S8 Ep37: Former US Navy Captain Gene Moran on the Houthi threat in the Red Sea

S8 Ep37: Former US Navy Captain Gene Moran on the Houthi threat in the Red Sea

On today’s podcast, Chris is joined by Former US Navy Destroyer Captain Gene Moran to discuss the Houthi Threat in the Red Sea. In this episode, they look at the background of the Houthis, the threat that they pose, and how the US Navy and its allies are dealing with that threat. They then discuss life on a ship during a time of conflict and finish up with Gene explaining what more he thinks could be done to counter this threat. 

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[00:00:00] Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world.

[00:00:30] The world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics and intrigue. This podcast is produced and hosted

[00:00:36] by Chris Carr.

[00:00:37] On today's podcast I'm joined by former US Navy destroyer Captain Gene Moran to discuss

[00:00:43] the Hoofie threat in the Red Sea. In this episode we look at the background of the Hoofies,

[00:00:49] the threat that they pose and how the US Navy and its allies are dealing with that threat.

[00:00:54] Then we later on discuss life on a ship during a time of conflict and we finish up with

[00:00:59] Gene explaining what more he thinks could be done to counter this threat.

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[00:01:26] and I hope you enjoyed this episode. Take care.

[00:01:28] The opinions expressed by guests on secrets and spies do not necessarily represent those

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[00:01:50] Hello Gene Moran, welcome to the podcast. Hello Chris, good to be here.

[00:01:54] It's great to have you on us. If it's a benefit of our listeners please can you

[00:01:57] just tell us a little bit about yourself and your career in the US Navy.

[00:02:01] Sure, I spent 24 years in the US Navy driving ships and then commanding ships in the Navy.

[00:02:08] There's a saying that you're either at sea or in DC and so I had multiple Washington

[00:02:14] tours between my ship tours. At sea I commanded a cruiser and a destroyer.

[00:02:19] I commanded multi-ship operations in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf operated

[00:02:24] carriers. Assure I worked representing the Navy to Congress in a few different positions

[00:02:32] at very senior levels coordinating for the secretary and chief of naval operations with

[00:02:38] Congress. Fantastic. What were the ships that you commanded because the only US

[00:02:43] Naval ship I've ever been on was the USS Normandy back in what was that 1994 when it visited Portsmouth?

[00:02:49] Well I commanded a sister ship. Philippine Sea was CG-58. I also commanded USS Laboon DDG-58.

[00:02:58] They share the same number but a different ship class. As life would have it both ships are in

[00:03:04] the Red Sea as we speak operating and I've been on both ships as they did similar missions

[00:03:13] previously. Fantastic. Well today we're going to talk about the Houthi threat to international

[00:03:18] shipping and the US led efforts to counter that threat. So I'll start with a kind of broad question.

[00:03:23] Why is freedom of movement in the Red Sea important? Movement of commerce is really what it's all about

[00:03:29] and that is a major sea line of communication for shipment of goods. Billions of dollars of

[00:03:37] goods passed through the Suez Canal which was brought about as a way to save travel time

[00:03:46] to go around Africa. But that saves about 10 days of transit time if you're traveling from the

[00:03:53] far east to Europe and if you don't have free transit there that immediately translates to

[00:04:00] additional costs of those goods. Indeed and obviously we're at a time where costs already

[00:04:06] rising because of energy prices and so on and so those added costs do have a massive knock-on

[00:04:11] effect and I think I was even reading just the other day how it's actually having an effect

[00:04:15] on people even in the Middle East itself with costs and things. Well just from the transit costs

[00:04:20] for some commercial ships that may be hundreds of thousands of dollars per day. You know multiply

[00:04:27] that by 10 days of transit time by the number of ships. I mean it is thousands of ships.

[00:04:33] Most people have very little idea that so much of commerce moves by sea because it's the most

[00:04:39] cost-effective manner but obviously when people are obstructing those transit lanes it has more

[00:04:48] localized effect as well. People make decisions to be in the area or not and you know it affects

[00:04:56] lives, it affects local commerce and in this case it's affecting global commerce.

[00:05:03] Karen with another broad question. I was thinking about sort of the Middle East and sort of

[00:05:07] post-Afghanistan and obviously the Red Sea itself. What kind of strategic interests do the U.S. and

[00:05:12] its allies sort of have in that region? Well our interest for decades had been

[00:05:17] in protecting access to oil. The oil posture of the U.S. has changed dramatically in the last

[00:05:27] couple of decades with the introduction of fracking and access to oil that was not accessible

[00:05:34] previously but in a broader sense beyond that what was access to oil as a driver is just the

[00:05:44] regional stability. It's healthy to have world order where everyone can move around and

[00:05:52] engage in commerce. Now we have activity that is focused on I say we the United States

[00:06:00] and its allies are focused on activity to prevent the flow of arms and narcotics in the Middle East

[00:06:10] which are used for certainly nefarious purposes and the narcotics are used to fund those nefarious

