]: Like he kept popping up. So I mean, it's interesting, they got him, they got, you know,

[00:28:26] [SPEAKER_02]: they got a number of other commanders. I can't even name them anymore because so many were

[00:28:30] [SPEAKER_02]: happening in such rapid succession that if I opened my Excel sheet with kind of leadership

[00:28:34] [SPEAKER_02]: charts and everything else, I still haven't been able to cross off or put them in red

[00:28:40] [SPEAKER_02]: all the names that have been essentially eliminated from that list. Even with the

[00:28:44] [SPEAKER_02]: Israelis producing stuff because clearly other people were killed as well. And I don't think a

[00:28:48] [SPEAKER_02]: lot of that stuff has even become more public. I mean, this even goes for kind of rank and file

[00:28:53] [SPEAKER_02]: fighters or people who are manning, you know, rockets, you know, different rocket setups.

[00:28:58] [SPEAKER_02]: So you had this, this like really far very deep kind of three to five levels

[00:29:04] [SPEAKER_02]: of Lebanese Hezbollah that had been really successfully targeted by the Israelis.

[00:29:09] [SPEAKER_02]: And I think the Israelis were banking on the shock and all that they kind of created with

[00:29:13] [SPEAKER_02]: this. And the other issues coming forward where, okay, well, who replaces him? Oh, God, that guy's

[00:29:18] [SPEAKER_02]: now dead. Oh, who do they replace? Well, I don't know where he is. I mean, he's dead. Oh, no,

[00:29:22] [SPEAKER_02]: he's missing a finger because of the beeper. I think part of this was it was a markedly

[00:29:25] [SPEAKER_02]: deeper calculation for really pushing the group back and establishing at least in Southern

[00:29:31] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanon some level of, and I put this in quotes, some level of security that the Israelis

[00:29:37] [SPEAKER_02]: could tolerate for, you know, some specific period of or maybe it's actually a more vague

[00:29:42] [SPEAKER_03]: period of time in their heads. Is Hashem Safedin confirmed as Nasser al-Sikhsasir?

[00:29:48] [SPEAKER_02]: Is it like a done deal? Is that set? So technically, they have to vote on it. So

[00:29:53] [SPEAKER_02]: Naim Qasim when he gave his speech and he gave this on the 30th, it was interesting,

[00:29:57] [SPEAKER_02]: he actually tried to imitate a lot of Nasrallahism but they all kind of came off as

[00:30:04] [SPEAKER_02]: not as good. I mean, not that anybody would be tricked to think that Naim Qasim could really

[00:30:08] [SPEAKER_02]: pull off a good Nasrallahism but his sweating and wiping of the brow, Nasserallah used to do that

[00:30:14] [SPEAKER_02]: quite a bit and it was this endearing quality when he would speak, at least it was with people who

[00:30:18] [SPEAKER_02]: supported him. And Naim Qasim meanwhile as he was patting his brow, this got mocked roundly and

[00:30:24] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of private Arabic language circles. I know the Israelis marched with it and said,

[00:30:29] [SPEAKER_02]: yeah, you looked far more nervous than he did, confident. But even the way the speech was

[00:30:33] [SPEAKER_02]: delivered was kind of, you could tell a lot was off. You could just tell. It was palpable.

[00:30:40] [SPEAKER_02]: But yeah, anyway, he was saying that the different committees within Lebanese

[00:30:45] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah are going to eventually elect a new leader. Now there's always the possibility

[00:30:49] [SPEAKER_02]: that somebody comes in there and is picked but from the looks of it, and this is going back

[00:30:54] [SPEAKER_02]: to Hashem Safi al-Din, he's a person with a lot of very deep connections to the Nasrallah

[00:31:00] [SPEAKER_02]: network. So one, you have familial connections. Two, he's also connected to the IRGC very closely.

[00:31:07] [SPEAKER_02]: And when I say that, he's actually married to Zainab Soleimani. That is Qasim Soleimani's daughter.

[00:31:16] [SPEAKER_02]: And she's also the person who runs the foundation for Qasim Soleimani, the martyrdom foundation.

[00:31:22] [SPEAKER_02]: And she also spoke in Beirut after he was killed. She made sure to speak there,

[00:31:26] [SPEAKER_02]: where her husband's located. So it's very interesting. You see how this is all getting grouped together.

[00:31:33] [SPEAKER_02]: And with Safi al-Din, for quite a while he was being set up to be in the leadership functions

[00:31:40] [SPEAKER_02]: for Hezbollah. And there's a few reasons why he would have been an interesting pick. So one,

[00:31:45] [SPEAKER_02]: he kind of looks like Hashem Nasrallah. He does. He trims his beard in a similar way. He

[00:31:55] [SPEAKER_02]: it's a fascinating kind of study in how you do kind of imagery for the baseline in PR.

[00:32:02] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, well he kind of looks like the last guy. So I guess that might be the same thing.

[00:32:06] [SPEAKER_02]: Oddly, that actually works quite a bit with a lot of different kind of PR approaches.

[00:32:11] [SPEAKER_02]: And interestingly enough, if you ever watch a speech that he does, he tries to imitate the

[00:32:15] [SPEAKER_02]: cadence and the speech style of Hashem Nasrallah. Obviously, he doesn't have the lisp and he

[00:32:20] [SPEAKER_02]: doesn't have kind of the same level of confidence with backing that goes into it that Nasrallah really

[00:32:26] [SPEAKER_02]: did. But it's interesting how a lot of that's being ate. Anyway, kind of going off of that,

[00:32:31] [SPEAKER_02]: he also has a very deep connection with the Iranians and this goes further than just Suleimanis'

[00:32:37] [SPEAKER_02]: daughter being married to her. He would technically be the first head of Lebanese

[00:32:43] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah, the first secretary general who was not religiously educated in Iraq.

[00:32:48] [SPEAKER_02]: He was instead religiously educated in Qom. And I think he may have been confusing Nasrallah with him

[00:32:54] [SPEAKER_02]: on this, but he actually went to the institutes that are run directly by Hamana-e to kind of do

[00:33:03] [SPEAKER_02]: his religious studies, which means it's a full dose of absolute laitl f**k. It's like an absolute

[00:33:07] [SPEAKER_02]: full dose of the state ideology along with the theocratic ideology that's kind of melded into

[00:33:13] [SPEAKER_02]: one. And so that's kind of his background on it. He is clearly representative of a newer, different

[00:33:20] [SPEAKER_02]: second generation of both Lebanese Hezbollah but also within as a larger collective, the Islamic

[00:33:27] [SPEAKER_02]: revolutionaries who's taking over for the guys who were not really 1979 veterans, meaning veterans

[00:33:34] [SPEAKER_02]: of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and kind of its outgrowths that occurred in Iraq and Lebanon

[00:33:39] [SPEAKER_02]: and elsewhere. He is now that second generation where they were established kind of foundational

[00:33:45] [SPEAKER_02]: institutions that are with a lot of the different groups that surround what the Iranians have been

[00:33:50] [SPEAKER_02]: trying to push and within Iran itself. Let's take a quick break and we'll be right back with more.

[00:34:10] [SPEAKER_03]: Should we look at Safideen's term like some fresh-faced private showing up in the trenches

[00:34:16] [SPEAKER_03]: at the Somme? Like there's no need to learn his name or get attached because he'll probably be

[00:34:19] [SPEAKER_03]: dead in a week or could he have some shelf life here? Well, I think the way the Israelis are

[00:34:24] [SPEAKER_02]: eliminating leadership in Hezbollah, your comparison to a Brit or a French soldier showing up in the

[00:34:33] [SPEAKER_02]: Somme might not be so incorrect. However, I would say studying him is going to be very important.

[00:34:39] [SPEAKER_02]: Thus far, he's not dead. It's already been on the books that he's likely going to be

[00:34:44] [SPEAKER_02]: the successor. Whoever the successor might be, he's still a major player within Lebanese Hezbollah

[00:34:51] [SPEAKER_02]: and he was set up to be one. This is again, it goes back to early 2000s, even late 90s. I've seen

[00:34:57] [SPEAKER_02]: some writings in Arabic and in English arguing that it was as far back as like 97, 98, 99,

[00:35:04] [SPEAKER_02]: that kind of period. I would say it's very important to understand him because of where

[00:35:08] [SPEAKER_02]: the organization of Lebanese Hezbollah is. Again, as a whole, a lot of the axis of resistance groups

[00:35:14] [SPEAKER_02]: that will send people, their clerical leadership and they all have, well, most of them,

[00:35:20] [SPEAKER_02]: have some level of Shia clerical leadership if they're a Shia militia modeled off of

[00:35:24] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese Hezbollah, they have sent people like that to comb. This is kind of what you're getting.

[00:35:29] [SPEAKER_02]: In Iraq, they're also, I mean, they're in different stages too on this. I mentioned before

[00:35:34] [SPEAKER_02]: Akram Kaby and he's a sheikh, but he actually studied under the Sotirist School. He was looked

[00:35:41] [SPEAKER_02]: at a Sotirist's aid for a little bit. He studied under Muhammad Muhammad's Sotirist School.

[00:35:44] [SPEAKER_03]: I was just going to ask you that, yeah.

[00:35:46] [SPEAKER_02]: But very different guy who's completely adopted Khomeinism. Now we can argue as to why

[00:35:50] [SPEAKER_02]: he's adopted it and why he's trying to be so loyal and why he puts out for the Iranians

[00:35:55] [SPEAKER_02]: whenever they ask, but I think that's immaterial. Still a young guy,

[00:35:59] [SPEAKER_02]: but in a way, it's an odd parallel but then markedly different still from even Nasrallah

[00:36:06] [SPEAKER_02]: in terms of how one gets into this mix. I wrote about this before. I think with Nasrallah's loss,

[00:36:14] [SPEAKER_02]: you are seeing this other loss of that original gusto, that fervor that came with supporters

[00:36:21] [SPEAKER_02]: of the Islamic Revolution. He organically adopted this line of thinking when he was a

[00:36:26] [SPEAKER_02]: Nudjaf. He was associated with people who eventually became leadership within Lebanese

[00:36:30] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawiy. When you see something like that, that is an organic growth

[00:36:35] [SPEAKER_02]: and an organic development of ideological thinking. Whereas now the Iranians are almost

[00:36:41] [SPEAKER_02]: reverting back to when I was writing this for CTC Sentinel. I didn't really talk about

[00:36:45] [SPEAKER_02]: for West Point, CTC Sentinel. I didn't really discuss the ideological chunks of this, but

[00:36:51] [SPEAKER_02]: there is this sticks and carrots approach that the Iranians will take to proxy groups.

[00:36:55] [SPEAKER_02]: Initially, early Iran, you had groups that were approaching Khomeini and his camp and saying,

[00:37:01] [SPEAKER_02]: we want to start a Khomeini-type group in our country and extend the Islamic Revolution.

[00:37:06] [SPEAKER_02]: We would love to do that. We are true believers. Okay, that's all well and good.

[00:37:10] [SPEAKER_02]: But now you have groups that are brought over to the side using money, using other forms of

[00:37:16] [SPEAKER_02]: influence, sometimes if they don't listen, sometimes using physical force to get them

[00:37:23] [SPEAKER_02]: on side. Sometimes the Iranians will splinter the group. The same thing goes for religious

[00:37:27] [SPEAKER_02]: thinking as well. Now they're coming along and saying, yeah, I guess I'll take that course in

[00:37:31] [SPEAKER_02]: Khomeini. Sometimes they'll say, yeah, we believe in absolute vitality. Okay, then they have a

[00:37:35] [SPEAKER_02]: disagreement with the Iranians and all of a sudden that little statement on their web page

[00:37:38] [SPEAKER_02]: disappears. I've actually seen this happen in real time. You can read the tea leaves

[00:37:43] [SPEAKER_02]: only so much. It's like Kremlinology except with a little bit more added to it.

[00:37:48] [SPEAKER_02]: I would say it's a very different approach going forward now. It's because it's become so

[00:37:53] [SPEAKER_02]: institutionalized and with that, you can see it more pink and naked and see

[00:37:57] [SPEAKER_02]: corruption that occurs when you're running a state. You can see other bits that don't really apply to

[00:38:03] [SPEAKER_02]: running essentially God's state on earth and Khomeini is technically Imam al-Makti's

[00:38:08] [SPEAKER_02]: representative on earth according to how the system works. I think a lot of people who are

[00:38:14] [SPEAKER_02]: not as well-versed with shea theological thinking, they're probably looking at this especially like

[00:38:20] [SPEAKER_02]: your average American listening to this going like what? They think he's the origin of God on earth.

