[00:00:00] Announcer: Due to the themes of this podcast, listener discretion is advised. Lock your doors, close the blinds, change your passwords. This is Secrets and Spies. Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics, and intrigue. This podcast is produced and hosted by Chris Carr. [00:00:38] Chris Carr: On today's podcast, I'm joined by author Keir Giles, who wrote the book Who Will Defend Europe? On this episode, we look at the prospect of an open conflict with Russia, and we ask whether Europe's systems and leaders are ready for such an eventuality. I hope you find this episode interesting. Take care. [00:00:55] Announcer: The opinions expressed by guests on Secrets and Spies do not necessarily represent those of the producers and sponsors of this podcast. [00:01:11] Chris: Keir, welcome to the podcast. It's, it's really great to have you on. Thank you for joining me today. [00:01:23] Keir Giles: No, thanks for having me. [00:01:24] Chris: For the benefit of the audience, please just tell us a little bit about yourself. [00:01:27] Keir: Yeah, sure. I'm Keir Giles. I'm a professional explainer of Russia. For about the last 20 years, plus, I've made a living from describing what Russia is, why it does the things it does, why, what it's gonna do next, which, uh, usually doesn't get listened to, and writing a few books about it, which usually take the form of, here's a problem that we have with Russia, if it's not dealt with, it's going to get worse and this is what's gonna happen. Then that happens. Couple of years later, I write a new book about the new situation with a new warning, and then the cycle repeats. The most recent one of those is, uh, the one that came out in October last year. It's called Who Will Defend Europe?, which we might be talking about during the course of this podcast, which basically describes where we are now. So a lot of people could have seen this coming. [00:02:09] Chris: Yes, indeed. It sort of feels like being a Cassandra almost. I mean, I felt this a little bit on our podcast too. There's a lot of things that have been happening that we kind of saw were coming. Um, [00:02:19] Keir: Could be worse. My professional nickname these days is Keir-sandra because I've done it so often. [00:02:24] Chris: I like it. Oh dear. Well, I'm sorry you're in that sort of situation because it must be quite frustrating. Um, yeah, it's nothing worse than seeing something coming and then nobody seems to pay any attention to it. It is very annoying. [00:02:35] Keir: It's a repetitive habit when we, when we deal with Russia. And it's not just me, there are plenty of people that have watched Moscow over time that understand what Russia does, the look of the lack of res at the lack of response across Europe and uh, know that things are gonna get worse. [00:02:48] Chris: Yes. Yes. Well, let's hope they don't get worse. But, um, yeah, optimism's a, a, a rare thing these days. So you have written this fantastic book, Who Will Defend Europe?, and it examines the likelihood of an open conflict with Russia and whether Europe is ready. So why did you write this book? [00:03:06] Keir: Largely because as we just discussed, I could see this coming. It was, uh, plain that we were going to be in the situation we are in today. Of course, the book was written before the US presidential election, so there was still a chance that it might not have been Trump in charge. But even so, the direction of travel of the United States pulling itself away from European security because the US had other priorities around the world that were now moving higher up the scale of its, uh, its immediate challenges meant that we were gonna be in a situation like this sooner or later. Because there are three basic elements to the problem that Europe's got at the moment. It's Russian determination, it's US disengagement, and it's the denialism in Western Europe and the cumulative effect of all of the 25 plus years of ignoring that there are hard security challenges and assuming that war is something that happens to other people a long way away, and consequently running down the armed forces of Western European countries to the point we're in now where there are political objectives being set for them to achieve. But uh, some of the armed forces turning around and saying, Nope, we can't do it anymore. [00:04:10] Chris: Yeah. I've always found that sort of really fascinating that attitude. I've called it, uh, late-nineties thinking where a lot of people seem to think we're still in this sort of post-Cold War period where we are disarming or should be disarming when really we shouldn't. Um, and it is surprising how many, both members of the public and politicians seem to sort of suffer from this sort of, uh, point of view. [00:04:30] Keir: Yes. Late-nineties thinking is a good way to describe it. Of course, one of the, the really depressing things is. We didn't have to wait until the late-nineties for all of the systems that kept us safe to be destroyed. It was a very, very rapid process, particularly here in the UK, of eliminating everything that was, uh, preparedness for war, resilience, civil defense. In fact, one of the, the things that, um, I observed at the time but didn't really realize the significance was that, uh, part of the civil defense