S8 Ep48: Espresso Martini: Hamas leaders messages, Europe & China, Chinese spies and potential ISIS-K plot foiled in USA

[00:00:04] Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton. Well, hello everybody and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you? I'm doing good, Chris. How are you? Good to be back.

[00:00:31] Yes, yeah, it's good to be back after last week. We nearly didn't come back this week either. I had a bit of a dental emergency yesterday and I'm now missing half of a wisdom tooth,

[00:00:44] which is not great, but thankfully I'm not in any pain currently and I'm now on an NHS waiting list waiting to get my tooth extracted in a few weeks time. So that will be

[00:00:53] fun. Nice. Well, between the two of us, that makes what? That makes three and a half wisdom teeth? Yes, because yeah, you had an issue, didn't you, not long ago? Right. Yes. Hold on. You wait. Okay. We're both not up to speed today. Okay. So you have

[00:01:14] three and a half wisdom teeth. I have three. Okay. Right? Yeah. So that makes... So it'll be two. It'll be, yeah. Well, two gone soon. One tooth each. Okay. So you're getting the other half gone? Yeah. Yeah. So I'm on this waiting list to get

[00:01:32] it extracted, which sounds like a Chris Hemsworth movie. Extraction, you know, get my tooth extracted, but- Probably not as exciting. No, I'm worried it's going to be a bit like Marathon Man. But if you remember that scene,

[00:01:44] I mean, what should I expect from a tooth extraction? Because you've been through this recently. Well, honestly, it was fine for me. I had the one up in the corner taken out, so it

[00:01:59] wasn't, you know, like, I guess it might've been worse if I had all four taken out at the same time or whatever. I would've get knocked on my ass, right? But no, it was fine. I was actually

[00:02:08] very pleasantly surprised with how like... First, I was really nervous about coming off of the anesthesia, terrified of what I might say, the things that come out of my mouth sober, what I might say coming off of that stuff. Were you completely under or just local?

[00:02:29] Yeah, yeah. Well, no, they... Yeah, I was fully under. Oh, you're lucky. I'm going to have to be doing local. Yeah, I'm doing local. See, that's we... We attempted that the first time.

[00:02:44] So I had two attempts with this surgery. The first time was with local and it didn't work out for various reasons. Not fun. Learned I would not hold up to torture well, so I need to brush up on my

[00:02:59] seer training. That wouldn't go well. And we came back and we did it with the general anesthesia. But that was fine. Yeah, cool. Okay. Well, I'm going to be under local, so it's going to be interesting. So I won't feel it, but I'll have the sensational. Because that's

[00:03:18] the weird thing about being under local. You kind of could feel something's going on, but can't quite feel it. So it was like she numbed it at the nerve, right? And then she was apparently holding

[00:03:29] something very sharp up into my gum and was like, can you feel this? And I was like, wait, hold on. Just so I understand this here. You were just now just holding something very sharp up into my gum.

[00:03:39] She was like, yes. And I was like, no, I could not feel that. So we're awesome now. Like, I know we're good. Cool. Proceed. And then it was a lot of weird pressure. And I don't know quite why, but

[00:03:54] my head was being moved around a lot and lots of odd noises and everything. It was weird. How many minutes are we into the show now? That's all right. About four minutes. It was weird because rationally, the rational thinking side of my brain was totally like,

[00:04:15] okay, we're not in pain. We're fine. Let's do this. Let's get it over with. Cool. Done. But the caveman subconscious part was like, we are under attack. Get up and start swinging. Why are you just laying there? Yeah. So that was odd. Not cut out for torture.

[00:04:35] No. Well, God, I think of if I'm cut out for this, we'll find out in a few weeks time. And undoubtedly, there'll probably be a delay or probably fall on an espresso martini day or

[00:04:49] the recovery period will. But well, actually, let's quickly talk about so obviously, we're coming up to August. We're not that far away. And generally, we take a production break in August. And my plan is to do that. I think we'll still air some interviews that we'll hopefully have

[00:05:07] over August. So we don't go completely silent. But my plan is not to do any espresso martinis or extra shots over August just because we need a bit of a break. And also, I'm going to be away

[00:05:18] filming at a Buddhist retreat, filming people in silence for a week. So it's gonna be quite interesting. And so I'm going to be completely incommunicado for a whole week in August, which undoubtedly will probably be the most exciting week in human history.

[00:05:36] And I'll be there thinking, why can't I go on the internet and do a show about whatever terrible things? Yeah, something's wild. Some wild is gonna pop off while you're away for sure. Exactly. Well, we had Prakosian, last time I was away, we had Prakosian died, didn't he?

[00:05:52] Yeah, you were on vacation. And then what else happened? I can't remember. But that was, I think, the standout event for when I was last on vacation. So it doesn't bode well for anybody

[00:06:05] in the Russian government when I go on vacation. And I always have an alibi, I definitely didn't kill Prakosian. I was at a cinema at the time watching Serpico, I think I remember correctly.

[00:06:15] So there we go. Oh, dear. So, well, on today's show, we're going to be looking at reports of private messages from the leader of Hamas. Then we're going to be moving on to criticisms of

[00:06:27] Europe's outdated approach to China. Then we're going to look at a former CIA officer and FBI linguist who's pled guilty to spying for China. And then we'll wrap up at a potential plot from

[00:06:39] ISIS-K that's been foiled in the US. On Extra Shot, our patron only show, we're going to be looking at Europe on high alert to Russian sabotage, Russian backed online efforts to disrupt the Olympics because that's coming up soon, a fugitive sheriff from Florida who has

[00:06:53] a new career as an online propagandist in Russia, or should we say supposedly. And we will wrap up by looking at a piece about Chinese espionage efforts in the West. So that's on Extra Shot,

[00:07:05] which is our patron only show. To get access to that, you'll need to be a Patreon subscriber. There is a link in the show notes. If you look at your show notes now, you'll see the link right

[00:07:14] there and it'll take you through to that show. And depending on which level you pick, you'll either get a free cup or coaster and you'll be directly supporting this podcast. And yeah,

[00:07:24] thank you very much for that. So Matt, shall we look at the Hamas leader and his private messages? Let's do it. Yeah. So this is from an article in CNN. So just to kind of go through the key points,

[00:07:38] Yair Sinwar, the military leader of Hamas, believes he has the upper hand over Israel and sees the rising civilian death toll in Gaza as advantageous for Hamas, considering them necessary sacrifices. The Wall Street Journal, which is what all this reporting is based on,

[00:07:55] reviewed dozens of messages from Sinwar to ceasefire negotiators and they reveal his intent to continue fighting despite high casualties with the hope of increasing global pressure on Israel. Sinwar's exact whereabouts are unknown. According to this article, he is thought to be hiding in

[00:08:14] Gaza's tunnel system. I will just say now I'm not convinced by that. I suspect he's probably in Qatar. Could be wrong there. And his communications show a strong resolve to persist in the conflict regardless of human costs. The United Nations Security Council, except for Russia, endorsed

[00:08:31] a US drafted resolution for a ceasefire and the release of hostages. Hamas welcomed the resolution and expressed a willingness to engage with mediators to implement the plan despite Israel's ongoing military actions and political statements. So Matt, do you have any sort of thoughts on all