[00:38:25] [SPEAKER_02]: That sounds like a pope except a pope who wants to achieve nuclear weapons in some ways.

[00:38:30] [SPEAKER_02]: You have something like that and it's interesting. It's a distinct change from what

[00:38:35] [SPEAKER_02]: happened when Khomeini was around and a lot of these original old school guys

[00:38:40] [SPEAKER_02]: who were true believers were around. It doesn't mean that the new school aren't true believers in

[00:38:44] [SPEAKER_02]: and of themselves but they're from a very different setup and from a very different time

[00:38:48] [SPEAKER_02]: and I don't really think it's quite, it's not quite the same and doesn't carry with it

[00:38:53] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of the push that really Nusra'la was bringing to the table.

[00:38:57] [SPEAKER_03]: Hasbel as previous secretary general, Abbas al-Musawi who you mentioned a bit earlier

[00:39:02] [SPEAKER_03]: was assassinated in February 1992 which shows how long Nusra'la was in the job, what 30, 32 years

[00:39:10] [SPEAKER_03]: when Israeli Apache helicopters fired on his motorcade in southern Lebanon.

[00:39:15] [SPEAKER_03]: Can Musawi's death tell us anything about how the group adapts going forward into,

[00:39:22] [SPEAKER_03]: I don't know what you want to call it, Hezbollah 3.0?

[00:39:24] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, I mean a few things. I mean I think he can also tell us about what,

[00:39:27] [SPEAKER_02]: you can tell a lot about what responses are possible for Lebanese Hezbollah for this.

[00:39:34] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean again we looked at the missile strike that happened. You had, there's a high likelihood and

[00:39:38] [SPEAKER_02]: I've seen different estimates all around. There are what? Around 200 to 250 missiles

[00:39:43] [SPEAKER_02]: that may have been launched. Some were saying upwards of 400 may have been launched and then

[00:39:47] [SPEAKER_02]: 180 to 181. Yesterday? Yeah.

[00:39:51] [SPEAKER_02]: The Pentagon was only saying 180.

[00:39:53] [SPEAKER_02]: They're saying 180 because that's what actually kind of penetrated into Israeli airspace.

[00:39:58] [SPEAKER_02]: What was successful, what actually kept flying, what didn't just fall out of the sky or

[00:40:03] [SPEAKER_02]: get hit by some weapon system that we don't know that we paid for yet.

[00:40:08] [SPEAKER_02]: It's a space possible. Behind the green door, behind the green door where it stays.

[00:40:13] [SPEAKER_02]: You look at that and Iran had to lead the charge on that. Iran had to launch these

[00:40:17] [SPEAKER_02]: medium range ballistic missiles so there's solid fuel and everything else. Well when Musawi

[00:40:22] [SPEAKER_02]: was killed there were a number of massive car bombings. What really put Hezbollah on the map

[00:40:27] [SPEAKER_02]: again after a ton of massive trucking car bombings in Beirut targeting American forces,

[00:40:33] [SPEAKER_02]: the French actually targeting pretty much anyone who was on their list they didn't like.

[00:40:38] [SPEAKER_02]: But I mean look at Argentina. They targeted the Israeli embassy there and that was a very

[00:40:43] [SPEAKER_02]: successful attack and then the Amia building, the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentina's

[00:40:48] [SPEAKER_02]: history and the Amia building was not a governmental building, it was a Jewish institution,

[00:40:52] [SPEAKER_02]: pro-Israel obviously but it was a civilian target. They also tried to target the Israeli embassy in

[00:41:01] [SPEAKER_02]: London. This was kind of roped in with potential responses that were from Osalwi's death.

[00:41:06] [SPEAKER_02]: We had other little rocket attacks here and there. I mean you name it.

[00:41:10] [SPEAKER_02]: But now I think because there's been such an intelligence roll up of

[00:41:14] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese Hezbollah overseas and not saying it's been so completely successful that they have no

[00:41:18] [SPEAKER_02]: capability of doing so but that was so threatening and such a nasty shock when these attacks did occur

[00:41:26] [SPEAKER_02]: that I think a lot of work in Western intelligence agencies was done to kind of blunt

[00:41:31] [SPEAKER_02]: that force. And if you remember even recently when Lebanese Hezbollah has tried to do

[00:41:35] [SPEAKER_02]: different attacks, they tried in Thailand, they tried in India, they tried to put little

[00:41:39] [SPEAKER_02]: limpid minds on Israeli diplomats' cars at some points. I mean the Bergus bombing that happened.

[00:41:44] [SPEAKER_02]: Bulgaria too, yep. That was in India. Bergus bombing in Bulgaria. The interesting thing about

[00:41:50] [SPEAKER_02]: that one was and it's interesting, like Lebanese Hezbollah always kind of has its hands in this,

[00:41:55] [SPEAKER_02]: ever since 2005 they've been doing it more and more where these fake Sunni cutout groups

[00:42:00] [SPEAKER_02]: that they'll have. So the guy who bombed the bus wanted to be a Sunni jihadist but clearly

[00:42:05] [SPEAKER_02]: had a lot of links to Lebanese Hezbollah but boarded this bus being a Sunni jihadist and did the

[00:42:10] [SPEAKER_02]: job and it was kind of the Iranians kind of thumbing their nose at two different foes at the same time.

[00:42:17] [SPEAKER_02]: Same thing goes with Rafiq Hariri. One of the claims was that some Palestinian guy and he

[00:42:22] [SPEAKER_02]: was standing in front of a black flag, that he was killing him as a response to what was going on.

[00:42:28] [SPEAKER_02]: He thought he was killing the Iraqi prime minister and this was like 2005.

[00:42:32] [SPEAKER_03]: Rafiq Hariri was a Lebanese prime minister assassinated in a big car bomb linked through a

[00:42:39] [SPEAKER_03]: long UN investigation to Hezbollah and the Syrians in 2005.

[00:42:45] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, nailed it. But that actually is what sparked off the Cedar revolution in 2005,

[00:42:52] [SPEAKER_02]: his killing. But essentially there was this claim that was out there. Actually if you read

[00:42:58] [SPEAKER_02]: Nicholas Blandford's book on this, he doesn't really detail it in the way that I'm describing it

[00:43:02] [SPEAKER_02]: because at the time he wrote it, first a lot of journalists, that was a possibility that could

[00:43:07] [SPEAKER_02]: have happened although it didn't really sound as kosher pun intended when you are looking through

[00:43:13] [SPEAKER_02]: it and seeing certain trend lines. But it's interesting. They have had to use different

[00:43:17] [SPEAKER_02]: levels of subterfuge and also have had just a lot of half-assed and failed attacks that

[00:43:24] [SPEAKER_02]: have occurred more recently. And I think it shows a degradation of capability over time.

[00:43:30] [SPEAKER_02]: So now you need to look at what can Lebanese Hezbollah bring to the table and obviously

[00:43:35] [SPEAKER_02]: it's going to be far more regionally focused, but it's markedly different than I'm not saying

[00:43:38] [SPEAKER_02]: it's not possible for them to try a truck bomb somewhere. And I'm not saying that they

[00:43:43] [SPEAKER_02]: couldn't pull one over if they really put their thinking caps on. But you can definitely

[00:43:49] [SPEAKER_02]: see there's a distinct change. And this is again comparing this to Mosaoui and what

[00:43:54] [SPEAKER_02]: happened with him going into Hezbollah 3.0 to answer that. I think we're going to see this

[00:44:00] [SPEAKER_02]: ascension of a lot of these Hezbollah 2.0 type people into the 3.0 that are used to working

[00:44:06] [SPEAKER_02]: within as functionaries within an Iranian-controlled system. Again, time will tell. I mean,

[00:44:13] [SPEAKER_02]: you don't know what can happen. I mean, with Nasrallah he was known for being a fiery

[00:44:17] [SPEAKER_02]: speaker and he was known for sometimes being out with some of the guys who were in

[00:44:22] [SPEAKER_02]: infantry units. But what really got him a lot more credibility was part one of this,

[00:44:28] [SPEAKER_02]: the fact that his son Hadi was killed by the Israelis in 1997 because he was fighting as a

[00:44:34] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah fighter. So that was kind of an interesting thing that kind of set him aside that said he

[00:44:38] [SPEAKER_02]: was a true believer. The other thing that set him aside which might not always be read as a

[00:44:42] [SPEAKER_02]: positive was when Hezbollah had its own little shake up and this was around 1992. And it

[00:44:49] [SPEAKER_02]: was from 1992 until around 1998 when there were splits within the group. One of them was actually led

[00:44:55] [SPEAKER_02]: by Sheikh Tufaili, who you might see on Twitter quite a bit who will be saying anti-Iranian things

[00:45:01] [SPEAKER_02]: and anti-Lebanese Hezbollah things. But Tufaili was technically the first head of Lebanese Hezbollah.

[00:45:06] [SPEAKER_02]: He was actually the emissary who went to Iran and asked, hey, can we start this group in

[00:45:11] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanon that follows these Homanist presets? But he revolted against this and in some parts,

[00:45:17] [SPEAKER_02]: because he was from the Baka'a, whereas Nasserallah and a lot of the new leadership was coming from

[00:45:21] [SPEAKER_02]: the south, the Jnub. And so there was kind of this geographic split and there's a lot of other

[00:45:25] [SPEAKER_02]: stuff that was going on. But Nasserallah was able to still solidify things under his leadership.

[00:45:31] [SPEAKER_02]: That was another kind of big play. But a lot of this, this took 40 years to build with

[00:45:36] [SPEAKER_02]: Nasserallah. 40 years for him to build up both capacity and also kind of the view

[00:45:43] [SPEAKER_02]: that he could lead the organization successfully, have successes with them and then successfully

[00:45:48] [SPEAKER_02]: market them. And I think a large part of this is kind of marketing because one could make the argument

[00:45:54] [SPEAKER_02]: that in 2006, given a good chunk of Lebanon was absolutely flattened, Lebanese Hezbollah lost

[00:46:00] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of guys. But yeah, did the Israelis not perform quite so well? They did not.

[00:46:06] [SPEAKER_02]: But if it were not for certain kind of the stars aligning, then Nasserallah might not have

[00:46:10] [SPEAKER_02]: been able to kind of pull this off in the way that he did. There were certain historical

[00:46:14] [SPEAKER_02]: conditions that were there. So in terms of kind of the Lebanese Hezbollah 3.0, you have a lot of

[00:46:20] [SPEAKER_02]: opportunities that need to kind of arise where you have leadership there that can kind of attain

[00:46:26] [SPEAKER_02]: both the skills and then also kind of the awareness from the population that they are

[00:46:31] [SPEAKER_02]: actual combat leaders. They are actual people who can get stuff done. They have a unique

[00:46:37] [SPEAKER_02]: panache that kind of can focus on kind of internal communal issues, which Nasserallah demonstrated

[00:46:43] [SPEAKER_02]: quite a bit. Actually, he was the model for the Iranians kind of allowing certain kind of nationalistic

[00:46:49] [SPEAKER_02]: sounding tones with a lot of their proxy groups, even though they are fundamentally against a lot

[00:46:54] [SPEAKER_02]: of that stuff ideologically speaking. But I would wait for that. Then there's another piece to

[00:46:59] [SPEAKER_02]: this. Who's rising up within the group? Not just people who graduated from Qom

[00:47:04] [SPEAKER_02]: from a seminarian Qom run by the Islamic Revolution. No, it's also other people who were recruits that

[00:47:11] [SPEAKER_02]: were fielded from tail end of 2006 war until going around the Syria war. So we're talking

[00:47:19] [SPEAKER_02]: about a lot of people who were newer assets that were there. And a lot of those newer assets,

[00:47:24] [SPEAKER_02]: again kind of like Safildin, these are people who have gone through the Lebanese Hezbollah

[00:47:30] [SPEAKER_02]: institution. They understand how certain elements of Wasta, clout and connections would work with that.

