You can find out more about Gene and his work here:
https://www.genemoran.com/
You can connect with Gene on LinkedIn here:
https://www.linkedin.com/in/genemoran
Check out Gene’s books on his Amazon page:
https://www.amazon.com/stores/Gene-Moran/author/B07YW9RLMD?ref=ap_rdr&isDramIntegrated=true&shoppingPortalEnabled=true
Support Secrets and Spies:
Become a “Friend of the podcast” on Patreon for £3 www.patreon.com/SecretsAndSpies
Buy merchandise from our shop: https://www.redbubble.com/shop/ap/60934996?asc=u
Subscribe to our Youtube page: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDVB23lrHr3KFeXq4VU36dg
For more information about the podcast, check out our website: https://secretsandspiespodcast.com/
Connect with us on social media.
BLUE SKY https://bsky.app/profile/secretsandspies.bsky.social
TWITTER twitter.com/SecretsAndSpies
FACEBOOK www.facebook.com/secretsandspies
INSTAGRAM https://www.instagram.com/secretsandspies/
SPOUTIBLE https://spoutible.com/SecretsAndSpies
[00:00:00] Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world.
[00:00:30] The world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics and intrigue. This podcast is produced and hosted
[00:00:36] by Chris Carr.
[00:00:37] On today's podcast I'm joined by former US Navy destroyer Captain Gene Moran to discuss
[00:00:43] the Hoofie threat in the Red Sea. In this episode we look at the background of the Hoofies,
[00:00:49] the threat that they pose and how the US Navy and its allies are dealing with that threat.
[00:00:54] Then we later on discuss life on a ship during a time of conflict and we finish up with
[00:00:59] Gene explaining what more he thinks could be done to counter this threat.
[00:01:03] Just before we begin, if you're enjoying this podcast please consider supporting us
[00:01:06] directly by becoming a Patreon subscriber. All you need to do is just go to patreon.com
[00:01:11] forward slash secrets and spies and depending on which level you pick you'll get a free
[00:01:15] coaster or coffee cup and also you'll get access to our Patreon exclusive show Extra
[00:01:21] Shot which comes out twice a month after every espresso martini. Thank you for listening
[00:01:26] and I hope you enjoyed this episode. Take care.
[00:01:28] The opinions expressed by guests on secrets and spies do not necessarily represent those
[00:01:33] of the producers and sponsors of this podcast.
[00:01:50] Hello Gene Moran, welcome to the podcast. Hello Chris, good to be here.
[00:01:54] It's great to have you on us. If it's a benefit of our listeners please can you
[00:01:57] just tell us a little bit about yourself and your career in the US Navy.
[00:02:01] Sure, I spent 24 years in the US Navy driving ships and then commanding ships in the Navy.
[00:02:08] There's a saying that you're either at sea or in DC and so I had multiple Washington
[00:02:14] tours between my ship tours. At sea I commanded a cruiser and a destroyer.
[00:02:19] I commanded multi-ship operations in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf operated
[00:02:24] carriers. Assure I worked representing the Navy to Congress in a few different positions
[00:02:32] at very senior levels coordinating for the secretary and chief of naval operations with
[00:02:38] Congress. Fantastic. What were the ships that you commanded because the only US
[00:02:43] Naval ship I've ever been on was the USS Normandy back in what was that 1994 when it visited Portsmouth?
[00:02:49] Well I commanded a sister ship. Philippine Sea was CG-58. I also commanded USS Laboon DDG-58.
[00:02:58] They share the same number but a different ship class. As life would have it both ships are in
[00:03:04] the Red Sea as we speak operating and I've been on both ships as they did similar missions
[00:03:13] previously. Fantastic. Well today we're going to talk about the Houthi threat to international
[00:03:18] shipping and the US led efforts to counter that threat. So I'll start with a kind of broad question.
[00:03:23] Why is freedom of movement in the Red Sea important? Movement of commerce is really what it's all about
[00:03:29] and that is a major sea line of communication for shipment of goods. Billions of dollars of
[00:03:37] goods passed through the Suez Canal which was brought about as a way to save travel time
[00:03:46] to go around Africa. But that saves about 10 days of transit time if you're traveling from the
[00:03:53] far east to Europe and if you don't have free transit there that immediately translates to
[00:04:00] additional costs of those goods. Indeed and obviously we're at a time where costs already
[00:04:06] rising because of energy prices and so on and so those added costs do have a massive knock-on
[00:04:11] effect and I think I was even reading just the other day how it's actually having an effect
[00:04:15] on people even in the Middle East itself with costs and things. Well just from the transit costs
[00:04:20] for some commercial ships that may be hundreds of thousands of dollars per day. You know multiply
[00:04:27] that by 10 days of transit time by the number of ships. I mean it is thousands of ships.
[00:04:33] Most people have very little idea that so much of commerce moves by sea because it's the most
[00:04:39] cost-effective manner but obviously when people are obstructing those transit lanes it has more
[00:04:48] localized effect as well. People make decisions to be in the area or not and you know it affects
[00:04:56] lives, it affects local commerce and in this case it's affecting global commerce.
