[00:00:00] Chris Carr: Hey everybody, it's Chris here. I hope you're well. This episode, we cover the Signalgate scandal. There have been a few developments since this recording, and Matt and I will discuss those next week. I hope it doesn't affect your enjoyment. This is still a cracking episode, and we've got an amazing guest, Shane Harris, who goes into great detail about the Signalgate scandal. I hope you enjoy it. Thank you for watching, and thank you for listening. Take care. [00:00:25] Announcer: Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton. [00:00:48] Chris: Hello, everybody, and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you? [00:00:52] Matt Fulton: I'm doing good, Chris. How are you? [00:00:54] Chris: Yeah, I'm good. I'm on coffee number four now, which is probably a bit bad for 4:00 p.m. on a, or nearly four o'clock on a Wednesday, but- [00:01:03] Matt: Dude, you gotta see a cardiologist. [00:01:07] Chris: Oh dear. Yeah, no. Caffeine addiction going well or not, I don't know, depending on how you look at it, but yeah. [00:01:12] Matt: I'm on, um, I'm on one and a half, but, uh, you've also been up a lot longer than I have, so. [00:01:17] Chris: That is true. [00:01:18] Matt: You've had more time. [00:01:18] Chris: That's true. I'm definitely putting the espresso in it, not the martini today. [00:01:22] Matt: Yeah, yeah, yeah. [00:01:24] Chris: Oh dear. Well, we've got a really interesting show lined up. So, we've got a special guest, Shane Harris is joining us to talk about Signalgate. Then we're gonna be chatting about the new F-47, uh, sixth-generation fighter that's just come out. Well, it's just been announced. It's, it's not come out yet, but it's been announced. Um, and then we're gonna talk a little bit about the death of Oleg Gordievsky, who, um, was the first spy I ever met in my life, and so, uh, so I wanted to just bring up, uh, his passing and talk a little bit about that. So, um, Matt, yeah, I'll just hand over to you. [00:01:57] Matt: Yeah, so lemme just, uh, introduce our first, um, our, our coverage of, of, of Signalgate. We're a bit about, uh, a week behind, I guess, but, we'll, we'll, we'll, catch up and, and, and cover it. Uh, we got, uh, one of the, one of the men himself who, who helped break the story. Um, so it, just to kind of level set here on, on what the deal is with this, uh, it started on March 11th, when National Security Advisor Mike Waltz added The Atlantic's editor-in-chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, to a Signal group chat, seemingly by mistake. The chat was titled the "Houthi PC small group" -- uh, PC stands for Principals Committee -- and included what appeared to be the highest levels of the US National Security Council: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, DNI Tulsi Gabbard, and several senior White House and NSC officials. Goldberg stayed in the chat for four days. During that time, he watched as officials use the commercial encrypted messaging app to coordinate US military strikes against the Iran-backed, uh, Houthi militia in Yemen. The messages went far beyond policy chatter -- they included strike timelines, weapons platforms, realtime battlefield updates and discussions of a likely kill. On Saturday, March 15th at 11:44 a.m. eastern, Hegseth texted that the first strike package of F-18s from the USS Harry Truman would launch at 12:15. Two hours later, explosions began in Yemen's capital, Sana'a, right on schedule. Realizing the messages were authentic, Goldberg quickly left the chat. He soon published the story and it's been generating headlines ever since. At first, the Trump administration tried to downplay it. Hegseth claimed no war plans were shared, just a routine team update. Officials insisted nothing classified was discussed. But then The Atlantic published the full text of the chat in a follow-up piece by Goldberg and Shane. Uh, the messages revealed precise strike sequencing, operational details, and the real-time location of a Houthi target just minutes before the bombs fell. The military community was outraged. Fighter pilots, past and present, told The New York Times that the disclosures blatantly violated operational security. One called it "extremely cavalier." Another said, "The idea that the secretary of defense, who should know better, has done this, is just mind-boggling." And the legal implications may be just as severe. As Shane reported, national security lawyers say that using Signal to coordinate active military operations could violate the Espionage Act as well as federal record retention laws. Signal isn't approved for handling classified material, and some messages in the group were set to auto-delete, raising concerns about records destruction. A federal judge has since ordered the messages preserved. As for accountability, Waltz, the man who created the group and added Goldberg to it, remains in his role. Trump reportedly considered firing him -- not because of the breach, but because he had Goldberg's number in his phone. Uh, Hegseth has faced no consequences. And the White House continues to insist the situation has been blown out of proportion, but the episode has laid bare a deeper issue: a national security team operating outside secure systems, handling sensitive decisions on apps designed for convenience, not protection. At best, it's reckless. At worst, is dangerous. To help us unpack what actually happened, what's at stake, and where this might lead, we're joined now by one of the journalists who broke the story and a friend of this little podcast, The Atlantic's Shane Harris. Shane, how are you? [00:05:20] Shane Harris: Hi. [00:05:21] Matt: Thank you for joining our, uh, our, our, our small group to get some signal on this whole mess. [00:05:28] Shane: Yes, a very small group. Do you like my SCIF that I'm in, by the way? [00:05:31] Matt: I do. I do. [00:05:32] Chris: Yeah, I've got SCIF envy. [00:05:34] Shane: Yeah, exactly. I plan all my missile strikes from this room. It's great. [00:05:39] Chris: Best place to do it, I think. [00:05:40] Shane: Very much so. [00:05:41] Chris: Shane, thank you so much for joining us. So, obviously we're here to talk about the, the Signalgate, um, or some people have called it, Whiskeyleaks. It hasn't really taken off much. [00:05:48] Shane: Whiskeyleaks?! Oh, that's good. I haven't heard that. [00:05:51] Chris: Yeah, I like that one. [00:05:53] Shane: Mm-hmm. That implies some interesting backstory that might be worth investigating. [00:05:58] Chris: Well, I'll leave that to you. [00:05:59] Matt: A follow-up article, yeah, for you and Jeffrey. [00:06:01] Shane: Sure. [00:06:02] Chris: But, um, so I, I saw you mentioned that in all your years of national security reporting, you've not seeing anything quite like this. So what makes this episode so remarkable? [00:06:12] Shane: Well, it's a couple of things, really. I mean, one is just to find out that the national security advisor convened a Principals Committee meeting for an airstrike over Signal. That was news to me, and in fact -- and we can talk about this later if you want -- but it was so unusual that initially when Jeff told me what was going on we both thought it was a hoax, um, because why would you do that? And the other was the idea that, you know, someone would then inadvertently include a journalist. Um, like what are the chances of that happening? I mean, it truly seemed kind of like winning the lottery or something, just really that kind of astronomical, and that it would be like not just any journalist, but Jeff Goldberg for whom Donald Trump has a particular degree of enmity. [00:06:57] Matt: Yeah. [00:06:57] Shane: Um, uh, so it was just, it was just for that, that made it just absolutely extraordinary. I never seen or even heard of anything, um, like that. I mean, I, I mean, what would even be the equivalent of like, I mean, being overheard conducting an airstrike like a, in a restaurant or something? [00:07:14] Matt: Yeah. [00:07:14] Shane: I mean, but I've never heard of that either, so it was a pretty, pretty remarkable breach. [00:07:18] Matt: I know you have, you've, you've definitely been, been asked this on, on other media hits that you've done in the past week or so, but I just wanted to sort of clarify here. Do you guys have an idea of who "JG" was supposed to be? [00:07:33] Shane: We don't know. There, there, there's been speculation. I mean, just on social media, I've seen that some people have suggested, maybe it was the US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer. Um, um, and it would maybe, I mean, there would, I, you could, I mean, many people also said then, well, why would the US Trade Representative be in a discussion like this? I don't know why he would, except that there was a lot of discussion about trade and the volume of shipping that moves through the straight, um, there, and you know, whose containers are they, what percentage is European, what percentage is American? Because the idea was to basically send the Europeans the bill. That's what the administration wanted to do. [00:08:10] Matt: Yeah. [00:08:11] Shane: So, maybe? But, you know, honestly though, Matt, we just don't know. And, and as far as I know, Mr. Greer has not said one way or the other, and I don't mean to imply that he was, I mean, it's just something that people have, have brought up. Was it somebody else named Goldberg? Did it have an, did he mean a different J? Did somebody just have fat fingers and accidentally hit Jeff's name and didn't know it? So, we just don't know the answer. [00:08:32] Matt: Yeah. [00:08:32] Shane: It's a good question. If anyone knows, if you are JG, call me. [00:08:37] Matt: Yeah. Um, okay, the, so the, the, the National Security Council traditionally works according to a settled process. So, first, um, an Interagency Policy Committee tackles an issue. Then, it goes up to the Deputies Committee for further coordination, um, and debate. Uh, then the Principals Committee meets, counsels POTUS. Finally, he makes the call, and back down his orders go. One hallmark of Trump's first term was often the warping or breaking of that process based on his mood, the news cycle, whoever was last, uh, in his ear, whichever cabinet secretary was out of favor, um, at the moment, uh, et cetera. Um, what does this mess reveal about the NSC policy process during the second term? [00:09:19] Shane: It's a great question, and I think that there, there needs to be a lot more scrutiny of that. I mean, in a weird way, it reveals there is a process, right, in so far we're kind of, we're seeing it. I mean, this Principals Committee, small group Signal chat, they refer to previous Principals Committee meetings that have occurred in which it, it, it appears that the president either was present or was making his views known somehow. So there had been sort of a, um, a discussion at that PC level preceding the chat. Um, now, that the chat then cont- that, that, that the PC meeting continuing on said chat reveals, you know, a really unusual aspect of the process in that they even do like things like this on Signal. So that's one. I think what also reveals is that there's not, at least in this episode, um, that even when it got to the level of the Principals Committee meeting, which is Matt, you just said, you know, the way this would normally work is like the president's given his orders and then things kind of flow out from there. That doesn't appear to have happened here. There appears that there was. Not agreement. It's very clear actually that there's not agreement among the principles on how to proceed. Um, and the most really dramatic example of that, Vice President Vance comes into the chat at one point and says, I think we should halt, you know, we should pause this because I don't think that the president fully comprehends the implications of this strike on his Europe policy. And what Vance seems to be saying there is, look, our whole attitude in the administration is, we are done bailing out the Europeans and solving their messes for them, so why are we now jumping in and committing our military and risking our personnel's lives to open up shipping lanes that will mostly benefit European shipping? And, and that's the part that Vance is sort of struggling with, which I think is actually a, a, a perfectly fair point. [00:11:12] Matt: Yeah. [00:11:13] Shane: Um, and you know, and then there's this disagreement like saying, well I thought the president said this, and then Stephen Miller comes