[00:08:48] of this? Yeah, yeah. I was kind of curious how... So this reporting, as you said, initially comes from an article in the Wall Street Journal. I was curious how the Wall Street Journal got these

[00:09:04] messages. So it's a few dozen messages back and forth between Sinwar and the negotiating team in Qatar. I'm not suggesting any reasons to doubt their authenticity. I have no reason to do that at all. I'm just interested in the sourcing. The original article doesn't offer any details. It

[00:09:21] just says, reviewed by the Wall Street Journal. Notice not that they say that they obtained them, just that they reviewed them. So I suspect maybe... Maybe they sat in somewhere and read them,

[00:09:34] yeah. Or maybe, yeah, that someone maybe in US or Israeli intelligence came along and offered them a peek. I don't know. But that dozens of messages between Sinwar and the negotiating team would

[00:09:51] suggest a high degree of access, like intercepts or something. That a portion of which were shared to like, hey, look and see what they're talking about amongst themselves. Yeah. But beyond that, thoughts on the content of the conversations as a whole, obviously, it's pretty gross.

[00:10:14] The Hamas's rationale for October 7th, we know was to, or we're pretty sure, was to sabotage Israeli-Saudi normalization efforts and return the Palestinian cause to global importance. It's thrown a wrench in the former and achieved the latter. Although it still doesn't have to

[00:10:33] result in an outcome that Sinwar would find favorable. We can, as awful as this whole thing has been, we can still at least build a Palestinian authority that is functional and not corrupt,

[00:10:49] and an alternative in Gaza that is so much better than what Hamas represents. I think he's also miscalculated the support he'd received from Iran and Hezbollah. That hasn't quite come together. They're out there still, but they didn't on day one, on October 7th or on October 8th, Hezbollah

[00:11:16] didn't fully activate their arsenal of rockets and missiles and drones and stuff to the extent that they would if they were totally all in on this fight. He's also likely surprised at how well the Arabs have held together in pushing a ceasefire and opposing Gaza. He's also likely

[00:11:37] surprised at how well the Arabs have held together in pushing a ceasefire and opposing Iran, especially the Arab militaries that spun up to help propel the missile and drone attacks that Iran launched against Israel. But looking at this from a place of cold, calculating, evil logic,

[00:11:55] Sinwar isn't wrong. I mean, 40,000 and counting dead Gazans does help Hamas, or at least has been made to help Hamas. I mean, these people aren't stupid. All the militia leaders get extensive media training from Iran. He knew what response awaited them on October 6th and 7th. They know

[00:12:18] how to exploit the information environment and drive their narrative. It may not endear Hamas with Arab leaders, but the past eight months have certainly endeared Hamas with Arabs outside those palace walls. It's driven a wedge in Biden's base and further inflamed US politics in an election

[00:12:42] year. But at the end of the day, the fact remains that Hamas is a vile, apocalyptic, authoritarian Islamic fundamentalist death cult. They're more than willing to condemn all 2.3, I think it is, million Gazans if they feel it's to their tactical or strategic benefit. We knew it before October

[00:13:05] 7th and these messages confirm it. I think overall the greater exacerbating problem here not to, of course, excuse Hamas at all, or at least how they see the people that they've been governing, that they're essentially responsible for and have been since what, 2006? Not to minimize that at all,

[00:13:31] but there's an exacerbating problem here when Netanyahu goaded by a handful of ultra-nationalist ministers he needs to hold his coalition together, plays directly into Hamas' hands by allowing the IDF to bomb Gaza into dust. I've said on here before, I think shortly after October 7th,

[00:13:52] that this stunning barbarism of October 7th of that attack gave Israel a rare but brief opportunity to turn the Arab world against Hamas as they were turned against ISIS. I think frankly, they really squandered that almost immediately. We're eight months later, over 100 hostages are

[00:14:14] still in Gaza. They've gotten some out. They've rescued a few recently, but over 100 are still in Gaza and about a quarter of those are believed to be dead unfortunately. Hamas hasn't been destroyed. Even if the war miraculously ends tomorrow, global public opinion will take

[00:14:32] global public opinion of Israel will take generations to recover if it ever does. The extent of how the rest of the world feels and not just like lefties on college campuses, we're talking up and down the line. The hit has been severe and profound.

[00:14:53] Yeah, I agree. Yeah, I agree with you on that. I think Israel have played directly into the hands of Hamas, reacting with the tactics they have. We're looking at a death toll of, is it 37,000 plus estimated at the moment? Yeah, between 37 or about 40,000. Of course,

[00:15:17] those numbers are... It's definitely hard to accurately count in these circumstances. A lot of the numbers come from Gaza's health ministry, which is governed by Hamas. That's important to keep in mind. But at the same point, I wouldn't... None of what we've seen in the last eight months

[00:15:35] would suggest that the civilian death toll is anything but catastrophic and horrific. Yeah, indeed. Indeed. And easy for me to say this sitting in London, but I think Israel have experience with dealing with Hamas and should we say Palestinian-backed terrorist groups in the

[00:15:53] past, I think they should have found a more surgical way to deal with Hamas rather than going for full-blown war. And you mentioned earlier that Israel had a very rare opportunity for a moment with sort of sympathy on their side from the Arab states and to some extent,

[00:16:12] the larger Western world. And they could have used that to their advantage because they could have found a way potentially to have politically sort of targeted and maybe destroyed Hamas that

[00:16:27] way and get rid of some of their support instead of using the military tactics they have. Because now by having large death tolls, by targeting fighters who are in designated safe zones, it makes Israel look callous. It makes Israel look like they aren't taking enough measures

[00:16:47] to protect civilians. And it's obviously making Israel look like the oppressor and the kind of oppressor stroke oppressed kind of narrative that we seem to like to use these days when trying to simplify this rather complicated political situation. And then on top of that, obviously,

[00:17:08] in the West with the kind of sympathy for the Palestinian cause and to some extent, the sympathy for Hamas as well, because there is some. There isn't much criticism of Hamas during many of these protests. So one can only conclude that either people are conveniently ignoring Hamas

[00:17:25] or that they have some sort of sympathy for them. I want to remind them that obviously these messages make it very clear that the high civilian death toll has always been a part of Hamas's strategy. It's certainly been a part of past strategies by the Palestinian Liberation Organization

[00:17:40] and Black September. And on top of that, obviously as well, Hamas knew exactly what they were doing on October the 7th and they made zero plans or put any provisions in place for the civilian population

[00:17:55] of Gaza. There were no bomb shelters, there were no food stores. All of that was given to the Hamas fighters in the tunnels. They're the ones who had the protection, but the civilian population never

[00:18:05] did. And the civilian population literally are the collateral. And they pretty much had an idea of how Israel would react. Israel typically do react with airstrikes against buildings. We've seen it in the past where hospitals and media centers have been bombed because Hamas fighters

[00:18:22] are in there. But Israel has sort of taken this, and I'll put it as the Team America approach. If you remember Team America, that film where Team America go in to seek out terrorists in Paris,