[00:05:03] Karen with another broad question. I was thinking about sort of the Middle East and sort of
[00:05:07] post-Afghanistan and obviously the Red Sea itself. What kind of strategic interests do the U.S. and
[00:05:12] its allies sort of have in that region? Well our interest for decades had been
[00:05:17] in protecting access to oil. The oil posture of the U.S. has changed dramatically in the last
[00:05:27] couple of decades with the introduction of fracking and access to oil that was not accessible
[00:05:34] previously but in a broader sense beyond that what was access to oil as a driver is just the
[00:05:44] regional stability. It's healthy to have world order where everyone can move around and
[00:05:52] engage in commerce. Now we have activity that is focused on I say we the United States
[00:06:00] and its allies are focused on activity to prevent the flow of arms and narcotics in the Middle East
[00:06:10] which are used for certainly nefarious purposes and the narcotics are used to fund those nefarious
[00:06:18] activities. Many would be surprised to know that the Coast Guard has the U.S. Coast Guard has
[00:06:23] quite a presence in the Middle East every day in addition to the naval presence and that is there
[00:06:32] specifically because they are expert at interdicting narcotics trafficking. I did not know that about
[00:06:38] the Coast Guard so basically you're saying you've got U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships in that area
[00:06:43] and they have sort of different skill sets is that right? Yes and different offensive and
[00:06:48] defensive capability as well. Yeah that's interesting yeah because obviously some Coast Guard
[00:06:53] ships are quite large you know they form a sort of U.S. Naval ship but especially commissioned for
[00:06:59] the Coast Guard. The what's over there now are specific Coast Guard ships they are not
[00:07:05] former Navy ships but if you think about the missions that you know a Coast Guard ship would
[00:07:12] not be doing offensive strike, ashore or operating in an integrated air defense mode they just
[00:07:21] don't have those sort of weapon systems. Very skilled at tracking and interdicting
[00:07:28] narcotics trafficking but integrated weapons systems is not their strength and that's not a
[00:07:35] knock on them it's just not central to their mission. Yeah that makes sense. So how does this
[00:07:40] sort of conflict with the Houthis affect regional stability? Well we have people who are influencing
[00:07:47] geopolitical scenarios that are not in authorized power. Houthis are a rebel force
[00:07:59] they're not elected they are trying to regain control for hundreds of years they were in control
[00:08:06] until about the 1960s or so and in the nineteen they were not the Houthis at the time they were
[00:08:14] a you know a form of Shiism but since the 80s or so they have established themselves as the Houthis
[00:08:24] to try to regain power. Right now we see parts of Yemen that are controlled and uncontrolled and
[00:08:34] the Houthis tend to be in the uncontrolled portions of the country. Yeah and they are
[00:08:40] considered a proxy of Iran aren't they? They are and they are one of several
[00:08:46] and so that certainly causes challenges when trying to figure out how to
[00:08:54] how to participate in the world order. Yeah you know we tend to see the military actions and
[00:09:01] the strikes that they're taking place in the last several months but
[00:09:05] you know there's a diplomatic side of the equation as well there's an intelligence
[00:09:10] aspect to this to just be monitoring what's going on but the and the economic considerations are real
[00:09:17] and it's to every nation's advantage to be able to engage in free commerce. Indeed indeed
[00:09:25] obviously there's been a lot kind of going on in the Red Sea with the Houthis. Are you able
[00:09:29] to kind of give us an overview of what the kind of current situation is and maybe if possible
[00:09:34] some numbers on some of the sort of drones and things that have been shot down I certainly
[00:09:38] believe at least a ship has been sunk it might be more than that. Yeah so that from a US perspective
[00:09:43] there's a US battle group in Dwight D Eisenhower battle group I have operated with them on multiple
[00:09:50] occasions and have overseen the air warfare picture for that battle group in a prior
[00:09:56] life while I was on active duty. The ships are joined by cruisers and destroyers of that
[00:10:03] battle group and what are known as independent deployers there are always a couple of ships that are
[00:10:10] sort of free floaters that can move between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the
[00:10:17] Mediterranean and Red Sea depending on where the where the activity might be we have had an
[00:10:23] anti-piracy force there for decades now operating with along with allies. In the Red Sea we are
[00:10:30] joined by allied ships that have different capabilities and I do think it's important to recognize that
[00:10:39] multiple allied partners are trying to participate alongside us just because they don't have the
[00:10:46] same types of ships and capability doesn't mean that they don't have the will and much like the
[00:10:52] Coast Guard can integrate in certain military operations other nations navies can integrate
[00:10:59] with us as well and it does help from a logistics perspective and sometimes presence
[00:11:05] matters and just being visible to that opponent matters and so to the degree that those allies
[00:11:14] are able to multiply our force number that's helpful. You talk about numbers you know we
[00:11:22] have not seen this sort of activity where so many targets and threats are coming at us at
[00:11:29] one time and it's not that we haven't imagined it and haven't trained for it because we have and I
[00:11:35] think we're seeing in the response the US response that it's been superb the success rate in
[00:11:45] dealing with the threats coming at the US ships I think it's been spectacular.