system of the UK, the Royal Observer Corps, was disbanded even before the Soviet Union was. Such was the, the haste to get rid of everything that was to do with protecting this country against war. [00:05:10] Chris: Mm-hmm. And I've noticed most of our nuclear bunkers are now museums. Uh, so I dread to think what would happen if we actually got attacked and what would happen to, yeah, the society. [00:05:20] Keir: The problem is we do knoq fairly well what would happen if we were attacked. And it is a result of the, the complete unpreparedness of British civil society as a result of the leadership over successive generations not being honest with what the threat actually is. So there are war games, there is scenarios, there are, there's planning that is happening. There is a, a major conference in London in the middle of January. Um, big caveat. It was sponsored by Raytheon, an anti-missile, you know, basically a missile company, but highlighting with, um, defense analysts and Air Force officers, uh, on the stage and MPs and government officials in the audience, just how easy it would be for Russia to mount a missile strike on this country from how far away and how little the UK could do about it, and how little warning there would be. And hopefully that message is sinking in so that something is changing. But of course, these things take time. [00:06:12] Chris: Well, yeah. Just talking about missile attacks, I'm just sort of thinking of the, um, attacks, uh, that Israel had last year and a response to that. Um, would we be able to sustain something like that? I don't think we could. [00:06:23] Keir: Well, uh, there are a lot of an angles of that, um, response, that multinational coalition that was mobilized to protect Ukraine, which tell us a lot about dealing with Russia. And one of the biggest angles, of course, was the fact that, um, this, this organization was led by the United States. It was set up very rapidly. It interdicted as many air and missile threats against Israel as possible over third-country airspace. All of the things that have actually been specifically denied to Ukraine, despite meeting exactly the same circumstances, and uh, even to the point where there were Iranian drones that were being launched at Israel. Uh, the US response was not just the military response, but also sanctioning those Iranian drone makers, overlooking the fact that those same drones had been being launched at Ukraine for over a year killing women and children, civilians, anything that could reach with no response from the US whatsoever. So it's just another illustration of how the US had already been distancing itself from European security. As to what the UK could do to protect itself. We're without an integrated air and missile defense system. It's bound to be patchy. The RAF is confident that it can intercept some missile threats if it knows about them far enough in advance. But, uh, there are big questions over exactly what the UK would do if it were facing the kind of, uh, mass barrage that Ukraine has seen. Now, a lot of people will say perfectly reasonably, yeah, but Ukraine's at the far end of Europe, surely Russia can't actually reach this far. The problem is that only holds if you're looking at a map of the world and the inconvenient factors. The world isn't flat, and Russia has been practicing for years coming around the top of Norway into the, the Arctic Ocean, to the north Norwegian Sea, and launching missiles from extremely long ranges. The, the Russian bomber pilots call it, going around the corner, flying around the corner into where they could actually attack countries like not just the UK, but Western Europe from. [00:08:19] Chris: Mm-hmm. Well, let's delve into some of the motivations behind Russia's aggressive posture. Beyond territorial expansion, what are the kind of key ideological strategic drivers influencing their actions towards Europe? [00:08:30] Keir: Let me get a book plug in here. This was, uh, something I wrote about in detail back in 2018. Uh, again, one of those books saying we have a problem and it's gonna get worse. It was called Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West? So, in other words, exactly the answer to your question. But when we have to summarize it as we've had to do multiple times over subsequent years, and sometimes in a very short space of time, basically the way we, we try to get the concept of what Putin sees Russia as, as saying that he, he wants it to be 1914 again. Because before the First World War that Russia of Putin's imagining was the kind of state that was widely accepted and understood in the world. It was a great power that had global reach. It had exemption from the rules. It had an empire. It had domination over the countries around it, and all of those things were perfectly normal. So Russia wants a return to that, not just in terms of the, the territorial control because, uh, Putin has said very clearly the aim of the reconquest of Ukraine was to be correcting what he called the historic strategic mistakes that led to the, the lines on the map that we think of as the borders of Eastern Europe today actually being laid down by the early Bolsheviks a hundred years ago. So his program is to revise that and to restore Russia to a century-old vision of itself