[00:18:32] but managed to destroy Paris in the process of getting the terrorists. And that's effectively what Israel have done. They've destroyed Gaza to get at the Hamas terrorists. And still, as you pointed out, they haven't managed to destroy Hamas. And in fact, they've actually managed to

[00:18:48] make Hamas more popular, more sympathetic in the West now. And with all the protesters who are young today, they are our future politicians, they're our future decision leaders. And so there

[00:19:00] is a whole generation of people now who have grown up to see Israel in a very negative light, they've seen Israel at their worst. And they've become very sympathetic to Hamas. And so that does

[00:19:12] not bode well for the national security of Israel in the future that is very dependent on American and Western support. I think Israel in particular has always been on a European perspective, I think a lot of European people and governments have been somewhat careful and cautious about

[00:19:29] supporting Israel. But America has been the other way. America has been very open in their support of Israel. And that could change. There's no guarantee it's going to be a given. Yeah. Historically, US support for Israel has always been very bipartisan. I think there was a

[00:19:50] has been a sort of growing divide, at least on the left within within like establishment Democrat circles, even again, not just talking about, you know, lefties on college campuses. There was a growing divide within the center left within the Democratic Party within that sort of

[00:20:11] progressive base along generations, you know, so younger people before October 7, more skeptical of Israel, of their tactics, as compared to, you know, older generations in the Democratic Party, among the left who always been, you know, far more staunchly supportive. I think part of that

[00:20:36] is due one of its I think just the younger generation that they're naturally more progressively inclined. I think that's fair to say. Part of it, I think what has a lot to do with it is

[00:20:50] a lot of people, you know, my age and younger, Bibi Netanyahu was essentially the face of Israel, you know, that his kind of politics, his temperament, you know, he's been in office

[00:21:10] off and on a few times, you know, going back to into the 2000s and even before that, I think, you know. That's just sort of like the idea of what young people in the West have that Israel is,

[00:21:23] even though they haven't always been that. Does that make sense? What I'm saying? Yeah, it does. And I think, yeah, and I think the mistake with that, not saying your analogy is wrong or anything, your insights wrong there. I think you're right. I think the mistake a lot

[00:21:35] of people make is that they see they think Israel just all whole of them back Netanyahu, back Netanyahu, even though prior to October 7th, he also had those historic protests in Israel against the government. And I think, yeah, I just think I get this, especially talking with

[00:21:55] Middle Eastern relatives and friends, a lot of people have this mistaken belief that the whole of Israel backs Netanyahu and just see whoever's in government, they back them. And it's not like

[00:22:05] that at all. And I think there's a lot of nuance missing a lot of just misunderstanding about Israeli politics. And also, I think there's some willful ignorance there too. I think some people

[00:22:14] don't want to understand Israel. They just want to believe it's this terrible apartheid state is the term that gets used and make no effort at all to really learn about Israel as it is. Yeah.

[00:22:27] And I think that's kind of dangerous. And I think so. I think, yeah, I think it is fair to say that I think a lot of people do see Netanyahu as the face of Israel. And a crude analogy for me, I mean,

[00:22:36] Netanyahu has been called Israel's version of equivalent of Donald Trump, you know. So if Donald Trump was your face of America, I don't think you'd be too pleased about that. If I was

[00:22:48] to say you as an American, Donald Trump represents you. So I should view you in that way. That's kind of a bad thing or for me at the moment is Rishi Sunak, but God forbid it was like Nigel Farage

[00:22:59] or something who became the prime minister, you know, and he's the representative of Britain. And suddenly everybody thinks that I like Nigel Farage, but I don't. I think he's repulsive. And this is the problem with politics. And I think this is the problem with those sort of

[00:23:13] generalizations that we base on on those people. And actually, one point I was going to make that kind of fits into this is people like Netanyahu and people like Trump are actually quite useful for terrorist propaganda because people do make those generalizations based on those people and

[00:23:29] say, look, they keep electing this guy. So all of America or all of Israel or wherever must be awful. So it's an interesting and difficult problem, isn't it? Yep. One more thing here.

[00:23:42] I don't mean to suggest that, you know, that the appropriate response for Israel to October 7th would be to, you know, do nothing. Oh, yeah. Or to, you know, politely ask Hamas to stand down.

[00:23:54] There is no country on Earth that would not respond to the horror of October 7th without some sort of kinetic violence. You know, that's a given. I'm not saying you let someone like Sinwar live. I'm saying you just don't kill 40,000 people and flatten Gaza Strip to do it.

[00:24:13] Yeah. And not kill him in the process. One deeper question I was going to go into for a moment or deeper point. Obviously, there's a lot of talk now about a Palestinian state and a two state solution,

[00:24:30] which I think is a positive thing. But I ask what is a Palestinian state going to look like? Because with this one run by Hamas, that's not going to make things better. I think for the,

[00:24:40] you know, I think for the Palestinians, that's going to be bad because Hamas run a pretty much a dictatorship. They, you know, they have no elections there. They rule with a very firm hand

[00:24:50] and they beat and kill anybody who kind of stands against them. And so I think this is where the international community could be coming in and providing pressure on Hamas. And this is also an

[00:25:05] opportunity maybe for the Palestinians as well to take a long hard look at what they want their future state to be, because if they don't want it to be run by Hamas, this unfortunately is now the

[00:25:18] time to do something about it. And is that meaning does that mean there needs to be some sort of revolt against Hamas? I think that would be something. Do the Palestinians need to work

[00:25:28] with the Israelis to remove Hamas? Or is there a way the international community can deal with Hamas? Because I don't see any easy answers to that question. In fact, I only think Hamas will be

[00:25:40] gone by force of some description. But I think it needs to be from the Palestinians. And obviously, again, easy for me to say this in London. I'm not in Gaza or the West Bank at this time.

[00:25:54] And I don't have any skin in the game. So it's easy for me to sit here and say, hey, there needs to be some sort of like, you know, revolution against Hamas. But really,

[00:26:02] being looking at it from afar, something needs to happen, because I don't think a Palestinian state run by Hamas is going to be realistic or sustainable. And Israel certainly are not going

[00:26:12] to accept that because, as we said in our episode after October the 7th, Hamas have it baked into their charter to destroy Israel. So to ask Israel to tolerate a new state that has that in their

[00:26:24] charter is not really going to happen, is it? Yeah. I mean, as far as like, the state of ordinary Gazans after the last eight months, I don't know that they're in any condition to,

[00:26:37] you know, rise up and overthrow Hamas. I don't think that's not going to happen. But yeah, I mean, a Hamas that continues to rule Gaza, that's just completely unacceptable. Yeah, there's no way that Israel or any country should allow that after October 7th. What happens

[00:27:02] though in Gaza and with the rest of the West Bank and stuff after this war is over, eventually, whenever that is, that's still very much out. There is no kind of agreed upon or even serious

[00:27:18] plan that's been offered. That's still very much up in the air. But I guess a lot of that would depend on, you know, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, their input. I know that's,

[00:27:30] I think, what the White House would like to see, that the Arabs have some kind of stake in this. But then, you know, it's balancing that out with the Israelis, their cultural issues with