[00:47:36] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, well, my dad's a commander and I guess that means I get to be a commander too. Fascinating

[00:47:39] [SPEAKER_02]: how many commanders had sons who were commanders. Like for instance, Muhammad Rad, who was the

[00:47:45] [SPEAKER_02]: head of the political committee within Lebanese Hezbollah, he lost his son, I want to say

[00:47:49] [SPEAKER_02]: in October, November of 2023. He interestingly enough was a commander. We had Imad Mughniyeh,

[00:47:56] [SPEAKER_02]: who was a leading Hezbollah commander. Right from the start, his son, Jehad Mughniyeh, who had

[00:48:02] [SPEAKER_02]: number of songs written about him by Lebanese Hezbollah musical performers. He was an al-Qaeda.

[00:48:08] [SPEAKER_02]: He was a Shahid al-Qaeda. So he was a martyr commander, a young guy, but still a martyr commander.

[00:48:13] [SPEAKER_02]: And there are a lot of these family networks that are kind of now just kind of,

[00:48:17] [SPEAKER_02]: they're kind of grandfathered into the network in the system. With that comes,

[00:48:21] [SPEAKER_02]: you know, not just the familial connections, but also the connections with cash,

[00:48:24] [SPEAKER_02]: the political connections and certain realities that are there that again have caused issues for

[00:48:30] [SPEAKER_02]: this ideological thinking in Iran. The other thing is also kind of the tactical know-how on

[00:48:35] [SPEAKER_02]: the ground depends on what the Israelis are going to do in Lebanon. I think it remains to be seen.

[00:48:40] [SPEAKER_02]: I still think that their version of the quote unquote limited incursion will be probably south

[00:48:45] [SPEAKER_02]: of Lutani. There might be some penetrations elsewhere. It might even be even more limited

[00:48:49] [SPEAKER_02]: to just kind of targeting tunnels and you know, this, that and the other thing in the south.

[00:48:54] [SPEAKER_02]: But still, you know, what do they learn from that experience? How many of the guys

[00:48:58] [SPEAKER_02]: who were stationed down there who may actually have more veteran experience,

[00:49:01] [SPEAKER_02]: how are they going to come up in the group? Where is their experience going to go? Because

[00:49:05] [SPEAKER_02]: clearly the old school guys who were there, a lot of them have been wiped out. That's a

[00:49:11] [SPEAKER_02]: lot of historical memory to wipe out within an organization. That is a lot of stuff where,

[00:49:17] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean now it kind of fades into just being, you know, propaganda statement and a poster.

[00:49:20] [SPEAKER_02]: So, you know, what are they getting out of these guys? And just to remind everyone,

[00:49:24] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese Hezbollah itself and I always hate this because there was a whole period in the 90s and

[00:49:28] [SPEAKER_02]: 2000s when if you were a master's student on Middle East studies then you would have written about

[00:49:32] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah's transformation. And that was always, well they have social networks in. They entered

[00:49:37] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese parliament. Thus they've moderated and they're totally a cool group. I'm not talking

[00:49:42] [SPEAKER_02]: about that with this but there was another, there's a military transformation that was going

[00:49:46] [SPEAKER_02]: on and a number of people studying the issue really called it out where Lebanese Hezbollah was

[00:49:53] [SPEAKER_02]: trying to transform into more of an army apparatus. Where they had more conventional style arms,

[00:50:00] [SPEAKER_02]: where they were respected as an armed force, not just kind of the state within a state and, you

[00:50:06] [SPEAKER_02]: know, oh we have an insurgent army and yeah, we might be able to hold off the Markavas but

[00:50:10] [SPEAKER_02]: you know, really if the Israelis wanted to give the ra-ra push they're going to be in Beirut

[00:50:14] [SPEAKER_02]: a week. You know, I think there was a big shift that happened there and when that happened

[00:50:18] [SPEAKER_02]: the organization and its military leadership and structure changed quite significantly in terms

[00:50:24] [SPEAKER_02]: of who they were letting in as recruits, in terms of the training regiments, a lot of other

[00:50:28] [SPEAKER_02]: organizational regiments. There was another piece to that as well. It's also we, again you might

[00:50:33] [SPEAKER_02]: see this a lot, the talking about the unity of the fronts. There's always a big comment on that

[00:50:38] [SPEAKER_02]: now. The unity of the fronts which is kind of hilarious to me because throughout the Syrian

[00:50:42] [SPEAKER_02]: war it was about the unity of the fronts all the time but no one was paying attention because it

[00:50:47] [SPEAKER_02]: wasn't as interesting as this one I guess. I'm sorry, I'm sounding so mocking about that but it

[00:50:52] [SPEAKER_02]: just, it infuriates me. But it's one of those things where now you have Lebanese-Hazbullah

[00:50:58] [SPEAKER_02]: intermediate level commanders who are used to operating with let's say Iraqi groups or

[00:51:03] [SPEAKER_02]: local Syrian groups or the Syrian Arab army and they will have their opinions on these groups.

[00:51:08] [SPEAKER_02]: They will have their opinions on their capabilities and how well they fight and what

[00:51:11] [SPEAKER_02]: that means for a larger axis of resistance. What that means for Lebanese-Hazbullah's place

[00:51:16] [SPEAKER_02]: at the table when it comes to dealing with them and I think that will be another add-on effect.

[00:51:22] [SPEAKER_02]: Do I know what that'll really result in? I frankly couldn't even tell you, I wish I could

[00:51:27] [SPEAKER_02]: but I do think it will have some form of an effect both negative and positive.

[00:51:31] [SPEAKER_03]: So in roughly two weeks, Hazbullah's internal communication networks were compromised,

[00:51:36] [SPEAKER_03]: crippling thousands of their senior and mid-ranking members. This is to say nothing of

[00:51:41] [SPEAKER_03]: MSAAD's work on the Ismail Hanea hit in Tehran earlier in the summer. The IDF then decapitated

[00:51:46] [SPEAKER_03]: their command and control and now according to Israeli and U.S. officials in the New York Times,

[00:51:52] [SPEAKER_03]: half of the missile and rocket arsenal they accumulated over the last 30 to 40 years

[00:51:56] [SPEAKER_03]: has been destroyed. This is all largely due to Iranian security services being turned into

[00:52:01] [SPEAKER_03]: Swiss cheese by MSAAD. How do the Iranians from their standpoint, I'll just say it, unfuck this?

[00:52:09] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean time heals all wounds of course but how do they even begin?

[00:52:12] [SPEAKER_02]: That's a $64,000 question for the Iranians not to give policy advice for that side.

[00:52:19] [SPEAKER_03]: I mean it's sort of a crisis of their own incompetence that made this.

[00:52:24] [SPEAKER_02]: Yes. Well when you, I think part of the problem here that needs more assessment and I really wish

[00:52:31] [SPEAKER_02]: I could write the piece on it and I think about it sometimes but I know that I wouldn't really be

[00:52:37] [SPEAKER_02]: able to do it true justice. I believe in you. You can do it.

[00:52:40] [SPEAKER_02]: Too kind. I just keep doing these podcasts and they keep taking time away from me right now.

[00:52:45] [SPEAKER_03]: Maybe I'll give you the transcripts and you can just kind of reshape them into your paper.

[00:52:50] [SPEAKER_02]: Well I'll put it this way. I think the Iranians and the Axis of Resistance and even Lebanese

[00:52:58] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah were victims of their own propaganda and I think they were victims of their own successes

[00:53:04] [SPEAKER_02]: or what they perceived as successes and because of that they never gave the other side a true vote

[00:53:10] [SPEAKER_02]: and the Israelis had a vote mess and no one really gave it to them.

[00:53:15] [SPEAKER_02]: And after messing things up in 2006, I mean how much senior leadership for Hezbollah

[00:53:21] [SPEAKER_02]: did the Israelis really able to get during that conflict compared to now it's like zero.

[00:53:27] [SPEAKER_02]: Zero compared to a thousand. I mean to think that your foe was not going to develop

[00:53:33] [SPEAKER_02]: different setups when they realized that you could very well be bringing an existential threat

[00:53:38] [SPEAKER_02]: right to their door I think was a big misstep by them.

[00:53:42] [SPEAKER_02]: I also think in part their view of American, I think we could, you know what I don't think it would

[00:53:49] [SPEAKER_02]: be unfair to say American weakness in their face on a lot of issues. I think again there were

[00:53:54] [SPEAKER_02]: problems going forth with pretty much every single American administration dealing with Iran

[00:54:00] [SPEAKER_02]: for one reason or another. The way that we generally countered the Iranians was kind of

[00:54:05] [SPEAKER_02]: standoffish it's yeah well they've got to deal with this and oh you know okay we'll handle

[00:54:09] [SPEAKER_02]: this later or hey let's just cut this deal and it'll go away and also a lot of that came down to

[00:54:14] [SPEAKER_02]: you know our analysis of their actions and capabilities sometimes would have been overstated

[00:54:21] [SPEAKER_02]: and I think you know American analysts often do that anyway you know we often view things through

[00:54:26] [SPEAKER_02]: our own lens and you know god I mean if they're saying they have a nuclear missile they must

[00:54:30] [SPEAKER_02]: have a nuclear missile when that might not even be the case probably it's just you know

[00:54:34] [SPEAKER_02]: tin foil with some paint on it. And again I'm not saying that's the case of the Iranians

[00:54:37] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm just saying in general there is often an overstatement that's there and it comes from

[00:54:41] [SPEAKER_02]: the best possible place but it results in very bad policy. And I think with the Iranians you know a

[00:54:46] [SPEAKER_02]: lot of this was coming down to hey we can shut down international shipping, hey we can cause this

[00:54:50] [SPEAKER_02]: problem, hey we can cause this problem. You want us to bomb your embassy, you want us to take

[00:54:53] [SPEAKER_02]: over your embassy? If you recall what happened for why Qasem Soleimani and Mohandis were killed

[00:55:00] [SPEAKER_02]: in 2020 it was because they were threatening the American embassy and came very close

[00:55:04] [SPEAKER_02]: to getting in there. Whatever their true willpower behind that was I mean remains to be seen

[00:55:11] [SPEAKER_02]: but clearly they saw an opportunity there but a lot of aggressive posturing when you're able

[00:55:15] [SPEAKER_02]: to get away with it. Again I leave out the Soleimani and the Mohandis hit but I say with a lot

[00:55:21] [SPEAKER_02]: of other things you know if the American response this has been hey we're going to

[00:55:25] [SPEAKER_02]: hit an empty depot in eastern Syria on the Iraqi border and maybe we kill some low level

[00:55:32] [SPEAKER_02]: you know Shia militia guy who can't find America on the map you know and isn't really a piece of

[00:55:37] [SPEAKER_02]: the command apparatus. Okay that sends a message if the Americans are unwilling to kill you know

[00:55:42] [SPEAKER_02]: Iranian command and leadership which is essentially leading these organizations with the exception of

[00:55:48] [SPEAKER_02]: Soleimani there hasn't really been a lot of follow-up from that then you have an issue there

[00:55:51] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean I think when you have domestic politics playing a game when it comes to let's say

[00:55:56] [SPEAKER_02]: Iran deal and like a lot of other stuff you know that adds more complications to this

[00:56:00] [SPEAKER_02]: and I think the Iranians looked at this as hey we not only have kind of a quasi get out of jail

[00:56:05] [SPEAKER_02]: free card if you know if the shit really hits the fan but we can keep pushing pushing pushing and

[00:56:11] [SPEAKER_02]: yeah we might take some hits but they're not going to be that big we can keep pushing and we

[00:56:16] [SPEAKER_02]: can bite off when we bite something off it's not going to be more than we can chew and look

[00:56:20] [SPEAKER_02]: what we pulled off in Syria you know look what we pulled off here look what we pulled off

[00:56:24] [SPEAKER_02]: saved the shards ass yes so I think that the cumulative result of that they now have

[00:56:31] [SPEAKER_02]: Iraq they now have Syria they now technically have Yemen they have threatened and caused issues in Bahrain

[00:56:37] [SPEAKER_02]: and eastern Saudi two countries where one of them you have the American Fifth Fleet Bahrain

[00:56:43] [SPEAKER_02]: in Saudi you have a kind of key American ally and huge oil producer I mean it's like