[00:11:49] That's because those ships are trained in a very deliberate manner to deal with very large
[00:11:57] scale threats before they ever go into that environment. It doesn't mean that we ever
[00:12:04] expect to fully see what we're seeing and we're learning from what we're seeing because some of
[00:12:09] it is not quite as expected the mix of sophistication of the drones,
[00:12:15] the mixture with the ballistic missiles. I'm not sure the degree to which anyone can fully prepare
[00:12:23] for that but the fact that the US response has been so thorough I think it's pretty impressive.
[00:12:31] Those commercial ships that have taken hits you know you can only do so much there's geometry
[00:12:37] involved here and how one defends ships and you know that becomes a math and physics
[00:12:44] challenge that hasn't been figured out yet. Yeah your US naval ships have they not sort of run out
[00:12:49] of ammunition and rockets to kind of counter that threat because it seems to be a large volume of
[00:12:54] things going on out there? Well there is a very deliberate dialogue happening now about do we
[00:13:01] have the right weapon systems in place for this defense. The Navy has been working on
[00:13:08] for years directed energy weapons both lasers and microwave systems that are probably much better
[00:13:18] suited for this type of threat so we are firing fairly expensive missiles at fairly inexpensive
[00:13:26] threats but in doing so we are protecting multi-billion dollar ships and the lives on board.
[00:13:33] So I think that's a false debate right now about we fire a two million dollar missile
[00:13:40] at a twenty thousand dollar threat. It's always going to be an expensive defensive system
[00:13:48] but the Navy has known that it needed to move into directed energy. I think we're seeing a
[00:13:55] rapid acceleration now not coincidentally in January the head of the US Navy surface forces
[00:14:01] at the surface Navy Association annual symposium said it very bluntly we've been working on this for
[00:14:08] 10 years it's time to accelerate this and to his credit he doesn't own the budget and all the
[00:14:14] budgeting decisions associated with it but he's responsible for those ships that are forward
[00:14:19] deployed. The budgeting process that gets us to those decisions is incredibly complex and there
[00:14:26] are all sorts of competing factors that can delay or accelerate which systems get the investment.
[00:14:34] The Houthis seem to have some quite sophisticated equipment it seems to be drones and certain
[00:14:39] types of missiles do we know where they're kind of getting that from? There's no doubt that Iran
[00:14:44] is supporting them. I think there's two aspects to it one is the flow of funding
[00:14:50] that allows for it to happen the other is the flow of technology and the sharing of information.
[00:14:58] There are reports of an Iranian ship or ships supporting with targeting information I will say
[00:15:06] to pinpoint a specific target at sea requires highly sophisticated integrated capability.
[00:15:15] I think we've seen probably the peak of what the Houthis have available to them in terms of
[00:15:21] sophistication but you don't do that sort of targeting without high quality data.
[00:15:29] So they clearly have access to that. What are we doing about that I think is a fair question
[00:15:37] Vice Admiral Brad Cooper and the former fifth fleet commander was on 60 minutes
[00:15:42] in a fairly open conversation about the fact that the U.S. could certainly do more to Iran
[00:15:50] to stop this but that's not a military decision that's that's a political decision and I
[00:15:58] comment to others about the stated concern that we don't want this to grow into a broader
[00:16:06] conflict. I contend we've been in a broader conflict for quite some time now. We have U.S.
[00:16:14] forces in most Middle East countries for a variety of reasons Syria Jordan Iraq Kuwait Afghanistan
[00:16:24] Pakistan UAE Horn of Africa I mean we have a presence there and and in various ways
[00:16:34] we have been subject to dozens if not now hundreds of attacks across many of these countries. So
[00:16:44] we're already in a broader conflict we're just not calling it such and I think we should be
[00:16:52] calculating differently what would the impact be if we escalated with Iran to send a more clear
[00:17:01] message and that could take a number of forms. You know if we were to sink an Iranian ship that
[00:17:08] we suspect is targeting that's a pretty loud signal much much like Ukraine has done with with Russia
[00:17:17] that's a that's a serious cost to any country it takes years to rebuild that capability
[00:17:25] and it could it could send a signal that's just one example. Yeah yeah with that Iranian spy ship I
[00:17:31] believe it suffered an electronic attack not long ago was that like a kind of warning because it
[00:17:37] might next time be shot out by something sort of more more sort of fatal should we say. Yeah I
[00:17:43] don't claim to have direct knowledge of that particular situation but it's uh it's not uncommon
[00:17:49] for the US to signal things in such a way that hey we we've got your number and we can do this
[00:17:56] anytime of day so tread carefully. Yeah and what options are there to deal with that ship other
[00:18:04] ways to sort of jam it and so on and you know sort of stop it sort of abilities without having to
[00:18:09] necessarily resort to sinking it? Certainly ideally we could affect it in port before it went to
[00:18:18] and and you know certainly those sorts of plans are always in consideration so I have served in the
[00:18:27] J3 of the Joint Staff where global operations are considered I've been a part of military planning
[00:18:35] at the theater level and at the operational level and those sort of options are always on
[00:18:42] the table how could we send a signal and prevent this from ever escalating that that could still
[00:18:49] happen those ships have to return to port at some time there are ways to disable ships with
[00:18:56] electronic means with means to impact their propulsion those would be soft kill sort of
[00:19:05] options to use a term of art there it's not always about the kinetic and sinking them to the
[00:19:11] bottom but the the morale impact of sinking a ship is unmistakable that that can send a
[00:19:21] much stronger signal that is irrefutable. Yeah you were talking for a few moments ago about
[00:19:27] this situation could spiral with Iran so I suppose my thought is sort of what options are there on
[00:19:34] the table that can both send a direct signal to Iran but not necessarily let things sort of
[00:19:39] spiral to a point where it leads to a full head-on-head conflict with them.
