S8 Ep26: US Airstrikes in Iraq & Syria with Phillip Smyth

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[00:01:12] This is Secrets and Spies.

[00:01:14] Secrets and Spies

[00:01:27] Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics and intrigue.

[00:01:34] This episode is presented by Matt Fulton and produced by Chris Carr.

[00:01:39] Hello everyone and welcome back to Secrets and Spies.

[00:01:41] On today's episode I'm speaking once again with Philip Smythe.

[00:01:44] Previously a Sora Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy from 2018 to 2021.

[00:01:49] Philip is one of the leading researchers studying Iranian-backed militia groups in the Middle East.

[00:01:54] He returns to the podcast today to impact the January 28th drone attack against a US military outpost in Jordan.

[00:02:00] That killed three service members and the resulting round of airstrikes beginning on February 2nd.

[00:02:05] Targeting militias believed to have been responsible.

[00:02:08] Philip gives his take on the degree of Iranian control over these militias,

[00:02:12] analyzes the effectiveness of the US response thus far and tells us what, if anything, can be done to deter future attacks.

[00:02:18] As always a couple of housekeeping notes first.

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[00:02:37] Thanks for listening and I hope you enjoy our conversation.

[00:02:39] The opinions expressed by guests on secrets and spies do not necessarily represent those of the producers and sponsors of this podcast.

[00:03:00] Philip Smith, thanks for coming back on the pod on such short notice buddy.

[00:03:04] It's always good to have you, which could be under better circumstances, but that's the business we're in.

[00:03:10] The nature of the beast.

[00:03:11] Yeah, really.

[00:03:12] So I asked you to come back on today to unpack the attack on our service members in Jordan and discuss some of the follow-on retaliation that the US Air Force executed just.

[00:03:27] So we're recording this on Monday.

[00:03:29] The first round of airstrikes as of this recording was on Friday.

[00:03:33] And we're going to talk about that all in a bit.

[00:03:35] Before we get going though, for anyone who might have missed the first couple episodes since October that you've been on, tell us a bit about you and your work.

[00:03:44] Okay, well my name is Philip Smith.

[00:03:47] You can follow a lot of my work.

[00:03:49] I put a lot of it up on Twitter, but if you Google my name it's 2L's SMYTH.

[00:03:54] I follow Iranian backed organizations.

[00:03:57] I mean, you may hear the term proxy thrown around or Iranian backed militias like Shia militias.

[00:04:04] There are other groups that are not Shia.

[00:04:06] Sometimes they have different ideological beliefs from what the Iranians promote.

[00:04:11] But in general it's this wide network of proxy organizations that Iran sponsors and pushes.

[00:04:19] And I tend to follow those guys and I've been doing that for what over 15 years now did a lot of early work when it was not really an issue that many people cared about and just kind of kept doing it since then.

[00:04:36] I've worked at a number of major think tanks in Washington DC. I've lived in the Middle East and I regularly engage and engage a lot of Shia militia members, commanders follow a lot of their their activities.

[00:04:53] And it's been a very, very long process and kind of a long kind of, let's call it like an institutional kind of growth that I've tried to promote for following a lot of these groups.

[00:05:05] So that's essentially what I do, the long and short of it.

[00:05:08] Thank you for that. And as I've said on here before, I think you're kind of like the guy for this.

[00:05:14] So it's as always it's good to have you on when something flares up regarding these groups here.

[00:05:20] So, okay, so to get us started off here, I'm going to give us a few background notes on the attack itself in Jordan and how we got to this specific round here.

[00:05:30] So on January 28th, an attack drone launched by a Shia militia struck the living quarters of the US logistical support base tower 22 and rook bond northeast Jordan near the tribe or area with Iraq and Syria.

[00:05:43] The outpost is part of a network of US bases in the region established in 2015 to support an ongoing advise and assist mission for Kurdish forces combating ISIS remnants in the area.

[00:05:53] The attack killed three US service members who are asleep in their tents at the time, all subsequently identified as belonging to the 718th Engineer Company, the US Army Reserve unit at Fort Moore, Georgia, 47 others were reportedly injured.

[00:06:07] The Islamic resistance in Iraq, an umbrella term encompassing several Iranian-backed militia groups claimed responsibility later that day.

[00:06:15] Since Hamas's October 7th attacks against Israel in the beginning of the Gaza war, Iranian linked groups struck US and coalition forces throughout the Middle East on 160 occasions injuring approximately 70 personnel.

[00:06:27] The US retaliated for these incidents only eight times previously.

[00:06:32] So, Philip, before we get into the US response to these attacks, if you can tell us a bit, any kind of background on this group calling itself the Islamic resistance in Iraq, who they are, and any kind of chatter that you've been monitoring amongst these guys that perhaps preceded the attack itself.

[00:06:52] Sure. So, I think we need a little bit more context with a lot of this. I mean, it's interesting, you know, how I'm seeing a lot of the reporting coming out.

[00:07:01] Just kind of this accepted reality. Oh, this, this Islamic resistance and they're connected with a bunch of militias. Okay. And what does that mean?

[00:07:08] Since 2020. And this is when the United States killed two rather prominent leaders in kind of the Iranian proxy machinery, meaning the guys really managing and growing and creating a lot of these proxy networks that they're that the Iranians are using.

[00:07:25] The first and foremost of them was Qasam Soleimani who is a leading general for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could force the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[00:07:35] I mean, think of that as kind of the central hub for the Iranians when they are projecting and creating managing and controlling a lot of the proxy groups are using them.

[00:07:45] And then his lieutenant who was an Iraqi, his actually his mother was Iranian but he was an Iraqi named al-Muhandis.

[00:07:53] And he was a prominent leader in what's called al-Hashd al-Shaba, which you might see it in the news in English. It's the popular mobilization forces or popular mobilization units.

[00:08:06] That's a collective of primarily Shia militias that are Iraqi government sponsored but they are dominated by Iranian controlled groups and Iranian backed groups.

[00:08:18] So when those two were killed, the Iranians had a strategy that came forth in Iraq, which was to create front groups. And these front groups would sometimes execute attacks.

[00:08:31] They would do different threats against American forces. They would just attack American forces, but it was also attacking perceived and very real American allies and kind of other partners in the region that went for the Kurds at times.

[00:08:47] It was allied states or at least partner states like the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi. There were threats and sometimes there were attacks that were the claim that they had launched.

[00:09:01] So you had these front groups kind of operating that way. And when I say a front group, imagine it's imagine I've already established an organization and then I'm claiming responsibility using another another name.

[00:09:14] Like a nom de plume in literature or a nom de gar, a name of war that I've just kind of slapped on the top. Now, part of that, you're probably sitting there thinking, well, why would they go through all that trouble if they've already have like a million different militias that are out there and doing all that?

[00:09:31] And I would make the argument that it's a form of kind of implausible plausible deniability, you know, it gives just enough for a policymakers who doesn't really want to act like enough kind of leeway, an American policymakers enough leeway to go.

[00:09:45] Oh, it's kind of confusing. I guess we don't know what to do here. And I know who knows.

[00:09:49] I just want to make it very, very clear, though, that it was quite clear from the beginning which organizations were being used by the right specific malicious specific Iraqi Shia militias.

[00:10:00] That were being used to kind of populate this front strategy.

[00:10:05] So I guess going to kind of the current setup, you know, you mentioned the Islamic resistance in Iraq. The Arabic name is al-Mukal-Malis, let me feel the rock.

[00:10:15] To clarify something else. I mean, you're going to love this with a million different names and, you know, a lot of repeating names and a lot of stuff like this.

[00:10:22] Like you have to be permanently on and also kind of operating in a lot of binary code to turn it all down.

[00:10:32] The Islamic resistance in Iraq is actually quite a common, quite a common name that's used. It's attached to quite a few organizations that the Iranians use, not just in Iraq.

[00:10:45] But in terms of Islamic resistance, I mean Hezbollah, Lebanese Hezbollah, is called al-Mukal-Malis, that me feel lived in, and that's the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.

[00:10:57] You know, they use this every other time. And they even tried to describe, you know, the Houthis known as Ansar al-Laz, you know, the Islamic resistance in Yemen.