[00:06:18] activities. Many would be surprised to know that the Coast Guard has the U.S. Coast Guard has

[00:06:23] quite a presence in the Middle East every day in addition to the naval presence and that is there

[00:06:32] specifically because they are expert at interdicting narcotics trafficking. I did not know that about

[00:06:38] the Coast Guard so basically you're saying you've got U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships in that area

[00:06:43] and they have sort of different skill sets is that right? Yes and different offensive and

[00:06:48] defensive capability as well. Yeah that's interesting yeah because obviously some Coast Guard

[00:06:53] ships are quite large you know they form a sort of U.S. Naval ship but especially commissioned for

[00:06:59] the Coast Guard. The what's over there now are specific Coast Guard ships they are not

[00:07:05] former Navy ships but if you think about the missions that you know a Coast Guard ship would

[00:07:12] not be doing offensive strike, ashore or operating in an integrated air defense mode they just

[00:07:21] don't have those sort of weapon systems. Very skilled at tracking and interdicting

[00:07:28] narcotics trafficking but integrated weapons systems is not their strength and that's not a

[00:07:35] knock on them it's just not central to their mission. Yeah that makes sense. So how does this

[00:07:40] sort of conflict with the Houthis affect regional stability? Well we have people who are influencing

[00:07:47] geopolitical scenarios that are not in authorized power. Houthis are a rebel force

[00:07:59] they're not elected they are trying to regain control for hundreds of years they were in control

[00:08:06] until about the 1960s or so and in the nineteen they were not the Houthis at the time they were

[00:08:14] a you know a form of Shiism but since the 80s or so they have established themselves as the Houthis

[00:08:24] to try to regain power. Right now we see parts of Yemen that are controlled and uncontrolled and

[00:08:34] the Houthis tend to be in the uncontrolled portions of the country. Yeah and they are

[00:08:40] considered a proxy of Iran aren't they? They are and they are one of several

[00:08:46] and so that certainly causes challenges when trying to figure out how to

[00:08:54] how to participate in the world order. Yeah you know we tend to see the military actions and

[00:09:01] the strikes that they're taking place in the last several months but

[00:09:05] you know there's a diplomatic side of the equation as well there's an intelligence

[00:09:10] aspect to this to just be monitoring what's going on but the and the economic considerations are real

[00:09:17] and it's to every nation's advantage to be able to engage in free commerce. Indeed indeed

[00:09:25] obviously there's been a lot kind of going on in the Red Sea with the Houthis. Are you able

[00:09:29] to kind of give us an overview of what the kind of current situation is and maybe if possible

[00:09:34] some numbers on some of the sort of drones and things that have been shot down I certainly

[00:09:38] believe at least a ship has been sunk it might be more than that. Yeah so that from a US perspective

[00:09:43] there's a US battle group in Dwight D Eisenhower battle group I have operated with them on multiple

[00:09:50] occasions and have overseen the air warfare picture for that battle group in a prior

[00:09:56] life while I was on active duty. The ships are joined by cruisers and destroyers of that

[00:10:03] battle group and what are known as independent deployers there are always a couple of ships that are

[00:10:10] sort of free floaters that can move between the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the

[00:10:17] Mediterranean and Red Sea depending on where the where the activity might be we have had an

[00:10:23] anti-piracy force there for decades now operating with along with allies. In the Red Sea we are

[00:10:30] joined by allied ships that have different capabilities and I do think it's important to recognize that

[00:10:39] multiple allied partners are trying to participate alongside us just because they don't have the

[00:10:46] same types of ships and capability doesn't mean that they don't have the will and much like the

[00:10:52] Coast Guard can integrate in certain military operations other nations navies can integrate

[00:10:59] with us as well and it does help from a logistics perspective and sometimes presence

[00:11:05] matters and just being visible to that opponent matters and so to the degree that those allies

[00:11:14] are able to multiply our force number that's helpful. You talk about numbers you know we

[00:11:22] have not seen this sort of activity where so many targets and threats are coming at us at

[00:11:29] one time and it's not that we haven't imagined it and haven't trained for it because we have and I

[00:11:35] think we're seeing in the response the US response that it's been superb the success rate in

[00:11:45] dealing with the threats coming at the US ships I think it's been spectacular.

[00:11:49] That's because those ships are trained in a very deliberate manner to deal with very large

[00:11:57] scale threats before they ever go into that environment. It doesn't mean that we ever

[00:12:04] expect to fully see what we're seeing and we're learning from what we're seeing because some of

[00:12:09] it is not quite as expected the mix of sophistication of the drones,

[00:12:15] the mixture with the ballistic missiles. I'm not sure the degree to which anyone can fully prepare

[00:12:23] for that but the fact that the US response has been so thorough I think it's pretty impressive.