[00:19:43] Well I've been in the room leading congressional delegations in the UAE where
[00:19:53] people who run banks were told fairly directly hey we understand what's happening here
[00:20:01] and we know you understand what's happening here there are ways to freeze assets
[00:20:07] that can have a an incredibly debilitating effect I think we have been a bit schizophrenic with our
[00:20:18] approach to those sort of tools and there are further steps that could be taken
[00:20:26] where when you when you do cut off the flow of funding things slow down dramatically.
[00:20:32] Indeed I was thinking about the the Falklands war where Britain used MI-6 to sort of buy up the
[00:20:39] exorcist missiles that were being used to shoot at British ships I don't know there's any options
[00:20:44] on the table to somehow disrupt the weapons supply or buy up the weapons that the Houthis might want
[00:20:50] or want to use. Yeah you know I think that's a actually a reasonable diplomatic tool and some
[00:20:56] some may not see that as diplomacy but it's it's not much different than us distributing cash on
[00:21:03] the ground in Afghanistan or Iraq to win friends and influence people that is a tool that we are
[00:21:13] uniquely able to execute. The degree to which those sort of plans are ever discussed openly
[00:21:23] you know you might hear it anecdotally I don't claim direct knowledge of interaction with with the CIA
[00:21:30] I think it is generally understood that our special operations forces are
[00:21:36] intertwined with various paramilitary operations and that's as designed and there is a specific law
[00:21:44] that controls how that's done but those sort of activities can shape the battlefield so to
[00:21:50] speak. Yeah yeah so one interesting question is how do we balance of long-term geostrategic and
[00:21:56] diplomatic goals in the Middle East with short-term immediate needs when it comes to dealing with the
[00:22:00] Houthis? Yeah you're hitting on what I think is the problem of our times certainly from a U.S.
[00:22:08] perspective we seem to have lost sight of what we think our place in the world should be.
[00:22:15] I say we as the citizens of the United States the government I believe generally feels that it has
[00:22:23] a leadership position and then there are debates about how to exercise that leadership but there is
[00:22:29] a growing portion of our population that is less well informed about the history of the post-World
[00:22:39] War II world order such that they may have lost some of the connection to why some of these
[00:22:46] relationships and alliances came about to begin with and so it might look easy to save money by
[00:22:54] not spending on some of these things that cost a lot of money and pulling back to be more isolationist.
[00:23:01] The cost of that is that the vacuum will fill. There aren't other countries who have the resources
[00:23:09] to be able to be forward deployed and to be as ever present as the U.S. has grown to be. It's just
[00:23:19] a function of the resources and our method of government that has brought us to this place
[00:23:28] but we have a growing portion of the population that questions that position in the world order
[00:23:35] and we may find ourselves relearning lessons that were painfully learned in the 30s and 40s.