in and says, I heard him say this. And then that kind of ends the discussion, right? Which, question, why is the deputy White House director for policy weighing in on this? And he's kind of like, is he a Trump whisperer or Trump enforcer? So there you're seeing, I think, these interesting breakdowns in the policy where by the time they are, you know, hours away from this strike, they're still not entirely on the same page. And it's weirdly not even clear that they all agree what did the president tell them to do. So that seems to me to illustrate a pretty significant breakdown in whatever their process is. [00:11:53] Matt: That Vance flashed us some very rare daylight between him and the boss -- it, the whole thing just sort of in, there's the, the dy-, the social dynamic here that you see is that, you know, Vance is perhaps frustrated by the inconsistencies. And then to your point also, that's a great thing that you remind me of, Stephen Miller comes in and everyone just sort of just, just shuts up and just goes with the flow. That is very odd because he's, that position that he has is not traditionally on the Principals Committee, and he's mostly doing domestic and immigration stuff, not this. [00:12:27] Shane: Correct, yeah. And, and it really gives you a sense, I think, of what appears to be the very influential role that he has. I mean, if essentially what he's doing in that group is speaking for the president, or at least with the most authority of, "The president said this," and then after that there's no more disagreement, they all move forward. So that's, that is pretty striking. [00:12:48] Matt: Thank you. [00:12:48] Chris: Well, there've also been reports of Signal being loaded onto CIA devices. Do you have any insights on that and what other secure communication apps could they be using instead? [00:12:58] Shane: So I, I do have a little bit. I mean, the director, John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, he testified, um, they had a previously scheduled hearing that happened to be the day after our first story ran and he was asked about this and he said, you know, it's come loaded on my computer. Then he suggested that this was a fairly ubiquitous kind of thing. I, I don't think that the latter part is accurate. But, what is accurate is that, um, and this was true in the previous administration as well, that the director and staff around him will have access to Signal for use as an unclassified way of communicating when people are on the move, when the director is out of the building. And when I talk to people who've used this in the previous administration, um, whether they be in the White House, the intelligence agencies, it's, it's meant to be, um, for conveying logistics information. Like, Hey, the boss is wheels up from wherever he is, um, can you get the director, uh, uh, back to headquarters or into a facility? We need to put something in front of him. And as one person described it to me, you know, you learn to kind of talk around things and not to mention them directly. Now, there's a legitimate question of whether even that should be allowed, but we live in an era of ubiquitous communication and people like to convenience of being able to text. And from what I've, what I've learned from people is that, you know, they kind of, people in the administration moved over to Signal as a way of having more secure texting capability rather than just doing it over, you know, an unencrypted system. But they really just emphasized repeatedly that the, the chains that they'd been or the communications they'd had did not resemble anything like this Houthi PC small group that Mike Waltz set up, where they were discussing active military operations. That they just found stunning, that they, they knew to never use it for something like that. If you were gonna talk about an operation, you would just, you know, talk about, like one person said, you know, you'd say like, you know, that thing we talked about, if you really needed to say it. Um, and then when one person I talked to said that there were groups that they would set up, they wouldn't even, it just would just, it would just say like, group, it wouldn't even be labeled as anything. [00:15:15] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:15:16] Shane: Um, so to actually then label it as Houthi PC small group, um, which just completely gives away what it is, was not a best practice in, in, in earlier, um, usage. [00:15:27] Chris: No, I think al-Qaeda had better OPSEC than that, but- [00:15:31] Shane: Yeah, which does make it really rich when, you know, Pete Hegseth, you know, is saying, our OPSEC is clean on the operation. You're like, oh God. [00:15:38] Chris: Yeah, a hundred percent, I think he said. Yeah. What are the, what are the alternative apps? Because is, is it JWICS? Is that the name of the system? Uh, is that in an app form or is that more like a laptop-based thing, or? [00:15:51] Shane: That's not in an app form, no. I mean, that's, you're talking about the systems that are disconnected from the internet and that are used in a closed circuit, essentially. Um, or a closed connection. Um, and look, those would be more cumbersome than talking on an app or even using a secure phone device. Um, the government functioned for, you know, many decades using systems like that before we had apps. So I, you know, I mean, I get that there's, that there's a convenience aspect that having the apps, but the, you know, the really secure systems or the SCIFs, the secure facilities you're supposed to have these discussions, in those are still there and available. And I mean, I think it's pretty obvious that's what they should have used here. [00:16:31] Chris: Yeah, yeah. And how feasible would it be for a foreign intelligence service then to compromise the personal device of a senior official within the US if that official wasn't taking precautions? [00:16:41] Shane: It's a very good question. And, so there are exploits, you know, malware, um, that, uh, you know, so-called, uh, no-click malware is one where you know, it, it's sent to you maybe via text message or some other means, and you don't have to do anything as a recipient, it just loads onto your phone. Now, that is extremely high-end, nation state-level, um, intelligence gathering. And we know that there are companies out there that manufacture malware like that and that their clients are mostly governments. Um, so I think, I mean this is based on, you know, many conversations I've had in the past couple weeks with people, particularly in the counterintelligence space, is that every person in that group, at least the principals anyway, the secretary of state, defense, the CIA director, are presumably primary targets for foreign intelligence agencies and, you know, will have, presumably had seen, uh -- seen or not know about, maybe -- attempts to penetrate their communications devices. Um, I'm, I'm blanking on where this was, but in recent days somebody had an interesting report, um, quoting a former US official saying, you know -- I think it was in The Washington Post -- saying, look, you know, we spent a lot of time trying to hack the devices, the personal devices of foreign government officials. We, being the United States. Um, and they just presume that they're doing it to us, too. So, you know, if any one of the 18 people in that Signal chain had foreign malware on their phone, uh, and I think a lot of them were using personal phones perhaps for, for this, um, uh, or their government phone for that matter, then conceivably the intruder could see what was being typed as if they were looking at the screen right over the person's shoulder. And that's really, I think the, the, the big security risk here, um, uh, that doesn't seem to have factored into their thinking. [00:18:33] Matt: Um, those in Trump's political sphere often harbor paranoia over leaks and personal rivals, suspicion of and hostility towards established institutions and procedures. Um, surviving the gauntlet of his legal fiascos turned that anxiety into, like, white-hot rage and resentment of anyone or anything that could hold them accountable, slow them down, or, or, or question them. Um, it seems like they've sort of learned over the course of the past few years, the end of 2020, through the prosecutions, through the campaign, the people around him that, you know, this is a, um, uh, this is just sort of a, a, a, a way to help yourself in the future. Like, I'm reminded of those Heritage Foundation training videos that leaked over the summer that said, you know, if you get a, a sticky email, rather than replying to it, you should walk down to the office of the person who sent it and, you know, hash it out. So there isn't like a paper trail. Signal of course, doesn't retain data, as government-issued devices are, are, are, are meant to do. Um, Waltz at some point set these messages to delete, um, after, um, I think it was like a week? [00:19:43] Shane: One week, and then later he changed it to four. [00:19:45] Matt: Right, okay. So could, could, could we see the use of Signal in this way as an internal cultural thing, like a bad habit carried over from the past few years? What, what they were talking about in this group wasn't really illegal or even all that shocking, for them. The thing that was illegal and shocking was that they were doing it in, in, in Signal with the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic. You know, like there's this meme of, like, an undercover border collie who's like covered up in wool and a flock of sheep and the sheep don't notice him. [00:20:15] Shane: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, I guess the question is, I mean, maybe your question is like, you know, do we think that they were using Signal as a way of avoiding detection, you know, by others? I mean, I, I have wondered that question of whether this was a way of basically short-circuiting the normal process so that, um, NSC staff and other staff that might normally be involved in this don't see what they're doing. That's possible. I think it's also that it's possible that it's, it's partly convenience. Um, you mentioned that Walt set the, um, messages to auto-delete, and he and he did. And there is an obvious problem here with both the Presidential Records Act and the Federal Records Act, which are, are, I think, unambiguous that a text message is considered a record. And, um, if you're the national security advisor, both the Presidential Records Act and the Federal Records Act would apply here. And what that says is that within 20 days of creation of the record, which a text would be, you have to find a way to, you have to archive it, you have to put it on a dot-gov-system if you're using a commercial system, essentially. Well, John Ratcliffe actually testified that, um, the CIA, at least, is using Signal and that he suggested that it was being archived, which is interesting. I mean, that, that would be appropriate, by the way. That's how you would, would need to do it. Um, he didn't say how that was happening. So, if Waltz or others were looking at Signal as a way to somehow have disappearing or ephemeral conversations that weren't captured well, they might be captured on the CIA side, so that would kind of, so, so I don't know. I mean, your question, like, I mean, if your question is sort of like, why, why did they do this? Is it a bad habit that carried over? It may well be. Um, I think that it's notable that when Mike Waltz was coming in as national security advisor, uh, his, I think it was his chief of staff gave an interview saying that they were going to essentially get rid of all of the NSC career staff who were on detail from different agencies and, and they were doing this because they wanted to tamp down on leaks. You know, they felt like these are not people who are necessarily maybe loyal. Um, they want to limit the number of people, um, who see sensitive information. So maybe Signal is another way to kind of keep everything very tightly held, um, and do things over chat that maybe they're not doing, uh, on paper. That said, I, I wanna note that they reference in this Signal chat things happening on the "high side," things -- documents and statements being sent on the classified system -- so there is clearly some other process that is moving here on the classified side, as it should be. Um, it doesn't give us a great explanation for why they're doing this on Signal. And, and in point of fact, none of these officials have given