[00:11:04] You know, they slapped this onto pretty much everything. So, you know, if you wanted to pick a front group and calling it, "Oh, it's the Islamic resistance in Iraq.

[00:11:11] Which one?" You know, what do you mean? The broader overview kind of structure of all these different militias that they've used before?

[00:11:19] Or do you mean something new? Do you mean something here? Do you mean something here? But in this case, you know, using this term, it specifically refers to, even though they didn't really completely openly say it, but this is really how it's operating.

[00:11:34] This Islamic resistance in Iraq, this front group, this specific front group, is populated by two major parties, and there's one other side party that's kind of in there that also is quite a prominent one, but has not been as open as the other two.

[00:11:51] And so I'll just, I'll name all three of these Iraqi Shia militias that are, and when I say they're controlled by Iran, they are controlled by Iran. There is no doubt that the Iranians through the IRGC not only have very, very long links to these groups, but that there is a good amount of control, and I can outline that if you'd like because it's interesting what was passing around as news from certain shadowy figures in the administration and elsewhere.

[00:12:18] Well, we just have no idea what the deal is with these groups. No, everybody knew, but everybody knew. It did not take a specialist like me, you know, they knew.

[00:12:26] But anyway, first group that's there is a group called Haddakat Hezbollah Nuzhabah, or also known as Haddakat the Nuzhabah. I can actually say, interestingly, two of the groups that are mentioned in here, I wrote the first English profiles on them that are online.

[00:12:42] Sadly, the profiles, because a lot of the data was lost when the servers were changed, and there was a lot of other stuff going on technically with the website.

[00:12:51] But I did write about these guys very early on, so it's interesting to see them come back now.

[00:12:57] But the first one that Nuzhabah actually wrote that profile on them, and I know a lot of their early command structure. I've talked to these guys quite a bit.

[00:13:06] They were one of the leading recruiters for the Iranians of Iraqi Shia to go to Syria, and they were created in 2013.

[00:13:15] They were split off of another group called Asai Bakhul-Hawk, actually a former Secretary-General of Asai Bakhul-Hawk named Akram Kabi, was used by the Iranians to kind of populate and grow this group.

[00:13:30] But it's an initial stages. I would say it was far more disunited than what many people thought.

[00:13:40] You know, it was kind of being populated and grown by the Iranians with some heavy guidance,

[00:13:43] you know, to the Iraqis who were on the ground there. So you have that organization. And Akram

[00:13:49] Khabi himself has taken on quite a prominent role in kind of this front strategy. Now, when I was

[00:13:55] mentioning the front strategy before that really kind of started and really started to gain some

[00:14:01] traction from 2020 to 2021. 2021 in particular was when it really started to get moving.

[00:14:08] But he had come out and was quite a public face for these front groups. Like there was no denying

[00:14:14] that, you know, there was a clear connection that was going back to the very least his organization.

[00:14:19] So Khabi has been out there and been quite a, quite a mouthpiece for, for a number of different

[00:14:26] fronts. But with the Islamic resistance in Iraq, you know, this new front group, he has been, again,

[00:14:32] quite an open person talking about it. In fact, Nuzhaba from the beginning, since when I say from

[00:14:39] the beginning, I mean, since October 7th and since this kind of new wave of attacks using a front

[00:14:44] group was initiated, Khabi really took an outsized role talking about kind of what his group was

[00:14:54] involved with. Like they were not hiding the fact that they were part of this Islamic resistance

[00:14:59] in Iraq that was launching attacks. And I mean, that went down to, you know, everything from

[00:15:05] the propaganda footage they were putting up the statements that they were releasing,

[00:15:09] they were very, very, very open about it. So that's just, I mean, think of that as kind of,

[00:15:14] you know, one of a few of the groups. So second group, which is extraordinarily important for this

[00:15:22] and extraordinarily important, the Iraqi Shia proxy of the Iranians to the point where they are

[00:15:27] pretty directly controlled is a group called Katab Hezbollah. So the second group, Katab Hezbollah,

[00:15:33] literally, it's the Hezbollah battalions or Hezbollah brigades. It's, you know, some people will say,

[00:15:39] you don't want to confuse them with Lebanese Hezbollah. I mean, I would agree they're ones in

[00:15:43] a rocky group and one's a Lebanese group, but they essentially follow the same ideological precepts.

[00:15:47] They have the same level of connection and link with the Iranians. Katab Hezbollah in Iraq is

[00:15:55] considered a first among equals when it comes to Iran's proxies, just as Lebanese Hezbollah is

[00:16:00] considered a first among equal among the rest of its proxies. So it's a very, very important group.

[00:16:05] And in fact, Katab Hezbollah was created by the man I mentioned earlier, Abu Makediel Muhandis.

[00:16:11] He had actually taken guys who were even more loyal already out of a loyalist Iraqi Shia

[00:16:18] militia group called the bater brigades at the time, put them into special groups. They were in

[00:16:23] five different networks. And then he combined them all together to create this group,

[00:16:27] Katab Hezbollah. And Katab Hezbollah, right now, they're one of their commanders named Abu Fadak

[00:16:35] al Muhammad Ali, he is actually the operations head. He's like the big cheese guy who controls

[00:16:41] Al-Hashal Shabhi. Interesting how you're replacing all these guys from these little nodes and all

[00:16:45] these important positions who control different things. So Katab Hezbollah has also had a very,

[00:16:51] very important role in maintaining and being a big part, kind of an operational part and

[00:16:58] intelligence part to this Islamic resistance in Iraq. So that's part for them. Another group

[00:17:05] that I would mention, and this is a group that I actually, you know, I know in Arabic or English,

[00:17:09] I wrote the first profile on them called katab site al shuhadah, masters of the martyrs brigade.

[00:17:15] And that was actually, this is like classic. I mean, I know people are going to listen to this

[00:17:20] and they're going to get lost with, oh my god, this group is just split into this group and this

[00:17:24] and this and this. And I think you know, from my writing that boy, do I love me some splinters?

[00:17:29] Like I just love hyper complex it is. It's like looking at it like a turbulent movement and a

[00:17:35] watch. It just keeps getting more and more complicated. But I mean, at the end of the day, it's really

[00:17:39] not. So one of those networks, I mentioned that there were five networks that were combined and

[00:17:45] made into katab as Bola. Well, one of those networks run by two prominent commanders,

[00:17:50] one named Abu Allah. And then the other one is known as Abu Mustafa.

[00:17:55] They kind of had an issue and I mean, this is how the Arabic press was reporting it. They had an

[00:18:01] internal issue in katab as Bola, where they were not as favorable with some of the leadership that

[00:18:06] was there. Some claimed it was because that leadership was a bit too youthful. Other times,

[00:18:11] it was, you know, these guys wanted to be involved in politics and kind of get there

[00:18:15] their take, whereas katab as Bola wasn't really allowing that at the time.

[00:18:18] And very early on, Kataab said al-Shuhadaw was allowed to kind of split off around the

[00:18:25] same time that had a cut Hezbollah al-Nujaba did. This was in early 2013, late 2012.

[00:18:31] And it's interesting, both groups were essentially pushed to do a lot of heavy recruitment to get

[00:18:37] guys over to Syria. You know, this is a way the Iranians use them to not just prove loyalty,

[00:18:41] but to also prove utility, you know, and to kind of keep those pressure points going within,

[00:18:45] you know, a larger proxy network. So you have katab, say al-Shuhadaw there,

[00:18:52] and they are, again, they may have had certain issues internally, but you know,

[00:18:57] sometimes I think people, especially people in the press and people in policy,

[00:19:01] this is often an effective of reading the wrong international relations books,

[00:19:06] will regularly think that, oh, you know, there's an issue there. We can exploit that. No, these

[00:19:12] guys are IRGC fighters. I mean, they are Iraqis, but they have been alongside running networks that

[00:19:19] the IRGC is used to attack Americans, to attack others, to kind of build political and military

[00:19:25] influence. They are never leaving that umbrella, the Iranian umbrella, that is.