[00:27:49] the Palestinian state, you know, that many on the Israeli right to include some of the ministers in Netanyahu's cabinet, especially, have jet, which is the idea of a free and independent, with a free and independent Palestine at all. And then, you know, what kind of security services

[00:28:07] do they have? Are they demilitarized? You know, you can see that easily being a nonstarter for the Palestinians because why would you not want to have the means to defend yourself? But at the same point, I mean, Israel doesn't want to be in a vulnerable position,

[00:28:22] you know, so it's a huge mess. I'm not sure what it looks like. But the one thing I know for sure is Hamas cannot be part of that equation. No, definitely. I mean, one, I was just thinking

[00:28:36] of that West Wing. Do you remember the West Wing had the whole Israel-Palestine peace proposal in the show and President Bartlett came up with this historic idea that led to Leo McGarry having a

[00:28:49] heart attack and leaving the White House? And basically, I think the plan was that there would be a demilitarized Palestinian state, but the UN would provide the security. So maybe that's something on those lines where there's an international peacekeeping force that it

[00:29:07] would provide security for, I don't know, a period of time until things calm down a little bit. I don't know that that's a possibility. Well, probably not actually, but... I'm not sure either. I mean, this has been the billion dollar question of Middle Eastern

[00:29:26] foreign policy in the region for what, 50 years? You know, 60 years? No one's figured this out. We're not exactly going to solve it today. Yeah, no one's figured this out. Many have tried, none have succeeded. Some have gotten close,

[00:29:41] you know, it's waxed and waned a bit. We've gotten close and then gone back and then gotten close again, but we've never figured it out. Yeah, yeah. I think it was, was it 1993 when,

[00:29:53] yes, Arafat was at the White House? It was roughly when I was starting secondary school. It's a bit vague, that memory, but yeah, that was very close to something positive happening and

[00:30:06] then it all ended with an assassination. And yeah, and things went back to sort of square one again very quickly. And this is the other thing with the Abraham Accords last year, kind of completely ignored the Palestinian issue. And if anything, nobody's really politically been made any

[00:30:26] effort to really talk about it. It's both on the Israeli side and on the American side as well. It's sort of been conveniently ignored for some time and unfortunately October 7th brought it right back to the forefront of international conversation. So yeah. Well, is there anything

[00:30:44] else you'd like to add or shall we move on? No, we can move on. Okay. Well, our next story is one that you picked out about in the new Cold War, Europe's approach to China is already outdated. So

[00:30:58] Matt, I'll let you tell us about that. Yeah, this is an article in The Diplomat that makes some good points about, I think that the path that Europe wanted to chart with China and how that

[00:31:10] grates against the reality of what China wants. So a couple of points here. Starts with Putin is prepared for prolonged conflict, not only in Ukraine, but against Western democracies. This strategy has been evident since Russia's 2008 intervention in Georgia. Despite initially

[00:31:28] cautious support for Russia to avoid economic repercussions, China is now openly backing Russia against Western democracies supplying some degree of support for the Russians in Ukraine, as seen, of course, in the recent joint diplomatic statement by Putin and Xi Jinping. Recent joint statement

[00:31:50] from Putin and Xi highlights their shared stance against Western military alliances and nuclear powers, establishing military bases near the borders of other nuclear powers. So they want a buffer zone around Russia, don't get too close, essentially is what they're arguing, which leave

[00:32:10] all that stuff that's really close to them for them to do whatever they want with, is what they essentially want. So this marks a significant shift in China's policy. It also signals China's intent to undermine European security and NATO's influence, presenting a challenge to Europe's

[00:32:26] strategic framework. Xi's visit to Serbia recently on the 25th anniversary of NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, it was an accidental bombing, but indicates China's new strategic direction, including signing a security pact with Hungary that could allow Chinese law enforcement

[00:32:44] activities on its territory to exploit freedom of travel through the Schengen zone to target dissidents across Europe. This comes as some Chinese officials are betting on a Korea type solution for Ukraine, whereby the country will be demilitarized and partitioned, enhancing Russia's

[00:33:00] influence over Eastern Europe. These developments suggest a new Cold War with fault lines, two fault lines, so one spanning Eastern Europe, and the other spanning the Indo-Pacific over the South China Sea, linking the Ukraine and Taiwan crises, and assassinating a realignment of Europe's

[00:33:18] strategic focus. Europe must enhance its military capabilities and prepare for various contingencies in light of strengthened Russia-China relations. This new reality of block confrontation requires Europe to align more closely with the US, with economic interdependencies, with China

[00:33:36] becoming increasingly problematic. The primary challenge is to keep the new Cold War from escalating into a global hot war, with Europe needing a more pragmatic approach in its relations with China. Chris, what do you think? Very interesting article, and quite concerning as

[00:33:52] well. I mean, it kind of confirms really that what a lot of people have been saying about the importance of Ukraine at the moment for European security, potentially worldwide security. It seems to me that Ukraine has become the battleground between East versus West, a bit like Afghanistan

[00:34:07] in the 80s, potentially. So yeah, I think the time for optimism about relations with China, you know, which saw things like films being co-financed, got Western businesses turned to China for manufacturing, and big businesses saw it as a vital market, and politicians hoped that

[00:34:25] this would foster a new age of positive relations with China. I sadly think a lot of that is pretty much over now. It's a bit like what I call about late 90s optimism and late 90s thinking about

[00:34:37] Russia. I think we need to maybe get past the 2010s thinking about China. Yeah. And interesting point in the article, obviously, China's economy is largely dependent on Western exports. But at the same time, China weirdly don't seem to be too bothered about disrupting

[00:34:57] that. So maybe Europe and the West need to reconsider very quickly their economic relations with China, because it seems to me that we're kind of co-financing the monster that China is

[00:35:12] becoming, if you want to put it that way. Maybe it's a bit of a judgmental way to put it, we're calling him a monster, but I'm trying to think of a better term there. But you know, China is

[00:35:20] becoming a kind of threat and we are co-financing it. And they are building this sort of anti-Western global order axis with Russia. You know, and obviously they've been now supplying for a while

[00:35:34] there was debate about what kind of aid they were supplying Russia for Russia's war in Ukraine. But I think it now is becoming increasingly clear that they are supplying weapons or components of weapons. There have been some has been some tittle tattle about whether they're even supplying

[00:35:48] people. I've not seen anything confirmed about Chinese people working in Ukraine. I have heard about Cubans and operating in Ukraine, and potentially people from Syria, but haven't heard anything about Chinese people as of yet. But interestingly, on a side note, Chinese soldiers

[00:36:06] actually were in the Vietnam War. And there's a whole load of Chinese veterans of the Vietnam War, who are fighting on behalf of the North Vietnamese, who could never publicly admit their role in the

[00:36:19] Vietnam War. So I got that from Frank Snepp a few years ago. So it's quite an interesting one. So a load of veterans there who have no water to kind of celebrate, but to commemorate. So yeah,

[00:36:29] we're kind of in a time now for careful statecraft. You know, because as you mentioned earlier, we don't want this turning into a hot war. And I've said this on past episodes, it does feel