one. All they've done is say like, oh, it wasn't classified, the information wasn't classified. And you can tell they're in a defensive posture when they're saying that, and we can talk about why they're doing that. But none of them has really offered an explanation for why in the world they did this. [00:23:21] Matt: Have you heard any indications that, um, uh, let's say Rubio or Gabbard or Ratcliffe or pretty much people other than Waltz or, or, or Hegseth, who I think are the two who kind of -- I mean, Waltz made the group chat, Hegseth put, copied and pasted the most sensitive information into it, right? Have you heard indications that like the rest of the group are kind of angry at the two of them for putting them-, for putting them in this position? [00:23:52] Shane: I, I've heard, I think I've heard more rumblings that, um, like, look, there's clearly fingerpointing that's going on, and you can see it reflected in, you know, press accounts with anonymous officials about whether or not Pete Hegseth is gonna be fired or not. Um, I would presume that there is probably a kind of frustration with Waltz for adding Jeff Goldberg in the first place and Hegseth is the one that's kind of revealing the most sensitive stuff. Rubio barely speaks -- you know, speaks, quote unquote. Um, Gabbard, same. Um, her de facto chief of staff, a guy named Joe Kent, has a passage where he talks a bit about whether they should go or not go on the attack, but he doesn't say much more beyond that. I mean, it really is, like, Hegseth is like the big star of the show. [00:24:43] Matt: Yeah. [00:24:44] Shane: And the one who is adding the stuff that I think is just, um, unambiguously classified, and his insistence that it's not classified, I mean, it doesn't just not pass the smell test, you can look at defense department regulations that describe in detail what information is presumably classified and lots of the stuff that he's sharing fits the description. [00:25:06] Matt: The White House has said, I believe a couple times now, like, No one's getting fired, get over it. Um, but there have been several cases in the last decade of some senior official who, you know, came out, really wasn't ready for primetime. The boss had his back until, you know, one day Trump's saying he's never heard of the guy before. Um, do, do, do you think Waltz and Hegseth, especially, are in, are in serious trouble? [00:25:29] Shane: I think Waltz is probably on thinner ice -- and this is just, sort of, like reading the political tea leaves of it -- but, um, you know, Waltz was never really, has never been close personally to the president. Secretary Hegseth is close to the president, like they've, they've known each other for a long time. They, you know, um, they have a history. Um, you know, Hegseth's a TV guy. Trump likes TV guys. Um, you know, Waltz, I think that Trump is, from the reporting we've seen, both that we've done and other organizations have done, you know, it's Trump doesn't want to fire Waltz and make it look like he was caving to pressure. He doesn't want to fire Waltz and make it look like, you know, The Atlantic got him fired. Um, but yeah, I think he's, um, probably on thin ice. It wouldn't, it wouldn't surprise me if in a month or two Waltz leaves and, you know, um, and they just kind of act as if this was not the reason. Um, there was a story, uh, in The Washington Post on Tuesday by my good friend and former colleague, John Hudson, great story, about Waltz and members of the NSC staff using Gmail for official purposes. Like, that is another weight on the scale like Mike Waltz cannot afford, you know, more revelations about improper communications patterns and, and these kinds of things. It just draws more and more attention to him and it distracts from what the president is trying to do. I mean, we're talking on Wednesday, April 2nd. This is supposed to be "Liberation Day," the president's gonna come out and talk about tariffs. The Signal story just utterly distracted from anything they wanted to do last week, and I think if Mike Waltz becomes a distraction, he's a problem. [00:27:06] Matt: Yeah. [00:27:07] Chris: Obviously the use of Signal to coordinate national security-related action may have violated several provisions of the Espionage Act and, as you mentioned earlier, the federal records law. What would be the typical consequence of that? [00:27:19] Shane: So, the typical consequence of this would be like -- one, politically, in a normal administration, I think the national security advisor would offer his or her resignation. If Jake Sullivan had done this, um, you know, if, if, if a Bush-era national security advisor, you know, if Stephen Hadley had done this -- they didn't have Signal back then, I don't think -- um, but they would've offered their resignation because it's humiliating and it was reckless, and whether the president would've taken it or not is a different question. Nothing like that happened here, but in the ordinary course of events, there would be an investigation. And it wouldn't be led, as the White House has said in this case, by the National Security Council, which of course is run by the guy who created the Signal chat. That's not a credible investigation. Um, the FBI would investigate this because you have a spillage of classified information, right? Now, I know the administration is going through back flips to say it wasn't classified, I think we've discussed the reasons it almost certainly would be. The attorney general, Pam Bondi, has all but said there will be no in FBI investigation. That's quite shocking, actually. So, normally there would be an investigation into how this happened, um, particularly if the individual agencies whose information was exposed and referred this to the Justice Department for said investigation. Now, in this case, it's a little weird because the person, for instance, who revealed the Defense Department equities is the secretary of defense. So, how does that work exactly? I mean, this is very, this is another reason this is so strange too, Chris, is that the people who are leaking the information, the classified or presumptively classified information, themselves have original classification authority. They can declassify things or classify them. Now they can't do it, I think, at the snap of a finger. This goes back to, like, did Trump imagine all the documents he took to Mar-a-lago were unclassified? I don't think that's, that's the case here. Um, but this complicates it. Um, well, I mean, you know, can they now retroactively say it was unclassified? But, you know, in, in a normal situation, if this was like a lower-level official, let's say, or a contractor who took something home, the FBI would investigate it. They, first of all, they'd probably be fired. Um, and, you know, whether they would be criminally prosecuted is an interesting question. Um, the, the, the closest analogy may be in this case is actually Hillary Clinton's use of a personal email server to conduct official business, right? She's a principal, she has this alternate communication system. It's not, she's not doing it appropriately. In that case, the Justice Department considered whether or not the gross negligence provision of the Espionage Act applied to her, and they ultimately determined not to charge her. That provision, which could apply here, has only been successfully used to get a conviction one time, that I'm aware of, in the entire hundred-plus-year-history of the law because gross negligence is actually quite murky and it's, it's, it's how do you define it? And there's not a lot of good case law for how you define it. So, you know, my suspect, if this was a normal procedure, the FBI would investigate it and probably they'd come down on the side of, you know, this was unintentional and we're not gonna file charges against anyone. But the political repercussions and, and the career damage would be severe. If it were a lower-level person in an inadvertent leak like this, I still don't think they'd be prosecuted, but, you know, people have been charged and gone to prison for taking classified documents home and keeping them at their house and hoarding information. So, you know, you're on, if you're a lower-level person, you are on very thin ice if you do something like this. [00:30:50] Chris: I mean, if there is an inaction, could it have an effect on future cases of a similar nature? [00:30:55] Shane: I would imagine that this would. I mean, I have to think that whatever Signal conversations may be going on in government have stopped at least temporarily, or people are paying really close attention to who's in the group. Making sure everyone sounds off. "JG, who are you? Which JG are you?" Um, so I would think that this might, you know, kind of sh-, you know, shake people up and, and push them back onto the, you know, appropriate systems, which, you know, I would count as a good thing for the public interest. [00:31:26] Chris: Yeah, definitely. What impact do you think this scandal could have on the Five Eyes relationships? Because I know there's already been some rumblings from Canada about this. [00:31:33] Shane: Yeah, I think it's, it's, it's, it's significant. I mean, I've done some reporting on this myself, um, and I, you know, I think that, you know, our allies are appalled. Um, you know, one of the things that they were, I mean, this is, it's, it's appalled the whole nature of it. Um, really distressed, interestingly, that, um, the name of a currently serving US intelligence officer was thrown into this chat. Um, and I don't think that Director Ratcliffe meant to expose that person. I am not saying that, and that person is not undercover. We withheld that person's name in our final publication of the text, by the way, at the CIA's request, just wanna note that. Um, but I think the allies are looking at this and saying, this is not just an isolated incident, this is part of a pattern of just serial recklessness when it comes to handling and mishandling of classified information going back to the first term. You know, um, uh, the Americans, you know, uh, sharing and leaking information about the Manchester bombing, uh, in 2017, I think it was. That really infuriated the British. Um, President Trump, uh, exposing the, uh, uh, existence of an Israeli intelligence agent inside ISIS to the Russians in 2017. Um, you know, we could kind of go on and on, and I've written some about this recently, the allies look at this and it's just one more factor in their calculation to hold back on what they share with us. Um, and, and I think this is gonna have real consequences. It is the case that we provide more intelligence to our allies, and particularly Five Eyes partners, than they provide to us, but what they can do is fill in gaps that we are not collecting on. And you know, if this strains the relationship and they're holding back, you're increasing the risk of blind spots or us missing something. I, I don't wanna suggest that if an ally had information about an imminent attack, they would hold back on that. I absolutely do not believe they would do that. [00:33:31] Chris: No, no. [00:33:32] Shane: But, but you, you have to account for the possibility that kind of this slow pulling back and the changing of the nature of what will have been a more open relationship, that that could have pretty negative consequences on our security and, and potentially on theirs. [00:33:45] Chris: Also then, it might affect joint operations. I remember there was a really great talk last year with Richard Moore and Bill Burns -- director Burns, at the time, of the CIA -- talking about, they would use, um, the kind of athletic approach of the best person to move forward with an operation. I'm assuming now that would be rarer. [00:34:01] Shane: I think it's gonna, it could be rarer. I think what also is, um, gonna be the case is that, the kind of the working-level, career people, you know, in these agencies -- like just take MI6 and CIA as an example -- you know, they will have to work out even more closely how they're gonna do these operations together and will have to come up with ways that they're gonna keep information safe. Now, does that, do they kind of, like, band together as, you know, fellow career people and say, "Right, let's kind of like maybe keep this away from the White House if we can. Let's keep this to ourselves. Let's be more protective of it." Maybe. I mean, I think there that, um, they will still work together, but will there be hesitation