[00:56:47] [SPEAKER_02]: you look at little instances like that then you look at other little elements where

[00:56:52] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of these groups have been able to metastasize and essentially dominate government

[00:56:55] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanon you have a hasboa and one of the issues with hasboa is you know a lot of American

[00:57:01] [SPEAKER_02]: policymakers and we've talked about this there is this I think this degradation in terms of like

[00:57:06] [SPEAKER_02]: how do you handle the Middle East and I think it's been phrased as well I'm just being realistic

[00:57:11] [SPEAKER_02]: or we're just you know using realism here well hasboa is the the main actor on the ground

[00:57:16] [SPEAKER_02]: the Iranians are the main actors and so you got to deal with them you know shrug your

[00:57:19] [SPEAKER_02]: shoulders and just say so be it you know where's the the you know how are you going to cooperate

[00:57:24] [SPEAKER_02]: with any of the other groups well who cares we're kind of at this point now but you were talking

[00:57:28] [SPEAKER_02]: about before the last the last podcast that we did about fatigue from the Iraq war where we got to

[00:57:34] [SPEAKER_02]: see firsthand a lot of the interesting complexities that would occur with how you deal

[00:57:39] [SPEAKER_02]: with certain networks in you know in Iraq or you know tribal tribal groupings like all

[00:57:44] [SPEAKER_03]: sorts of complications where many ways socom wrote the book on how to deal with this stuff

[00:57:50] [SPEAKER_02]: in Iraq at that time yes but I mean again there's fatigue that comes from that and there is fatigue

[00:57:56] [SPEAKER_02]: when you know part of the line is well hey you know we're going to pull out of Afghanistan

[00:57:59] [SPEAKER_02]: I've had enough of this yeah we're done with that I mean and I see that there was a general

[00:58:04] [SPEAKER_02]: attitude that's there and it does spill over and again I don't want to place this all

[00:58:09] [SPEAKER_02]: on the shoulders of American policymakers for missteps or even correct steps and other

[00:58:13] [SPEAKER_02]: things that have led to it but again there is a general line of thought that can come from

[00:58:18] [SPEAKER_02]: that and again I don't want to make this too America centric so again you make policy

[00:58:22] [SPEAKER_02]: missteps based on those those issues if you're the Iranians now again you're saying how they

[00:58:27] [SPEAKER_02]: how do they unscrew this one it's going to take a lot and given what has been thrown out

[00:58:31] [SPEAKER_02]: there I think quite deliberately so by people in America in excuse me in Israeli intelligence

[00:58:38] [SPEAKER_02]: it's part of it was well did they infiltrate something within the IRGC did they turn

[00:58:42] [SPEAKER_02]: certain members well we've seen before that certain members could be turned there is some

[00:58:47] [SPEAKER_02]: dissension in the ranks there it may be a you know a very ideological group and very very roped in

[00:58:53] [SPEAKER_02]: but all you need is you know one or two or three bad apples there had to have been serious

[00:58:58] [SPEAKER_03]: human sources recruited or like these guys are just walking around live streaming their

[00:59:03] [SPEAKER_03]: lives 24 seven it's like that's also a possibility but let me let me just say this

[00:59:07] [SPEAKER_02]: there's a lot of stupid stuff that happens that doesn't require

[00:59:11] [SPEAKER_02]: a high level of kind of intelligence background to know that oh is that supposed to be on here I

[00:59:18] [SPEAKER_02]: can tell you this first hand from research that I've done in terms of me dork who's sitting on an

[00:59:23] [SPEAKER_02]: ex-girlfriend's couch uh who you know it's just like this is what I'm obsessed with so it's

[00:59:28] [SPEAKER_02]: not like I come back from work and I keep doing this stuff and I'm finding in just like personal

[00:59:33] [SPEAKER_02]: Facebook posts of uh it looks like this guy's in Syria it looks like you know this other guy got

[00:59:38] [SPEAKER_02]: killed they haven't announced it yet but I'll just put that over here and it looks like this group is

[00:59:43] [SPEAKER_02]: there now but they haven't officially announced it in fact they're saying the opposite this stuff

[00:59:47] [SPEAKER_02]: was all out there to be grabbed and looked at so I can say sometimes there is stuff that's

[00:59:52] [SPEAKER_02]: just put out because there's no real thought put into it um and it's kind of hard when

[00:59:57] [SPEAKER_02]: you're the Iranians and a lot of it comes down to your PR and the messaging that you're

[01:00:02] [SPEAKER_02]: sending outwardly and they're very big on messaging they're very very big on the money that's spent

[01:00:06] [SPEAKER_02]: when it comes to that why is it almost every militia needs to have a tv network and 37 social media

[01:00:11] [SPEAKER_02]: pages why do they need a telegram page that clearly has like five people running the damn thing

[01:00:16] [SPEAKER_02]: like it's a clout but you look at this it's not just clout but it's the it's the constant

[01:00:21] [SPEAKER_02]: need to have this gaitling gun of content flashing in your face you know it's it's also

[01:00:26] [SPEAKER_02]: quite clear they work with other international partners too who also see a benefit in that

[01:00:31] [SPEAKER_02]: and when I say international partners I'm assuming it's the Russians because there's a lot of kind

[01:00:34] [SPEAKER_02]: of weird overlap with that um but I think you know you kind of boil this down and it's kind of

[01:00:40] [SPEAKER_02]: where are the priorities you know how are you doing kind of I've noticed that they did close

[01:00:44] [SPEAKER_02]: down quite a bit that they were posting there was a big security push that happened during the

[01:00:49] [SPEAKER_02]: Iraq part of their campaign meaning 2014 to 2018 a bigger professionalization

[01:00:56] [SPEAKER_02]: so that there is some learning that's there but again you know how deep is that learning

[01:01:00] [SPEAKER_02]: and I don't know if it's if it's that deep I think there was a lot of fast-paced growth I think they

[01:01:05] [SPEAKER_02]: may actually have to slow it down and not operate at the same pace that they were doing it before

[01:01:09] [SPEAKER_02]: you know when you're allowing them a task to civilization of 50 some odd militias in one

[01:01:14] [SPEAKER_02]: country and they're all kind of going at each other and maybe you have seven guys

[01:01:17] [SPEAKER_02]: of your own who are micromanaging each thing there are benefits to that but there's also

[01:01:22] [SPEAKER_02]: some extreme disadvantages if you're worried about infiltration um so I think you know

[01:01:28] [SPEAKER_02]: I think they grew a little too fast a little too quickly there's a lot of confidence that was there

[01:01:33] [SPEAKER_02]: just because of the conditions that were on the ground but you know I keep wanting to go back

[01:01:37] [SPEAKER_02]: to this question and how to answer like how do you how do you fix something like that

[01:01:40] [SPEAKER_02]: there's no easy answer no no there is but again I mean that's an easy answer I could give you

[01:01:46] [SPEAKER_02]: well it's really complicated um but I mean I I would say just from from my position looking

[01:01:51] [SPEAKER_02]: at how the militia groups have grown how the Iranians were running stuff like that how

[01:01:56] [SPEAKER_02]: they were trying to kind of you know CYA and also protect themselves um and when I say CYA that

[01:02:02] [SPEAKER_02]: means cover your ass for those out there who are not aware like how they were doing that

[01:02:06] [SPEAKER_02]: I do think there is some stuff that you can criticize from it and if they were you know

[01:02:11] [SPEAKER_02]: serious about it there have to be some fixes um but you know I I think on kind of the intelligence

[01:02:17] [SPEAKER_02]: side I mean I'm not I was about to say I'm not an intelligent person so we'll just leave it

[01:02:21] [SPEAKER_02]: but I mean I'm not I'm not one who who is working for intelligence uh but I think you know they have

[01:02:29] [SPEAKER_02]: they have already telegraphed to use an oft used term in media now they have telegraphed that they

[01:02:35] [SPEAKER_02]: wanted to put the hurt on these realities they have telegraphed that they want to put the

[01:02:40] [SPEAKER_02]: hurt on the Saudis they have telegraphed who their enemies are what they're going to do

[01:02:44] [SPEAKER_02]: and then executed on it not always that successfully but they just keep doing it

[01:02:48] [SPEAKER_02]: and they don't stop and I think when you're doing that given they are they've always marketed

[01:02:53] [SPEAKER_02]: themselves as very long-term players uh strategically speaking it wasn't as beneficial

[01:02:58] [SPEAKER_02]: because it just put more onus uh strategically speaking on different intelligence agencies to

[01:03:03] [SPEAKER_02]: get in there and see what they were doing whether it was using you know signals intelligence or

[01:03:08] [SPEAKER_02]: human intelligence you know it was kind of full court press on them.

[01:03:12] [SPEAKER_03]: Iran's attack yesterday consisted of only ballistic missiles around 180 in total that breached

[01:03:18] [SPEAKER_03]: Israeli airspace the guardians will say in in Colorado and elsewhere maybe handled some others

[01:03:26] [SPEAKER_03]: no cruise missiles no drones etc as they launched during the last attack against Israel in April

[01:03:32] [SPEAKER_03]: you always make the point that it's important to pay attention to the kind of weapons Iran

[01:03:36] [SPEAKER_03]: and its proxies choose to deploy in this case can we discern anything from what weapons they

[01:03:41] [SPEAKER_03]: didn't use unless there's some simple explanation that I'm missing.

[01:03:45] [SPEAKER_02]: Well it's interesting there was still simultaneous claims so for instance El Mokal al-Islami

[01:03:50] [SPEAKER_02]: fi'il-ar-aq which is the Islamic resistance in Iraq and just for your listeners pretty much every

[01:03:56] [SPEAKER_02]: group the Iranians run in Iraq that's a Shia militia will call itself the Islamic resistance

[01:04:00] [SPEAKER_02]: in Iraq like they always have that that nameplate on the bottom of their seals or their flag or

[01:04:05] [SPEAKER_02]: wherever but for this one when I say that I'm talking about a front group that includes

[01:04:10] [SPEAKER_02]: anywhere from like four to six different organizations established Shia militias that are

[01:04:15] [SPEAKER_02]: extraordinarily loyal sometimes one of them has had their issues with the Iranians but

[01:04:20] [SPEAKER_02]: they're very very loyal but they claimed that there were cruise missile launches

[01:04:24] [SPEAKER_02]: that they did from Iraq now they've lied before you know but I think it's interesting you

[01:04:29] [SPEAKER_02]: know for talking about what the Iranians directly did are we counting that as part of

[01:04:33] [SPEAKER_02]: it if said attacks did actually happen I mean they put up a video and everything else

[01:04:37] [SPEAKER_02]: but the way they marketed it was they wanted and it's interesting going back to the PR bit

[01:04:43] [SPEAKER_02]: they wanted that shot that Palestinian Islamic jihad has used a similar type before and clearly

[01:04:49] [SPEAKER_02]: the graphics are done with some Iranian help Lebanese Hezbollah has done graphics like this

[01:04:55] [SPEAKER_02]: some of the Iraqi groups have put graphics where they show Tel Aviv and they show kind of

[01:04:59] [SPEAKER_02]: like that main I think it's like the diamond exchange and Ramadan it's a circular kind of

[01:05:03] [SPEAKER_02]: building and then the Ministry of Defense is there and stuff yeah the Kirya right there

[01:05:08] [SPEAKER_02]: put the highway so it's this yeah it's a very distinct building and they also have distinct

[01:05:12] [SPEAKER_02]: buildings that are like on the Tel Aviv and Yafa the shoreline that's there but they'll show that

[01:05:17] [SPEAKER_02]: and they love to show kind of like the rockets smashing into the skyscrapers and they love

[01:05:22] [SPEAKER_02]: to show that stuff and when we saw the first attack you know that happened in April that

[01:05:27] [SPEAKER_02]: actually did involve cruise missiles and drones and a lot of other other weapon systems

[01:05:32] [SPEAKER_02]: it's interesting how that was played afterwards like they were looking for the propaganda image

[01:05:36] [SPEAKER_02]: it's so I mean it shouldn't have been surprising to me but you know I will say it's it's it was

[01:05:42] [SPEAKER_02]: actually surprising in terms of how fast it was once they got the shot they wanted boom did

[01:05:46] [SPEAKER_03]: they have stuff produced immediately for that missile trails over the over the al-Aqsa mosque