[00:36:41] like this creeping inevitability of a conflict with China. And I'm still trying to get my head around whether this creeping inevitability is one has become a kind of self fulfilling prophecy, whether people I don't know if you have any thoughts on that. But yeah,

[00:36:58] yeah. I think if you look at the entire US defense establishment down to development, development and acquisitions of new weapon systems, whether it's sort of retrofitting or reimagining weapon systems that we already have to be more survivable and useful in a high end

[00:37:20] conflict across the Indo-Pacific dealing with the tyranny of distance and all those problems that you have, right? Down to our doctrine, our training, the way we organize our unit structures, right? On very large sort of macro levels, right? Down to where we decide to, you know,

[00:37:44] where we put bases if we still feel that having, you know, these large forward operating bases like Anderson in Guam or Okinawa, whether it's wise to have our forces concentrated in a few large

[00:38:01] operating bases or whether it's best to have them more dispersed, you know? All of this stuff that we're doing right now is directly in preparation for a potential war with the Chinese across the Indo-Pacific. It's all pointed in that direction. Now, of course,

[00:38:22] the good thing with that is we're preparing for contingencies in case it happens, you know, we're ready. But to your point, I think there is definitely at least the question to be asked is,

[00:38:39] do these preparations make war more likely to happen? You know, like where you can even look at it down to like moving semiconductor production out of Taiwan, right? That's designed to make a

[00:38:55] potential war with China more survivable for us. But in a way, I think it's worth asking. And again, I'm not saying we shouldn't be doing what we're doing. We absolutely should. However, is it not true that when you make a conflict more survivable for yourself,

[00:39:12] you inherently also make it more likely that it'll happen? You know what I mean? Luke Simon Yeah. Yeah, yeah. It is concerning because obviously, I don't think any of us want to live through a world war. It feels like we're very

[00:39:27] close to it now, to be quite honest. I feel like we're in an undeclared world war because there is so much conflict going on around the world right now. That is getting closer.

[00:39:36] People started... I remember people saying, after 9-11 that the global war on terror was World War III. We just didn't call it that. You know? And that's definitely looking back, that definitely

[00:39:52] was not the case. Not even close, not even remotely close. I think we're at least probably in probably the late 1940s, if we're looking at it in terms of this as a Cold War with China.

[00:40:07] Probably, yeah, the late 1940s maybe, in terms of that phase of the Cold War with Soviet Union. That was eminently survivable. We survived. Was not a given or a guarantee and probably that many times during the Cold War with Soviets did not seem like we would,

[00:40:28] that a nuclear exchange would be inevitable. Probably seemed a lot... I mean, I wasn't around for that really, but probably seemed a lot scarier and more inevitable than a war with China does right now. I think it's also important too to not... The Chinese are very good. They're

[00:40:49] capable. They're hungry. They're ambitious. They want to win. They mean to, but they're not 10 feet tall. They're not unbeatable. They have a lot of problems in such ways that we're probably not even

[00:41:10] entirely aware of because they don't live in an open society the way we do where all our dirty laundry is aired out 24 hours a day, seven days a week for the entire world to see. They have a lot of issues. Not even much military experience either.

[00:41:24] Right. I was just going to say that. They've not fought in a war since the Communist Party took over the country after World War II. They've not fought in a major conflict, certainly on the scale that it would be facing the US and its allies across the Indo-Pacific.

[00:41:48] That experience, that institutional memory, that counts for a lot in an actual war. I think that's definitely worth keeping in mind. They're not 10 feet tall. They want us to think they are, but that they're inevitable. That authoritarian sort of Blade Runner cyberpunk

[00:42:11] vision of the world that they have that seems at least on the surface so neat and orderly and controlled, but it's really just pretty dark if you ask me. They want you to believe that that future is inevitable and you should just lay down and accept it.

[00:42:30] Yeah. Well, they spend like $6 billion a year on online efforts to make us think that. Yeah. They're very good at it. Yeah. They're very good at it. I think they're definitely winning the information war currently,

[00:42:44] but will they win an actual war is a different matter. We'll see. I'm not here to say, hey, let's have a war and find out because I really would rather we all avoid that.

[00:42:55] I think it's all about trying to find ways to stop this and hopefully calm ahead and diplomacy will prevail because at one point I came up, I was going to say maybe a bit left field for this

[00:43:08] podcast, but it kind of goes back to a conversation I had a few years ago with a man named Rolf Moat Larsen who used to work for the CIA and was once the head of the Department of Energy.

[00:43:18] And we talked about the climate change in the future because climate change is a reality, whether people like it or not. And for the human race to survive the realities of climate change, there is going to be an inevitable squabble sooner or later about resources.

[00:43:34] And unless we all find a way to better cooperate, we're probably going to all end up becoming extinct if we're not careful. And I think I feel like this particular period of history,

[00:43:47] it feels like the time we need to come together, but we're suddenly fracturing. It felt like the late 90s we were coming together, that wonderful golden period of time. And it feels like now that

[00:43:57] we're all hating each other and we're all kind of going down the path of old politics, it feels like the world has become much more divided and less united than it once was. And I don't think

[00:44:10] that bodes well for the bigger picture, which is dealing with the effects of climate change, which I don't know how long, I'm not a meteorologist or a specialist in climate change at this time.

[00:44:23] Not that I ever will be, but it certainly feels like over the last few years, we started to really start feeling things like with the fires that have been going on in Australia last year

[00:44:33] and so on. And obviously, I mean, we always have a crap summer in England, we're having a particularly crap one at the moment. So that's nothing new. But apparently, there is a relationship between

[00:44:45] what's going on in the Arctic and how it has a knock-on effect on weather in Europe. So things are changing. And sooner or later, we're going to have to start cooperating. But it

[00:44:57] feels like, I don't know whether it's part of Russia and China's strategy to kind of club together for that or not, I don't know. But they're definitely becoming more united.

[00:45:06] Yeah, I don't know. I think you just, I would just go back to you don't have to accept their theory of the case. Like I just, I'll say again, they want you to think that they're inevitable.

[00:45:19] All authoritarian forces want you to think that they're unbeatable and that they're inevitable. That's sort of what gives them power in many ways. And another point there about the 90s, I would, you know, as good as they were, at least for the West, that decade-

[00:45:39] Well, for the West they were, but for others, not so much. Yeah. But that was, I think it's just important that we just sort of accept that that decade was an aberration and move on. It was not normal. It was probably not, it was definitely not

[00:45:58] sustainable that this just sort of unchallenged peaceful hegemony. It's just not, you can't sustain that indefinitely for decades and decades and decades into the future. That wasn't normal. That was a brief, happy break. And now we're back to our regularly scheduled programming. So

[00:46:23] suit up and let's win this one like we did the last one. Yeah, indeed. Well, I think we're kind of starting to see the politicians who came of age during that time slowly fizzling out. I mean, I was just interested the other day, the leader of the,

[00:46:38] oh God, which party in Wales was it? The leader of the Welsh government. How was it? It was talking about nuclear disarmament. And it's like, you know, nuclear disarmament to me feels like

[00:46:51] such an old conversation now because sadly we live in a world where, you know, if we are to get rid of the West or Britain was to get rid of its nuclear deterrent, I don't think it's necessarily

[00:47:04] going to be good for Britain in particular. And if Europe decided, hey, we're going to get rid of all of our nuclear weapons, we're going to say goodbye to America's support. I don't think

[00:47:13] that's going to end well. As much as we want it, it'd be nice to live in a world where nuclear weapons are not a reality, where we are all peaceful and cooperating and loving each other.