[00:12:31] Those commercial ships that have taken hits you know you can only do so much there's geometry

[00:12:37] involved here and how one defends ships and you know that becomes a math and physics

[00:12:44] challenge that hasn't been figured out yet. Yeah your US naval ships have they not sort of run out

[00:12:49] of ammunition and rockets to kind of counter that threat because it seems to be a large volume of

[00:12:54] things going on out there? Well there is a very deliberate dialogue happening now about do we

[00:13:01] have the right weapon systems in place for this defense. The Navy has been working on

[00:13:08] for years directed energy weapons both lasers and microwave systems that are probably much better

[00:13:18] suited for this type of threat so we are firing fairly expensive missiles at fairly inexpensive

[00:13:26] threats but in doing so we are protecting multi-billion dollar ships and the lives on board.

[00:13:33] So I think that's a false debate right now about we fire a two million dollar missile

[00:13:40] at a twenty thousand dollar threat. It's always going to be an expensive defensive system

[00:13:48] but the Navy has known that it needed to move into directed energy. I think we're seeing a

[00:13:55] rapid acceleration now not coincidentally in January the head of the US Navy surface forces

[00:14:01] at the surface Navy Association annual symposium said it very bluntly we've been working on this for

[00:14:08] 10 years it's time to accelerate this and to his credit he doesn't own the budget and all the

[00:14:14] budgeting decisions associated with it but he's responsible for those ships that are forward

[00:14:19] deployed. The budgeting process that gets us to those decisions is incredibly complex and there

[00:14:26] are all sorts of competing factors that can delay or accelerate which systems get the investment.

[00:14:34] The Houthis seem to have some quite sophisticated equipment it seems to be drones and certain

[00:14:39] types of missiles do we know where they're kind of getting that from? There's no doubt that Iran

[00:14:44] is supporting them. I think there's two aspects to it one is the flow of funding

[00:14:50] that allows for it to happen the other is the flow of technology and the sharing of information.

[00:14:58] There are reports of an Iranian ship or ships supporting with targeting information I will say

[00:15:06] to pinpoint a specific target at sea requires highly sophisticated integrated capability.

[00:15:15] I think we've seen probably the peak of what the Houthis have available to them in terms of

[00:15:21] sophistication but you don't do that sort of targeting without high quality data.

[00:15:29] So they clearly have access to that. What are we doing about that I think is a fair question

[00:15:37] Vice Admiral Brad Cooper and the former fifth fleet commander was on 60 minutes

[00:15:42] in a fairly open conversation about the fact that the U.S. could certainly do more to Iran

[00:15:50] to stop this but that's not a military decision that's that's a political decision and I

[00:15:58] comment to others about the stated concern that we don't want this to grow into a broader

[00:16:06] conflict. I contend we've been in a broader conflict for quite some time now. We have U.S.

[00:16:14] forces in most Middle East countries for a variety of reasons Syria Jordan Iraq Kuwait Afghanistan

[00:16:24] Pakistan UAE Horn of Africa I mean we have a presence there and and in various ways

[00:16:34] we have been subject to dozens if not now hundreds of attacks across many of these countries. So

[00:16:44] we're already in a broader conflict we're just not calling it such and I think we should be

[00:16:52] calculating differently what would the impact be if we escalated with Iran to send a more clear

[00:17:01] message and that could take a number of forms. You know if we were to sink an Iranian ship that

[00:17:08] we suspect is targeting that's a pretty loud signal much much like Ukraine has done with with Russia

[00:17:17] that's a that's a serious cost to any country it takes years to rebuild that capability

[00:17:25] and it could it could send a signal that's just one example. Yeah yeah with that Iranian spy ship I

[00:17:31] believe it suffered an electronic attack not long ago was that like a kind of warning because it

[00:17:37] might next time be shot out by something sort of more more sort of fatal should we say. Yeah I

[00:17:43] don't claim to have direct knowledge of that particular situation but it's uh it's not uncommon

[00:17:49] for the US to signal things in such a way that hey we we've got your number and we can do this

[00:17:56] anytime of day so tread carefully. Yeah and what options are there to deal with that ship other

[00:18:04] ways to sort of jam it and so on and you know sort of stop it sort of abilities without having to

[00:18:09] necessarily resort to sinking it? Certainly ideally we could affect it in port before it went to

[00:18:18] and and you know certainly those sorts of plans are always in consideration so I have served in the

[00:18:27] J3 of the Joint Staff where global operations are considered I've been a part of military planning

[00:18:35] at the theater level and at the operational level and those sort of options are always on

[00:18:42] the table how could we send a signal and prevent this from ever escalating that that could still

[00:18:49] happen those ships have to return to port at some time there are ways to disable ships with

[00:18:56] electronic means with means to impact their propulsion those would be soft kill sort of

[00:19:05] options to use a term of art there it's not always about the kinetic and sinking them to the

[00:19:11] bottom but the the morale impact of sinking a ship is unmistakable that that can send a

[00:19:21] much stronger signal that is irrefutable. Yeah you were talking for a few moments ago about

[00:19:27] this situation could spiral with Iran so I suppose my thought is sort of what options are there on

[00:19:34] the table that can both send a direct signal to Iran but not necessarily let things sort of

[00:19:39] spiral to a point where it leads to a full head-on-head conflict with them.