[01:05:53] [SPEAKER_02]: in Jerusalem yeah I mean look they did that in April and then this time around now it's the

[01:05:58] [SPEAKER_02]: the kind of glowing orbs that are falling into Tel Aviv shot with a giggling Nasrallah in the

[01:06:04] [SPEAKER_02]: background or you know like other stuff like that but it's you know it's interesting there is that

[01:06:09] [SPEAKER_02]: PR angle there I think the other angle on it is and you can make the argument on one side

[01:06:14] [SPEAKER_02]: you know when you choose some form of direct action it's highly likely that the other side

[01:06:20] [SPEAKER_02]: will misinterpret it in some way and it's interesting there is this line of them

[01:06:24] [SPEAKER_02]: to go back to the telegraphing a bit that's always used you know well they telegraphed

[01:06:30] [SPEAKER_02]: you know essentially what they would do that's all well and good okay you know that's that's nice

[01:06:36] [SPEAKER_02]: you guys still launched a bunch of ballistic missiles and I think launching those ballistic

[01:06:39] [SPEAKER_02]: missiles and doing that was to send kind of another message of power well who are they

[01:06:45] [SPEAKER_02]: trying to send that message of power to and I you know I said this on on on Twitter slash

[01:06:50] [SPEAKER_02]: X where I was going you know a lot of this was more internally focused they really hit a catch 22

[01:06:57] [SPEAKER_02]: and the catch 22 was either they can they can continue playing the the game of Saber and we

[01:07:03] [SPEAKER_02]: are the Saberine we're the patient ones the Quranic patient ones and patients that they emphasize

[01:07:08] [SPEAKER_02]: quite a bit and say this is a patient calculation and we're just not going to do anything when

[01:07:14] [SPEAKER_02]: like the key guy one of our key guys you know at probably beyond Soleimani level of importance for

[01:07:21] [SPEAKER_02]: our our grand army in the Middle East for our proxy forces is killed in addition to a leading IRGC QF

[01:07:29] [SPEAKER_02]: commander in addition to a variety of other people and we've been mocked consistently internally

[01:07:35] [SPEAKER_02]: and externally for that lack of response or we can kind of bite the bullet here and kind of

[01:07:40] [SPEAKER_02]: you know just do it and yeah there's probably going to be some harsh repercussions but it's

[01:07:45] [SPEAKER_02]: to demonstrate that we're going to continue going who does that appeal to well what it said to me

[01:07:49] [SPEAKER_02]: it actually it actually reaffirmed this a bit more that there was a higher likelihood that they

[01:07:55] [SPEAKER_02]: had to do this internally because if they let Nasrallah if they let the Nasrallah thing go

[01:07:59] [SPEAKER_02]: when they didn't have something that was kind of graphically appealing in terms of something

[01:08:04] [SPEAKER_02]: they could pull off and a move they could pull off that looks like wow that is I can't believe

[01:08:09] [SPEAKER_02]: they pulled that off they've been promising this for a while it is yet another Waddle Sadiq you know

[01:08:14] [SPEAKER_02]: it's kind of a sacred promise if you will uh you know in the same form they used to call the Waddle

[01:08:18] [SPEAKER_02]: Sadiq what Nasrallah said he had a you know the truthful promise like the sacred promise

[01:08:23] [SPEAKER_02]: that he delivered in 2006 it's interesting they also called the operation that you know they

[01:08:28] [SPEAKER_02]: called it Waddle Sadiq too but I mean you look at something like that if they weren't able

[01:08:32] [SPEAKER_02]: to kind of produce something like that I think they would have had and I think they thought

[01:08:37] [SPEAKER_02]: this far more internal issues from their proxies is seeing and smelling weakness because the weakness

[01:08:43] [SPEAKER_02]: that blood was already in the water I'm not saying these groups were going to just split off and say

[01:08:48] [SPEAKER_02]: we're done with the Iranians or done with this we're done with that but to maintain some level

[01:08:52] [SPEAKER_02]: of cohesiveness and demonstrate that you actually will support not just Nasrallah but also they

[01:08:57] [SPEAKER_02]: lost a leading guy of their own uh meaning from IRGC had they not done it then they you

[01:09:02] [SPEAKER_02]: know there's nothing they really could do and no matter what the repercussions are going to be

[01:09:06] [SPEAKER_03]: kind of not so good it's funny I have the the tweet of yours from yesterday that you

[01:09:11] [SPEAKER_03]: referenced I have it right here I was gonna I was going to ask a question about it but you

[01:09:16] [SPEAKER_03]: kind of answered it already but it was I'll read the tweet if you don't mind it's not like

[01:09:20] [SPEAKER_03]: incriminating or anything deterrence is being overused by those following the Israel-Iran issues

[01:09:26] [SPEAKER_03]: missile attack clearly wasn't about reestablishing it it was a play to show some strength internally

[01:09:31] [SPEAKER_03]: slash two proxies in shock Nasrallah gone no way Iran wouldn't assume there wouldn't be further

[01:09:37] [SPEAKER_03]: repercussions so my my question to you was and you sort of answered it that I was I saw this yesterday

[01:09:43] [SPEAKER_03]: I was like oh he's kind of saying this is more for like the messaging with more for like internal

[01:09:46] [SPEAKER_03]: consumption like Iranian saying you know don't worry daddy it's still here with the big guns

[01:09:51] [SPEAKER_02]: yes yes yeah I think that their move and after I kind of let it kind of sit for a little while

[01:09:57] [SPEAKER_02]: and I was really trying to think about this how did they cover it I've been doing these little threads

[01:10:02] [SPEAKER_02]: on there where I will go through kind of my wide list of you know each group sometimes I'll have

[01:10:07] [SPEAKER_02]: like 40 different accounts for them and then I kind of write down what they're saying in them and

[01:10:10] [SPEAKER_02]: just look I do it for my out my myself but I'm figuring like who's gonna actually read that

[01:10:14] [SPEAKER_02]: so now I've just kind of stuck kind of synopses of it on Twitter me on my couch with my cat

[01:10:21] [SPEAKER_02]: sitting in the dark reading this like yeah well it's better than me I'm actually writing it

[01:10:26] [SPEAKER_02]: when I have a small parrot on my finger that's trying to eat my computer luckily the cat isn't there

[01:10:33] [SPEAKER_02]: but it's I would say you know it's interesting to watch how they reacted to it and I'm not

[01:10:41] [SPEAKER_02]: saying that all those reactions were 100 honest like you're seeing public reactions that they

[01:10:47] [SPEAKER_02]: are putting out but the public reactions were almost so in line with one another

[01:10:52] [SPEAKER_02]: there was definitely a structure to it there's definitely a messaging angle

[01:10:55] [SPEAKER_02]: that was required to kind of come out and it just felt to me that that was more of an emphasis

[01:11:01] [SPEAKER_02]: in again I don't want a misconception to be born from this where I am saying well it's like

[01:11:07] [SPEAKER_02]: they're kind of angry with with mama bear not doing enough for them well that can happen

[01:11:12] [SPEAKER_02]: and I don't want people to think that that magically means an organization will just

[01:11:16] [SPEAKER_02]: split from the Iranian orbit a lot of these groups require Iranian funding they require

[01:11:22] [SPEAKER_02]: Iranian support they require the arms to come from them they require the political overhead

[01:11:26] [SPEAKER_02]: because they are often not the only group in the country they're often sometimes set against

[01:11:30] [SPEAKER_02]: another group that's also backed by the Iranians this is another mode of control that that Iran

[01:11:35] [SPEAKER_02]: uses but that doesn't mean that you will not get some reactions and I mean you don't want like

[01:11:41] [SPEAKER_02]: five groups getting together and saying yeah isn't that messed up that no one really cared that

[01:11:44] [SPEAKER_02]: we lost like five commanders and they didn't care that their best guys that we look up to

[01:11:49] [SPEAKER_02]: got waxed earlier I think that is something if you're kind of doing proxy management that

[01:11:56] [SPEAKER_02]: you kind of have to take account for and you kind of have to do it but I also think again

[01:12:00] [SPEAKER_02]: let's say they didn't do anything let's say there was no response that's just more the same then

[01:12:06] [SPEAKER_02]: that they've already been knocked for constantly at a time in place of our choosing yes so I mean

[01:12:12] [SPEAKER_02]: that's essentially what it comes down to so I mean imagine it's the catch 22 that I'm getting at

[01:12:16] [SPEAKER_02]: it you know what are you going to do and the Israelis very successfully and very strategically

[01:12:21] [SPEAKER_02]: they're very intelligent with a strategy of calling the bluff well okay let's keep doing this

[01:12:27] [SPEAKER_02]: and let's keep doing this and let's keep doing this it was so overwhelming that again there was no

[01:12:33] [SPEAKER_02]: other real choice they could have made and yet it was still the wrong choice because there's now

[01:12:37] [SPEAKER_02]: going to be another response from the Israelis that'll probably cost them something

[01:12:41] [SPEAKER_03]: you know we've talked a lot about deterrence here you know we were it's interesting that Iran's attack

[01:13:02] [SPEAKER_03]: on Israel yesterday was reestablishing deterrence for Israel's strike on Nasrallah and Hania mostly

[01:13:13] [SPEAKER_03]: which was done by Israel to reestablish deterrence for October 7th and it's just

[01:13:19] [SPEAKER_03]: like that sort of goes all the way back right so I got thinking yesterday about that whole kind of

[01:13:26] [SPEAKER_03]: issue and I was I was thinking back to our conversation at the end of the last show

[01:13:30] [SPEAKER_03]: about sort of like reflecting back on the last year since October 7th and I don't know I have this

[01:13:37] [SPEAKER_03]: kind of like soup in my head that I want to sort of like suss out for you and kind of see

[01:13:44] [SPEAKER_03]: what you think here you probably want to agree but I don't I don't know that I entirely agree

[01:13:49] [SPEAKER_03]: with what I'm about to say here it's more just like a thought that I have in my head that I don't

[01:13:53] [SPEAKER_03]: quite know what to do with but bear with me here it's often said that Israel's purpose in this war

[01:13:59] [SPEAKER_03]: aside from eliminating those responsible for October 7th is to reestablish deterrence but

[01:14:04] [SPEAKER_03]: one question I haven't seen discussed is if the objective is to reestablish deterrence

[01:14:09] [SPEAKER_03]: shouldn't it first be pinpointed when and how it was lost clearly it wasn't in place on October

[01:14:15] [SPEAKER_03]: 5th or October 6th or at any point during the two years Hamas spent planning and training for the

[01:14:20] [SPEAKER_03]: attack it would seem to me that deterrence was lost whenever Hamas first seriously calculated

[01:14:25] [SPEAKER_03]: they could pull this off at the same time Israeli intelligence intercepted the whole playbook

[01:14:31] [SPEAKER_03]: for October 7th over a year in advance and dismissed it the IDF then redeployed units

[01:14:36] [SPEAKER_03]: near Gaza to the West Bank arguably for domestic political purposes I've always thought did

[01:14:42] [SPEAKER_03]: Hamas actually outwit and outgun Israel's security establishment on October 7th

[01:14:49] [SPEAKER_03]: anything not really they weren't defeated they neglected to show up that morning

[01:14:53] [SPEAKER_03]: they forfeited the game and I'm not equivocating the two but it's like both belligerence here

[01:14:59] [SPEAKER_03]: Beebe's cabinet and the pungent stew of Iran Hamas Hezbollah and maybe hitched onto that

[01:15:06] [SPEAKER_03]: wagon you can include the Iraqi groups and the Houthis and all of that got way too high

[01:15:11] [SPEAKER_03]: on their own supply and the result was the worst mass slaughter of Jews since 1945 followed by this

[01:15:17] [SPEAKER_03]: horrific regional war that's killed 40,000 Gazans and could yet spin out of control even further

[01:15:23] [SPEAKER_03]: it's like your point that Hezbollah and the Iranians forgot that the Israelis had a vote here

[01:15:29] [SPEAKER_03]: also I think if you go back to October 5th and 6th both sides forgot that the other also

[01:15:36] [SPEAKER_03]: now any country with the means to do so would unleash hell on anyone who did that to their people