[00:47:22] I just sadly don't see us in that world. And I'm deeply, well not suspicious is the wrong way because I'm just deeply sceptical of any politician who hasn't woken up to that fact.

[00:47:34] In fact, I remember in 2010 when it was the general elections that led to David Cameron and the coalition with the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, she made an argument saying we no longer need Trident because the real threat is terrorism today.

[00:47:52] And there's this other thing as well. A lot of people seem to only believe in singular problems and singular threats, which requires a single solution, preferably a cheap one. But I say, yeah. Yeah. Everyone wants to think that the thing that they're facing at the moment is

[00:48:08] a thing that will always be the thing. It's just sort of, yeah, there was terrorism at the moment. It's not now. Yeah. And it was probably, I mean, a lot of people thought that we were at the end

[00:48:21] of history and this is just what it's going to be from now on, but it's not. No, indeed. Indeed. And one last point on this, I think, obviously there needs to be

[00:48:31] some sort of effort to, I think, better educate and have a better debate with the public about this sort of, you know, this effort by China and Russia to destabilise European security. Because

[00:48:45] I think at the moment there's two reactions. There's the one reaction which is, oh, this is all just Western propaganda, Western warmongering. And then there's the other reaction, which is sort of from the far right where it's sort of this very racist and xenophobic kind of, oh,

[00:49:00] of course the Chinese are going to do that and they're going to, I don't know, turn the world Chinese or something. And obviously both of those are two very big extremes. And I think that's not

[00:49:10] a healthy place to be either. And I think we need to make people, especially businesses, etc., who are affected by like Chinese espionage, which we'll go into a bit later. I think people just

[00:49:22] need to be more aware that this is a reality and not a kind of, I don't know, Cold War fantasy. Because I still think there are a lot of people out there who seem to just, I don't know,

[00:49:30] everybody's in my mind, everybody's 10 years behind reality. They're thinking about these things. It feels that way. It does feel that way. Yeah, yeah. Certainly with the circle of friends that I have in the arts and stuff, it feels like everybody's still banging on about something

[00:49:44] that happened 10 years ago that has completely changed now. But there we go. There we go. There's me going widely there. But anyway, well, is there anything else you'd like to add? Or no? Well, let's take a quick break and we'll be right back.

[00:50:14] Welcome back, everybody. So we're now going to look at a CIA officer, well, a former CIA officer and FBI linguist who pled guilty to spying for China. And we've got an article from AP News.

[00:50:27] So a man named Alexander Yuk Ching-Ma, I hope I got that pronunciation right, was a former CIA officer and FBI contract linguist, and he pled guilty to conspiracy to gather or deliver national defense information to China. The plea agreement suggests a 10 year sentence and is now pending

[00:50:47] the judge's final decision. Ma was involved in espionage for at least a decade providing classified information to Chinese intelligence officers. Evidence includes a 2001 video of Ma and a relative sharing information and receiving $50,000 from Chinese agents.

[00:51:06] During a sting operation, Ma accepted cash from an undercover FBI agent, classic there, posing as a Chinese intelligence officer. The FBI had been aware of his ties with Chinese intelligence and had hired him as a part-time contract linguist to monitor his activities. Despite Ma's claim of

[00:51:24] early stage Alzheimer's, a judge has found him competent and his plea agreement requires ongoing cooperation with the US authorities, including debriefs, polygraph examinations, and representing a lifetime commitment of cooperation. So Ma, I don't know if you have any thoughts or extra

[00:51:41] insights, obviously it's an American case, has there been any other stories your side of the pond, so to speak, about this? Yeah, I mean, this is one of several of recent Chinese espionage

[00:51:52] cases, at least that we're aware of. I've read this... My big takeaway was trying to get the timeline more correct here. Yeah, because this is more than a decade, definitely, it feels like 20 years. Right, so yeah, he joined CIA in 1982, did some assignments overseas, left the agency in 89

[00:52:15] and then moved to China, was over there doing whatever, right? In Hong Kong and other places, right, and Shanghai. Moved back to Hawaii from Shanghai in 2001 and then got applied, presumably,

[00:52:34] and then was hired by the FBI in 2004 as a linguist in their Honolulu field office. And it seems that the FBI knew he was in bed with Chinese intelligence when they hired him to catch him in

[00:52:47] the act, right? I'm curious, within that time, so after the time in which they hired him, so after 2004... So nearly 20 years now, yeah. Right, did they ever use him as essentially an unwitting

[00:53:05] double agent? Did they feed bad info back to China in that time? Was he controlled the entire time? Yeah, it feels like a really good counterintelligence operation, potentially, because it feels like that the FBI basically spent sort of 10 to 20 years studying his contacts in

[00:53:22] China, which wouldn't surprise me, because I think... But then, I suppose, why would it lead to a case now? I don't know, but it's an interesting one. That was my other question, because he wasn't

[00:53:33] arrested, he was recruited by the FBI in 2004, they knew he was fishy, right, and then he was only arrested in 2020. Yeah, with an FBI sting operation, yeah. Right, was he in play for like 16 years?

[00:53:50] Potentially, potentially. That's a really long... Yeah, and then the timing of why arrest him now, I mean maybe... Well, saying that, he was an employee with the FBI, I think, until 2009 as

[00:54:02] a linguist, or am I messing that up? I feel like he was only employed for a period of time, and then maybe they... I can look at the article. Yeah, but here's one thing that stood out for me,

[00:54:12] back to his CIA career. His brother David worked for the CIA, and his brother was actually in the Vietnam War, and he left the CIA because he had been accused of basically helping Chinese

[00:54:27] nationals obtain entry to the United States under fraudulent kind of claims. So his brother left the CIA in 83 under a bit of a cloud, and yet still, Alexander was able to operate without much

[00:54:41] scrutiny up until 89. It's very bizarre. Yeah. It's a very... This one feels like a very messy case in some respects. Yeah, there's a lot of pieces here that we're missing still, I think. I wonder if the charging documents are out there? I mean, he pleaded guilty, right, so

[00:55:00] they're definitely... Unless they're... I don't know how much of the details goes into those documents, especially on a case like this. But it sounds like there's a lot that we're missing, but just the potential of the FBI running an unwitting double agent for many years

[00:55:20] is interesting if that's in fact what we're looking at here. Yeah. Yeah, and if they did, I mean, that's amazing if they did do that. That could be a really... Well, hopefully whoever the FBI agent was will release a book sooner or later, and they'll

[00:55:32] be on the podcast to tell us about it. Yeah. Well, okay, so here's a thought. Okay, so they hire him, right? They have him controlled, okay? They have him dead to rights. They fully control

[00:55:50] what information he's exposed to, you know, right? So that's all measured to anything you say or give him. Think that it could get back to the Chinese, so let's use that to our advantage. Is there then