[00:19:43] Well I've been in the room leading congressional delegations in the UAE where

[00:19:53] people who run banks were told fairly directly hey we understand what's happening here

[00:20:01] and we know you understand what's happening here there are ways to freeze assets

[00:20:07] that can have a an incredibly debilitating effect I think we have been a bit schizophrenic with our

[00:20:18] approach to those sort of tools and there are further steps that could be taken

[00:20:26] where when you when you do cut off the flow of funding things slow down dramatically.

[00:20:32] Indeed I was thinking about the the Falklands war where Britain used MI-6 to sort of buy up the

[00:20:39] exorcist missiles that were being used to shoot at British ships I don't know there's any options

[00:20:44] on the table to somehow disrupt the weapons supply or buy up the weapons that the Houthis might want

[00:20:50] or want to use. Yeah you know I think that's a actually a reasonable diplomatic tool and some

[00:20:56] some may not see that as diplomacy but it's it's not much different than us distributing cash on

[00:21:03] the ground in Afghanistan or Iraq to win friends and influence people that is a tool that we are

[00:21:13] uniquely able to execute. The degree to which those sort of plans are ever discussed openly

[00:21:23] you know you might hear it anecdotally I don't claim direct knowledge of interaction with with the CIA

[00:21:30] I think it is generally understood that our special operations forces are

[00:21:36] intertwined with various paramilitary operations and that's as designed and there is a specific law

[00:21:44] that controls how that's done but those sort of activities can shape the battlefield so to

[00:21:50] speak. Yeah yeah so one interesting question is how do we balance of long-term geostrategic and

[00:21:56] diplomatic goals in the Middle East with short-term immediate needs when it comes to dealing with the

[00:22:00] Houthis? Yeah you're hitting on what I think is the problem of our times certainly from a U.S.

[00:22:08] perspective we seem to have lost sight of what we think our place in the world should be.

[00:22:15] I say we as the citizens of the United States the government I believe generally feels that it has

[00:22:23] a leadership position and then there are debates about how to exercise that leadership but there is

[00:22:29] a growing portion of our population that is less well informed about the history of the post-World

[00:22:39] War II world order such that they may have lost some of the connection to why some of these

[00:22:46] relationships and alliances came about to begin with and so it might look easy to save money by

[00:22:54] not spending on some of these things that cost a lot of money and pulling back to be more isolationist.

[00:23:01] The cost of that is that the vacuum will fill. There aren't other countries who have the resources

[00:23:09] to be able to be forward deployed and to be as ever present as the U.S. has grown to be. It's just

[00:23:19] a function of the resources and our method of government that has brought us to this place

[00:23:28] but we have a growing portion of the population that questions that position in the world order

[00:23:35] and we may find ourselves relearning lessons that were painfully learned in the 30s and 40s.

[00:23:44] Yeah indeed it does seem there's sort of a disconnect these days. In the U.K. and when I

[00:23:52] grew up we kind of traditionally have seen the U.S. as the policeman of the world and I

[00:23:58] as the best way to put it but certainly Europe is very dependent on American support and I feel

[00:24:04] like a lot of people sort of I don't know if it's my generation or younger have sort of lost

[00:24:10] touch with that sort of sense of responsibility. I feel like there's some sort of pushback

[00:24:15] against that idea. Well in general Americans don't travel abroad in general it's a minority that do

[00:24:23] and it is a fact that the majority of Americans don't read a single book in a given year. They

[00:24:32] don't complete a single book in a given year. I had the good fortune to travel extensively as

[00:24:38] a congressional liaison around the world. I've been to over 60 countries it has enhanced my

[00:24:45] perspective of what options are out there. Something that is sort of seared in my mind

[00:24:53] are the multiple visits to American battle monuments cemeteries that exist across Europe

[00:25:00] and when we would go to those cemeteries where American dead are buried on foreign

[00:25:08] soil. Those communities around the cemetery they remember vividly what that experience was about

[00:25:17] and it's we're losing them but there are people still living who shed tears describing the story

[00:25:27] of what their life was like in those moments. You know I pray that we don't have to revisit that

[00:25:35] but I fear it's a possibility if the US were to disengage. I think there's some very loose talk

[00:25:45] about who pays the bill for NATO and why that's important to us and to me it's just silliness

[00:25:54] and ignorance of how it came about. Yeah indeed and I think I wonder if the sort of drawdown after

[00:26:04] the Cold War in the 1990s a lot of sort of wrapping up of like bases in Europe and things has led

[00:26:10] people to a false sense of complacency and feeling that pieces are given because I don't think

[00:26:15] nowadays I don't feel like pieces are given at all. I think there was a false message

[00:26:21] that took hold that there could be a peace dividend that the wall came down and we had won