[01:15:43] [SPEAKER_03]: on October 7th and the threat from Hezbollah against northern Israel has been strategically

[01:15:47] [SPEAKER_03]: untenable for years if a Russian backed Canadian militia had a massive arsenal aimed at Buffalo

[01:15:53] [SPEAKER_03]: or Seattle we'd never tolerate it Israel's intelligence community has since pulled off

[01:15:59] [SPEAKER_03]: some truly historic feats to restore their honor at home and remind the world of their

[01:16:04] [SPEAKER_03]: reputation so is this a matter of Israel needing to reestablish deterrence or is it more

[01:16:11] [SPEAKER_03]: straightforward do they need to just demonstrate their capabilities dispense justice for October

[01:16:16] [SPEAKER_03]: 7th and not forfeit the game again I'm not sure I have an answer thus I ask you

[01:16:22] [SPEAKER_02]: I do not think you are wrong in the least to say deterrence quote unquote was technically lost

[01:16:29] [SPEAKER_02]: by the Israelis prior to October 7th I think the fact that you know their intelligence apparatus was

[01:16:36] [SPEAKER_02]: working pretty well but you know policy and kind of how they were understanding the intelligence

[01:16:40] [SPEAKER_02]: they were getting that was an issue the other thing is I think there's a great line from 9-11

[01:16:46] [SPEAKER_02]: which was we had a failure of imagination and I think yeah a lot of different entities in

[01:16:50] [SPEAKER_02]: the Middle East this includes the Iranians the Iranians were setting Hamas up for you

[01:16:57] [SPEAKER_02]: know hang glider style attacks they were setting them up for you know successful tunneling

[01:17:02] [SPEAKER_02]: operations they were setting them up for you know more advanced arms and more advanced equipment

[01:17:07] [SPEAKER_02]: and how they were kind of developed as military actors within Gaza there's no way this is no

[01:17:14] [SPEAKER_02]: really way you could deny that but this kind of comes down to what I had said a number of times

[01:17:19] [SPEAKER_02]: on here you know you had groups that were met with different levels of catastrophic success

[01:17:24] [SPEAKER_02]: the Iranians I'm pretty sure knew that an operation was coming pretty sure the Israelis

[01:17:28] [SPEAKER_02]: thought it I'm pretty sure sometimes overconfidence is a definite direct effect I also think when

[01:17:34] [SPEAKER_02]: you take a policy position like the Israelis did which is kind of downgrading Hamas hey we have

[01:17:39] [SPEAKER_02]: them contained quite literally contained in Gaza yeah there's some there's some guys that

[01:17:44] [SPEAKER_02]: are kind of developing their ways in the West Bank we can deal with that and you know the PA

[01:17:48] [SPEAKER_02]: will have to deal with that as well but I think that kind of that general attitude

[01:17:52] [SPEAKER_02]: you know that cost them cost them very quite dearly the other thing was kind of the

[01:17:57] [SPEAKER_02]: you said this and I hope I'm not I'm not misreading it this really comes down to

[01:18:02] [SPEAKER_02]: the Iranian position on a lot of this you know well why would they get involved well it's just

[01:18:06] [SPEAKER_02]: like this you know sink that's kind of constantly sucking the water out and they just kind of

[01:18:11] [SPEAKER_02]: got sucked into this I think in part because of a lot of the oh I think they're they're

[01:18:15] [SPEAKER_03]: self-aware actors in this they're not the dog being lagged by the tail yeah I don't buy I see

[01:18:21] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't buy that at all either I think that they knew what was going to happen and I also think

[01:18:25] [SPEAKER_02]: they were struck by how successful it really was I think that they're they're thinking on it was

[01:18:30] [SPEAKER_02]: probably yeah well these Israelis are they have a pretty effective military and a pretty effective

[01:18:34] [SPEAKER_02]: cordon on Gaza and there might be a few things out there might be some hostages taken but it'll

[01:18:39] [SPEAKER_02]: be like you know Gillard Shelley level but a little bit larger and Hamas and Sinwar took this

[01:18:45] [SPEAKER_02]: like it was wow this is you know a kid in the candy store what can I try and pull off and how

[01:18:50] [SPEAKER_02]: can I do it and they were also you know by by chance because of you know kind of luck of the draw on it

[01:18:57] [SPEAKER_02]: uh they were met with that success meaning you know it was a lot of stuff was undefended a lot of

[01:19:01] [SPEAKER_02]: things uh did not really come up the way many assumed that they would so but to go back to

[01:19:07] [SPEAKER_02]: this in terms of deterrence I think part of it is for the Israelis anyway dealing with the

[01:19:13] [SPEAKER_02]: deterrence picture and when it comes to the deterrence picture it's the if you launch an

[01:19:18] [SPEAKER_02]: operation of that magnitude again look at what we can do look at what we can bring to the table

[01:19:24] [SPEAKER_02]: do you really want to play that game do you want your proxy army to be rolled back like nobody's

[01:19:29] [SPEAKER_02]: business and done so when at a time in place of our choosing which is essentially what they've

[01:19:34] [SPEAKER_02]: done it's like there's a level of I think uh mockery of the Iranians that are that's there

[01:19:40] [SPEAKER_02]: it's also how much patience do you think these really the Israelis I could make the argument

[01:19:45] [SPEAKER_02]: that the Israelis exhibited a good level of patience when it came to uh kind of the annoyances

[01:19:51] [SPEAKER_02]: that they were facing from Lebanon from Hezbollah from the missile attacks from the Houthis uh from

[01:19:56] [SPEAKER_02]: other issues with the Iraqis and I think because of that it sent the wrong message to the Iranians

[01:20:02] [SPEAKER_02]: and also sent the wrong message to the Americans too the Americans who constantly have been

[01:20:07] [SPEAKER_02]: complaining about the potential for escalation and a regional war which is priceless because when

[01:20:12] [SPEAKER_02]: you have a multitude of groups from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen in addition to Gaza in addition

[01:20:18] [SPEAKER_02]: to Palestinian groups in Lebanon in addition to attacks that are going on within West Bank

[01:20:24] [SPEAKER_02]: and Israel proper I think that kind of defines as a as a regional war you know but regardless

[01:20:30] [SPEAKER_02]: I mean I think that there is this kind of this mindset where okay well they can have their

[01:20:35] [SPEAKER_02]: little dust up and squabble it'll last a couple of weeks and you know we just have to kind of

[01:20:40] [SPEAKER_02]: maintain this constants that that'll be okay and maybe things will wrap up in Gaza and I think the

[01:20:45] [SPEAKER_02]: Israelis were looking at this going wait a second hold on back up there are still people who are

[01:20:49] [SPEAKER_02]: kidnapped that are theirs there are there is still the damage that was done to the this is like

[01:20:54] [SPEAKER_02]: 1973 uh talking about the Yom Kippur war levels of surprise uh and and kind of attrition

[01:21:01] [SPEAKER_02]: that they're facing and losses trauma and shock yes all of it I don't think a lot of that's been

[01:21:07] [SPEAKER_02]: calculated I think a lot of people uh you know and I think this this qualifies for both ends

[01:21:14] [SPEAKER_02]: you know they're not really factoring in you know just the the trauma that's actually happened

[01:21:18] [SPEAKER_02]: again I don't like to use the the uh psychological speak uh uh babble but I do actually I do I do

[01:21:26] [SPEAKER_02]: think that there's a genuine piece to that that is not being picked up on and you can feel

[01:21:30] [SPEAKER_02]: it's speaking of things that are quite palpable uh again I've tried to talk to lots of different

[01:21:35] [SPEAKER_02]: people I'm talking you know Lebanese on one end and I'll talk to a bunch of Israelis that I know

[01:21:38] [SPEAKER_02]: on another end and you know talk to Iraqis that I know on another but with the Israelis I mean I

[01:21:43] [SPEAKER_02]: can tell you just from those first couple months after this people did not sound the same there

[01:21:49] [SPEAKER_02]: was like some a good level of PTSD now imagine that was factor that in for a policymaker who

[01:21:56] [SPEAKER_02]: was kind of high on their horse and hey we have such an advanced army hey we have such

[01:21:59] [SPEAKER_02]: advanced intelligence da da da da you know put that down I mean imagine the level of hit that

[01:22:04] [SPEAKER_02]: takes when your country is the vaunted representative of being the the intelligence leader when it comes

[01:22:12] [SPEAKER_03]: to dealing with issues threatening the country you and I were both kids but we remember 9-11

[01:22:16] [SPEAKER_02]: and what it was like here after that that I mean for us we were kind of fresh and new

[01:22:20] [SPEAKER_02]: in terms of looking at a lot of that but I would say that hasn't left me I mean I was

[01:22:25] [SPEAKER_02]: I was living in the New York metro area and my school alone we think we lost like five or six parents

[01:22:30] [SPEAKER_02]: for 9-11 I remember I still remember the first year where there were kids we had a little ceremony

[01:22:36] [SPEAKER_02]: in the school and kids were weeping they were just weeping in the hallways it was just

[01:22:41] [SPEAKER_02]: unbelievable you could never seen something like that but now imagine this where they're

[01:22:46] [SPEAKER_02]: you're having entire villages that have been wiped out by you know by Hamas with videos

[01:22:51] [SPEAKER_02]: of it and a lot of other a lot of other really really horrific acts I you know and again this isn't

[01:22:57] [SPEAKER_02]: to you this isn't to downplay everything else that's going on in the war particularly the

[01:23:01] [SPEAKER_02]: stuff that's going on in Gaza too but there is I just feel like that unaddressed peace to this

[01:23:09] [SPEAKER_02]: they're the Israelis may be looking for some form of redress it's the how do you get

[01:23:14] [SPEAKER_02]: this back how do you get that position it's kind of like the beeper attacks were they

[01:23:19] [SPEAKER_02]: tactically sound and effective for the most part yeah were they an intelligence master bees yes

[01:23:24] [SPEAKER_02]: were they really unique and outside the box totally or is this something that people are

[01:23:29] [SPEAKER_02]: going to be talking about for years efforts you bet your ass they are it's it's a bit like

[01:23:33] [SPEAKER_02]: you know al-Muhandis and I'm not talking about Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis I'm talking about

[01:23:37] [SPEAKER_02]: Yahya Ayash the engineer who right interestingly he also had a phone issue because he used

[01:23:44] [SPEAKER_02]: a cell phone that I forgot it was PETN or something or Semtex or something that was in the

[01:23:48] [SPEAKER_02]: in the phone the Israelis put in but I remember he was calling his father and they blew it up

[01:23:53] [SPEAKER_02]: and it blew his head off well if you recall the things that he did beforehand we're talking about

[01:23:58] [SPEAKER_02]: bus bombings suicide bus bombings and he was building the vests for them

[01:24:02] [SPEAKER_02]: but he was doing that we're talking about multiple suicide bus bombings that were

[01:24:05] [SPEAKER_02]: really brutal in terms of the numbers that they had taken the speaking of trauma that

[01:24:10] [SPEAKER_02]: happened with that group well here they infiltrated his network they even got into his phone and they

[01:24:16] [SPEAKER_02]: got him as he was calling apparently his father at least that's according to you know the stories

[01:24:20] [SPEAKER_02]: that are told about it that's something that people were talking about you know right after 9

[01:24:23] [SPEAKER_02]: 11 like it was an example of well look this is how you can handle Islamic Islamist terrorism and

[01:24:28] [SPEAKER_02]: but I mean I think you look at something like this it's kind of how do you regain

[01:24:32] [SPEAKER_02]: that presence and again I can't really put my finger on on what it truly addresses

[01:24:38] [SPEAKER_02]: but it does address something it's a jinnisei quah that's there that covers a lot of different little

[01:24:42] [SPEAKER_02]: micro kind of subject matters the other pieces to this in terms of that deterrence quote-unquote

[01:24:48] [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know and I don't know if the Israelis even think about this anymore I think that they've

[01:24:52] [SPEAKER_02]: they've come around to a position of you know deterrence only means so much

[01:24:57] [SPEAKER_02]: but I do think it's the it's the mess with us and we're going to bring the hurt

[01:25:01] [SPEAKER_02]: and we'll bring the hurt in ways that you could never imagine now does that qualify as kind

[01:25:05] [SPEAKER_02]: of the academic textbook version of deterrence well in some ways it does does it classify and I