[00:19:30] So these are three hyper extreme organizations that are involved in this. And again, what they

[00:19:37] do is they will populate the group. They will use different operational, kind of different

[00:19:42] operational leaders, and they'll use kind of different little structures they can go out.

[00:19:47] Like, let's say, for instance, they've been approved to use a heavier gauge or a heavier

[00:19:51] rocket or to use a UAV. So for instance, that attack that happened out in Jordan,

[00:19:57] you know, that was part of that larger base setup of Al-Pomath, which is in southern Syria, but it

[00:20:03] extends into Jordan. It's got its own kind of Syrian rebel groups that are there, you know,

[00:20:07] so on and so forth. And the US is helping them both in the anti-ISIS campaign, but also clearly

[00:20:13] and increasingly to kind of counter the Iranians who were moving around in that area.

[00:20:17] So you would get certain operational groups. Let's say, you know, today we're going to use

[00:20:22] Kataba's Bola. They're going to launch, you know, some UAVs at an American base. And then the

[00:20:27] Islamic resistance in Iraq is going to take credit for it. And then you'll also kind of notice a

[00:20:31] little shift in kind of messaging that will come out where maybe Kataba's Bola is a little bit more

[00:20:36] detailed in their statements about the attack. Like it kind of, it sends these little,

[00:20:41] these little hints at times. Nujibah is probably the least nuanced when it comes to it. They're

[00:20:46] quite open. And then other times you'll get kind of public statements that'll come from all three

[00:20:49] of those leaders, you know, Abu Allah from Qatab Said al-Shawadaw. You'll get one from Akram Cabi,

[00:20:54] from Harqat Hezbollah in Ujibah. And then you'll get some statement that will come out either

[00:20:58] from a spokesman or for some, you know, a variety of different leaders within Qatab's Bola,

[00:21:02] you know, about the right of the resistance to resist the American forces and push them

[00:21:06] out of Iraq and, you know, something along those lines. So that's generally how they kind of work

[00:21:12] that. And we can also see this from the American, I mean, you said eight responses. And I would say,

[00:21:19] you know, how are we defining responses here? Right. Because I mean, I would, I would argue that

[00:21:24] really we had maybe two true responses out of those eight. And actually, you know, maybe it's,

[00:21:32] if we're counting the most recent one as nine, that I would say, you know, two or three. The reason

[00:21:36] I'm saying that is because most of these, most of these strikes were actually tactical in nature.

[00:21:42] And they were protective in nature. So we were not going out and just, you know,

[00:21:47] knocking off another commander of Qatab as Bola, or knocking off another, you know, another main

[00:21:53] leader like Qasem Sulemani or Abu Makhdi Al Mohandis. No, we were going after their

[00:21:59] tactical teams that were at that moment, setting up and trying to launch rockets or launch UAVs.

[00:22:05] And in a number of those attacks, we had killed a number of Qatab as Bola people. I remember

[00:22:09] there was one that killed, I think five of them in one shot. And then they hit a facility down in

[00:22:15] Jiful Sohar, which is, you know, Qatab as Bola central. They essentially run a private

[00:22:19] fiefdom down there. But I would say, out of those, those responses, there was one that targeted

[00:22:27] an operational commander, and he was quite prominent within how to cut Hezbollah and Ujibah.

[00:22:31] And that was what at the end, I want to say it was in the end of November, early December.

[00:22:37] Yeah, it was December. Yeah, every, it's interesting, you know, every day is flowing into the next.

[00:22:42] It was before Christmas. Yes, it was definitely before Christmas. Okay.

[00:22:46] And they got him around, but he was, he was in Baghdad area. So I'm thinking, now it's probably

[00:22:50] the most that I would count as, you know, a quote unquote, response that you're actually going after

[00:22:57] a mid-level commander, and, and, you know, taking him off the battlefield. So it really hasn't,

[00:23:04] it's been far more tactical in nature the way the United States has responded to a lot of this.

[00:23:10] And the responses, I mean, you'll, you'll hear the line out of DC, well, we want to de-escalate,

[00:23:14] we want to de-escalate, we want to de-escalate, we want to de-escalate. It's very interesting when

[00:23:18] the other party that's involved, which is Iran, has very slowly, you know, kind of run this up a bit,

[00:23:26] where they have continually escalated, whether it's in the Red Sea with Ansar al-law or the Houthis,

[00:23:31] or in Iraq, using these organizations, or in Syria, also using those organizations,

[00:23:37] or with Lebanese Hezbollah against the Israelis, and also different threats that are launched,

[00:23:42] you know, against the United States, by Lebanese Hezbollah. It's, it's kind of an intriguing picture,

[00:23:48] you know, you're, you're, it's almost like you're speaking past the issue, hey, we want to de-escalate,

[00:23:52] meanwhile, the bully keeps punching in the face, you know, it's like, kind of like one of those,

[00:23:56] like, you know, what do you think about it now? What do you think about it now? Hey, look,

[00:23:59] I'm just trying to de-escalate. Maybe a wrong Harrison given, you know, we also have aircraft

[00:24:04] carriers and, you know, long-range bombers, but, you know, in a way, it is kind of like that.

[00:24:09] It's like, it's like the guy sitting behind you constantly, like flicking you in the back of the

[00:24:12] head, you go, what do you do about it? Yeah, what do you do about it? And then when he gets hit in

[00:24:15] the face, it's like, we have to stop this aggression, you know, it's kind of the Iranian angle on this.

[00:24:20] But, I mean, what I would say is it has not, it's very interesting how the administration,

[00:24:27] Biden administration has been handling this, particularly with how the responses have been

[00:24:32] kind of meted out. And I would say the most recent one that occurred over the weekend,

[00:24:38] I should say Friday, but I, one could make the argument that it was the first kind of real

[00:24:47] response. The problem with the attack itself, though, was that the Iranians were warned for a

[00:24:54] week in advance. They were also told essentially what, you know, they weren't necessarily told what

[00:24:59] the targeting packages would be, but they were told, you know, hey, we're going to go after IRGC

[00:25:03] targets. Well, okay, you know, you want everyone to go to ground and hide and not get nailed. Well,

[00:25:09] there you go. It's a great way to do it. Well, before we dive into the airstrikes and the strategy

[00:25:16] behind it and the effectiveness or the, or the lack thereof, there's been a lot of discussion

[00:25:21] since this attack on tower 22 about the issue of control, you know, to what degree

[00:25:28] does the Iranians exercise like operational control over these militias? And in my mind,

[00:25:35] the debate about it has just gotten very kind of silly and muddled down in the weeds to the point

[00:25:41] that it's sort of missing the most obvious answer. And I'm wondering if you could give us like

[00:25:46] bit of clarity here, like their control over these groups or the lack thereof. What is the

[00:25:54] extent of that? Well, here's the thing. I'm noticing, and I mean, you've already heard this from me,

[00:25:59] and I think you've seen when I've thrown stuff up on Twitter, I tend to be at something as I get

[00:26:04] pissed off enough where I'm just like, are you kidding? Oh, yeah, it's this was one of those moments

[00:26:10] where I'd say, are you freaking kidding me? And you know, reaching out to people and press going,

[00:26:13] is this for like, is this what I'm seeing published? There was an argument coming out. Now,

[00:26:18] there are truisms that are there. But again, it's been so decontextualized that, you know,

[00:26:23] for the average person reading this, I mean, jeez, you know, I just scrolled through how many different

[00:26:28] different Arabic language militia, you know, militias with complicated names that,

[00:26:34] you know, another group is named the same thing. And it's in a region that we've been in now

[00:26:39] fighting for how many decades. It's a confusing process. And what I notice is that's a lot of

[00:26:45] political playing that was going on regarding, you know, who's really in control. So let's get

[00:26:51] something straight right off the bat. The Iranians, there really has been no argument

[00:26:57] that the Iranians don't always maintain 100% control on a proxy. It's, you know, and I want to get this straight,

[00:27:05] though, there's a proxy and then there's a proxy. You know, there are groups that the Iranians control

[00:27:13] that are believers in their ideological system, like true believers, they believe in what's called

[00:27:18] absolute with Ayatollah Fokhi, which technically means that that group, if Kamana E himself

[00:27:24] gives an order because he is the supreme leader, then guess what? That's what goes because

[00:27:30] he is the mouthpiece for Imam al-Makti before Imam al-Makti returns to earth. That is the

[00:27:35] the theocratic ideological view that they follow. And you know, whether that's extended

[00:27:40] through the mouth of an IRGC commander or what or through a representative that's associated

[00:27:46] with Kamana E, who's issuing, you know, specific fatwas and different edicts, you know, taklif

[00:27:51] shari, stuff like that, then that's how it goes. Now those groups, I mean, a good example

[00:27:58] of one of them is Lebanese Hezbollah, but that doesn't mean that Lebanese Hezbollah does

[00:28:02] not have its own, you know, autonomous interests. It doesn't mean that it doesn't push back

[00:28:07] at times if need be, but how much pushback does that really, you know, how much of that

[00:28:12] really matters with specific organizations like this. But, you know, at the end of the

[00:28:17] day, there's also other issues too, and I don't want people to think, well, wow, that

[00:28:20] sounds like a pretty good level of control. I guess it's all like that, not necessarily.