[00:56:02] a calculation that, okay, even if we stop... Even if he's not in play for 16 years, okay, let's say he stopped working for the FBI in 2009. I think you said it was, right? What if there's then the

[00:56:14] consideration that if we wrap this guy up, if we go then and arrest him, would that then give the Chinese too much of an insight into the bad information that we fed them through him? So

[00:56:32] would you then wait longer and then roll him up where when they go back and they do their damage assessment, go, okay, what is all this crap that the FBI gave us all these years? You have more

[00:56:43] distance there, and it's not as relevant. I'm totally speculating here. I'm not sure that that's just the case here. Well, the flip side to it, could all of this be a bit of a lie? And in fact,

[00:56:53] he did pass on genuine information, but now they're saying it's not genuine to make the Chinese doubt the information they got. Maybe. I don't know. It's a difficult one,

[00:57:01] this one, isn't it? It's a very bizarre one. And so I think it's one to definitely keep an eye on. The other thing that was interesting as well, see the Chinese intelligence sent him

[00:57:13] photos of people they wanted to keep tabs on as well, which is getting us that kind of creepy territory. We were talking about that earlier with Chinese police officers operating in Europe and

[00:57:22] rounding people up or keeping eyes on people. We've talked about that a few times now. Common theme. Yeah, which is why that thing with Hungary was such an egregious... So Hungary signed an agreement with the Chinese that would allow them access to establish those Chinese quote unquote

[00:57:42] police stations on the territory of Hungary, which would then allow them to use the Schengen zone to travel freely across Europe to potentially abduct Chinese dissidents in Europe and bring them

[00:57:56] back to Hungary and then spirit them back to a gulag in China. Which I mean, I made the comparison yesterday that it's like your roommate saying, hey, I'm going to leave the door unlocked so my

[00:58:08] friend can come in here and rob you whenever he feels like, are you cool with that? You would not keep that same living situation. Yeah, it's ridiculous. Yeah, it's very messed up. Very messed

[00:58:16] up indeed. Yeah. So it's not good. And one last thing as well, obviously interesting in the motives and it looks like it's part financial, part ideological. He apparently said that he wants to see the motherland succeed. Obviously China succeed there. And that's kind of an interesting

[00:58:36] little tidbit there. And the other thing as well, which I find a little bit, should we say unfortunate or sad about this case? Obviously it looks like China is targeting Americans and Westerners who have some Chinese ancestry. And the problem is what I find problematic about that

[00:58:55] is every time one of these scandals occurs and they get found out, it's sort of feeding into the kind of the racist rhetoric about how you can't trust people of Asian descent, which I

[00:59:07] find disturbing. And I worry that in the near future with a potential conflict or certainly tensions rising with China, or even God forbid, potentially a Trump administration part two and the way the rhetoric was with China back then. I just worry that Asian Americans and

[00:59:28] Asian Europeans are going to become more at risk from members of the far right because of all this stuff. And it's going to become this very nasty cycle that will kind of both feed into helping

[00:59:41] China get more and more disgruntled, Asian people potentially working for them and B, just sort of feeding into the other cycle, this idea that there are Chinese spies everywhere, which they're not. And that's something I think we all are going to have to navigate very carefully.

[00:59:57] And I just find it a little bit sad that China can't find a way to find people. I guess as well, gives them some sort of leverage. I mean, there is this idea or obviously some people might have

[01:00:09] this sort of misty-eyed sort of nostalgia for their ancestral homeland, or there might be some family that could be blackmailed or threatened as well. Many motives. Well, they'll do that. They'll have your auntie, let's say you're a Chinese, could be an American, nationalized

[01:00:31] permanent resident or citizen or whatever. And let's say you're in a university or some other corporation that has access to something that the Chinese are interested in. You could very well get a phone call from your auntie back in China somewhere with a ministries of state security guy

[01:00:49] there sitting there in her kitchen and your auntie saying like, hey, you need to go get X, Y, and Z from your office and send it to us. And they functionally, the Chinese government, they functionally see no difference between people, civilians, and the intelligence services.

[01:01:12] They're all just auxiliaries at the end of the day. That's how they see it. And that's the danger that it represents. Yeah, indeed. Indeed. Well, I think we've covered that one. Is there anything else you want to add on that? Nope.

[01:01:24] No. Cool. Well, let's move on to our last story, which is still kind of a semi-breaking story about these eight people who've been arrested with possible Islamic state ties. Matt, I'll let

[01:01:35] you talk to us a bit about that. Yes. As you said, this is sort of a current thing that's still very much out there. So eight Tajikistan nationals with suspected ties to the Islamic state have been arrested in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles on immigration

[01:01:53] violations. The individuals legally entered the US through the southern border last spring and were not initially identified as potential terrorism-related concerns during screening. So there was nothing on the databases that would have flagged that these guys

[01:02:09] wouldn't have been let in. I guess they found that out later. They were arrested by immigration and customs enforcement while being tracked by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and are being held on the immigration charge while the terrorism connection is investigated further. The exact

[01:02:26] nature of their suspected ISIS connections is also unclear, at least publicly anyway. The FBI and DHS confirmed the arrest but did not provide detailed specifics. The US is currently in a heightened threat environment, according to the FBI and DHS. At a recent congressional hearing,

[01:02:44] FBI Director Christopher Wray highlighted growing threats from homegrown violent extremists and foreign terrorist organizations, especially in light of the war in Gaza. He also expressed concerns about potential terrorism vulnerabilities at the border. Terrorism analysts have been

[01:03:00] alarmed about the growth of ISIS's affiliate in Central Asia, also called ISIS-K, which was responsible for the attack on the Krokus City Hall concert venue near Moscow in April that killed 175 people. Biden administration previously detected and stopped a network smuggling people from

[01:03:17] Uzbekistan with at least one member linked to a foreign terrorist group. Chris, what do you think about this? Wow. It's an interesting one, this one. So these guys who were arrested were from Tajikistan. So I did a quick Google about Tajikistan because I don't know much about

[01:03:32] the kind of ISIS threat there. And I found this really good piece in Foreign Affairs that I'll link to in the show notes as well. And it notes that Tajikistan is the most southern and poorest

[01:03:43] republic of the former Soviet Union. And it has a poor economic outlook, a repressive government and a predominantly youthful population. And it's reportedly become a fertile ground for ISIS recruitment. And obviously, as you mentioned before, the men behind the Moscow theatre attack

[01:04:01] earlier this year were from Tajikistan and connected to ISIS-K. And the ruling regime have seen Islam as a threat to its legitimacy and subjected the religion to strict controls there, which is great ground for resentment. And the government likes to demonise Islam and

[01:04:23] Islamic customs and it accuses its critics of being Wahhabi, Salafi or Jihadi. And so the rise of ISIS-K has sort of been a bit of a blessing and a curse to the regime in Tajikistan because

[01:04:36] it gives legitimisation to their demonising of Islam. But at the same time, it does pose a credible threat to that regime and could destabilise its hold on power. The Russian security services have not been able to keep a lid on it there because they're obviously very focused on

[01:04:52] Ukraine at the moment. And so it's sort of allowing this room for growing domestic terror attacks. And apparently also, these members from Tajikistan are able to get weapons allegedly from the Ukraine war itself. We saw with the ISIS-K attack in Moscow, they were using