certainly of the political class, the appointed class? Yeah, definitely. I mean, the new director of, deputy director for operations, who's coming in, um, is gonna kind of have his work cut out for him in that way. He is a career, extremely seasoned, very experienced case officer, chief of station, operative, um, and I think somebody who will come in with a lot of credibility. That will, I think, probably help, uh, uh, kind of calm nerves. Yeah. [00:35:11] Chris: Yeah, so it's unlikely we're gonna see a Five Eyes Signal group started anytime soon then. [00:35:17] Shane: I don't think so. [00:35:18] Matt: That's, that's what, that's what, that's what you and I got, Chris. [00:35:20] Shane: I mean, if there was, I'd love to be included, but I doubt that'll happen. [00:35:25] Chris: Excellent, excellent. Matt, was there anything else you wanted to add, or are you happy? [00:35:28] Matt: No, no. That's, that's, that's, that's good for me. Um, yeah. [00:35:31] Chris: Thank you, Shane. [00:35:31] Matt: Thank you for, thank you for coming on and- [00:35:33] Shane: Yeah, thanks guys. [00:35:34] Matt: And talking about this with us. [00:35:35] Shane: Anytime. [00:35:35] Matt: You know, thanks to you and Jeffrey Goldberg and also, uh, Laurene Powell Jobs, and all your colleagues at The Atlantic for not, um, burying this. You know, nowadays there are real incentives to do so. Um, what you did, it, it, it, it's ballsy. It, it's brave. [00:35:52] Shane: Appreciate that, thank you. [00:35:54] Chris: No, well done. And, uh, Donald Trump's favorite paper, apparently. [00:35:57] Shane: Yeah, he loves it, he loves it. He's subscribing. We sent him a tote bag. [00:36:01] Chris: Nice. Thank you, Shane. [00:36:04] Matt: All right, my friend, thank you. [00:36:05] Shane: All right guys, take care. [00:36:06] Matt: So, Chris, what did you, what did you think about what, what, what, what'd Shane had to say? [00:36:09] Chris: Yeah, well, it was very, very interesting chat with him. Um, obviously the, for me, the concern about the Five Eyes relationship's always paramount because it seems to be getting so dented at the moment. [00:36:19] Matt: Mm-hmm. [00:36:20] Chris: And obviously now, um, Five Eyes partners are gonna be a little bit more guarded about sharing particular information about ops, especially about sort, should we say, people under deep cover in terrorist organizations, Russia, et cetera. Um, that kind of information won't easily be shared anymore. Um, so yeah, that was a very big sort of piece there. Um, also I've, I'm just fascinated by the use of Signal itself. Um, you know, again, it's for sharing non-classified information, like, you know, planning a meeting, et cetera. And it's just so bizarre, um, that the US government, shall we say, hasn't maybe created an app that's of a, um, an equivalent sort of convenience to Signal, um, that could be used for people who are used to using apps like Signal, WhatsApp, because I remember President Obama used to be a massive fan of his Blackberry back in the day and Blackberry Messenger. [00:37:12] Matt: Yeah, yeah. [00:37:12] Chris: And I, I loved Blackberry Messenger when I had a Blackberry, it was really cool. But, um, so, you know, it's not like the, um, I don't wanna put the blame on the US government because it's not US government's fault, but at the same time, um, it, you know, it is just interesting that the government's been very slow to maybe create an app that gives you that experience of being like on Signal, WhatsApp, so it deters employees from going one step too far with using a commercial app. It's a bit like why, um, the MI5 building, uh, they have very good sort of dining facilities and coffee shops, et cetera. So it encourages employees to stay in the building so they can have open conversations, et cetera, rather than go to the local coffee shop and, you know, wait in Starbucks and start accidentally talking about classified information, you know. So it's, it's, yeah, there, there's a, uh, an interesting kind of issue around, um, why there isn't some sort of convenient app that could be used instead. But anyway, but that, that's a minor issue, it shouldn't excuse the behavior, um, of, of those involved. [00:38:13] Matt: Yeah. You know, it's, um, it's interesting you bring up, uh, Obama's Blackberry. I, I remember that because I mean, he was, um, he was -- as far as presidents go, especially nowadays -- was very young when he was elected. [00:38:24] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:38:24] Matt: Um, and, um, you know, he was of, of a generation and of an age that had been, you know, using personal cell phones like that, you know, for his entire, um, adult life. I mean, now it sounds very, you know, kind of standard and just like everyone kind of uses it, but you think going back past presidents Bush Jr., Clinton, senior, I mean, before that cell phones didn't exist, but it was a, it was a new kind of technology and there was, yeah, I, I remember that, uh, distinctly during the transition then, um, sort of conversations like, Is Obama gonna have to give up his, his his beloved, um, Blackberry? And then they eventually, um, they did -- I forget the details, there's, there's articles about this on like specialized blogs that cover classified communications systems and stuff -- um, but they, they found a solution for him. Um, the NSA took a, I don't remember if it was initially, the first version of it, if it was like specifically a Blackberry or some other defense communications contractor that had something that was a lot like a Blackberry and looked like it and had the keyboard and kind of functioned the same way, and, um, the NSA, the White House Communications Agency -- of course, the NSA is um, at the time, I'm not sure if it's still is, I think it still is, uh, is responsible for, um, information assurance of government communication networks and stuff, and of course the White House Communications Agency, um, handles presidential communications for him and his staff at the White House, their separate residences, on the road, and Air Force One, et cetera -- um, but they, uh, configured a, a phone and, and had it for him to use. I think it was pretty restricted as far as what he could do. It was sort of limited to, um, senior staff and, and personal friends and stuff he had had, you know, going back to, to, to childhood and stuff. But I mean, to that point, there are, and that was, you know, God, how many years ago? 2008 we're talking about, right, so- [00:40:19] Chris: Yeah, 2008, yeah. That was the beginning of his presidency, yeah. [00:40:21] Matt: Now it's, so- Yeah, now it's, it's, it's so much more advanced what the capabilities are. I mean, it is, to your point, there, as Shane sort of was saying, you know, people get used to the convenience of just, you know, having your phone and just texting people little kind of stuff. I mean, yeah, I think we all get that. We're all, I'm totally addicted to my phone. It's a problem. I, I admit it. [00:40:42] Chris: Yeah, yeah, yeah. People multitask with them. You can, in a meeting, kind of kill two birds one stone by messaging one person and talking to somebody else. It's bad. But yeah, people do, do it. [00:40:49] Matt: Yeah, I can carry on both at the same time. Maybe I shouldn't, but I can. Um, and, uh, I get that. But you know, there are, we like, we have the technology, you know, to, to be able to have that, that convenience and that quick communication at that senior, you know, classified level, um, without doing it on your personal, on your personal cell phone, on a, on a, on a commercially available app. In the case of, you know, um, Steve Witkoff, we didn't, we didn't, uh, discuss him with Shane directly, but, um, uh, the special envoy to the Middle East, who is on these, um, chats. Uh, at the time of this conversation that was going on, he was in, he was in Moscow, um, negotiating stuff with Ukraine. Why the special envoy for the Middle East is now negotiating Ukraine, I don't, I don't know, but that's a separate, um, podcast. [00:41:41] Chris: Did they misread the map? [00:41:43] Matt: Maybe. Maybe. But yeah, he was, um, he was walking around, he's, he's walking around Moscow on his, you know, personal cell phone. And, I'm sorry, if you are kind of quarterbacking, um, uh, negotiations with the Russians over the war in Ukraine and you're in Moscow, you are the biggest intelligence target in the country. [00:42:00] Chris: Yeah, no, it's madness. Do you know what's interesting though? Um, it's like, it's not like the Houthis, as far as we know, ended up getting warned, did they? And, and Russia are connected to Iran, right? Iran are connected to the Houthis. So it is kind of interesting that despite all that, somehow the Russians, it doesn't appear that they picked up on it. Uh, that's, or they chose not to act because they have picked up on it and they're, you know, I dunno, it's an interesting one, that. [00:42:28] Matt: Right. Um, well we don't, we, I don't do, do, do, do we know that the Houthis had no indication that strikes were coming at all? [00:42:39] Chris: That's a good question. I'm not a hundred percent sure, but I only can assume that they didn't, only because I don't think there was much, um, resistance to the airstrikes as far as I know. [00:42:50] Matt: Yeah. I mean, yeah, they're, they, they have air defense capabilities. They, um, I believe in February, was it? They took a shot at, was it an F-18, I think? Um, they missed, but they have, they have greater capabilities than say, you know, al-Qaeda did. [00:43:08] Chris: Yeah. [00:43:08] Matt: The Taliban, you know. That's for sure. Um, they certainly have considerable intelligence capabilities, you know, given to them from the, um, from the Iranians. I would guess probably also the Russians to a much lesser extent, but, you know, they're always there to, they're there somewhere in the, in the, in the background. [00:43:27] Chris: Well, this is it, and one must always assume that when you're in Russia. [00:43:30] Matt: Oh, of course, yeah. Um, you know, it's, um, it's, it is, we got, we got lucky that we didn't, um, lose an F-18 pilot on that, on that operation. It's just sort of, you know, yeah, dumb luck, and that it was, um, happened to be the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, that got added to that chat and not someone with, who was a lot more careless and, um, had more nefarious intents to like, you know, the country itself. [00:43:58] Chris: Yeah. Well I, uh, I could think of two initials that might fit that. Uh, "JA?" Yeah? [00:44:06] Matt: Yeah. [00:44:07] Chris: Potentially. Um, if JA was in the chat, you know, it could have ended very differently. [00:44:12] Matt: Yeah, absolutely. Crazy, crazy story. Um, first, it's got, this is the first sort of national security story in a long time, that to my recollection, especially definitely in, in, in Trump's first, in Trump's second term, but first national security story in a long time that really has sort of broken through and, and has legs and that people can kind of just easily understand. I mean, I've seen like random, you know, 20-somethings, early 20-somethings on TikTok making, like, videos, like, you know, criticizing it, but in like a joking way. And that, when you see that, for a national security story, you know, it's, it, it's broken through into the culture and people know about it and they get it. And that's, that's just, that's very rare in this day and age. [00:44:59] Chris: And, like, traditional Republicans are all about pro-military. Anybody in the military now, I mean, if I were in the military, I would be very concerned because you could end up on one of these missions that gets blown because somebody's not doing their job properly because they're exposing the secrets. [00:45:13] Matt: Yeah. Or you have family who's deployed on the, on the Truman, you know? [00:45:16] Chris: Yeah, yeah. It's not good. So it's, uh, I'm sure more will come out in time, but, uh, you know, huge thank you to Shane for, you know, joining us and giving us that insight. [00:45:26] Matt: Yeah, one more point about this. You know, you can be, it is completely ideologically consistent to be, um, outraged, upset, you know, anxious about such stories in the past, like, um, Bowe Bergdahl or, um, the Iran nuclear deal, criticizing the terms of that and, you know, what the Iranians got in return for signing on to the JCPOA, or, you know, Hillary's email server, which Shane talked about a bit, um, the, the