[00:23:44] Yeah indeed it does seem there's sort of a disconnect these days. In the U.K. and when I
[00:23:52] grew up we kind of traditionally have seen the U.S. as the policeman of the world and I
[00:23:58] as the best way to put it but certainly Europe is very dependent on American support and I feel
[00:24:04] like a lot of people sort of I don't know if it's my generation or younger have sort of lost
[00:24:10] touch with that sort of sense of responsibility. I feel like there's some sort of pushback
[00:24:15] against that idea. Well in general Americans don't travel abroad in general it's a minority that do
[00:24:23] and it is a fact that the majority of Americans don't read a single book in a given year. They
[00:24:32] don't complete a single book in a given year. I had the good fortune to travel extensively as
[00:24:38] a congressional liaison around the world. I've been to over 60 countries it has enhanced my
[00:24:45] perspective of what options are out there. Something that is sort of seared in my mind
[00:24:53] are the multiple visits to American battle monuments cemeteries that exist across Europe
[00:25:00] and when we would go to those cemeteries where American dead are buried on foreign
[00:25:08] soil. Those communities around the cemetery they remember vividly what that experience was about
[00:25:17] and it's we're losing them but there are people still living who shed tears describing the story
[00:25:27] of what their life was like in those moments. You know I pray that we don't have to revisit that
[00:25:35] but I fear it's a possibility if the US were to disengage. I think there's some very loose talk
[00:25:45] about who pays the bill for NATO and why that's important to us and to me it's just silliness
[00:25:54] and ignorance of how it came about. Yeah indeed and I think I wonder if the sort of drawdown after
[00:26:04] the Cold War in the 1990s a lot of sort of wrapping up of like bases in Europe and things has led
[00:26:10] people to a false sense of complacency and feeling that pieces are given because I don't think
[00:26:15] nowadays I don't feel like pieces are given at all. I think there was a false message
[00:26:21] that took hold that there could be a peace dividend that the wall came down and we had won
[00:26:30] against those forces and now we can focus on our domestic concerns and it's just not the way the
[00:26:39] world works and unfortunately we've made some strategic blunders the movement in response to 9-11 by the US
[00:26:52] forces to move from chasing down Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to suddenly saying we need to go
[00:27:01] to Iraq. That was a huge strategic blunder that cost us 20 years and trillions of dollars and worse
[00:27:11] it chipped away at Americans confidence in their government to make sound decisions on the global
[00:27:21] stage and so two decades of war has affected multiple generations of citizens and how they view
[00:27:32] what the US position should be in the world. Yeah and I really think the Gulf War, so the second
[00:27:37] Iraq war very much fed into anti-Americanism which I think then countries like Russia have
[00:27:43] been able to capitalize on with disinformation efforts and I think it's a real shame because
[00:27:48] those disinformation efforts are now really influencing maybe people younger than myself
[00:27:53] these days. The speed and quantity of information good and bad that moves around the world has
[00:28:02] accelerated some of these problems no doubt about it. It's very difficult to understand on one
[00:28:12] level and control in another level and unfortunately the United States has a tremendous capacity to
[00:28:21] overestimate its capabilities to influence and shape things and there are other very bright people
[00:28:29] around the world who also know how to use technology and capabilities or bring about
[00:28:35] capabilities and sometimes we just have this false sense of superiority that we've got the
[00:28:43] right answer and why wouldn't everybody want the answer that we want and it just doesn't work that
[00:28:48] way. Yeah one wider question you were talking about travel and the importance of it earlier do you
[00:28:53] think that sort of travel and worldliness is a key to kind of maybe getting past some of that
[00:28:59] mentality of people's days sort of falling for foreign propaganda? I think it can help.
[00:29:04] I don't know exactly how to get at that one. I will say that opportunities for military service
[00:29:12] are what allowed it for me for many people in the United States as well off as we are it's not
[00:29:19] seen as something that many can afford to do certainly not on the scale that I've been able
[00:29:24] to through my government work. It requires a commitment requires you know a level of effort
[00:29:33] and resources that many people don't prioritize. It doesn't mean that you can't learn it through books
[00:29:40] or other forms of video entertainment you know documentaries for example but we tend to self
[00:29:49] select to the easiest and quickest thing and we now in this you know day of social media our
[00:29:57] attention span is so short that to sit down to learn something new that takes real discipline.
[00:30:06] Yeah indeed indeed well just throwing a little bit on your experience with the Navy it'd be
[00:30:10] remiss of me not to ask you about what it's like being on a naval ship in a situation
[00:30:16] you know dealing with missiles coming in at you and trying to sort of counter threats
[00:30:20] and also what it's like to be in a command of a ship like that you know what is sort of the
[00:30:24] day to day sort of processes like in those sort of situations. Yeah there are a few layers to that
[00:30:30] so I don't pretend to have endured the type of threat environment that the ships are in right now
[00:30:37] I have in a synthetic manner which is how we how we prepare for these things
[00:30:42] to be able to deal with the decision-making apparatus but a couple of points about ship
[00:30:48] life and command ships operate in a very structured way there's a place for everything
[00:30:55] everything's in its place there are procedures that are followed there is training at the individual
[00:31:02] level at the group level at a ship level at a multi ship level and at a battle group level
[00:31:08] so you spend a lot of time training on how to do things a correct way there's a right way
[00:31:16] a wrong way in the navy way and and and it's imperative that people understand and be qualified