[01:25:12] [SPEAKER_02]: guess the policymaker sense or does it work as long term as some might think might it have

[01:25:17] [SPEAKER_02]: some blowback to it because you know hey if I'm a group and you're telling me I can't do something

[01:25:21] [SPEAKER_02]: and my whole thing is doing it um you know it's just how some work right you know again

[01:25:28] [SPEAKER_02]: remains to be seen but what I would say is I mean you kind of look at this in terms of

[01:25:32] [SPEAKER_02]: what it's actually degrading in terms of capabilities I think that's another piece of this deterrence

[01:25:37] [SPEAKER_02]: puzzle they have decapitated Lebanese Hezbollah in such a way that they have removed the head

[01:25:43] [SPEAKER_02]: they have removed chunks of the neck and they have removed chunks of the arms fingers and legs and

[01:25:48] [SPEAKER_02]: feet um and and it's just I mean you look at it and it's been happening over what a three

[01:25:53] [SPEAKER_02]: almost three week period and again there's little spurts here and there uh from the summer

[01:25:57] [SPEAKER_02]: but this is where kind of the big stuff is heading and it's not just Lebanese Hezbollah

[01:26:01] [SPEAKER_02]: it's anyone who's touched the Iranians it's like the the Houthi commander in a helicopter who

[01:26:06] [SPEAKER_02]: crashed with a bunch of IRGC in it in Iran it's a bit like the three PFLP popular front for the

[01:26:12] [SPEAKER_02]: liberation of Palestine some may remember that from their their time hijacking aircraft in the

[01:26:17] [SPEAKER_02]: 1970s that was actually the group that caused the so-called Black September in Jordan uh 1970

[01:26:23] [SPEAKER_02]: Dawson's field they hijacked three or four different aircraft and landed them there but I

[01:26:29] [SPEAKER_02]: mean that's Marxist terrorist organization but it it had gone over to being an Iranian proxy

[01:26:36] [SPEAKER_02]: and the guys who are spearheading you know the the group that meets with Lebanese Hezbollah and

[01:26:42] [SPEAKER_02]: meets with Iran and by extension you know through Hezbollah meets with Iran they are all killed

[01:26:47] [SPEAKER_02]: in a hotel room in Beirut in one shot this is also after you have a command structure that

[01:26:53] [SPEAKER_02]: belongs to al-Jama'is the mii the Islamic group which is the Muslim Brotherhood section that's

[01:26:59] [SPEAKER_02]: in Lebanon that has now even though there's splits within it become markedly more pro-Hazbollah and

[01:27:05] [SPEAKER_02]: they've been reoutfitted by Hezbollah they've been launching rockets into Israel and they're also

[01:27:09] [SPEAKER_02]: extraordinarily close to Hamas let's not forget that Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood group but

[01:27:14] [SPEAKER_02]: you know they had a number of leadership that was in it that were also removed these were guys

[01:27:19] [SPEAKER_02]: who were with their their their Kuwait al-Fajr their Fajr forces as they're called and this

[01:27:25] [SPEAKER_02]: all happened within a 48 hour period we're talking about a multitude of groups all with

[01:27:29] [SPEAKER_02]: links going to Lebanese Hezbollah and I I always love using the old 9x ad from New York City it's

[01:27:37] [SPEAKER_02]: like 9x New York telephone so it used to go we're all connected New York telephone and it

[01:27:42] [SPEAKER_02]: was like everyone who's now connected in with that you know we're all connected Lebanese Hezbollah

[01:27:46] [SPEAKER_02]: and Iran and anybody who had that link is now getting just kind of wiped from the picture

[01:27:53] [SPEAKER_02]: and they're all it's all happening in such rapid succession that does not bode well for you know

[01:27:59] [SPEAKER_02]: organizational capabilities I'm not saying it can't be rebuilt but the rebuilding process it's not

[01:28:03] [SPEAKER_02]: even going to be like a three or four year thing we're talking decades of rebuilding now does

[01:28:09] [SPEAKER_02]: that count as deterrence does that count as I guess putting your enemy in another position so you

[01:28:17] [SPEAKER_02]: can you know better kind of better protect you know your forces and better protect your population

[01:28:23] [SPEAKER_02]: I think the argument can be made yes yes that certainly does that that certainly assists with

[01:28:29] [SPEAKER_02]: the process so that Iran can't reach out and touch you again so yeah I mean I think that

[01:28:33] [SPEAKER_03]: calculus is there as well it's a it's a tough thing to to juggle with I just noticed like

[01:28:38] [SPEAKER_03]: when we were when we were talking and you know especially last night when you mentioned when

[01:28:43] [SPEAKER_03]: when you use that d word deterrence in terms of the Iranian attack yesterday it was just this

[01:28:49] [SPEAKER_03]: weird thing that kind of clicked to me like this is all just this tit for tat spiral about

[01:28:55] [SPEAKER_03]: reestablishing deterrence and I'm but where was it lost in the beginning you know where was

[01:28:59] [SPEAKER_03]: the original sin of this and I don't know it's just an interesting um thought experiment that I

[01:29:04] [SPEAKER_02]: had I think if we're talking about original sin uh I don't I you could go back to 79

[01:29:10] [SPEAKER_02]: yeah well I mean again one could you could even go back to 82 you could go back to 2006

[01:29:17] [SPEAKER_02]: I'm certain there were some people around that would say it goes all the way back to 1947

[01:29:21] [SPEAKER_02]: there are some that goes back to 1917 there are others that would say it goes back to 1923

[01:29:26] [SPEAKER_02]: it's like we can do this till we're blue in the face I think in the in the recent setting

[01:29:30] [SPEAKER_02]: I know this is a criticism that I would have of some of this thinking and I'm not saying there

[01:29:35] [SPEAKER_02]: isn't a truth to kind of the deterrence argument but it's kind of this annoying

[01:29:42] [SPEAKER_02]: pseudo-intellectual way of viewing things and it obviously I mean it comes from a lot of academia

[01:29:47] [SPEAKER_02]: it comes from a lot of talking heads who you know are working from a conclusion backwards in

[01:29:52] [SPEAKER_02]: search of supportive facts um I'm not going to name names it's kind of like sub tweeting

[01:29:56] [SPEAKER_02]: but I think people can figure it out when they're when they're looking around

[01:30:00] [SPEAKER_02]: it sounds really fluffy and serious and it sounds like a really good IR textbook and to

[01:30:05] [SPEAKER_02]: it re-achieve deterrence and I can cold analyze it this way and da da da da I don't really know

[01:30:12] [SPEAKER_02]: if it often falls into that positioning I think there's a lot of emotionalism here

[01:30:17] [SPEAKER_02]: obviously there would be you know it's a war you know I think that's not being accounted for

[01:30:22] [SPEAKER_02]: I think that you know Iran's goals is it deterrence per se well they've clearly demonstrated

[01:30:27] [SPEAKER_02]: they are an ideologically motivated country even if said ideology isn't all that popular even at home

[01:30:34] [SPEAKER_02]: you know it's I always give I hate the reductio ad Hitler and some stuff but I actually do think

[01:30:40] [SPEAKER_02]: there's a strong parallel here it's interesting you look at kind of how the Germans were

[01:30:44] [SPEAKER_02]: prosecuting the last days of world war two they were still killing Jews and they were still

[01:30:50] [SPEAKER_02]: you know still executing people who were traitors when they say traitors I mean people who

[01:30:55] [SPEAKER_02]: were trying to surrender to the allies that was still going on to the last days the last

[01:31:02] [SPEAKER_02]: muscle memory yeah it's but but you look at that and it's it's the this commitment to the cause even

[01:31:08] [SPEAKER_02]: though well the Russian tanks are literally in Berlin underneath the Reichstag you know what now

[01:31:14] [SPEAKER_03]: they're sending wave of 12 year olds out in front of these battle hard and Soviet shock troops

[01:31:19] [SPEAKER_02]: and it's funny you say that because during the Iran-Iraq war which really got started

[01:31:23] [SPEAKER_02]: in this time period in 1980 what you had was a bunch of kids who were put the Iranians put a bunch

[01:31:29] [SPEAKER_02]: of plastic keys on them in some cases and had them run over mines when they didn't have enough

[01:31:33] [SPEAKER_02]: minesweeper equipment and I'm talking and we talk about ideological motivation and people not

[01:31:39] [SPEAKER_02]: taking it seriously and again I think this is a big split in a lot of western academia and

[01:31:45] [SPEAKER_02]: policy circles you know it's the I paraphrase this and I I still know the person who said

[01:31:52] [SPEAKER_02]: it to me and I still criticize them for what they said to me but it's this kind of materialist

[01:31:57] [SPEAKER_02]: argument for everything which is it's almost like Tom Friedman in in Lexis in the olive tree

[01:32:03] [SPEAKER_02]: saying that there's going to be peace between the Syrians and Israelis because the Syrians

[01:32:07] [SPEAKER_02]: were watching cornflake commercials from Israel and the corn flakes looked crisper he actually

[01:32:13] [SPEAKER_02]: put that in his book that's actually in his book mine yes and that's that's a motivator for peace

[01:32:18] [SPEAKER_02]: um no but okay uh and again Syria isn't the same kind of ideological level of thinking

[01:32:27] [SPEAKER_02]: as say the Iranians are at least the poor man's mcdonald's theory it's it's a bit like that

[01:32:34] [SPEAKER_02]: but I think there's this misunderstanding it's kind of like well the IRGC commanders they have

[01:32:38] [SPEAKER_02]: these big parties with liquor and sometimes there's drugs and you know their kids are

[01:32:42] [SPEAKER_02]: taking pictures in in their mansions in Tabriz and putting it up on Instagram okay so because

[01:32:48] [SPEAKER_02]: they have a white Mercedes or a white BMW and they cruise around to the gold chain you're telling me

[01:32:55] [SPEAKER_02]: that that's somehow going to motivate them to not continue attacking the groups that they've

[01:33:00] [SPEAKER_03]: been attacking for a while yes clearly some hypocrisy classical secular liberal democracy

[01:33:06] [SPEAKER_02]: yes but see this is how it translates out though see it's they're just like us so why

[01:33:10] [SPEAKER_02]: would they want that it's like you know like Kantian peace theory you know well if you have a bunch

[01:33:14] [SPEAKER_02]: democracies and they all want to trade with one another why would they attack one another

[01:33:17] [SPEAKER_02]: well there's a lot of disputes not all of them are completely irrational and sometimes they just

[01:33:23] [SPEAKER_02]: going and going even when people have lost the rationale for some of them but I do think

[01:33:28] [SPEAKER_02]: there's this misconception there and I do actually you know believe this that you know in the

[01:33:32] [SPEAKER_02]: Islamic Republic in terms of their leadership apparatus you do have a lot of genuine

[01:33:37] [SPEAKER_02]: true believers this is my issue with Nasrallah he was a genuine true believer despite the fact that

[01:33:42] [SPEAKER_02]: there is plenty of corruption and hypocrisy that happened with Lebanese Hezbollah and he still carried

[01:33:48] [SPEAKER_02]: that out it was something that he projected quite effectively you know it you can say two things that

[01:33:53] [SPEAKER_02]: might sound opposing but they can both be true and I think a lot of people have forgotten

[01:33:58] [SPEAKER_02]: that when it comes to really looking at this situation and kind of looking at what say Iran

[01:34:02] [SPEAKER_02]: wants so is it deterrence per se I don't know if that would even be the right definition I

[01:34:06] [SPEAKER_02]: don't really know think if everyone's trying to just do things and out of a specific academic

[01:34:10] [SPEAKER_02]: theory and kind of form it in this paradigm style of thinking it doesn't allow for a lot of other

[01:34:17] [SPEAKER_02]: things to be included in there and this goes particularly for Iran its proxies I don't

[01:34:21] [SPEAKER_02]: think that there is any logic to how they're doing their things but their logic is not necessarily

[01:34:25] [SPEAKER_02]: what yours is and it might not ever be try to think like them and have some empathy for

[01:34:30] [SPEAKER_02]: what they're doing and then move forward with it but I again I don't think that often happens

[01:34:35] [SPEAKER_02]: and I think often there's a miss or over read on something and then there's no real confirmation

[01:34:40] [SPEAKER_02]: going you know going off of any other angle on it don't I really I don't I know I sound completely