Abbey Gate bombing during the withdrawal from Afghanistan. You know, all of those, um -- Benghazi, you know -- all of those kind of national security screw ups, should we say, right? You know, over the past 15 years or so. It is completely ideologically consistent to believe that those were awful and dangerous and inexcusable and, and, and, it is, you can do that and also say that this is wrong. [00:46:25] Chris: Yeah. [00:46:25] Matt: You know? [00:46:25] Chris: Yeah. [00:46:25] Matt: You're not contradicting yourself. If anything, you'd be contradicting yourself to twist yourself into a pretzel to find a way to say that, Well, actually no, this is fine. [00:46:32] Chris: Yeah, yeah, yeah. [00:46:33] Matt: You, you can say both are, you can say both are wrong, it's okay. [00:46:37] Chris: Mm. No, and I think it was interesting actually, because I'm trying to remember which scandal it was, but do you remember John Schindler, who used to work for the NSA? He wrote an interesting piece, um, about how there's a sort of culture in, um, you know, American political elites is not a term I like to use that often, but, you know, long people who end up in positions of leadership who can be very blase about secrecy. I mean, there were scandals, not only with President Trump taking classified documents back to Mar-a-Lago, even President Biden had things in his garage. Um, you've had, obviously, Hillary Clinton we mentioned earlier with her server, et cetera. Um, is there a, an attitude for some people when they get into position of power that they think the rules no longer apply to them or something? It's very odd. [00:47:26] Matt: Yeah. There's a, there's a fine line there. You know, I get the, as far as, you know, the, the Trump and Biden, you know, document stuff, there is a difference between the two. [00:47:36] Chris: Oh, yeah, huge difference. Just by the volume. [00:47:38] Matt: Biden should not have had. Right. Biden should not have had those documents in his, in his garage. Um, seems like it was a careless, um, staffing issue, packing up his office at the end of Obama's term. Um, and you know, when, uh, he became aware of it, he told his lawyers and they got ahold of the Justice Department and the FBI, and they took them back and they did an investigation and, you know, okay, like we can give some grace for that. Yes, you are the vice president. You are a step up from, you know, is it completely fair? You know, if you're like a, a regular, you know, career analyst or something, and you accidentally have classified documents in your garage, like, you're, you're gonna jail, bud. You know, is, is that fair, the discrepancy between the two? No, but that's the system we have and that's the way it is. You know, people at that senior level are just treated differently. They always are across administrations, right? So, but Biden or his lawyers, you know, realized, oh yeah, crap, we have these classified documents in, in, in, in, in this garage and they very quickly gave it back. As opposed to the other guy who had boxes of them stacked up on the stage of his private ballroom and a guest bathroom and in his office and wherever else, and, you know, tried to hide them and argue with the FBI and the Justice Department. "No, they're mine. I'm not giving them back." Like, you forced them. [00:49:03] Chris: Right, it wasn't even a private estate, either. Mar-a-Lago is a place where people go and stay. [00:49:08] Matt: Yeah, it's a country club. Yeah. Yeah, it's a private club, which I'm sure if, if you are the head of a major foreign intelligence service, even allied service, you know, um, and you don't have someone at Mar-a-Lago on your payroll, um, you're not very good at your job. [00:49:24] Chris: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, and there certainly were allegations that were members of Chinese intelligence there, um, and possibly even Russian. So, yeah. [00:49:33] Matt: But no to, to, to, just to reiterate from my point there, and then we can, um, move on because we've spent a lot of time on this, this morning. But, you know, it's, it's okay to say that all of this is wrong no matter who does it and still say that, well, I support this other stuff that he's doing, but this is wrong and they shouldn't be doing it, and they should stop it and they should fix it. It's okay. You can say that. [00:49:55] Chris: Yeah, yeah. [00:49:55] Matt: Just my thought. [00:49:56] Chris: Yeah, no, no, it, it is a perfectly valid thought there. So, yeah. Well, um, thank you again, Shane, for joining us. So, I think let's take a break and then we will be right back with more. Welcome back, everybody. So, uh, Matt, you've got a really interesting piece about the new F-47 that was announced last week. Uh, all the interesting things seem to happen when I was on my kind of week off last week, but, uh, yeah, you can tell us about that. [00:50:35] Matt: It is definitely a catch up, uh, uh, uh, uh, a catch up episode, but we have a lot of, a lot of interesting stories to cover. [00:50:40] Chris: Yeah. [00:50:41] Matt: Um, so yeah, so, after years of secrecy, the US Air Force has officially awarded Boeing the contract to build the F-47, the crewed centerpiece of its Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD. Meant to replace the F-22 Raptor, currently the world's most advanced air superiority fighter, the F-47 is set to become the US military's first sixth-generation fighter and potentially the last manned tactical aircraft the Air Force ever fields. Announced personally by President Trump in the Oval Office, the F-47 represents the biggest leap in US air power in over two decades. Built around broadband stealth, exotic electronic warfare tools, and long-range capabilities tailored to Pacific conflict scenarios, it's designed not just to outperform adversaries like China and Russia, but to operate at the heart of a broader air combat ecosystem. That includes the Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft program or CCA. Those are, um -- we've talked about them previously on here -- those are, um, the semi-autonomous, um, "loyal wingman," uh, drones that the F-47 will control and fly alongside in future conflicts. Um, two CCA designs, General Atomics', uh, YFQ-42, and Anduril's YFQ-44, both announced, um, recently, uh, were presumably developed alongside the F-47. Um, probably in the, I can get into this a bit later if you wanna really geek out about it, but probably in the same hangar complex. The aircraft's designation, F-47, appears to be both a nod to the World War II-era P 47 Thunderbolt and, according to Trump, himself as the 47th president. I'll have more on that later. In, in his words, this fighter is "virtually unseeable" with power and maneuverability like nothing else in the world. Uh, Air Force chief of staff, General David Allvin, called it "the most advanced, lethal, and adaptable fighter ever developed." Behind the scenes, this wasn't just a paper competition. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman also, built full, uh, demonstrators. One first flew in 2019, the other in 2022, um, and those aircraft logged hundreds of flight hours, um, very likely within the restricted airspace over Groom Lake, Nevada, where the CCA drones presumably also, uh, flew as well. Um, the decision to award Boeing and the contract came after extensive test data and real-world performance comparisons, all under an extraordinary veil of secrecy. There's still a lot we don't know: final configuration details, whether the design's rumored, uh, forward, uh, canards are real or just excited speculation, and how much of this will be exportable to US allies. But the bottom line is this: Boeing's future as a fighter-builder was on the line, and with the F-47, they've secured the biggest prize in tactical air power. Chris, uh, what say you about Boeing's big coup? [00:53:33] Chris: Yeah, major win for Boeing, um, once seen as the crown jewel of American business, but whose civilian reputation has been badly damaged by high-profile disasters, whistleblower claims, and accusations of prioritizing cost-cutting over safety and quality. I also want to add that there were 89 of the new KC-46A Pegasus tankers that have been grounded due to cracks being discovered in two of these new aircraft, as well as issues in the past with the refueling booms on these Boeing-made planes. So, Boeing has been in a bad place for some time in aviation circles, so I'm hoping the F-47 will be treated with great care because it's obviously a very important step forward for the US Air Force and possibly even for allied air forces. I'm sure the RAF will want to buy some if they get an opportunity to do so. Um, and obviously with the development of the F-47, I suspect it would've had a much higher level of scrutiny than other Boeing aircraft. As you know, um, it was developed at the Phantom Works, which, you know, Matt, you, I'm sure you can tell us a bit more about that in a minute. Um, and the other things interesting to note, so obviously Northrop Grumman withdrew from the program in 2023 to focus on the B-21, and apparently Lockheed Martin actually withdrew from the program not long before the announcement and they're focusing on the US Navy's next generation of carrier-based aircraft. So I don't whether Lockheed Martin, um, withdrew to save face or whether they properly withdrew, which then left us with Boeing. I hope that's not the case, but it's sort of, you know, reading between lines a little bit might be the case. Um, and then just looking at the F-47's design, it sort of has its roots in the X-36, uh, stealth drone concept fighter. And what's interesting to note with that is, obviously not long ago when, um, Trump came into power, uh, with, uh, the, you know, with Elon Musk helping him, there was speculation that the, the program might get canceled and it might be instead just with, um, kind of drone aircraft instead of, uh, you know, having an actual pilot in the aircraft. So it's, it's good to see the F-47 is still, you know, uh, uh, gonna have a pilot in it. Um, and then the design as well as, as I was saying, it has its similarities to the X-36, but it also has, um, some similarities to the YF-118G Bird of Prey concept fighter that was developed and tested at Area 51, and that was that, that came out in the late '90s. Um, so it just shows, shows-- yeah. Yeah, so it just shows how long this sort of technology takes to kind of come to being a viable concept. And that particular plane is actually on display at the US Air Force Museum in Ohio. Um, so if anybody goes, please send us a picture because it looks very cool. So, no, I think the F-47 on the whole, I'm, I have high hopes for it. I hope, I wish it all the best. I think it, you know, could be an amazing aircraft and obviously as we said a few episodes ago, China have put out their sixth-gen fighter for us to see. Um, and you know, obviously there's potentially competition now with, with regards to these sixth-gen aircraft. I hope that, that Boeing are able to sort of recover from their issues they've been having and kind of get back to being a, a world-class business because Boeing, for me, I've always been a big Boeing fan. It's been very sad to see how Boeing's kind of gone, um, really down in its reputation over the last sort of 10, 15 years and I'd like to see Boeing back on top. So I'm hoping the F-47 might put Boeing back to where it should be. But Matt, what are your thoughts on this? [00:57:03] Matt: Yeah, um, that Boeing won, this is very, um, interesting. I don't, like, I think the reaction at least online, like, when it was announced that Boeing won the contract was very much like, "Boeing! Why Boeing?" You know, they're like in the tubes right now. You know, um, all the issues that they've had on the civilian side. You mentioned the KC-46s. [00:57:25] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:57:25] Matt: Yeah, I mean, Boeing has had, the, the, the, the reaction when, um, when this was first announced, you know, like, "Oh my God, it's Boeing?1" You know, they've had all kinds of issues on the civilian side, and you mentioned the, the, um, KC-46, uh, tanker fleet, there problems. Um, they've been building a replacement for Air Force One for many years. That's, that's delayed, and Trump was pretty, um, reportedly pretty, pretty pissed about that. Like he, I think he was, um, asking the Pentagon and the Air Force ways to like, can we, can we speed this along? [00:57:56] Chris: Yeah. There