[00:28:25] I could also make the argument, you know, the Iranians have had issues with some of their,

[00:28:29] I'll call them better Iraqi groups at times.

[00:28:32] No, that would be like K-H is probably one of their better ones.

[00:28:36] Well, Kataba's Ebola, like I mentioned before, that's K-H. Kataba's Ebola has been extraordinarily

[00:28:42] loyal. In fact, they were loyalists pulled out of loyalists, and they were given, you

[00:28:46] know, a lot of very fancy weaponry very early on. Their commanders were true believers.

[00:28:52] They were started by probably one of the biggest Iraqi true believers, Abunah the Al-Mohandis.

[00:28:58] Like you couldn't get sharper than that. And by the way, they were also true believers

[00:29:01] ideologically speaking. So you have that context there too. But there are other groups that

[00:29:06] also, you know, when K-H was created, like Asaibah Al-Hawk, which I mentioned before,

[00:29:13] Asaibah Al-Hawk, they were peeled away from looked at Asaibah Al-Hawk's ranks, both to

[00:29:18] put pressure on Asaibah Al-Hawk, but to also kind of maybe be another angle that the Iranians

[00:29:23] could penetrate in the Iraqi Shia sphere.

[00:29:27] Now, A-H, which is Asaibah Al-Hawk, it's run by K-Slaqazali. They haven't been without

[00:29:35] their issues with the Iranians because again, they're coming out of the Sautilus stream.

[00:29:39] It's not always the most pro-Iranian. You know, they've had other little issues before,

[00:29:44] but they've also, it doesn't mean that their disloyalty at times has meant that they're

[00:29:48] a terrible proxy. Look, they've supplied guys for Syria. They have supplied plenty of fighters

[00:29:53] to manage affairs in Iraq for the Iranians for all intents and purposes. They have aided

[00:29:59] in other overseas adventures, including in Bahrain, so they've done stuff like that before.

[00:30:05] But sometimes it comes down to, you know, hey, it's maybe better to play this Iraqi nationalist

[00:30:09] angle and let's distance ourselves from the Iranians, or maybe the Iranians are telling

[00:30:13] us to do stuff that maybe we don't want to do. Maybe we're trying to grow a little bit

[00:30:17] more autonomy on this side. So occasionally, that does happen. And I do have to mention

[00:30:21] with A-H, I mentioned the front strategy before, A-H was involved in that. There were a number

[00:30:27] of reports that came out that A-H actually disobeyed the Iranians. They were using these

[00:30:33] attacks to demonstrate kind of their own bona fides domestically that they could be

[00:30:38] tough guys in the room and, you know, do as they pleased, you know, and they could, you

[00:30:42] know, hit American sites. And if maybe there was a prohibition on rocketing the embassy

[00:30:45] today, maybe they would do it occasionally to show that they had some level of independence

[00:30:50] and autonomy. Now, how that grew out, I mean, again, it's clear that these A-H groups grew,

[00:30:57] they kind of coincided with the other major effort that was going on with that was involving,

[00:31:03] you know, a variety of other Iranian proxies. But, you know, when that split came and how

[00:31:07] deep it was, you know, I'm not saying that, you know, they're no longer Iranian proxies

[00:31:12] anymore. You know, they are. They're still in that network. They're still de-conflicting

[00:31:16] with the IRGC, with the Iranians and with other groups. And, you know, the Iranians aren't

[00:31:22] stupid on this either. So, you know, it's kind of like saying, well, we have all these

[00:31:25] groups. What do we do? It's interesting how a lot of people, and I've written extensively

[00:31:30] about this how the wide kind of pantheon of these different groups, there's actually a

[00:31:35] benefit to it. You know, the more splinters I create, the more tension I create within

[00:31:39] those ranks, oddly kind of it operationalizes them in a way where it makes them a bit more

[00:31:44] utilitarian. You know, how much support am I getting from the Iranians if I give a thousand

[00:31:49] extra guys to the front in Syria? Well, they're going to give me more money. They're going

[00:31:53] to give me more influence. They might give me a new television network and some media

[00:31:56] support on that. They might give me some more cash privately. You know, those thoughts

[00:32:01] come into it and don't think the Iranians aren't looking at this like, hey, we could

[00:32:04] you know, pit Peter against Paul and, you know, see what kind of happens. And one of

[00:32:09] my, you know, I wouldn't call it assumption because I've done enough interviews now where

[00:32:12] it kind of sounds pun intended kosher enough. But there is one where, you know, Hatakat

[00:32:20] Hezbollah Nuzhaba, which was split from AAH's ranks. Very interesting that it was split

[00:32:25] from those ranks using a rather popular former secretary general of that group may have made

[00:32:30] there have been personal disagreements between case al-Hazali and Akram Khabi. Sure. But the

[00:32:35] Iranians are looking at this like, hey, we don't want to throw away, you know, the baby

[00:32:38] with the bath water number one. Number two, this might be very good to put some pressure

[00:32:42] on AAH when they, you know, maybe they want to be a little too autonomous and we don't

[00:32:46] necessarily want that. And here's a good way to do it. Here's a good way to overshadow

[00:32:50] case of Kazali within a solderist network that we want to control. So there's these

[00:32:55] little pieces that are in there, you know, okay, well, we're now using this new splinter

[00:32:58] of a splinter of a splinter of a splinter to have this add on effect. I mean, it does

[00:33:03] sound complicated, but at the end of the day, when you're kind of running this like a business

[00:33:08] and it's kind of cellular replication of groups, you know, you want sometimes those cells to

[00:33:13] play against one another if one might become cancerous, you know, you need to do stuff

[00:33:17] like that. How do you keep them in line? You know, how do you actually keep the machinery

[00:33:21] working and kind of lubed up so that it's always moving? And I think in large part,

[00:33:28] you know, a lot of people tend to ignore that. They just look at this large pantheon of

[00:33:32] organizations, they go, well, there's no way they can control that without actually saying

[00:33:36] maybe the Iranians have calculated that they can't control everything, but this is a much

[00:33:40] better way to do it where they're kind of two or three levels removed. You know, and

[00:33:45] they're still the moving pieces are moving. So I think that also plays into a lot of this.

[00:33:50] We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more.