[01:05:10] like AK-47s and I suspected they were quite old ones because I think I mentioned before the barrel of one of the guns caught on fire, which usually indicates it's not been cleaned properly. And they're using really crappy quality gunpowder. So yeah, there's definitely some interesting things

[01:05:26] kind of going on there. And the other interesting note is that these men from Tajikistan got intercepted so quickly and we talked about in the past, obviously American intelligence gave Russia a warning about ISIS-K before the Moscow theatre attack. And then obviously recently with this and

[01:05:44] the rest of these eight men, it does suggest that the American intelligence services, whether it be the CIA or the FBI do have some BDIs in the area and have some pretty good resources looking at this

[01:05:56] threat. And so yeah, so it'd be interesting to sort of see if any more information comes out. And as you noted earlier, obviously at the moment in the US, the terrorism warning lights are

[01:06:06] blinking red again in a very similar fashion to before 9-11. And I think you and I have both, I think on air and off air, been talking about the fear of another spectacular terrorist attack

[01:06:18] somewhere in the US, UK or Europe during the various election cycles that are going on. You know, terrorist groups like to exploit elections because if they can commit an atrocity during an election cycle, there is a potential they can manipulate the election in their favour.

[01:06:36] So it's, yeah, it's an interesting one there. So sadly, we want to keep an eye on this story. And have there been many more developments since we spoke about this yesterday?

[01:06:49] None that I'm aware of as of earlier this morning. Yeah, we know very little about this case at the moment. What I've outlined here is really the extent of it, I think. Holding these guys on

[01:07:00] an immigration violation tells me that the Feds don't currently have enough hard evidence to slap them with terrorism charges. But whatever they do have spooked them enough that they wanted them off

[01:07:13] the streets. Of course, you know, you made the point about with we warned the Russians ahead of that attack in Moscow, which suggests if we want something to inspire confidence, you know,

[01:07:25] we apparently know more about what ISIS-K is up to in Moscow than the Russians do. So, you know, apply that to here. Okay, that's potentially good. But I think, you know, if there was nothing in the

[01:07:43] databases that would have excluded them from being allowed in through a regular port of entry, which there's, I don't know that some of the intelligence here they have, it's they think it's solid, it's actionable. But it's perhaps for some reason or another, I couldn't tell you,

[01:08:05] perhaps not stuff that would be admissible in court at this point. And they need to find other stuff to make that stuff stick. Well, this terrorism cases are notoriously difficult to convict, because especially in the UK, actually, like you could have all the

[01:08:23] ingredients to make a bomb. But if you've not constructed it is very hard to convict somebody of bomb making apparently. So it's a tricky area. I wonder if the FBI just being optimistic had been

[01:08:36] watching them from the second they crossed the border, just to try and see who else they were mingling with. And maybe it got to a certain point bit like with the liquid bomb plot that it got to

[01:08:47] a certain point where they felt that the threat to having them on the streets is too high. But as you were saying, there probably isn't enough evidence of them actually going to do something.

[01:08:55] So the least that could happen is they just get deported. Right? Which kind of eliminates the threat on a short term level. So yeah, I don't know, I could be wrong about this. But just my

[01:09:07] gut, you know, seeing this eight suspects picked up in three major cities across the country, to me suggests a perhaps a decently large cell that might have been disrupted. I don't know the law well enough to say how long they can hold these men on immigration charges

[01:09:27] alone. But if they suspect a serious foreign terrorist connection, I'd expect to see further indictments reflecting that fairly soon. If so, the charging documents there might tell us a lot. I mean, yeah, there's a lot of questions here. You know, did the feds clear this threat off the

[01:09:47] board? Are there more people loose in the country or on their way here? I don't know. We'll have to wait for DOJ to say more. But this is potentially something significant to watch, especially because

[01:10:00] I sort of sat down the other night and sort of thought through like, the four potential foreign wild cards ahead of the election that keep me up at night. And this is one of them.

[01:10:09] Yeah, indeed. Indeed. And I think I've said this as well. The one that worries me a little bit as well as the Olympics. That's the other one. That's the other big sort of flashpoint I can see this year if something terrible could happen. But let's hope not.

[01:10:24] Yeah, I mean, that would obviously mean yeah, you don't you don't want to see that. That would be that'd be tragic. That'd be awful. It would be bad for Europe, it'd be bad for France, especially with

[01:10:33] those elections that they have coming up now. I don't know that that would have much of an impact on our election. No, I don't think we have much of an impact on the American elections, but it certainly would just be a bit of a shockwave across Europe, really.

[01:10:49] Yeah, it would be. It's not the headlines that you want, especially if it's a resurgent ISIS affiliate, you know, a bit of a comeback for them that you would want to deny them for sure.

[01:11:01] Yes, France has been plagued by sort of ISIS and al Qaeda inspired terrorism over the last many years now. It's terrible. Decade. Yeah, yeah. Very high state of alert and obviously with the Olympics and now the election. Oh my

[01:11:18] goodness. You know, it's not a good time to be in Paris probably. But there we go. Well, so the four concerns, potential foreign wild cards leading up to November that concern me.

[01:11:34] This is one of them. Second, and these are in no particular order, an Israeli invasion of South Lebanon or a major long-term escalation with Hezbollah. That's potentially very bad. A particularly insidious Russian or Chinese made AI deepfake of Biden that registers with the public

[01:11:56] in a pervasive, persistent way. And the last one is Russia goads the North Koreans into doing something stupid across the DMZ. Those are the four. Yeah, all of that could happen. While you're away at your Buddhist retreat in silence, it's all going to happen.

[01:12:15] Yes, in silence. Oh my God. And I'm going to be left here to man the shop. I won't be able to say a thing about it. Won't be able to say a thing about it.

[01:12:25] Oh dear. Well, on that note, I think we'll wrap up here, but we'll go on to Patreon now. So if you want to join us on Patreon, just click on the link in the show notes that will take you

[01:12:36] to Extra Shot and obviously depending on which level you pick, you'll get a free coaster for your coffee cup. So there we go. And also don't forget to connect with us on social media. We are

[01:12:46] secretsandspies, and that's spies spelled correctly. S-P-I-E-S. And you can find us on Twitter, Blue Sky, Instagram, and Spoutable. And I can tell you now that Twitter and Instagram have been very well looked after whilst the others at the moment have gone into a terrible state

[01:13:03] of neglect. So I apologize about that. So if you do want to connect with us, maybe pick Twitter or Instagram or X as it's called now. Only so many hours in the day to be parked on social media.

[01:13:13] Yeah, yeah. Well, you know, hopefully in time we might be able to, I don't know, we're quite way off from this, but maybe in a couple of years time I could actually hire somebody to look after

[01:13:24] our social media. So there we go. There's a goal for Patreon. But there we go. Well, everybody, thank you very much for listening. And if you're not joining us on Extra Shot, then, you know,

[01:13:35] obviously have a great weekend and we'll catch you on the next show. And if you are joining us Extra Shot, we will see you in a while. We'll speak to you in a few minutes. Take care. Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.