might even be competition for that soon. I dunno if you saw the Boom Air Force One concept not long ago. [00:58:01] Matt: No, I didn't see that. What, what was it? [00:58:02] Chris: Oh, the Boom's a supersonic plane. So basically, Boom's this sort of startup company that are wanting to bring back supersonic air travel. And they're, they're making pretty good headway, and they made a little mockup model of Air Force One as a supersonic jet and they gave it to Trump. [00:58:15] Matt: They're not gonna put, they're, the, the Secret Service and the Air Force is not gonna put the president and his staff in a supersonic plane for a very long time. [00:58:23] Chris: Yeah, there aren't the other aircraft that can keep up with it as well. So it's not just Air Force one that goes out alone, so. [00:58:28] Matt: Yeah, yeah. It flies with other, yeah. Um, but yes. Uh, but you know, that, that, that, that said, um, Boeing is a, is a very large company. Um, this project came out of their Phantom Works, um, division, which is sort of like their version of, of, of Skunk Works where, you know, like the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, where the black projects and stuff are kind of, um, housed and, and and built. Um, Boeing spent a lot of money in recent years, um, building up a new classified, uh, plant, factory, um, assembly line, um, at their plant in, uh, St. Louis. Um, so they have a lot of good infrastructure for this. Um, that probably, definitely I think sweetened the deal for the Air Force, those investments on the assembly line. Um, you know, Lockheed definitely has more experienced with manned fighters. I mean, they invented the stealth fighter. Um, Boeing's track record has recently been spotty, of course, to put it mildly. Um, although if -- something to keep in mind though, I think if Boeing had, um, gotten the contract, all US frontline fighter production would be in the hands of a single contractor. Um, and that poses, you know, real counterintelligence and, and security issues. Uh, institutional knowledge and talent start to atrophy, you know? Um, Lockheed will still have the F-35, the F-16, um, maintenance for the F-22 fleet -- uh, production of that has, has, has halted, um, but you know, you still have to maintain the ones that, that, that we have. Um, so Boeing gets, uh, the F-47, the F-15EX, which, um, has proven to be an extremely capable fourth-generation fighter. Um, you know, and of course the, the contract for the F/A-XX is still out, which is, um, the Navy's version of, of the NGAD program. It's, you know, their version of a sixth-gen fighter that would replace, um, the F-18. Uh, Lockheed, I mean, a lot of the stories were like, you know, oh, boo-hoo for Lockheed, you know, they, they kind of lost out on, on everything there. That's not, that's not the complete story. Um, they delivered a classified aircraft to the Air Force a few years ago. There's speculation -- and all we kind of know about it is just, is just speculation -- that is, that it is a, um, a reconnaissance aircraft, uh, uh, uh, a spy plane, possibly hypersonic, um, in nature. Think of like, you know, the, the Dark Star from the new, um, Top Gun movie. [01:01:09] Chris: Yeah. [01:01:10] Matt: Maybe like that in real life, possibly. We don't, we don't know for sure. So they got, they've, they've, they've had other victories that remain in the black that we are unaware of. You know, Northrop has the B-21. [01:01:23] Chris: Yeah. [01:01:24] Matt: That's in, um, flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base right now has been for a little while. Um, there's also, uh, they have -- it's operational, it, it, it's been operational for, for, for a few years now -- um, the replacement for the U-2. Um, the, uh, we don't know its actual name because its existence is still classified, there's a few pictures of it. I think one, one over Groom Lake that was captured a few years ago, and then someone in Thai- in, in, in the Philippines, um, snapped a picture of this, you know, flying-wing triangle, like 80, 70,000 feet up over the Philippines heading towards China, um, a few years ago that looks like what we think this, this drone is. We, we call it the RQ-180 because we don't know what that, what, what, what, what its actual name is. Um, but so Northrop has that, um, probably very similar in design and function to the B-21. Well, not function, but, um, very similar in a design to the, to the B 21, probably developed alongside it to an extent. Um, so it's, I, I, I don't know. I, I definitely, again, there, there's so much that we don't know about the F-47. Um, uh, we have a couple graphics that were released by the Air Force and Boeing when it launched. Um, those were just computer-rendered, um, images, not actual, like, photographs of it. Um, and there are in that, in that photo that it, it looks like it has forward, kind of, canards to it. And there's a, there's been a long debate, um, in the military aviation community, like the black project, um, enthusiasts, as to whether or not, you know, canards are, are good for, for, for, for stealth or not. Even I am not gonna touch something that controversial. Um, I'm not going there, I don't know. [01:03:23] Chris: I have no idea on that, but it does look like it has canards, but from what I've seen. [01:03:27] Matt: Yeah, at least in the front. And, um, the X-36, uh, did as well, so it's, it's likely that it does. Um, yeah, we, we, we still haven't seen it. It's been, um, really kind of impressive, you know, it's been, uh, this prototype which would be called, um, the YF-47 -- Y designator because it's a, because it's a prototype -- um, has been flying since, you know, 2019, 2020. It's already logged hundreds of flight hours. And, um, you know, we still, we haven't actually seen it. Um, we just have those kind of, you know, um, images, uh, you know, illustrations of it. Um, so it's, it's, it's, it's very, it's very cool. It's very interesting. Um, I don't know. Do you have any other kind of questions about it that you wanted to go through? [01:04:09] Chris: I think, I think you pretty much covered everything there. I mean, yeah, I just, uh, again, you know, I hope it, it, it lives up to the, uh, expectations. I know at the moment there is even issues now with, um, there was, there've been some more F-35 crashes. Because the F-35 has been a very controversial jet, I think I'd put it as, um, because it went over budget, took a long time, and then, unfortunately, quite a few of them- [01:04:31] Matt: Engine issues, yeah. [01:04:32] Chris: Crashed. You know, I, I, I can't, I haven't got to hand the exact numbers, but, um, when I last checked it was definitely in double digits. So, and that might be more pilot error than anything, but, um, it's still a bit of a concern. And these jets are not cheap either, so it's, uh, yeah, the, the whole, um, sixth-gen thing -- uh, what was, can you remember the cost of the exact cost per unit, uh, per jet? I can't remember. It was a lot of money. [01:04:58] Matt: Um, I believe off the top of my head, I believe the cost per unit is $300 million. [01:05:04] Chris: And that's why they're having to come up with these, uh, kind of wingman drones, because they're gonna have less manned aircraft, but the wingman- [01:05:10] Matt: Right, yeah. They're gonna have, they're gonna have fewer, fewer manned aircraft. And those, um, those unmanned drones are, um, the, the, the, the wingman drones are kind of force multipliers to kind of make up the difference. You won't need as many, as many manned aircraft because of that. But yeah, it's a, it's a very expensive platform, for sure. But I mean, probably, yeah, definitely it's designed to replace the most, um, advanced and capable fighter in the world, so it would be the most advanced and capable fighter, um, in the world. Uh, as for, you know, export versions, um, I don't know. Uh, you know, I, I definitely, if there's anyone who would get it, it would be the RAF. You know, it's, it's, it's gonna be expensive, you know, and there aren't many countries that'll be able to, to, to afford it. We had issues, um, in the, in the development of this. The Air Force had real issues about costs, and I believe this had to be, um, re-scoped, um, a couple times, but, uh. Oh, one more thing. So about the, the, the 47 number. Um, I know Trump, Trump said it was sort of a nod to him, I don't, um, I, I I don't know that, that's, that's entirely true. Um, you know, the, the Air Force chief of staff and Boeing said it was a nod to the, to the P-47, um, Thunderbolt from, from World War II. Also possible. I think that's more just like a marketing kind of uh, uh, thing that was layered on top of it. Um, so, uh, Peter Merlin, who was on, who's been on this podcast before, um, he's an, um, aviation expert, uh, um, historian, wrote, kind of like the book on, um, Area 51. Uh, he said, according to him on the Dreamland Resort forum -- which I read, um, religiously -- he said, um, so as to this question, he said, the designation might follow one of the black project, um, aircraft flown at Groom Lake. So in the past there have been such aircraft as the YF-43B, which flew circa 20, 2005 to 2007, um, and the YF-45D, which flew around 2020. Um, the latter fits the timeframe about, you know, five years ago. Um, that, there's reasons to suspect, according to a Navy test pilot who had that designation listed in his bio, um, that it, it could be, um, that aircraft, could have been part of an a, um, FME program, which stands for Foreign Material Exploitation, which is basically, um, we steal other people's stuff and take it apart and fly it and learn how it works. So that would be a, a foreign aircraft- [01:07:46] Chris: Like the Chinese one. [01:07:47] Matt: Or, or, or a Russian aircraft or something. Um, those have been flown and tested out of Groom Lake, um, in the past. So you have that sequence of, you know, -43, -45. Um, the, the CCA drones, what are their designations? Uh, FQ-44, FQ-42. Um, you know, the, the Lockheed and Northrop, um, prototypes, we don't know what they are, but would also have, um, YF designations with a number that's sort of around that same range. So I think it's kind of just coincidence that the Boeing one that got the contract happens to be called the, the F-47. Um, you know, and of course, you know, Trump can see that and go, oh, hey, that's just like me. Um, fine, but that's not that, that's, that's not why it's actually named that. This fighter has been flying for years and was beginning to be developed in the mid-2010s, you know? [01:08:43] Chris: Yeah. Because I know for some that's tainted the, uh, announcements. [01:08:47] Matt: Yeah. I, I, I, I, that's, that's why I, I, I wanted to bring that up here. I saw people online, you know, when it was announced being like, "Oh my God!" You know, "The Air Force named it after him, that's crazy," and I'm like, no, no, no, calm, calm down. I don't think that's, that's actually the case here, but yeah. [01:09:02] Chris: Random note, uh, sadly, uh, there's news of Val Kilmer passed away today and he was Iceman in Top Gun and his last role was in Top Gun 2, um, where he gives quite an emotional little sort of speech there. Um, so, you know, uh, sort of hats off to Val Kilmer really. And you know, Godspeed. It's such a shame that he's passed away because he was a great actor. So, uh, totally different note, but there was a slight aircraft, uh, um, angle there. So, uh, I thought it's definitely worth noting. Well, thank you very much for that, Matt. I think we'll take one more break and then we'll come back and have a quick chat about Oleg Gordievsky. So, we'll be right back. Welcome back, everybody. So, our final piece is about the passing of Oleg Gordievsky. So on the 21st of March, news broke that, uh, Oleg Gordievsky, who is considered one of MI6's most effective spies in the KGB, had passed away. So I'm gonna take notes from a detailed obituary by Clay Risen from The New York Times, and I'll just summarize the key points about Oleg's history before adding some extra info. So, um, Oleg Gordievsky was the most highly placed Western spy during the Cold War. He was recruited by MI6 in 1974, whilst posted in Copenhagen. He secretly fed intelligence to the British for over a decade whilst rising through the KGB ranks. By 1982, he was stationed in London and eventually became the KGB's top officer in Britain, all whilst working for the British. His covert role was revealed in 1985 when he dramatically defected to the