[00:33:52] [Music]

[00:34:09] There was some reporting between the Tower 22 attack and this first round of airstrikes

[00:34:15] on Friday, a CNN article in particular comes to mind that was sourced apparently from

[00:34:22] inside the U.S. intelligence community claiming that the Iranians, the IRGC, the Quds Force

[00:34:28] have gotten a bit nervous or concerned with some of the strategies and tactics these

[00:34:34] militias have been using against the West Forces in the region. How do you feel about

[00:34:39] that? Is there any, have you seen any kind of truth to that? No, okay. No, I don't see

[00:34:44] any truth to that. In fact, that sounds, I can say it pretty straight out here. That

[00:34:49] sounds like a pile of BS, a pile of BS from policymakers and specific kind of, I would

[00:34:56] say, political people within the intelligence realm that have their own kind of policy that

[00:35:01] they wish to push and also it does not actually fit with what these Iranian-backed groups

[00:35:06] have been doing. In fact, they've been so open and demonstrably so. Let's just look

[00:35:13] at the weapons, for instance. We're talking about a variety of these groups that are all

[00:35:17] part of the Islamic resistance in Iraq. We're quite open with their press announcements

[00:35:22] to say we are entering into a second phase and then they would change the weapons systems

[00:35:26] out and say, "Oh, we're using something more advanced now." Interesting. I didn't see the

[00:35:30] Iranians complain about that when they delivered those weapons systems to them and then also

[00:35:34] signed off on saying you can use those now because if we remember back to what happened

[00:35:39] with AAH, when they were using certain weapons systems that they were not approved for,

[00:35:44] guess what ended up happening? The Iranians said, "Guess what? You're not doing this

[00:35:47] anymore. Sorry, guys. Sorry, Charlie. The supply is no longer there." So they can shut

[00:35:53] it down when they want to and they will. Yes. Yes. And there's also a reason why they've

[00:35:57] picked very specific groups to operate through that are loyalists because they will listen.

[00:36:03] This is not because, well, they're Iraqis and they're just crazy and they're just going

[00:36:05] to do their own thing. There have been instances of Iraqis like in Syria being a little bit

[00:36:11] high-hand, a little nutty on the battlefield, but you're dealing with some of the most

[00:36:16] loyal groups that they have created. Yes, they may have their own notions on how violent

[00:36:21] they wish to be, but the Iranians after learning the hard way have really formed a setup that

[00:36:28] it's the loyalists carrying out these attacks. There's no denying that. I say there's no

[00:36:34] denying that because the administration itself has said that. The targeting that we have

[00:36:40] done against Iraqi Shia militia forces, if you look at the two groups that were targeted,

[00:36:45] it was Nuzhaba and it was Qatabah's Bola, which has been and Qatabah's Bola has well

[00:36:50] known. It's been very, very well known since the beginning, since they were truly started

[00:36:54] from the 2005 to 2007 chunk of time during the Iraq War. It was so well known that they

[00:37:02] were hardcore Iranian loyalists that even Iraqis would call them in leaked cables, the

[00:37:08] Kamana E groups, because they directly reported to Kamana E. There is no denying out there.

[00:37:16] That's essentially crafting an argument that doesn't actually exist. That's looking for

[00:37:21] nuance where there is none and then complaining about this lack of nuance you've found. This

[00:37:26] is something that academics do. Well, there should be more nuance here, but I'm going to

[00:37:29] write my thesis on why there's no nuance in their needs debate. It just throws your brain

[00:37:34] into complete atrophy. Frankly, I would say that's part of the estimation here, because

[00:37:40] that is not how these groups are working at all. Again, it doesn't mean to say, I feel

[00:37:47] terrible having to caveat this every single time. It doesn't mean that the Iranians just

[00:37:53] use groups that are 100% loyal to them all the time, but you can see the process and how

[00:37:59] it's going on in Iraq and what they've been using. It clearly demonstrates that they have

[00:38:04] very deliberately picked those organizations to operate through because of their loyalty,

[00:38:09] because they can trust them with these different arms, because they can trust them with promoting

[00:38:13] the message. They wouldn't have done it otherwise. By the way, the attacks that they have been

[00:38:18] launching, I have talked to enough people in Department of Defense. I've interviewed enough

[00:38:23] people. I've interviewed enough people even within Shia militia sections. They're targeting

[00:38:30] it. By the seat of our pants, we're escaping casualties in many cases here.

[00:38:35] The weapons systems that they're using are aiming to do exactly that. Again, this is another add-on

[00:38:42] to the fascination here. It's interesting, every single time they're successful with one of the

[00:38:47] attacks and they've killed somebody, then what do they do? They back up and say, "You know what?

[00:38:51] I think it's time for a ceasefire." It's like Hamas pulling this. They had catastrophic

[00:38:55] success in the attack. Then, once the air strikes and just complete destruction is being reigned

[00:39:01] upon Gaza by the Israelis, the response to that is, "I think it's a really good time for a ceasefire

[00:39:08] now. We got away with what we need to do, but it's perfect time for a ceasefire now."

[00:39:11] It is that blatant. It is that plain. It's really fascinating to see this. It's the same modeling

[00:39:18] that's going on with this because they are reading. Again, I feel bad saying this. I'm being quite

[00:39:24] blatant in what I'm seeing here, and it almost sounds partisan and I don't want it to.

[00:39:29] They're viewing the administration as being in a weak position and not able to really respond.

[00:39:39] Whenever they see that, whenever you give them a little rope, they're going to take even more,

[00:39:43] and they keep testing, testing, testing. They're going to keep flicking you in the back of the

[00:39:47] head until they're slapping you in the back of the head, until they're spitting at you in the

[00:39:50] back of the head. When you're sitting in the classroom, I was bringing that up earlier. It's the same

[00:39:55] kind of notion. I think in this case, it's just interesting how that's all playing out. Also,

[00:40:03] if I were an Iranian negotiator playing that game of implausible, plausible deniability,

[00:40:08] we only have so much control, but you still have to go through us to make sure it stops.

[00:40:19] Which isn't. I think it's this wink, wink, nudge, nudge, say no more kind of policy,

[00:40:25] and I think for a lot of policymakers, they know what the deal is, but it's the other question of,

[00:40:32] you have to take it from some empathy from their position too. Well, we don't need to get involved

[00:40:38] in yet another war, even though we are being dragged into another war. I can see that notion

[00:40:45] there, and I can also see kind of the understanding of, well, we got to deal with this if we're going

[00:40:51] to kind of back channel them, and if we're going to deescalate this whole thing. I mean, I can see

[00:40:57] why they would throw something out like that, especially with all the criticism that's,

[00:41:01] well, hey, it's been six or seven days since this attack happened. You guys have been quote-unquote

[00:41:06] telegraphing everything to the Iranians and what you want to do. It's interesting because, I mean,

[00:41:14] that's, it's a strategy that frankly has been around since earlier than 2010. We just don't know

[00:41:21] the nature of the groups and we have no idea what's going on here. And I would say we have far better

[00:41:26] institutional memory than we did in say 2010 about some of these these groups to the point where

[00:41:34] it's like ludicrous coming out and thus infuriating for me. I mean, there's been there's been enough

[00:41:39] written here where normally I complain about how little is written about about Shia militias and

[00:41:44] about Iran's proxy networks. But there is so much written and these guys, I know that they've read

[00:41:50] it, like it's really a break. It's just it does not pass the sniff test at all. Yeah. So just it

[00:41:57] really gets really grinds my gears. Sorry. That's all right. So okay. So that's probably a good segue

[00:42:01] into the administration's response to Tower 22 so far. So let me give you some details on that.

[00:42:07] On Friday, February 2nd, the US Air Force utilizing B1 long range bombers and fighter aircraft

[00:42:13] carried out strikes against 85 targets across seven facilities in Iraq and Syria.

[00:42:18] The targeted facilities as reported by US Central Command included command and control operation

[00:42:23] centers, intelligence centers, rockets, missiles and drones, storage depots,

[00:42:27] as well as logistics and munitions supply chain facilities belonging to militia groups.

[00:42:32] Somewhere in the range of 46 militia figures or beliefs have been killed in the strikes.

[00:42:37] The Pentagon has indicated that further rounds of strikes could follow in the days and weeks ahead.