[00:31:22] for the positions for the roles that they're in and there are ways to create methods of
[00:31:29] interchangeability but a ship runs 24 hours a day it provides its own power it provides
[00:31:36] its own water it has to be replenished with fuel and provisions periodically
[00:31:43] but it's a 24-hour operation where there's a watch team driving the ship there's a watch team
[00:31:49] responsible for weapon systems the captain is always on watch but never standing a watch so to
[00:31:57] speak and so you know for me the day would start between six and seven a.m. and it would go until
[00:32:06] 11 at night typically depending on what evolutions were happening i i may get calls
[00:32:11] through the night from watch teams and you know they have certain parameters within which they
[00:32:18] they make decisions there are some things that are command decisions
[00:32:23] there are very very very few instantaneous command decisions that have to be made
[00:32:28] but the ships that are out there right now in the Red Sea are facing
[00:32:33] many of those instantaneous decisions so they they are typically trying to control the battle
[00:32:40] space with time and time time is what allows for a decision to take place and so you can get your
[00:32:48] decision timelines pretty darn tight you know down to seconds where there are you know sort of go
[00:32:55] no-go decisions and so i mentioned parameters there can be parameters set where the the
[00:33:01] captain doesn't have to be in the the combat information center to to signal an authorization
[00:33:10] to fire a weapon in defense the tactical action officer is there to make that decision but
[00:33:16] that round-the-clock nature of operations can be quite tiring over time and so sleep management
[00:33:22] is an issue fatigue is an issue periodically you know ships do need to sort of take a break
[00:33:28] and come offline for a couple of days what we're facing right now we talked about weapons earlier
[00:33:36] these vertically launched weapons do require going ashore to replace them in large numbers
[00:33:44] so this is public information the destroyers have you know over over 90 missiles on board but
[00:33:51] if you're shooting dozens it doesn't take long before you get to that 50 threshold where
[00:33:57] we typically would be looking for where's the next round coming from
[00:34:02] those ships in the Red Sea are going over to Gibraltar to get reloaded so if you do the map
[00:34:09] there it's about 20 hours to transit the Suez Canal it's three days across the Mediterranean
[00:34:14] two days to reload three days to come back 20 hours suddenly you've burned a week
[00:34:19] going offline to go reload and so that logistics tail becomes problematic
[00:34:26] and so the Navy would like to get out of that when the ships were designed it was thought that those
[00:34:32] missiles could be reloaded at sea that proved to be inherently unsafe and the Navy has not done it
[00:34:39] ever there are systems being developed that will allow for shorter timelines because that
[00:34:46] scenario I just painted for the Mediterranean if you take that to the Pacific the numbers are much
[00:34:51] much bigger and it's uh it's weeks to cross the Pacific and we don't have those missiles
[00:34:59] pre-positioned everywhere they're in certain key locations that most most people could figure out
[00:35:05] so I'm giving you maybe maybe more than you wanted but that's good I like it
[00:35:11] the you know the typical daily routine is it's a full day the crew is on a watch rotation
[00:35:18] usually three sections meaning four on eight off that's enough where you can you can typically get
[00:35:26] five hours of sleep there at a single time which is that's pretty good
[00:35:31] but you know there are collateral duties associated with most sailors on board they have
[00:35:38] responsibility for something other than just standing watch yes yeah things going to be polished
[00:35:43] and cleaned and so on well you know that there's a reason for the cleanliness uh issue and uh
[00:35:49] you know most ships are quite clean I think anybody would be would be proud to walk aboard
[00:35:55] a warship from any country you typically see the same thing that's just you know good order
[00:36:00] and discipline and health standards you know demand that I loved it I entered the Navy thinking
[00:36:08] I would spend four years and I spent 24 it was it was incredibly exciting and fulfilling
[00:36:16] work and and I love the discipline and the structure of it and wouldn't have traded it yeah
[00:36:23] yeah thank you for showing that one question she just popped into my head we were talking about
[00:36:27] cleanliness just now and I was just thinking of I think it was the was it the sinking of
[00:36:31] the Moscow and there was some speculation about that certain standards in the Russian Navy
[00:36:38] weren't being adhered to about I think it was fire safety that might have led to the ship sinking
[00:36:43] basically yeah we've and we've understood this about the the the Russian Navy and the Soviet
[00:36:49] Navy before it that what they lack is an enlisted force of leadership that the U.S. and
[00:36:59] the British Navy have and and and there are other western navies that have this as well but that
[00:37:05] that enlisted force of technical skill that also has leadership abilities makes a tremendous
[00:37:12] difference in the ability to have a top-down structure of continuity in how things are done
[00:37:20] and and when the crunch is on the command and control is there to to support what's needed
[00:37:27] when things are centralized and only the boss can make decisions then people are not empowered
[00:37:35] and they don't take the initiative and they don't learn and they they're afraid to act and so it's
[00:37:41] very evident when you look at video of how that ship responded to an incoming threat and we've
[00:37:48] seen it multiple times now with the unmanned surface vessel attacks there's no defensive
[00:37:56] posture and and so other people learn from that other other nations learn from that we see wow they
[00:38:01] really aren't nearly as ready as one would think and this this has been a an issue I think with
[00:38:09] many of our adversaries in the past we used to refer to the the 10-foot Russians you know there's
[00:38:15] they're so big and powerful until we figured out they weren't I think we're we're making similar