and the first target in the way is Ukraine. [00:09:56] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed. And you've described the situation Ukraine as a potential blueprint for future conflicts. So what specific lessons from the Ukraine conflict should European nations prioritize in their defense planning? [00:10:08] Keir: Well, we have to be careful drawing too many lessons from what we see in Ukraine because first of all, this was a war that Russia was not intending or expecting to fight. And so some of the early, uh, phases of the war were a lot to do with the fact that Russia was taken by surprise. That having believed its own propaganda, it blundered into a, a fight, uh, without being prepared for one properly. And also because of the very, very rapid transformation that, uh, both Ukrainian and Russian armed forces have undergone over time. They've adapted to the enormous losses that Russia suffered in the early part of the war, um, to the recognition that introduction of technology like drones, et cetera, on the battlefield means a change of tactics. And this is still an ongoing process. So looking at a snapshot now of what Russia is doing and projecting that forward to what a another country neighboring Russia might face, including a NATO country, is misleading. Also, of course, because the, so many of the, the levers of Russian power haven't actually been touched by the, the war on Ukraine. People look at the, the devastation that was wrought on the Russian land forces and sometimes overlook that. There are large parts of Russia's armed forces that are capable of delivering strikes at extremely long range that are basically untouched. The Navy's been swept from the Black Sea very successfully by Ukraine, but that's a self-contained naval theater. Elsewhere, it's unscathed. Same with the Air Force, some damage, but mostly there. Nuclear forces, of course, completely unused except as an information weapon for constraining the responses of Western countries. [00:11:41] Chris: Yeah, and there's a, there's a danger as well. I mean, there's a, with Ukraine, it kind of, there's a perception that Russia's a bit on the ropes and they've lost a lot of equipment, et cetera, which might make people think that Russia's weak at this point. But I've always been cautious with that point of view. [00:11:55] Keir: That's right. Uh, the impression that people got in the early phases of the war when that they saw that evisceration of the Russian Army that went in has persisted. And it is, it's hard for people to understand that actually the, the Russian Army has been rebuilt larger already by this time a year ago now it's a different army, qualitatively and the way it fights. And yes, it is true, they have burned through their enormous reserves of armored vehicles incredibly quickly. But it's now fighting in a different manner and it's pulling on those traditional Russian strengths of, if you don't care about the lives of your soldiers, and if you treat human beings as the most disposable military commodity, in some ways, that gives you an edge over an enemy that actually wants to preserve the lives of its people. [00:12:40] Chris: Yes. Yeah. It does seem to be the tactic of Russia's, sort of a brute force approach. [00:12:44] Keir: Absolutely. Brute force, mass, uh, not counting the costs in a way that any other country, well, any Western liberal democracy would do, who would've, uh, looked at the enormous casualty figures the way it's doing permanent irreparable damage to the Russian economy, and decided that actually it was time to adjust the war aims. Those just aren't considerations in Russia's decision calculus for the return on investment of doing this. [00:13:10] Chris: Yeah. Yeah. Um, one random question. A lot of people like to make it out that Putin's kind of, well certainly last year, um, that Putin's kind of in a weak spot if he doesn't succeed in Ukraine. Is that so? I, I just, I'm, I can't really make heads or tails of Putin any longer. [00:13:27] Keir: You, you often hear people saying that Putin is in a weak spot for one reason or another. Uh, sometimes it's hard to discern whether that's an actual objective analysis or if it's based on optimism. We hear at the moment that the, the Russian economy was in trouble. The Russian military effort was in trouble, and in either 2025 or 26, it would reach the point at which could no longer prosecute operations against Ukraine. And, uh, of course we may never know that now because the, the US administration has decided to rescue Putin from that situation by bringing about a ceasefire. But the key point is Russia can't keep it up forever. And the point at which it is no longer capable is often unpredictable from the outside. We shouldn't assume that any of the things that make a, uh, a leader weak from a non-Russian perspective are actually gonna have an impact in Moscow at all. And let's not forget it's not just Putin. This is a broad mass of the Russian population that are in sympathy with the objectives and not greatly disapproving of the costs that are paid to reach them. [00:14:28] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed. So, I think so even if Putin, should we say it was to drop dead tomorrow of natural causes, sort of like Stalin, um, none of this will sort