[00:42:43] So Philip, what's your take on this response to Tower 22? I don't think it was the correct

[00:42:52] style of response for a few different reasons. Again, very interesting show of force, but the

[00:42:59] show of force did not really show itself to be perfectly frank. You know, I've noticed this

[00:43:05] quite a bit. This has been kind of the the Twitter X, one of the responses on there,

[00:43:10] which I happen to to agree with because it's I mean, it is true. Look at the Israelis when

[00:43:15] they're responding to Hezbollah issues in the north and they're dealing with IRGC in the north

[00:43:20] of their country. They're very tight lipped about who they're going to kill and when,

[00:43:25] and then they've what have they done? They've killed a number of senior IRGC commanders that

[00:43:30] have very prominent roles, helping Lebanese Hezbollah and coordinating efforts with Hamas

[00:43:35] and kind of doing a bunch of other things. There have been a lot of them that have been shipped

[00:43:40] back in body bags to Iran to the point where the Iranians have been going, oh, holy crap,

[00:43:45] there is an issue here. They are knocking these guys off and we got to go to ground. I mean,

[00:43:50] I remember they even like this is nonsense. There's no IRGC leaving Syria, but they're saying, God,

[00:43:56] we're going to have to evacuate some guys here. And I remember that was kind of hitting certain

[00:44:00] deliberately English language press. Yeah, I mean, it's not really true, but it's interesting how

[00:44:06] much how much I guess smoke they've kind of kicked up because of that because that's an actual hit

[00:44:14] that they're worried about. Those are irreplaceable, you know, mid level senior level commanders.

[00:44:19] Those are people with their fingers on the buttons. Those are people who have, you know,

[00:44:23] network connections, and it's very hard to replace them. And so, you know, you look at that in terms

[00:44:29] of a response that Lebanese Hezbollah is launching against the Israelis or kind of a preventative

[00:44:34] measure by the Israelis, that has has actually received a response from the Iranians. Now,

[00:44:40] you haven't seen a real militant response in that context, you know, from all these commanders

[00:44:44] getting knocked off. But it's fascinating to me because that, I mean, you remember back to

[00:44:50] Soleimani and Muwendiz. There was there was effect that occurred because of that it degraded

[00:44:57] operational capabilities with them. It degraded networking, you know, it degraded all these things.

[00:45:03] And, you know, it's kind of fascinating. You know, that was going on perfectly fine on one side,

[00:45:09] and that's not how we executed. Instead, what the United States did was for over a week,

[00:45:14] we were saying, well, we're going to respond at a time and place of our choosing. Okay,

[00:45:18] that's all that fine. That's all well and good. I don't mind that. But then it extended out,

[00:45:22] we're going to hit the IRGC and it will do it wherever we want. And we're going to do this,

[00:45:26] and then we're going to do this, and then we're going to do this. And then everybody who's monitoring

[00:45:29] the screen where they can see where the planes are flying from, you know, can see, oh, you know,

[00:45:35] it's great. I can go on Twitter and know about the air strike four hours before it's occurred

[00:45:40] in Iraq. I'm pretty sure that didn't send any signals to guys who literally follow this more

[00:45:44] closely because they've been bombed before. I mean, and then you look at you look at the targets.

[00:45:49] Yes, we targeted, Catabas Bola was targeted. You had a number of other groups that were out there.

[00:45:55] So if you look at the sites, these are kind of sites that have been hit before. These are not,

[00:46:00] you know, these are not new. I actually did the Shia militia mapping project back in the day for

[00:46:05] the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, did it from 2018 went from 2018 to 2021.

[00:46:13] That was the stuff that I was putting up on it. And so a few of the key areas, we hit a lot of

[00:46:19] targets in eastern Syria. A lot of targets in western Iraq. So on that Syria Iraq border,

[00:46:26] that's really where we concentrated things, namely in an Iraqi town called Al Qayem.

[00:46:31] And then across the line from Al Qayem, you have Abu Kamal, which is the Syrian town that's there.

[00:46:39] And then to itself, you have a call shot. This is, it's like right on the border with Syria.

[00:46:46] So you have kind of the real loyal Iranian controlled and Iranian backed Shia militias in that area.

[00:46:54] So upwards of 10 of them. Catabas Bola being a main coordinator and a main one. One of the sites

[00:46:59] that we actually hit belongs to a group called Liwel Tafouf. An hilarious thing of this is, I mean,

[00:47:05] if you know, if you want to hear a good example for how the Shia militia guys actually thought

[00:47:09] the US was going to respond, because we totally knew who we should be targeting, the Liwel Tafouf

[00:47:15] people. So Liwel Tafouf, their commander, is actually the commander of Western Anbar, which

[00:47:20] is where that that section is. So if you're out there in Western Anbar, he is the, you know,

[00:47:26] Qasamo Musleh, that's his name. But if you're dealing with it, you're dealing with him. So we

[00:47:32] hit one of his facilities. Well, the reason they had so many casualties there was because his group

[00:47:37] was like, yeah, they're not going to hit us because we're not necessarily involved in this. Yeah,

[00:47:40] we play closely with KH and we sometimes will be over the border in Syria and will sometimes be

[00:47:46] doing X, Y, and Z. But they're not going to hit us because they already know the deal. I mean,

[00:47:51] that was, I mean, that was some of the chatter that was coming out of that. So it's interesting

[00:47:56] to kind of look at that. But who did we hit? We were not targeting. I remember there were,

[00:47:59] because we actually hit that Liwel Tafouf site, people thought that that Musleh was killed,

[00:48:05] which I mean, it was quite clear that he wasn't, you know, but we didn't kill any senior junior

[00:48:11] commanders, none of them. We were hitting smaller positions. I mean, I remember the Heshtal Shalbi,

[00:48:17] you know, the overarching kind of Iraqi government sponsored umbrella group for a lot of these

[00:48:24] Shia militias that the Iranians control, you know, they had come out and they said, yeah, well,

[00:48:29] you know, they hit an anti-tank missile battalion site. Oh, okay, I did not realize that that,

[00:48:37] you know, had some target. They didn't realize that that was required to target.

[00:48:41] They hit people from, so it's the 45th Brigade. That's the Qatabah's balla section,

[00:48:48] and they hit a bunch of other little sections that were out there. And then in Syria, you know,

[00:48:52] they hit some Syrian Hezbollah, because there's been a number of, they call them Syrian Hezbollah,

[00:48:56] but the number of different smaller groups that are controlled by Lebanese Hezbollah and the

[00:49:01] Iranians, and they're located in Eastern Syria near Daral-Zor and Abu Kamal. So you had kind of

[00:49:08] issues out there, you know, where we hit those guys. But these are all very low ranking people.

[00:49:13] These are people that, you know, we lost, you know, again, I don't, I don't want this to sound

[00:49:19] partisan, but I think the comparison is needed. There was a line that Donald Trump delivered where

[00:49:23] he said, "If you kill an American, you know, one drop of American blood, and we're going to take

[00:49:28] a gallon from you, from the Iranians, you know, quite a flourish in terms of rhetoric."

[00:49:35] And he did actually do that. You know, we lost a contractor in December of 2019.

[00:49:42] Then the Iranian-backed Shia militias started to try and raid the U.S. embassy that was there,

[00:49:47] and so our response to that was to kill Qasem Soleimani and Mujandiz, and also, you know,

[00:49:52] 10 other junior and senior level aides to them in that airstrike. So, I mean, you look at that,

[00:49:59] and then you juxtapose to this, "Yeah, we hit with a very heavy hammer, but then what did we hit?"

[00:50:03] You know, "Hooray, we've destroyed yet another empty, you know, another empty gas station and

[00:50:09] another weapon storage facility. Oh, you got some cool images of some rockets firing off."

[00:50:14] And, you know, what's the deal? And, I mean, to say, well, and we got 50 for three, well,

[00:50:19] those are 50 people that they will pretty much repopulate very, very quickly into the ranks of

[00:50:25] those organizations. So, I mean, at the end of the day, it's kind of not, I mean, you look at

[00:50:30] the balance and you look at kind of, "Well, what are the other tertiary effects? What are the

[00:50:34] secondary tertiary effects of it? Is this really going to turn anything off?" It doesn't really do

[00:50:39] that. You know, it's just not where we are. So, correct me if I'm wrong here, but you believe that

[00:50:45] the kind of best and only way to deter more of these attacks is to kill a lot more senior people

[00:50:51] than we have to date. Well, I don't necessarily look. I don't think everything needs to be,

[00:50:56] it needs to come down to, well, we need to just keep killing people. In fact, you know,

[00:51:00] there's part of me that would say, I think policymakers sometimes look for responses that

[00:51:07] will also feed a domestic agenda. I mean, that's kind of the case a lot of times. And, you know,

[00:51:12] we're dumping, you know, J-dams on the Houthis and all sorts of other crazy stuff.