[00:26:30] against those forces and now we can focus on our domestic concerns and it's just not the way the

[00:26:39] world works and unfortunately we've made some strategic blunders the movement in response to 9-11 by the US

[00:26:52] forces to move from chasing down Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to suddenly saying we need to go

[00:27:01] to Iraq. That was a huge strategic blunder that cost us 20 years and trillions of dollars and worse

[00:27:11] it chipped away at Americans confidence in their government to make sound decisions on the global

[00:27:21] stage and so two decades of war has affected multiple generations of citizens and how they view

[00:27:32] what the US position should be in the world. Yeah and I really think the Gulf War, so the second

[00:27:37] Iraq war very much fed into anti-Americanism which I think then countries like Russia have

[00:27:43] been able to capitalize on with disinformation efforts and I think it's a real shame because

[00:27:48] those disinformation efforts are now really influencing maybe people younger than myself

[00:27:53] these days. The speed and quantity of information good and bad that moves around the world has

[00:28:02] accelerated some of these problems no doubt about it. It's very difficult to understand on one

[00:28:12] level and control in another level and unfortunately the United States has a tremendous capacity to

[00:28:21] overestimate its capabilities to influence and shape things and there are other very bright people

[00:28:29] around the world who also know how to use technology and capabilities or bring about

[00:28:35] capabilities and sometimes we just have this false sense of superiority that we've got the

[00:28:43] right answer and why wouldn't everybody want the answer that we want and it just doesn't work that

[00:28:48] way. Yeah one wider question you were talking about travel and the importance of it earlier do you

[00:28:53] think that sort of travel and worldliness is a key to kind of maybe getting past some of that

[00:28:59] mentality of people's days sort of falling for foreign propaganda? I think it can help.

[00:29:04] I don't know exactly how to get at that one. I will say that opportunities for military service

[00:29:12] are what allowed it for me for many people in the United States as well off as we are it's not

[00:29:19] seen as something that many can afford to do certainly not on the scale that I've been able

[00:29:24] to through my government work. It requires a commitment requires you know a level of effort

[00:29:33] and resources that many people don't prioritize. It doesn't mean that you can't learn it through books

[00:29:40] or other forms of video entertainment you know documentaries for example but we tend to self

[00:29:49] select to the easiest and quickest thing and we now in this you know day of social media our

[00:29:57] attention span is so short that to sit down to learn something new that takes real discipline.

[00:30:06] Yeah indeed indeed well just throwing a little bit on your experience with the Navy it'd be

[00:30:10] remiss of me not to ask you about what it's like being on a naval ship in a situation

[00:30:16] you know dealing with missiles coming in at you and trying to sort of counter threats

[00:30:20] and also what it's like to be in a command of a ship like that you know what is sort of the

[00:30:24] day to day sort of processes like in those sort of situations. Yeah there are a few layers to that

[00:30:30] so I don't pretend to have endured the type of threat environment that the ships are in right now

[00:30:37] I have in a synthetic manner which is how we how we prepare for these things

[00:30:42] to be able to deal with the decision-making apparatus but a couple of points about ship

[00:30:48] life and command ships operate in a very structured way there's a place for everything

[00:30:55] everything's in its place there are procedures that are followed there is training at the individual

[00:31:02] level at the group level at a ship level at a multi ship level and at a battle group level

[00:31:08] so you spend a lot of time training on how to do things a correct way there's a right way

[00:31:16] a wrong way in the navy way and and and it's imperative that people understand and be qualified

[00:31:22] for the positions for the roles that they're in and there are ways to create methods of

[00:31:29] interchangeability but a ship runs 24 hours a day it provides its own power it provides

[00:31:36] its own water it has to be replenished with fuel and provisions periodically

[00:31:43] but it's a 24-hour operation where there's a watch team driving the ship there's a watch team

[00:31:49] responsible for weapon systems the captain is always on watch but never standing a watch so to

[00:31:57] speak and so you know for me the day would start between six and seven a.m. and it would go until

[00:32:06] 11 at night typically depending on what evolutions were happening i i may get calls

[00:32:11] through the night from watch teams and you know they have certain parameters within which they

[00:32:18] they make decisions there are some things that are command decisions

[00:32:23] there are very very very few instantaneous command decisions that have to be made

[00:32:28] but the ships that are out there right now in the Red Sea are facing

[00:32:33] many of those instantaneous decisions so they they are typically trying to control the battle

[00:32:40] space with time and time time is what allows for a decision to take place and so you can get your

[00:32:48] decision timelines pretty darn tight you know down to seconds where there are you know sort of go

[00:32:55] no-go decisions and so i mentioned parameters there can be parameters set where the the

[00:33:01] captain doesn't have to be in the the combat information center to to signal an authorization

[00:33:10] to fire a weapon in defense the tactical action officer is there to make that decision but

[00:33:16] that round-the-clock nature of operations can be quite tiring over time and so sleep management

[00:33:22] is an issue fatigue is an issue periodically you know ships do need to sort of take a break