West. Gordievsky played a crucial role in diffusing one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War. During NATO's Able Archer 1983 exercise, the Soviets feared it was a cover for a real nuclear first strike. Gordievsky passed these concerns to the West and reassured Moscow that no attack was imminent. His actions helped prevent escalation and influence both President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to turn down their rhetoric. After suspicions arose in Moscow, Gordievsky was recalled, drugged, and interrogated. Without enough evidence to imprison him, the KGB placed him under surveillance, but he managed to slip away. A coded street encounter triggered Operation Pimlico, which was a daring MI6 extraction plan. He was smuggled across the Finnish border in the trunk of a car shielded from heat sensors and sniffer dogs, ultimately reaching safety in the UK. His cover was betrayed by Aldrich Ames, the CIA-officer-turned-Soviet-mole, who exposed numerous Western assets to the KGB. Gordievsky was one of the first outed, but one of the very few who managed to escape. Most others once identified were executed. His survival only underscored how valuable and rare his successful defection was. Living under a new identity in Godalming, Surrey, Gordievsky continued to advise British intelligence and later spoke publicly about espionage and international security. He authored several books, including an autobiography and a collaboration with historian Christopher Andrew. Despite personal losses, including years of separation from his family, he remained a firm opponent of authoritarianism and Russian aggression. So in later years, he became an outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin's regime and warned of a resurgence in Russian espionage activities in Britain. After the 2006 poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, a fellow defector and friend, Gordievsky feared he might be targeted himself. His insights and warnings about modern espionage remain relevant long after his active career ended, cementing his legacy as a key figure in Cold War intelligence history. And Oleg Gordievsky died on the 4th of March, 2025, at the age of 86. So, Matt, do you have any thoughts on Oleg Gordievsky's passing? [01:13:13] Matt: Nothing too extensive. Um, I was, I was glad you, um, you, um, included this, uh, here today. Um, you know, sad to, sad to see he passed. Uh, definitely very, um, you know, key part of, critical part of, of, of Cold War history and his contributions to, you know, helping to, to, to, to win the Cold War for the side of, of, of democracy. Um, you know, uh, yeah, I know you have, uh, you have quite a bit of, um, thoughts and kind of, uh, history, history with all that. But, yeah. [01:13:43] Chris: Well, yeah, yeah. Well, Oleg, you know, lived in my hometown. So I, I grew up in a town called Godalming in Surrey, which, um, in some respects actually has some similarities to Salisbury. Um, it's a lot smaller than Salisbury, but, um, when you think about where KGB defectors end up, there are some similarities with Salisbury and Godalming. Well, that's a whole other topic for another day. Um, I was very sad to hear Oleg Gordievsky passed away. You know, as I've said to long-term listeners, you know, he's the first real spy ever met, and he was a regular Custer of mine when I used to work at Waitrose in Golding, which was the local supermarket. I had this, um, as a teenager, I was working there while studying at sixth form college, and I was on the most gruesome job there. I was on the meat and fish department, so I was, you know, learnt how to fillet fish, um, and to cut, you know, livers and all sorts of horrendous things. And occasionally, um, I would see this man who looked familiar to me. And I, I'd seen a show called Wanted that used to be on Channel 4. It was like a game show where members of the public would go on the run, they'd be tracked by professional trackers. And Oleg was a technical advisor, so he would give them advice on things about how to disguise themselves and evade trackers and things. So I recognized his face from there, but I didn't know his name. And, uh, it wasn't until, um, the summer of 1999 when there was a really good documentary about the Cold War on the BBC that suddenly, there he was interviewed and there was his name, Oleg Gordievsky. So, I finally had his name, and I was a bit shy, so I did, and I didn't want to, and he was a customer, so I didn't want to like bother him, but one day, uh, when I was coming towards the end of my, my time working at Waitrose and probably cared a little bit less about losing my job, I approached him during the summer of 2000 and asked him, "Excuse me, sir, are you Oleg Gordievsky, the former KGB agent?" And he kind of looked at me and sort of said, "Yes." And I, you know, asked him a little bit about it and he said, you know, and, and he, you know, very politely said, Well, the best thing you should do is seek out my book, Next Stop Execution. And I read that over the summer of 2000, and it literally changed everything I, I thought I knew about espionage and really put me on the path to, you know, create this podcast to create my film, The Dry Cleaner. [01:15:54] Matt: Mm-hmm. [01:15:54] Chris: And, you know, hopefully, you know, I've got other films to make and it will, you know, go on to influence things. Um, but you know, in his book, Oleg discussed his anti-surveillance technique called "dry cleaning," which is also known as "provoker." And it's a technique that intelligence officers use when they're going to go and meet an asset. They want to make sure they're free of any hostile surveillance, so they kind of do these sort of drills where they look like they're shopping or something. It's, it is gonna always look very innocent, but what they're actually doing is studying the people around them. Are there familiar faces that keep turning up? You know, they go and have a coffee at Caffè Nero, study people around them, then they go and buy a birthday card at a shop, then they go and buy, you know, um, a newspaper that they go and read on the bus, et cetera. But whilst you're doing all that, what you're actually doing is studying those people around you. Is somebody following you, who you noticed in the coffee shop, and then when you bought the birthday cards, now on the bus with you? Stuff like that. And um, and the other thing that Oleg made clear as well is obviously you've gotta make sure it doesn't look like that's what you're doing, because all intelligence services have limited resources. So they will only follow people and put resources on people who they think are worth following. So your goal as a spy is to make it look like you're not worth following that. In fact, you're the most boring human being on planet Earth and following you is a complete waste of time. Because when that happens, when they stop following you, that's when you can get up to what you need to get up to. Um, and that's always the big challenge for every intelligence service, um, is knowing who to follow and who not to follow, because following people, I think on average it takes a minimum of 20 people to follow one person. Um, it might be higher than that, but that's the figure I vaguely remember for the one day of anti-surveillance training I did. Um, uh, years ago, I went on this really cool one day, um, uh, training, uh, event with the Hunt, the, it's a show called Hunted on Channel 4, and the hunters would run their own private event, and I got invited to somebody's birthday who was doing this. So we all got trained in how to conduct and evade surveillance in one day and went out in the streets of London and had fun, you know, trying to do it. [01:18:03] Matt: Yeah. [01:18:04] Chris: And it's very hard. [01:18:05] Matt: If you, yeah, I mean, you, you mentioned like the, that that 20 number, I mean, if you're in, if you're in, I don't know, New York or DC or London or Moscow or Beijing or something, probably Tehran, too, also, you know, it could be, you could have hundreds of people- [01:18:19] Chris: Yeah. [01:18:19] Matt: Out, out there. You know, in multiple vehicles, aircraft even. It's a, it's a, it's a serious hunt. [01:18:25] Chris: It is. And on top of that, the people who do it are gonna look like they're not following you as well. They can't keep touching their ear, et cetera, these little weird things you see in movies, you know. Um, good, professional surveillance people are kitted out with stuff where they don't have to keep touching their ear, et cetera. Um, and I remember on the day I did training. We didn't have proper kits and I had to hide my earpiece, as the target we were following was crossing the road and coming near to me. And I didn't want her to see my earpiece. So I, I did this sort of slight turn in my head and kinda grabbed my ear and then let the earpiece fall down and into my sort of shirt, and somehow she didn't notice me, which was great. So, so that was quite cool. So, yeah, doing surveillance, not easy. Sorry, you were about to say something. [01:19:09] Matt: Yeah, no. I remember this, this came up in your, um, interview from last weekend with, um, Eric O'Neill. He mentioned he's, his, his involvement in those courses for the Spy Museum. He does one called, called Surveillance 101, which I think is just, you know, kind of very, the same thing as what, as what you were describing. And I thought, you know, I should do that. Why, why, why haven't I done one of those? [01:19:28] Chris: Yeah. You should, it's good fun. [01:19:29] Matt: That'd be fun. It'd be cool. [01:19:31] Chris: It's good fun. [01:19:32] Matt: I should do it. Grab a friend. Yeah. [01:19:34] Chris: Uh, it's, it's quite hard work though, as well, because like I, what I, I've got such a poor working memory that trying to remember lots of detailed information is not my strong point. And, and, you know, and having to recall it immediately. I'd be able to recall 20, um, car registration plates. That's not my skill, you know, so that's the downside. But, um, the reason I bring up dry cleaning is because dry cleaning is the technique that saved Oleg's life, because when he was under surveillance in Moscow, under suspicion of being a traitor, he had to send this signal to his handlers that he was in trouble and they needed to activate Operation Pimlico to get him out. And um, and so there were always, one thing I learned about, um, at least in the old days, there are always lots of pre-planned times to meet people at specific places. Um, and obviously sometimes these meetings never happen, but at least one side of the meeting always makes sure that they're on a certain street corner at like quarter to five on a Friday afternoon or something like the third Friday of the month. And so Oleg knew of certain, um, places to be at a certain time and certain things would happen and he had certain things he had to do as well. So I think, if I remember correctly, he had to look out for a man with a Mars bar whilst Oleg himself was carrying a Safeway bag, and that Safeway bag was the signal to say that I'm in trouble and I need you to get me the, bloop, out of here. You know, and, um, and it is sort of subtle things like that. And, and so, you know, uh, Oleg's book, Next Stop Execution, I highly recommend it. I don't recommend it necessarily over The Spy and the Traitor, but what's good about Oleg's book, it's written by himself and he talks about the strain of being a double agent. He talks about what it's like to suddenly find you are being followed by people, what it's like to literally be on a knife edge, that if anything goes wrong, you will be executed. Because as the article I was paraphrasing earlier mentioned, all the other traitors betrayed by Aldrich Ames, and even Robert Hanssen, all ended up being executed. They all went, the, the Russian traitors typically get a bullet in the back of their head in some dingy basement of, I forget what the name of the prison is now, but there's a particular prison- [01:21:45] Matt: The Lubyanka. [01:21:46] Chris: That's it. [01:21:46] Matt: The Lubyanka Prison. [01:21:47] Chris: And it's usually some dingy dark basement. They get shot in the back of the head and then put in an unmarked grave and that's it. And that's the end. Um, and that could have been Oleg's fate and thankfully for him it wasn't. Um, and I think, you know, he lived a relatively good life in Godalming. Um, and, um, but he did have, so in 2008, um, Oleg believed