[00:51:17] I look at it in terms of, well, what would have the most outsized effect? You know, what would be

[00:51:22] if you want a positive end effect, I mean, even when it comes to killing people, do you need a

[00:51:27] 500-pound bomb to do it? Or, you know, maybe some other kind of method? Maybe something a little bit

[00:51:33] more covert. You know, maybe you don't necessarily need to go out and do that. I mean, how would I

[00:51:39] know if it was being investigated? But, you know, it kind of seemed a better use of resources

[00:51:47] than just doing a humongous bombing run that's just hitting a bunch of dust huts. You know,

[00:51:51] it's just not, it just doesn't really seem all that special. Now, what I would say is, I mean,

[00:51:59] the way you counter this, again, if we're using other examples, and that's not me promoting one

[00:52:04] over the other, but it's just, let's look for outsized effect. When Soleimani and Wohandis were killed,

[00:52:10] that had a genuine effect on the network and modes of control, the nodes of control, excuse me,

[00:52:17] for a lot of these Iraqi Shia militias. It did. Now, you see how this kind of goes back to what

[00:52:22] we were talking about earlier? Well, how many do they really control? And how do you know that?

[00:52:26] I mean, that's where somebody could kind of come in and say, well, are you arguing against yourself?

[00:52:30] No, I'm not. I'm actually not. It's, you'll notice that the Iranians were faced with an issue. So,

[00:52:36] what did they do? They rallied around their court guys, you know, you know, getting like,

[00:52:41] their core guys are there, and they've also found other deconfliction mechanisms to kind of deal

[00:52:45] with this, but it took them three years, four years to do that. I mean, that's like an open

[00:52:50] opportunity. And that causes a lot of other friction, a lot of other issues. But you look

[00:52:56] at something like that. Well, a lot of these old hand guys are getting older, they're getting

[00:52:59] long in the tooth. You know, a lot of these other commanders, these other other figures,

[00:53:04] they're not making the same level of replacement for them. And we saw this in the Syrian war when

[00:53:12] a lot of senior very experienced fighters that were mid-level commanders were killed and kind of

[00:53:17] who Lebanese Hezbollah would have to really pull on and who the Iraqi Shia militias would have to

[00:53:21] pull on. You know, it demonstrates something where, you know, I think to have that kind of effect,

[00:53:27] you take out certain commanders, you take out certain leadership, but you also, I mean,

[00:53:31] that's also where the demonstration of power projection comes from. You know, I think we're

[00:53:36] also running into this line, which is deterrence, deterrence, deterrence. Well, okay, well, that

[00:53:40] cat's already out of the bag. So let's let's, you know, let's forget about that for two seconds.

[00:53:45] It's now, you know, okay, how do we project ourselves and kind of get something done so that we can

[00:53:50] reestablish that, you know, one, our interests actually have a place in the Middle East, but two,

[00:53:57] you know, you can't just act with impunity. I think we unfortunately, there has to be some level of

[00:54:02] acceptance now, regardless of what we want, when it comes to, hey, you know, these, the militias,

[00:54:09] I thought that they're attacks on us would just stop if we bomb them. You know, I've heard this,

[00:54:13] I've heard this commentary quite a bit, but that's not actually the thinking that's going on there.

[00:54:18] These guys, by necessity, have to keep hitting to demonstrate that the Iranians have some level

[00:54:23] of power and some level of projection against the United States. We're going to keep doing it.

[00:54:28] But the issue is, well, what's the cost benefit analysis here? What's the cost benefit ratio?

[00:54:33] You know, it's interesting how people have

[00:54:36] You know, flipped a lot of this because it's the, well, do you remember when the Iranians

[00:54:40] launched these ballistic missiles at American sites after Soleimani and they kept doing

[00:54:45] these drone attacks?

[00:54:46] Okay.

[00:54:47] Compare that to what they were doing when the United States was in Iraq from 2010 to 2011.

[00:54:52] Well, I mean, again, they were, they were these groups, even as front groups were, and

[00:54:58] I mean this recently in contemporary times, they were doing ID attacks and stuff like that.

[00:55:02] But a lot of them were fake.

[00:55:03] A lot of them were like little IED attacks on, on logistical networks.

[00:55:07] Like it was not, you know, it was not the same level, and I'm not saying we don't have

[00:55:11] the same force presence in the country, but it was not the same thing.

[00:55:16] And so what they've done is they, they dialed it way down because they could only do so

[00:55:19] much and they were scared.

[00:55:21] And then what they're doing is they're slowly turning that dial back up.

[00:55:24] Hey, we'll use a shot head, one, one 29 drone this time, you know, we use this, the larger

[00:55:28] rocket this time will threaten sites that are in Jordan and Israel tomorrow.

[00:55:34] And that's what we'll do here.

[00:55:35] And it's little by little by little, it's, you know, it's like turning the heat up on

[00:55:39] that frog, you know, so it boils in the water.

[00:55:42] And that's essentially how they've been promoting it privately and also quite publicly.

[00:55:46] And it's, it's kind of the schema for how they're doing it.

[00:55:49] But I think it's the, if you demonstrate that a lot of those, those little nodes that they

[00:55:54] have out there no longer have, again, they no longer can really be operationalized in

[00:56:00] an effective way because you've removed command elements or maybe you've removed a specific

[00:56:04] arms cache or, you know, something here or there, it requires a little bit more organization

[00:56:11] and, and, and I think concerted effort as opposed to just looking for a response.

[00:56:16] You know what I mean?

[00:56:17] Right.

[00:56:18] Yeah.

[00:56:19] But once you would like to discuss or cover, get off your chest that we haven't yet today.

[00:56:24] Flores, yours, sir.

[00:56:25] God help us all.

[00:56:27] Well, I mean, I think what worries me quite a bit about a lot of this going on.

[00:56:36] We're, we're trapping ourselves in an earlier picture.

[00:56:40] And when I say that, it's kind of, you know, looking at what was leaked out into the media.

[00:56:45] Well, we have no idea how much controls over these groups, privately anybody in policy

[00:56:49] knows exactly that the Iranians control the groups that were launching these things on

[00:56:53] us.

[00:56:54] But the problem that happens is, and I've noticed this from the Iraq war on because again, there's

[00:56:58] very little institutional memory.

[00:57:01] People will read back and they'll say, well, we still, we had no idea.

[00:57:04] It was so fractious.

[00:57:05] And we didn't know I'm shocked to hear this from, you know, it's a sign that I'm getting

[00:57:10] a little along in my tooth too, from, you know, younger analysts who sometimes will kind

[00:57:14] of come up and they'll ask me a question.

[00:57:15] Yeah.

[00:57:16] But you know how fractious it is.

[00:57:17] Like it's this rejoinder now.

[00:57:19] Yes, they are, but let's contextualize that.

[00:57:21] Let's not kind of play this game of, well, we didn't, we never really knew.

[00:57:25] I mean, that's what me worry, you know, it's, I've noticed that that, that will gain traction,

[00:57:31] that will gain steam.

[00:57:32] And then when you actually have to fight these enemies later on, you know, you're already

[00:57:36] kind of disabused of thinking of it logically or with factual basis or, you know, like clinically.

[00:57:42] And now it's turned into, but there is these articles published that they really didn't

[00:57:44] have all that much control.

[00:57:46] So who knows?

[00:57:47] It's just autonomous.

[00:57:48] Ah, help us.

[00:57:49] And I, that really scares me down the line.

[00:57:51] That really scares me down the line for American policymaking.

[00:57:54] Yeah.

[00:57:55] Wow.

[00:57:56] That's a good point.

[00:57:57] And it's, it's not a good sign.

[00:57:58] The other thing is looking at how we're dealing with unceral law, AKA the Houthis.

[00:58:04] That's another case example where I would say, Oh, cool.

[00:58:07] So they launched a bunch of J dams and, you know, you know, against the Houthis who,

[00:58:11] who were essentially winning against the Saudis, who were, you know, doing the same thing,

[00:58:16] but heavier and actually far more aggressively.

[00:58:19] Um, I mean, in this kind of, it switches my thinking on a lot of this.

[00:58:23] Well, okay.