[00:33:28] and come offline for a couple of days what we're facing right now we talked about weapons earlier

[00:33:36] these vertically launched weapons do require going ashore to replace them in large numbers

[00:33:44] so this is public information the destroyers have you know over over 90 missiles on board but

[00:33:51] if you're shooting dozens it doesn't take long before you get to that 50 threshold where

[00:33:57] we typically would be looking for where's the next round coming from

[00:34:02] those ships in the Red Sea are going over to Gibraltar to get reloaded so if you do the map

[00:34:09] there it's about 20 hours to transit the Suez Canal it's three days across the Mediterranean

[00:34:14] two days to reload three days to come back 20 hours suddenly you've burned a week

[00:34:19] going offline to go reload and so that logistics tail becomes problematic

[00:34:26] and so the Navy would like to get out of that when the ships were designed it was thought that those

[00:34:32] missiles could be reloaded at sea that proved to be inherently unsafe and the Navy has not done it

[00:34:39] ever there are systems being developed that will allow for shorter timelines because that

[00:34:46] scenario I just painted for the Mediterranean if you take that to the Pacific the numbers are much

[00:34:51] much bigger and it's uh it's weeks to cross the Pacific and we don't have those missiles

[00:34:59] pre-positioned everywhere they're in certain key locations that most most people could figure out

[00:35:05] so I'm giving you maybe maybe more than you wanted but that's good I like it

[00:35:11] the you know the typical daily routine is it's a full day the crew is on a watch rotation

[00:35:18] usually three sections meaning four on eight off that's enough where you can you can typically get

[00:35:26] five hours of sleep there at a single time which is that's pretty good

[00:35:31] but you know there are collateral duties associated with most sailors on board they have

[00:35:38] responsibility for something other than just standing watch yes yeah things going to be polished

[00:35:43] and cleaned and so on well you know that there's a reason for the cleanliness uh issue and uh

[00:35:49] you know most ships are quite clean I think anybody would be would be proud to walk aboard

[00:35:55] a warship from any country you typically see the same thing that's just you know good order

[00:36:00] and discipline and health standards you know demand that I loved it I entered the Navy thinking

[00:36:08] I would spend four years and I spent 24 it was it was incredibly exciting and fulfilling

[00:36:16] work and and I love the discipline and the structure of it and wouldn't have traded it yeah

[00:36:23] yeah thank you for showing that one question she just popped into my head we were talking about

[00:36:27] cleanliness just now and I was just thinking of I think it was the was it the sinking of

[00:36:31] the Moscow and there was some speculation about that certain standards in the Russian Navy

[00:36:38] weren't being adhered to about I think it was fire safety that might have led to the ship sinking

[00:36:43] basically yeah we've and we've understood this about the the the Russian Navy and the Soviet

[00:36:49] Navy before it that what they lack is an enlisted force of leadership that the U.S. and

[00:36:59] the British Navy have and and and there are other western navies that have this as well but that

[00:37:05] that enlisted force of technical skill that also has leadership abilities makes a tremendous

[00:37:12] difference in the ability to have a top-down structure of continuity in how things are done

[00:37:20] and and when the crunch is on the command and control is there to to support what's needed

[00:37:27] when things are centralized and only the boss can make decisions then people are not empowered

[00:37:35] and they don't take the initiative and they don't learn and they they're afraid to act and so it's

[00:37:41] very evident when you look at video of how that ship responded to an incoming threat and we've

[00:37:48] seen it multiple times now with the unmanned surface vessel attacks there's no defensive

[00:37:56] posture and and so other people learn from that other other nations learn from that we see wow they

[00:38:01] really aren't nearly as ready as one would think and this this has been a an issue I think with

[00:38:09] many of our adversaries in the past we used to refer to the the 10-foot Russians you know there's

[00:38:15] they're so big and powerful until we figured out they weren't I think we're we're making similar

[00:38:21] assessments of the Chinese capability right now they are not the same as as the Russians but

[00:38:27] but they're not 10 feet tall our concern about escalating with Iran Iran is not 10 feet tall

[00:38:34] there there are no 10-foot tall Iranians they they these problems can be approached but

[00:38:42] but sometimes I think we need to use that sort of fear factor to help drive resources

[00:38:50] and protect resources on certain programs our US Defense Department budget is $850

[00:38:58] billion a year there are a lot of other interests that would like to get a piece of that and

[00:39:04] we have this ongoing debate for the last 15 years in the US about defense versus

[00:39:09] non-defense spending and there are legitimate concerns about domestic issues and social programs

[00:39:17] and and other ways that that money could be could be spent but it does come at a at a cost to the

[00:39:23] international position and our national security indeed and those are important things well let's

[00:39:30] take a quick break and then we'll be right back

[00:39:51] a wider question so we've seen especially if Ukraine and increased use of drones and

[00:39:56] obviously with the Houthis as well and they've had a devastating effectiveness against of naval