[00:38:21] assessments of the Chinese capability right now they are not the same as as the Russians but
[00:38:27] but they're not 10 feet tall our concern about escalating with Iran Iran is not 10 feet tall
[00:38:34] there there are no 10-foot tall Iranians they they these problems can be approached but
[00:38:42] but sometimes I think we need to use that sort of fear factor to help drive resources
[00:38:50] and protect resources on certain programs our US Defense Department budget is $850
[00:38:58] billion a year there are a lot of other interests that would like to get a piece of that and
[00:39:04] we have this ongoing debate for the last 15 years in the US about defense versus
[00:39:09] non-defense spending and there are legitimate concerns about domestic issues and social programs
[00:39:17] and and other ways that that money could be could be spent but it does come at a at a cost to the
[00:39:23] international position and our national security indeed and those are important things well let's
[00:39:30] take a quick break and then we'll be right back
[00:39:51] a wider question so we've seen especially if Ukraine and increased use of drones and
[00:39:56] obviously with the Houthis as well and they've had a devastating effectiveness against of naval
[00:40:01] and civilian ships and I was wondering what you may think the future of the US Navy is sort of
[00:40:05] looking like now in the age of the drone warfare is changing before our eyes no doubt about it
[00:40:11] and it has been we just haven't been able to see it as as as readily and and by that I mean
[00:40:17] cyber warfare is with us and has been with us for for decades now there there are things that
[00:40:23] happen that we never are told about that may may shape behaviors and outcomes that that is a
[00:40:32] non-lethal way to to send signals the recognition of we now politely call them uncrewed vehicles
[00:40:41] the recognition that uncrewed underwater vehicles and uncrewed surface vessels are a less expensive
[00:40:48] way to move forward we've been working we the US Navy has been working for some time to integrate
[00:40:57] autonomous underwater vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles with our subsea domain
[00:41:05] efforts you know we have a very robust submarine capability but we initially wanted to see that
[00:41:12] we could integrate those on uuvs and auvs with that environment control of water space is a is a
[00:41:21] particular challenge because you you don't have all of the visual cues that you do in the air
[00:41:29] the Navy moved quickly trying to ask congress for a lot of money a few years ago and congress said
[00:41:37] hey show us your plan before we're just going to throw money at this we don't want to start
[00:41:40] a program that's not ready the Navy stepped back they sort of developed a concept of ops that's
[00:41:46] that's unfolding now and we're seeing production this week i'm at home in Florida today but i was
[00:41:53] just in DC for the sea airspace symposium the largest maritime symposium in the world
[00:42:00] there's no doubt that uncrewed is is the future and it's happening underwater and on the surface
[00:42:10] all sorts of smaller surface drones are being developed you know we learned during the wars in
[00:42:20] the Middle East that we you know we could arm a predator drone in in the in the air that was a
[00:42:25] that was a precursor to some of these things that we are now figuring out what sort of
[00:42:30] payloads need to be on what sort of trucks for a lack for lack of a better word but it's just
[00:42:36] a matter of what what are the capabilities that we that we need is it a sensor is it a weapon is it
[00:42:42] just surveillance or presence and those things are now being very well integrated yeah yeah
[00:42:50] um i may be wrong here but i think is it the the zamelt class ship which was this sort of
[00:42:56] experimentation with a sort of a stealth ship but with more autonomy is that right the zoom
[00:43:02] zoom all that zoom all yeah named named after a former chief of naval operations yeah i've read
[00:43:07] there's been some sort of controversy around that type of ship and some people are saying it's
[00:43:11] become a waste of money i don't know you know sort of what your thoughts inside that type of ship
[00:43:16] are in the current navy strategy well it there were two at one point there were two have been
[00:43:23] more of them when at the time when the cost of the ship started to escalate to be above
[00:43:29] three billion per ship that was at the time deemed to be an outrageous sum of money and
[00:43:36] we made a mistake by thinking that we could move more quickly by bringing innovation to a platform
[00:43:47] before it was fully ready there's a there's a term for that it's it's escaping me right now
[00:43:54] but but uh we now insist that capabilities be be ready to be brought forward to a platform
[00:44:03] it it's not so funny but today an arleigh burke destroyer costs over two billion dollars so that
[00:44:09] that three billion dollar figure seems almost almost quaint we have figured out some things to
[00:44:16] do with this ship some of which involves you know use of an electric gun so to speak where you can
[00:44:26] fire weapons very far inland from from very far offshore in a way that a traditional gun could not
[00:44:33] could not do there are other weapon systems being demonstrated it is a ship that has far fewer
[00:44:43] sailors on board than a than a traditional ship but we've been experimenting with that for a number
[00:44:49] of years with the littoral combat ship the two variants of that ship class that was a troubled
[00:44:57] program but there was learning that took place about what's required to operate a ship when
[00:45:05] you introduce technology and various levels of autonomy you can reduce the the numbers required
[00:45:11] it will never be what a commercial ship is where you can run a super tanker with you know fewer than
[00:45:16] 20 people uh it it won't be that because there are there are too many other mission sets required
[00:45:24] along the way besides just getting from point A to point B thank you for that so if you were in
[00:45:29] a situation where you know you're in a position of authority where you could sort of deal
[00:45:33] with the Houthi situation what do you think Koodle should be done to counter the Houthis
[00:45:39] that currently isn't being done i've been puzzled that the senior diplomat for the U.S.