[00:58:24] Who are these key nodes that are here that are coordinating with the Iranians who are

[00:58:28] launching these missiles who are getting the shipments and I'm not saying we weren't

[00:58:31] interdicting things or kind of doing things, uh, somewhat effectively, uh, to kind of counter

[00:58:37] those, those, those measures, but I would wish that we would get out of this kind of

[00:58:43] almost childish stomping on the ground and saying, and we bomb them.

[00:58:47] We showed them, you know, and actually focused on it in a far more concerted effort to kind

[00:58:53] of say, no, these are the individuals who are, who are pushing buttons here.

[00:58:58] Because again, I mean, I also look at it, you know, cost benefit analysis.

[00:59:01] If you want to look at it that way, you know, it's interesting how the, these, uh, a lot

[00:59:05] of the Iraqi Shia militias that the Iranians were using in the front groups would put up

[00:59:09] like cost benefit stuff.

[00:59:10] Like we, we destroyed, you know, this much American equipment, this cost them this much.

[00:59:15] And look at how burdened the taxpayer is in America, like they were thinking along those

[00:59:19] ones.

[00:59:20] But, you know, I, I, let's flip that on its head and use it for Americans.

[00:59:24] Well, okay, cool.

[00:59:25] We just used like how much does a J dam cost and how much does this cost?

[00:59:28] How much does deploying stuff from, you know, naval vessel cost?

[00:59:31] I mean, there are better targets out there and there are better ways of sending signals.

[00:59:36] And you know, I think that we are caught in so many contradictory sections of thinking.

[00:59:44] It's the, well, we want to deescalate, but look what we did with our bomber.

[00:59:48] Okay.

[00:59:49] Maybe we could have used that more effectively and maybe we could have done this better.

[00:59:53] And it's just all this stuff is kind of swirling around.

[00:59:55] I'm sorry.

[00:59:56] I'm not being as clear as I normally would, would want to be.

[00:59:59] But I mean, I feel conflicted in my head, you know, hearing this kind of all hashed out

[01:00:04] and then kind of going, yeah, but then what's the end conclusion?

[01:00:06] And I think we are not coming to proper end conclusions and we're not using the proper

[01:00:13] methods to kind of deliver ourselves to a better kind of end point.

[01:00:17] Yeah.

[01:00:18] I don't know, man.

[01:00:20] I think you're living us, you're giving us a lot to, to, to think about here.

[01:00:24] Um, I don't know.

[01:00:26] I don't, I don't, I don't have any good answers.

[01:00:28] Yeah.

[01:00:29] Um, yeah.

[01:00:30] Oh, shit.

[01:00:31] Glad to leave on that heavy note.

[01:00:35] Yeah.

[01:00:36] All right.

[01:00:37] Well, this is definitely probably not, I can guarantee, not the last round of these

[01:00:42] strikes that we'll see, uh, there will be more.

[01:00:45] Yeah.

[01:00:46] So I guess we're just going to have to keep an eye on it.

[01:00:49] No real, uh, hard and fast kind of, um, cancers or, or, or resolutions today.

[01:00:55] But, you know, that's the, that's the region, I guess.

[01:00:58] No, let's say part of the territory.

[01:01:00] I just, uh, yeah, it's, I, I think there are so many different political concerns, both

[01:01:06] internationally and domestically that are at play right now, that, you know, if, if I'm

[01:01:11] looking at it just from, you know, the, the, the Philip position of hi, I'm Philip, I do

[01:01:14] Shia militias.

[01:01:15] Yeah.

[01:01:16] Totally could have a few answers for you.

[01:01:18] And even some answers that I would contradict, uh, my own answers that is, um, and I, I

[01:01:24] mean, imagine adding that onto all those other concerns and also a lot of other kind

[01:01:28] of wonky thinking or, you know, people who may, people I would maybe argue don't have

[01:01:34] the correct thinking on this because they're also included in this too.

[01:01:37] Um, and I think we're seeing the end result of that kind of, uh, atrophied thinking, and

[01:01:43] I keep saying atrophied thinking.

[01:01:45] I think it's, there's combinations of analysis paralysis, a lack of action, a lack of knowing

[01:01:50] what to do, a disinterest in general when it comes to the region.

[01:01:54] Um, and there's just so much swirling.

[01:01:57] I mean, we, we now literally have it.

[01:01:59] Remember the administration was denying this, but a regional war that has been based around

[01:02:03] what had, what occurred, uh, with Gaza and Israel on October 7th.

[01:02:07] Um, and so it's just, it's like one thing.

[01:02:10] It's layer upon layer upon layer, you know, it's, it's the, the Shrek model of, you know,

[01:02:14] it's an onion.

[01:02:15] Yeah.

[01:02:16] All right.

[01:02:17] Well, I think it's probably a good place to leave it here today.

[01:02:18] But it's probably the best place for people to find more about you and your work.

[01:02:22] Is that correct?

[01:02:23] Yeah.

[01:02:24] And they can reach out to me and I'll do my best to be polite and somewhat nice, they're

[01:02:27] nice to me.

[01:02:28] Okay.

[01:02:29] We'll have a link to all that stuff in the show notes.

[01:02:30] Yeah.

[01:02:31] This is the, uh, the third, this is the third show that you've been on with us.

[01:02:36] I think, uh, you know how like SNL has like the five timers club that if you host five

[01:02:41] times, you get like a special jacket or something, I think I have to talk to Chris about making

[01:02:45] one of those for when I would wear that jacket.

[01:02:47] Yeah.

[01:02:48] We just have to make sure it has like a lash car thought to me you and logo on the front

[01:02:51] with something.

[01:02:52] Yeah.

[01:02:53] Do you think they would, they would hit us with like a cease and desist if we, if we

[01:02:56] use their, if we use their branding without permission?

[01:02:59] Something tells me that, I mean, I would doubt that.

[01:03:01] Um, I mean, then again, we, there've been other groups that have caused other issues

[01:03:06] regarding their music that has been sampled before.

[01:03:08] Um, but no, I think we can get away with that one.

[01:03:11] I mean, hey, that's directly controlled IRGC, Pakistani Shia unit.

[01:03:14] I think that they're going to be cool with it.

[01:03:16] I mean, the marketing, could you imagine that with, I'm going to be totally self deprecating

[01:03:21] here.

[01:03:22] I mean, with a guy like me wearing that around the DC metro area, oh, they would wish for

[01:03:27] that kind of marketing.

[01:03:28] Oh man.

[01:03:29] Yeah, you would get off of like Roslyn or like the Pentagon and stuff and like you would,

[01:03:32] it would just be, it would just be pandemonium down there.

[01:03:34] Sup bro.

[01:03:35] Yeah.

[01:03:36] And I know you love it.

[01:03:37] All the SAIC contractors like just not knowing how to handle it.

[01:03:43] No, I don't wear a cack because it covers up the logo.

[01:03:48] Thank you once more for, for all of your awesome analysis here.

[01:03:52] Um, no, no better person I could think of to, to, to, to ask to come on when stuff like

[01:03:57] this goes down.

[01:03:58] And I know you're, uh, a bit, you've been a bit under the weather.

[01:04:01] So thank you for, for coming on and, and, and pushing through it today.

[01:04:05] Well, no worries.

[01:04:06] I just hope that you, as you were hearing my voice progressively change and drop in

[01:04:10] octave that, look, I was doing this for the team.

[01:04:14] So I totally deserve a jacket now.

[01:04:15] Thanks man.

[01:04:16] All right.

[01:04:17] Well, thank you.

[01:04:18] Until next time, dude.

[01:04:19] Thanks so much for coming on.

[01:04:20] I appreciate it.

[01:04:21] Thanks for listening.

[01:04:51] This is Secrets and Spies.

[01:04:53] Thanks.

[01:05:21] Thanks.

[01:05:50] Thanks.

[01:05:57] Thanks.

[01:06:04] Thanks.

[01:06:32] Thanks.

[01:06:39] Thanks.

[01:06:49] Thanks.

[01:07:18] Thanks.

[01:07:25] Thanks.

[01:07:32] Thanks.

[01:07:39] Thanks.

[01:07:46] Thanks.