[00:40:01] and civilian ships and I was wondering what you may think the future of the US Navy is sort of

[00:40:05] looking like now in the age of the drone warfare is changing before our eyes no doubt about it

[00:40:11] and it has been we just haven't been able to see it as as as readily and and by that I mean

[00:40:17] cyber warfare is with us and has been with us for for decades now there there are things that

[00:40:23] happen that we never are told about that may may shape behaviors and outcomes that that is a

[00:40:32] non-lethal way to to send signals the recognition of we now politely call them uncrewed vehicles

[00:40:41] the recognition that uncrewed underwater vehicles and uncrewed surface vessels are a less expensive

[00:40:48] way to move forward we've been working we the US Navy has been working for some time to integrate

[00:40:57] autonomous underwater vehicles and uncrewed underwater vehicles with our subsea domain

[00:41:05] efforts you know we have a very robust submarine capability but we initially wanted to see that

[00:41:12] we could integrate those on uuvs and auvs with that environment control of water space is a is a

[00:41:21] particular challenge because you you don't have all of the visual cues that you do in the air

[00:41:29] the Navy moved quickly trying to ask congress for a lot of money a few years ago and congress said

[00:41:37] hey show us your plan before we're just going to throw money at this we don't want to start

[00:41:40] a program that's not ready the Navy stepped back they sort of developed a concept of ops that's

[00:41:46] that's unfolding now and we're seeing production this week i'm at home in Florida today but i was

[00:41:53] just in DC for the sea airspace symposium the largest maritime symposium in the world

[00:42:00] there's no doubt that uncrewed is is the future and it's happening underwater and on the surface

[00:42:10] all sorts of smaller surface drones are being developed you know we learned during the wars in

[00:42:20] the Middle East that we you know we could arm a predator drone in in the in the air that was a

[00:42:25] that was a precursor to some of these things that we are now figuring out what sort of

[00:42:30] payloads need to be on what sort of trucks for a lack for lack of a better word but it's just

[00:42:36] a matter of what what are the capabilities that we that we need is it a sensor is it a weapon is it

[00:42:42] just surveillance or presence and those things are now being very well integrated yeah yeah

[00:42:50] um i may be wrong here but i think is it the the zamelt class ship which was this sort of

[00:42:56] experimentation with a sort of a stealth ship but with more autonomy is that right the zoom

[00:43:02] zoom all that zoom all yeah named named after a former chief of naval operations yeah i've read

[00:43:07] there's been some sort of controversy around that type of ship and some people are saying it's

[00:43:11] become a waste of money i don't know you know sort of what your thoughts inside that type of ship

[00:43:16] are in the current navy strategy well it there were two at one point there were two have been

[00:43:23] more of them when at the time when the cost of the ship started to escalate to be above

[00:43:29] three billion per ship that was at the time deemed to be an outrageous sum of money and

[00:43:36] we made a mistake by thinking that we could move more quickly by bringing innovation to a platform

[00:43:47] before it was fully ready there's a there's a term for that it's it's escaping me right now

[00:43:54] but but uh we now insist that capabilities be be ready to be brought forward to a platform

[00:44:03] it it's not so funny but today an arleigh burke destroyer costs over two billion dollars so that

[00:44:09] that three billion dollar figure seems almost almost quaint we have figured out some things to

[00:44:16] do with this ship some of which involves you know use of an electric gun so to speak where you can

[00:44:26] fire weapons very far inland from from very far offshore in a way that a traditional gun could not

[00:44:33] could not do there are other weapon systems being demonstrated it is a ship that has far fewer

[00:44:43] sailors on board than a than a traditional ship but we've been experimenting with that for a number

[00:44:49] of years with the littoral combat ship the two variants of that ship class that was a troubled

[00:44:57] program but there was learning that took place about what's required to operate a ship when

[00:45:05] you introduce technology and various levels of autonomy you can reduce the the numbers required

[00:45:11] it will never be what a commercial ship is where you can run a super tanker with you know fewer than

[00:45:16] 20 people uh it it won't be that because there are there are too many other mission sets required

[00:45:24] along the way besides just getting from point A to point B thank you for that so if you were in

[00:45:29] a situation where you know you're in a position of authority where you could sort of deal

[00:45:33] with the Houthi situation what do you think Koodle should be done to counter the Houthis

[00:45:39] that currently isn't being done i've been puzzled that the senior diplomat for the U.S.