[00:45:48] is too often our CIA director if you look at who's who's doing the real negotiating in
[00:45:55] in uh Gaza and in the Hamas situation it's Bill Burns I understand he's a particularly skilled
[00:46:03] individual but he's not the Secretary of State and I think we are firefighting with our diplomacy
[00:46:12] right now that's that's how it appears to me uh it doesn't mean that there aren't communications
[00:46:17] happening at the local level with ambassadors but they convey a different level of gravitas
[00:46:27] than does the president's most senior cabinet secretary yeah so I think diplomacy there's
[00:46:35] certainly more that could be done I think we have been a little erratic in our engagement with Iran with
[00:46:45] you know in the Obama administration we we handed over a billion dollars in cash
[00:46:50] where we thought that was going to go I who knows that that was an effort to do something different
[00:46:59] and I think it it failed I've talked about the flow of funds I think the you know access to the
[00:47:09] Swift system is something that could be more rigidly controlled you know we see Russia still
[00:47:16] has pretty ready access to that system in terms of direct kinetic strikes at Iran I don't think
[00:47:27] that's what we're talking about here but if you were to sink a ship or take out a capability that
[00:47:36] that matters that that does send a signal now we took out a a terrorist leader a few years ago
[00:47:44] and some would say that that that was stirring the hornets nest well you know if you want to get
[00:47:51] rid of the hornets you do have to stir the nest yeah and so there we have not in the US prepared
[00:48:00] the citizenry to understand why this matters and we've talked about some of the more peaceful
[00:48:07] reasons that in the big picture we want these things to take place we want commerce we want
[00:48:11] security we have to make people understand that you have to make Americans understand why does this
[00:48:19] why does this matter to me I don't think we're doing well at that sort of strategic messaging
[00:48:23] yeah yeah is there anything could be done that would improve that strategic messaging do you
[00:48:28] think or improve that understanding well you know I'm not wild about commenting on our two choices
[00:48:36] for who might be president but we have a system in place that allows less than the best to advance
[00:48:49] to the final round and that's frustrating and and it works its way down at the local level
[00:48:58] you know state and even county level in the United States and some of these decisions about who
[00:49:03] can even be on a ballot and how does one get there to me it's a bit murky and you know I'm a Ph.D. in
[00:49:11] public policy and I've studied political science and I teach public policy at a university but
[00:49:17] but the average citizen does not have that understanding of how the how the ballot process
[00:49:23] works for someone to even advance that there's a perception that it's just about money and
[00:49:27] whoever can raise the most money will will advance that's one part of the of the challenge
[00:49:34] so we need to have better people in government more thoughtful people in government
[00:49:44] who are participating in some of these decisions and and frankly we have some
[00:49:51] fairly uninformed people in fairly senior positions who are able to exercise influence
[00:49:59] over outcomes that is beyond their understanding and until that changes and in our country that
[00:50:08] changes with votes but until that changes we will continue to revisit this yeah well last
[00:50:14] question really is there anything else that's important to you that you would like to add
[00:50:17] before we wrap up today well I work in an area of government now I advise defense companies and
[00:50:25] how to how to best serve the government customer and I help them get to dramatic outcomes by my
[00:50:34] understanding of a very complex process I've had exposure to it from multiple perspectives
[00:50:40] as an active duty officer working at senior levels in dod as a corporate lobbyist working
[00:50:46] for a large defense company and for the last 10 years I've been advising smaller defense companies
[00:50:52] who don't necessarily have that access to the to the same information I mentioned I teach public
[00:51:02] policy I'm an adjunct professor at Florida State and I I believe very strongly that we need
[00:51:09] people to aspire to serve in government we need very smart and dedicated people to aspire to
[00:51:15] serve in government not just the elected positions but the the unelected positions it takes
[00:51:23] committed people to support a government and and to work in it and to fully participate
[00:51:31] and I fear that you know there's a generation that that may be getting a bad taste of what
[00:51:38] that could be like and why that you know maybe it doesn't pay as well as you as you could make
[00:51:42] in a in a in a higher higher tech job or or something where you're more directly involved
[00:51:49] in innovation we tend to promote the making of money as early as you can in as big a number
[00:51:58] as you can as as the key to success and I think most of the wealthiest people would say that
[00:52:03] that's that's not really what they think makes them successful but but but it's a challenge so
[00:52:10] you know what would I like to see as you know I'm a 61 year old man who's been at this for a while now
[00:52:15] I I hope that our following generations can see that there's a need for them to participate in
[00:52:24] whatever way whether it's just being an informed voter or participating in government
[00:52:30] there are opportunities to make a difference and you know we don't have to wait
[00:52:35] for some external force to rally us to that to that call for duty indeed
[00:52:42] indeed external force being a foreign power or alien power if you look at some movies we have
[00:52:47] out these days or AI or AI yes well thank you so much for your time say where where can
[00:52:56] listeners find out more about you and your work well thanks for that Chris I've enjoyed the
[00:53:00] conversation I have a website gene moran.com and it talks all about my my work my books
[00:53:07] if I speak to a lot of different groups of people who would like me to speak I
[00:53:13] have sort of a side role in explaining and interpreting what's happening for people
[00:53:17] and try to make it understandable as to why why some of these things matter at a more local level
[00:53:24] but it's all there and I'm happy to communicate with anybody
[00:53:27] fantastic well thank you for your time today you bet good to be here
[00:53:57] thanks for listening this is secrets and spies
[00:54:27] you
[00:54:57] you