[01:34:47] [SPEAKER_02]: arrogant sounding like this I know it and I don't want to but it's something just when you

[01:34:52] [SPEAKER_02]: watch it long enough it's kind of one of those things like okay here we go again it's the same

[01:34:56] [SPEAKER_02]: line that I heard 10 years ago it's the same line that I heard five years ago it's like

[01:35:00] [SPEAKER_02]: nobody read the literature afterwards it's like nobody learned the lesson and I think there's

[01:35:05] [SPEAKER_02]: a lot of that going on yeah I mean you're talking about a rock war fatigue I would actually say

[01:35:09] [SPEAKER_02]: that institutional memory after you know after we quote unquote lose a war I put that in quotes

[01:35:16] [SPEAKER_02]: it's interesting how quickly it drains and what people revert to as examples to kind of move

[01:35:21] [SPEAKER_02]: forward when a new crisis happens everything that's old yeah again that's like I mentioned in

[01:35:26] [SPEAKER_03]: in the last episode when when this came up and I said yeah we're weary from Iraq until

[01:35:30] [SPEAKER_03]: a carrier goes down in the South China Sea of the Taiwan Strait and then you know oh all history

[01:35:35] [SPEAKER_03]: wishes erased yeah it's that same kind of I mean we talked about this I'm I love exploring is in

[01:35:41] [SPEAKER_03]: in the novels just where we where we go as a society when we're confronted with these kind

[01:35:47] [SPEAKER_03]: of events and I think you can absolutely see that in in what's happened in the last year

[01:35:51] [SPEAKER_02]: since October 7th yeah I think it's gonna be a big part of what things are happening now

[01:35:57] [SPEAKER_02]: it's you know here's another little bit to go off of and I I tend to disagree with

[01:36:03] [SPEAKER_02]: oh I tend to get disagree with a lot of people including people who even agree with me

[01:36:07] [SPEAKER_02]: there's been this this it's ideologically informed but I don't think it's incorrect

[01:36:11] [SPEAKER_02]: this attitude of and you know the new Middle East is coming and I'm noticing it quite a bit

[01:36:16] [SPEAKER_02]: from places that I didn't expect it from where it's the and you know Lebanese

[01:36:21] [SPEAKER_02]: Hezbollah can finally be knocked out and there's going to be a functional Lebanese government

[01:36:25] [SPEAKER_02]: and then the axis of resistance is going to be rolled back and who knows maybe there won't even be

[01:36:30] [SPEAKER_02]: you know the Iranian Mullahs you know they won't be around leading Iran yeah they use terminology

[01:36:35] [SPEAKER_02]: like this and whether they're on the left or on the right or in the center or wherever but

[01:36:40] [SPEAKER_02]: it's really it's it's fascinating to me because it doesn't take a lot of history

[01:36:46] [SPEAKER_02]: into account at all it doesn't take even recent history and I will say it was actually

[01:36:52] [SPEAKER_02]: nice to have this conversation and I don't mean to malign the person that I was talking to it was on

[01:36:56] [SPEAKER_02]: that that twitter space thing and one of them said to me you know well you know you have a lot of

[01:37:01] [SPEAKER_02]: pessimism about you know Lebanese government and what they can bring to the table when it comes

[01:37:05] [SPEAKER_02]: to Hezbollah and you know part of my thinking was well I have pessimism it's not pessimism it's

[01:37:11] [SPEAKER_02]: just basic realism because I live there I even talked to the people that were being referenced as

[01:37:16] [SPEAKER_02]: well look and so-and-so is saying this we're for you know how to disarm Hezbollah these are

[01:37:20] [SPEAKER_02]: all the same lines that we heard from 2005 until 2010 sometimes it just stopped in 2008 after Hezbollah

[01:37:27] [SPEAKER_02]: really you know shwacked a lot of a lot of their political opposition after they invaded Beirut

[01:37:32] [SPEAKER_02]: but you know it it's interesting how quickly that's forgotten you know and people will hear

[01:37:37] [SPEAKER_02]: a statement and then really read into that statement and not look for the broader context

[01:37:42] [SPEAKER_02]: the broader swath of what was really going on and kind of how much viability that has

[01:37:49] [SPEAKER_02]: and I've seen like two ends of this where one end is and finally the Lebanese army will be able to

[01:37:54] [SPEAKER_02]: do x y and z really what do you know about the Lebanese army and their capabilities of doing so

[01:37:59] [SPEAKER_02]: there are sections of the Lebanese army if we can recall back to and not everything is a parallel

[01:38:03] [SPEAKER_02]: to the Lebanese civil war but it's a good parallel right now you know there are sections of the

[01:38:09] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese army that are a little bit more pro Hezbollah there are also sections that are

[01:38:13] [SPEAKER_02]: a little bit more neutral on things there are also sections that may be gung ho about it privately

[01:38:17] [SPEAKER_02]: but it's not like they're going to go to the Jannoub and take care of it you know and I think

[01:38:21] [SPEAKER_02]: they're just as afraid of getting blown up by an efp that Lebanese Hezbollah has laid there

[01:38:25] [SPEAKER_02]: and also the populations in certain villages that support them and that doesn't really sound

[01:38:30] [SPEAKER_02]: like a viable quest for them so that's out of the way on that side then the other side is

[01:38:34] [SPEAKER_02]: it's this misconception that you know the rival political parties of Lebanese Hezbollah

[01:38:39] [SPEAKER_02]: are going to materialize their own force well you know I hate to break this to people

[01:38:43] [SPEAKER_02]: but you know on the Sunni and Druze side the Druze who by the way you know generally we're

[01:38:48] [SPEAKER_02]: talking about Wali Jumblot before you know it's not like Wali Jumblot in the PSP for his small

[01:38:53] [SPEAKER_02]: militia apparatus that's there like they're just going to roll out of the mountains and

[01:38:57] [SPEAKER_02]: start solving problems in the Jannoub that's not how that works same thing goes with the

[01:39:01] [SPEAKER_02]: Lebanese forces under Samir Zhaja who would probably be the most capable of any you know

[01:39:06] [SPEAKER_02]: remaining kind of quasi-arm force well they haven't really been an armed force since the

[01:39:10] [SPEAKER_02]: early 90s oddly the same time around Abbas al-Musalli meeting his end because they turned in

[01:39:17] [SPEAKER_02]: the vast majority of their weapons they don't have the same capabilities as before a lot of

[01:39:21] [SPEAKER_02]: their guys are old it's not like they're training up in the mountains constantly and they've got this

[01:39:25] [SPEAKER_02]: whole stream of 18 year olds that are gung-ho okay are we expecting them to wipe out Hezbollah

[01:39:31] [SPEAKER_02]: and Dahya when the Israelis invaded in 1982 and they were unable to even do minor

[01:39:36] [SPEAKER_02]: operations in West Beirut and just expect the Israelis to do it like it's just I don't know

[01:39:41] [SPEAKER_02]: there's this sense of unreality and kind of wishful thinking that's not based on

[01:39:47] [SPEAKER_02]: on really just unfortunate constants that are just there that's not cynicism it's just

[01:39:52] [SPEAKER_02]: kind of being realistic about it and I think you know this kind of attitude of hey we're

[01:39:56] [SPEAKER_02]: you know finally we've reached the future and we have our flying cars now

[01:40:00] [SPEAKER_02]: you know that's not there it's just not there and you know I get worried sometimes when

[01:40:08] [SPEAKER_02]: there are a lot of like serious people who and again I don't expect them to know every little

[01:40:12] [SPEAKER_02]: microcosmic thing about Lebanon or even about Hezbollah or anything else but it's these notions

[01:40:17] [SPEAKER_02]: that pop up and then they try to enforce said notions but there is no means to do it to

[01:40:23] [SPEAKER_02]: begin with like it's just right it's mind this theory true yeah yeah it's but it's working from

[01:40:29] [SPEAKER_02]: conclusion in search of supportive facts but I think we've even right bypassed the supportive

[01:40:33] [SPEAKER_02]: facts it's the yeah but they're saying a nice thing okay great yeah well I was hoping for a

[01:40:41] [SPEAKER_03]: nicer to tidy bow would present itself to tie off this episode but it did not it did not present

[01:40:48] [SPEAKER_03]: itself um I don't know and my neighbors now go along with the leaf blower which is sort of I

[01:40:53] [SPEAKER_03]: don't know if you can hear that but it's sort of like the uh orchestra and the pit of the

[01:40:57] [SPEAKER_03]: academy awards this has been another super sized conversation here this might be I have to check

[01:41:03] [SPEAKER_03]: this might be like a record for length for for this podcast I I apologize in advance no no no no

[01:41:10] [SPEAKER_03]: this is this is fine um it's it's been a tectonic few days in the region for these groups that

[01:41:17] [SPEAKER_03]: we've been that we've been talking about these actors that we've been talking about for the

[01:41:19] [SPEAKER_03]: last year um and I have no doubt the next few could be just as tectonic we'll see what happens

[01:41:26] [SPEAKER_02]: yeah it's the best that we can do but I I guess advice going forward and I'm I'm sorry again

[01:41:31] [SPEAKER_02]: I tend to get very excited during these things as we're really getting into it so I

[01:41:37] [SPEAKER_02]: no don't apologize well I I'm just hoping that I'm not being so tangential and and kind of

[01:41:42] [SPEAKER_02]: excitedly going through it that it's like a blur but you know what I would say is it's

[01:41:48] [SPEAKER_02]: there's a lot of wisdom in kind of if one is watching this stuff taking kind of a pause

[01:41:55] [SPEAKER_02]: and then assessing a lot of the other moving pieces going forward and when I say that you know

[01:42:00] [SPEAKER_02]: you brought up the issue of of weapons with what did the Iranians use and you have to kind of look

[01:42:06] [SPEAKER_02]: at it from that perspective and you know what message are they trying to send I would say

[01:42:10] [SPEAKER_02]: if a lot of the kind of big picture stuff is annoying if you focus on those little bits

[01:42:14] [SPEAKER_02]: it's fascinating how much of the big picture it actually helps fill in and if it doesn't

[01:42:19] [SPEAKER_02]: fill something in I I would say it actually does assist in getting another little piece and

[01:42:24] [SPEAKER_02]: then eventually you can fill in that big piece but I mean I I try to give that advice to you

[01:42:29] [SPEAKER_02]: know other analysts who look at this who are kind of like I'm flustered but I would I would

[01:42:33] [SPEAKER_02]: highly recommend that for people like if all of this is like a stream of kind of

[01:42:38] [SPEAKER_02]: gatling gunfire you know coming out of an A-10 then I would say kind of pick one of those

[01:42:43] [SPEAKER_02]: things focus on it and I can promise you you're going to get something out of it

[01:42:47] [SPEAKER_02]: you're going to get something out of it and kind of the more you focus on it

[01:42:50] [SPEAKER_02]: the things that you get out of it might be so very unique that you see a totally different

[01:42:54] [SPEAKER_02]: trend but it doesn't mean that it negates what the actual big picture is that a lot of other

[01:42:59] [SPEAKER_03]: people might be saying. You know what that was the neat bow that I was looking for to wrap this up

[01:43:04] [SPEAKER_03]: thank you for that. I try. Yeah I'm quite skilled. All right sir, Philip Smyth we will

[01:43:09] [SPEAKER_03]: as always have all of your details in the show notes and folks want to follow you on

[01:43:16] [SPEAKER_03]: on Twitter, reach your work all that stuff great follow great mind and voice to follow

[01:43:23] [SPEAKER_03]: and pay attention to I'm saying follow a lot as developments come in this part of the world.

[01:43:30] [SPEAKER_02]: As always my friend thank you so much. Well thank you thanks again for having me and

[01:43:33] [SPEAKER_02]: again I'm sorry that these issues just keep coming down the board and I'm even more

[01:43:38] [SPEAKER_03]: sorry that you have to deal with me. Hey you know what it's a small price to pay.

[01:43:42] [SPEAKER_02]: Well actually you know what I'm sorry that your audience has to deal with me. No you deserve this.

[01:43:47] [SPEAKER_03]: All right I'll talk to you probably sooner rather than later. Yeah that would be good all right bye.

[01:43:53] [SPEAKER_01]: Bye sir. Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.