[00:45:48] is too often our CIA director if you look at who's who's doing the real negotiating in

[00:45:55] in uh Gaza and in the Hamas situation it's Bill Burns I understand he's a particularly skilled

[00:46:03] individual but he's not the Secretary of State and I think we are firefighting with our diplomacy

[00:46:12] right now that's that's how it appears to me uh it doesn't mean that there aren't communications

[00:46:17] happening at the local level with ambassadors but they convey a different level of gravitas

[00:46:27] than does the president's most senior cabinet secretary yeah so I think diplomacy there's

[00:46:35] certainly more that could be done I think we have been a little erratic in our engagement with Iran with

[00:46:45] you know in the Obama administration we we handed over a billion dollars in cash

[00:46:50] where we thought that was going to go I who knows that that was an effort to do something different

[00:46:59] and I think it it failed I've talked about the flow of funds I think the you know access to the

[00:47:09] Swift system is something that could be more rigidly controlled you know we see Russia still

[00:47:16] has pretty ready access to that system in terms of direct kinetic strikes at Iran I don't think

[00:47:27] that's what we're talking about here but if you were to sink a ship or take out a capability that

[00:47:36] that matters that that does send a signal now we took out a a terrorist leader a few years ago

[00:47:44] and some would say that that that was stirring the hornets nest well you know if you want to get

[00:47:51] rid of the hornets you do have to stir the nest yeah and so there we have not in the US prepared

[00:48:00] the citizenry to understand why this matters and we've talked about some of the more peaceful

[00:48:07] reasons that in the big picture we want these things to take place we want commerce we want

[00:48:11] security we have to make people understand that you have to make Americans understand why does this

[00:48:19] why does this matter to me I don't think we're doing well at that sort of strategic messaging

[00:48:23] yeah yeah is there anything could be done that would improve that strategic messaging do you

[00:48:28] think or improve that understanding well you know I'm not wild about commenting on our two choices

[00:48:36] for who might be president but we have a system in place that allows less than the best to advance

[00:48:49] to the final round and that's frustrating and and it works its way down at the local level

[00:48:58] you know state and even county level in the United States and some of these decisions about who

[00:49:03] can even be on a ballot and how does one get there to me it's a bit murky and you know I'm a Ph.D. in

[00:49:11] public policy and I've studied political science and I teach public policy at a university but

[00:49:17] but the average citizen does not have that understanding of how the how the ballot process

[00:49:23] works for someone to even advance that there's a perception that it's just about money and

[00:49:27] whoever can raise the most money will will advance that's one part of the of the challenge

[00:49:34] so we need to have better people in government more thoughtful people in government

[00:49:44] who are participating in some of these decisions and and frankly we have some

[00:49:51] fairly uninformed people in fairly senior positions who are able to exercise influence

[00:49:59] over outcomes that is beyond their understanding and until that changes and in our country that

[00:50:08] changes with votes but until that changes we will continue to revisit this yeah well last

[00:50:14] question really is there anything else that's important to you that you would like to add

[00:50:17] before we wrap up today well I work in an area of government now I advise defense companies and

[00:50:25] how to how to best serve the government customer and I help them get to dramatic outcomes by my

[00:50:34] understanding of a very complex process I've had exposure to it from multiple perspectives

[00:50:40] as an active duty officer working at senior levels in dod as a corporate lobbyist working

[00:50:46] for a large defense company and for the last 10 years I've been advising smaller defense companies

[00:50:52] who don't necessarily have that access to the to the same information I mentioned I teach public

[00:51:02] policy I'm an adjunct professor at Florida State and I I believe very strongly that we need

[00:51:09] people to aspire to serve in government we need very smart and dedicated people to aspire to

[00:51:15] serve in government not just the elected positions but the the unelected positions it takes

[00:51:23] committed people to support a government and and to work in it and to fully participate

[00:51:31] and I fear that you know there's a generation that that may be getting a bad taste of what

[00:51:38] that could be like and why that you know maybe it doesn't pay as well as you as you could make

[00:51:42] in a in a in a higher higher tech job or or something where you're more directly involved

[00:51:49] in innovation we tend to promote the making of money as early as you can in as big a number

[00:51:58] as you can as as the key to success and I think most of the wealthiest people would say that

[00:52:03] that's that's not really what they think makes them successful but but but it's a challenge so

[00:52:10] you know what would I like to see as you know I'm a 61 year old man who's been at this for a while now

[00:52:15] I I hope that our following generations can see that there's a need for them to participate in

[00:52:24] whatever way whether it's just being an informed voter or participating in government

[00:52:30] there are opportunities to make a difference and you know we don't have to wait

[00:52:35] for some external force to rally us to that to that call for duty indeed

[00:52:42] indeed external force being a foreign power or alien power if you look at some movies we have

[00:52:47] out these days or AI or AI yes well thank you so much for your time say where where can

[00:52:56] listeners find out more about you and your work well thanks for that Chris I've enjoyed the

[00:53:00] conversation I have a website gene moran.com and it talks all about my my work my books

[00:53:07] if I speak to a lot of different groups of people who would like me to speak I

[00:53:13] have sort of a side role in explaining and interpreting what's happening for people

[00:53:17] and try to make it understandable as to why why some of these things matter at a more local level

[00:53:24] but it's all there and I'm happy to communicate with anybody

[00:53:27] fantastic well thank you for your time today you bet good to be here

[00:53:57] thanks for listening this is secrets and spies

[00:54:27] you

[00:54:57] you