he was poisoned. So he was rushed to the Royal Surrey Hospital in Guilford and was in a coma for 34 hours. And when he recovered, he reported that he believed that, that he was poisoned and the culprit behind it was a UK-based Russian business associate who had supplied him with pills, which he said were the sedative, Xanax, and purportedly for insomnia. And, um, yeah, Gordievsky was advised not to identify the associates and, um, Gordievsky went on to accuse MI6 of trying to prevent the instant from becoming known. Um, and, um, and it's interesting kind of timing because there's a really good book called From Russia with Blood by Heidi Blake, and it kind of covers a period of, um, suspicious deaths between 2006 and to 2018 that are linked to the Kremlin. And the book claims that the police covered those deaths up and they were covered up by the orders of the British government. And I think the idea was that the British government were worried about public pressure, um, of having to do something against Russia, because at the time, after the poisoning and death of Alexander Litvinenko, Anglo-Russian relations were at all-time low and successive prime ministers kind of wanted to do what they could to repair that, especially as Obama, the Obama administration came, Obama administration came in and famously tried to reset relations with Russia. And I think that was 2010. Um, and you know, Britain didn't want to be seen as being a, um, the awkward one. He didn't even know there'd been a murder on British soil, et cetera, or a series of murders. So, um, for some reason, success of governments felt, or it is believed, obviously, this is not a hundred percent confirmed, but most of those deaths, it is believed and reported, uh, by Heidi Blake, that there was some sort of coverup that went on. And obviously that went on until the, um, Skripal poisoning. And then by that point there was no way to really, um, cover these up and what's the point of covering them up anymore. And in fact, I will mention one thing that happened whilst I was on holiday that just, I briefly want to bring up that's sort of relevant, because, um, the Heathrow fire. A lot of people are still in the belief that the Russians are somehow responsible for it, but I don't think they are because why would there be a coverup? Because why would we need to cover that up now? In the world that we live in today, I don't see what justifiable reason the British government has to cover up any Russian hostile action against Heathrow Airport. [01:24:40] Matt: Right, right. [01:24:40] Chris: I could be wrong, but, um, I did look into, um, fires at substations, and they do happen. And they happen, and it happened in a similar way to what went down at Heathrow. Anyway, going off topic there. Um, but, but, uh, it just talk about coverups and things, that just came up in my mind because that was something that did happen whilst I was away and it, um, bothered me slightly about the way some people are obsessed with the idea that Russia is responsible. They, you know, I think it's highly unlikely. It's not impossible, but from what I've seen in this situation and that particular incident, it's unlikely. Um, so there we go. But, uh, yeah. So, um, one last thing. Obviously, um, most towns have their own little Facebook group and Godalming is no different. And what's nice to see, there's been lots of little stories about various locals and their encounters with Oleg Gordievsky in town. I wasn't the only person to have encountered him. Um, and apparently he was a keen cyclist and he used to get his bike repaired at the local cycle works. Um, and there's talk of potentially getting a, a blue plaque put up in his honor. And some have also suggested that maybe Godalming should get an intelligence museum because Godalming has this rich history of espionage because we, um, well, Godalming and Surrey, Surrey played host a lot of SOE training centers during World War II, famously one called Wanborough Manor, which is just near Guilford. And one thing you might be interested in, Matt, in the, in the 1970s, Godalming became famous because the shah of Iran purchased a property on the outskirts of Godalming, and there was talk of him going to stay there after he was ousted. Um, and in the end, um, some documents came out in 2010 that revealed a behind the scenes, um, kind of dialogue going on. Um, and the then-prime minister, Jim Callaghan, really disliked the idea of having the shah live in Britain on humanitarian grounds. Um, and so he was persuaded not to move into his house in Godalming. But I have been past that house in the past and it's quite a foreboding looking place, there were like little guard towers outside. I remember that as a kid, um, we used to drive past it occasionally. My mom mentioned, "Somebody important lived in there." And we never really found out who, and obviously it's now all turned out to be it might've been the shah of Iran. And my dad used to find that quite amusing that the shah of Iran might end up living in Godalming, because he had, like, ideas that he might bump into him at Waitrose or something. So, not impossible in Godalming. It's interesting who you do bump into. I mean, former KGB, shah of Iran. You know, who else were you gonna bump into in Godalming? So, um, so yeah, Godalming's second big hero. Our first one, famous hero in Godalming, is Jack Phillips, who was the signal operator on the Titanic. So, Jack Phillips, Oleg Gordievsky. So, there we are. So putting Godalming on the, on the map of international intrigue there. [01:27:26] Matt: Yeah. You know, it's, uh, if, if they do ever build that museum, they, um, they, they better invite us for the grand opening. [01:27:33] Chris: Oh, fuck yeah! If they don't, I'm gonna be deeply offended. [01:27:39] Matt: Um, no, no. I, um, I mean it's, it's, it's, it's interesting that you kind of have that connection. I mean, this, this, this podcast, you know, a long time ago -- years ago, long before I was involved -- was called, um, The Dry Cleaner Cast. [01:27:52] Chris: It was, yeah. [01:27:52] Matt: It was a response, was a response to, to, to your short film that, you know, of course was inspired by Oleg Gordievsky and the tradecraft, um, that, that, that he employed. You know, I mean I, I've talked on here about, um, when I was 11, 12, you know, the, the, me cold emailing Tom Clancy and talking to him for a bit and how kind of critical that was for me, putting me on the path that, sort of, I went down as far as just being interested in this kind of stuff. I mean, it's, it's interesting and I still remember, you know, exactly where I was and sort of how I felt when I got, when I heard the news that, that, that, that Clancy had had passed. It's, um, you know, and, uh, you just had kind of in person that interaction with him in the, in the grocery store. Um, I don't know, it's kind of interesting how, like, you, you have that kind of brief time with someone, you know? Like you don't, you don't know them, they're not really a part of your life, but they, they had such a lasting impact on your life that, you know, they don't, they, they, they don't, they don't know. And then you, you hear that they're gone. I mean, it's, it's definitely, it's, it's a personal loss, you know? So I, um, yeah, thank you for, thank you for sharing that. [01:28:59] Chris: Yeah, no, it's, um, yeah, it's quite something. I was really just shocked to hear it, but it wasn't unexpected because he was 86, so, uh, but very sad nonetheless. And, um, you know, looking at that, that group and, uh, that Facebook group did give me a, a few chuckles because it is just so nice to hear about how he did affect other people as well, so it wasn't just me. [01:29:21] Matt: Yeah. [01:29:21] Chris: Um, and, uh, no, you know, um, my condolences to any surviving members of Oleg's family, really. He, he put his life on the line because he really didn't believe in the Soviet system, and that comes across in his book. And in fact, it was the, um, 1968, um, repression in Prague, I think it was. Is that right? Yeah, the Czechoslovak- [01:29:44] Matt: Yeah, the Prague Spring. They, they, uh, Soviet troops put down- [01:29:48] Chris: Yeah. [01:29:48] Matt: Put down an uprising there. [01:29:49] Chris: That's it, yeah, yeah. So it's the 1968 Prague Spring that really inspired Oleg to become, um, an agent for the West. He originally, he, if I remember his book correctly, he was stationed in Copenhagen and he went to a phone booth that he knew the, um, the local authorities were monitoring. And, um, and so they, you know, heard his message where he said some, he said something along the lines of, you know, I, I'm done with the Soviet system, I'm appalled by what's going on. And then, um, MI6 approached him, um, at a badminton game because Oleg -- the other funny thing I learned about Oleg was he was the KGB badminton champion. So I found that quite funny, you know, well, there's a film to be made about the KGB badminton championships, but, uh, it just- [01:30:34] Matt: Like a KGB like, like, like badminton league. It's like a, I don't know. [01:30:38] Chris: Yeah. [01:30:39] Matt: Like A League of Their Own, or something, but it's, but it's, it's the KGB. [01:30:42] Chris: It's so funny, isn't it? I didn't, I dunno, I wouldn't associate badminton with espionage. It's not the game I would -- I dunno, I dunno what sport I would, I mean in America it's probably baseball, because quite a few baseball stars had gone on to be spies during World War II. Um, but I dunno, what would an English sport be for espionage? It'd probably be cricket, because I know a lot of former MI6 people like going and sitting at Lord's Cricket Ground, but- [01:31:02] Matt: That's definitely very old money, Oxbridge. [01:31:04] Chris: Yeah. [01:31:04] Matt: Which is, I mean, yeah, that's maybe not now, but back in the day. Yeah, that, that was, that was British intelligence, yeah. [01:31:09] Chris: Yeah, yeah. It might be, is it paddle balls, the new thing that's taking off at the moment? I don't know. But yeah, so who knows? Maybe MI6 have a badminton team. I'm not sure. We'd love to find out, but yeah. [01:31:21] Matt: Well, uh, yeah, um, rest well, sir, and, and, and, and thank you for your service. [01:31:26] Chris: Yeah, thank you, Oleg. Well, that is it for this week. Um, you know, thank everybody for listening. Please connect with us on social media. All of the links are in the show notes. We're on all the key platforms except X. So for, for personal reasons, we're not on X. But, um, yeah, so we're on Bluesky, Instagram, Facebook, Spoutible. So, uh, yeah, check us all out there. The links are in the show notes. Also, if you are enjoying this podcast, um, you can go ad-free if you become a Patreon member. Uh, you just got to patreon dot com forward slash secrets and spies, and then you'll be directly supporting the show, and we thank you in advance for that. But that is it for us this week, and we'll be back next week. Matt, thank you very much for your time. Is there anything, um, you're up to this weekend of note, or, uh- [01:32:13] Matt: I gotta mow my damn yard. It is, it is time in the season. It is, it, it, it finally needs to be done for the first time since, like, what? October or something. But, uh, yeah, I was, I was taking the trash out last night and I was like, damn, I gotta cut this stuff already. [01:32:27] Chris: Yeah. [01:32:27] Matt: So, no, I gotta do that. It's a, it's a little bit too chilly here today, but it'll get warmer in the next couple days, so, yes, it will be, it will be tackled. [01:32:34] Chris: Yeah, yeah. It's interesting actually, because even though it's nice and sunny in the UK at the moment, in the beginning of spring, it is still pretty cold and windy. So, uh, you gotta be a bit careful. I think they, they call this phase Fool's Spring, where people think that it's gonna be hot, but it's not. [01:32:47] Matt: Yes. We get, we get, we get, we're, we're in that phase here in, in this part of the northeast, you know, where we have days where it's like, 80, which I think is about 30 C, and then there's, you know, the next day it'll be like close to freezing in the morning. It's, it's all over the place. [01:33:02] Chris: Yeah, cool, cool. Well, there we go. Nice one. Well, thank you again, everybody, have a wonderful weekend, and we will catch you on the next episode. Take care. Bye for now. [01:33:12] Matt: Thank you. [01:33:26] Announcer: Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.