of, this kind of, uh, posture against the West is not gonna just stop, is it? [00:14:43] Keir: Well, there's nobody around Putin, uh, that is in a position to, to be the anointed successor who is going to think any differently than him about Russia and about the world, and probably to act any differently. [00:14:54] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:14:54] Keir: And let's not forget that the, the biggest criticisms that we still hear that are still permitted within Russia of the war policy is saying it's not being waged harshly enough. It's egging the, the Russian forces on to commit more and better genocide and remove any restraint on what, um, damage Russia is doing to Ukraine and the West. So just because, uh, Putin might drop off his perch, uh, we shouldn't think that there's gonna be any change in Russian state policy. [00:15:19] Chris: Yeah, yeah, that makes sense. So, considering the evolving nature of warfare, how do you see Russia's approach to hybrid tactics such as cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns that are playing out in a potential conflict with Europe? [00:15:33] Keir: Well, we've fought for over a decade against the, the use of the term hybrid to describe what Russia does for a number of different reasons. But most of all, it confuses more than it actually describes or, or it illuminates what is being talked about when we think about Russia's covert deniable, semi-deniable campaigns against the West. And, uh, there's an example in, in what you said just now, hybrid and, uh, and disinformation. Now, depending on who you talk to, those are either part and parcel of the same problem or they're very different things. And that's just a, an example of how the terminology that's been developed in Western countries to describe what Russia understands it's doing varies from country to country and it just adds layers of confusion. As far as Russia is concerned, there's information warfare and there's special military operations. And parts, or all of both of those have actually been grouped under these adjectives that have been applied in the West to what Russia is doing, like hybrid, like gray zone, um, sub-threshold, uh, liminal warfare, et cetera, et cetera. So many of them. But the key thing to remember is as far as Russia is concerned, these are military operations. So to the extent that calling it hybrid warfare or any other adjective just allows you to pretend that Russia is not at war with us, it actually really constrains Western military options and societal options for responding to the challenge. [00:16:58] Chris: Yeah, and I remember you, uh, mentioned in your book about the, the sort of Chatham House Rule and how there's a lot of people at NATO, et cetera, who kind of, um, see that Russia sees itself at war with the West, but we refuse to say it ourselves. Why? Why is that? [00:17:15] Keir: Well, first of all, the, the Chatham House Rule, it's a, it's a diplomatic convention or a think tank convention as well, where you allow a space where people can say things that need to be said, but without having their name put to them. And that's a actually a really useful and helpful tool for having frank conversations about what's going on at times when, for example, government officials can't be frank in public about what's happening, but also, of course, that illustrates the extent to which some of those private conversations are sometimes very distant from the picture that's being sold to the general public. And, uh, I think, I know the conversation you might be referring to is back in, uh, January of, uh, 2023, I believe, outside Brussels, joint meeting of, uh, very senior EU and NATO officials, discussing again, what they call hybrid threats, where one of them, and I can't name him because the Chatham House Rule says you can't say who this is or even which organization it was he represents. But this is a very senior individual, probably a household name to lots of people said, We can admit that Russia is at war with us, but we can say it in this room. We can't say it outside. And that for me was the, the perfect illustration of the way in which publics have just not been told about what is going on, the scale of the challenge and what needs to be done about it. [00:18:32] Chris: Yeah. And, and one question I realized I'm missing is what would an actual open conflict with Russia look like? What do we, um, you know, what is the actual threat that we are facing from them? [00:18:41] Keir: It very much depends on who we is, because of course, that varies hugely across all of the range of Russia's possible targets. People in the frontline states are very clear that that can mean full-scale warfare, including Russia rolling tanks across the border, as well as the long-range bombardments, the missile attacks, the cyber, the societal disruption, everything that's been visited on Ukraine. And that's why those countries have invested so heavily in societal resilience, comprehensive defense to make sure that individuals and the economy and society as a whole, politics, democracy can still continue to function when Russia is doing its very best to stop it. Now it's a very different threat if, for example, the other end of the continent, if you are in the UK or Ireland, for example, which, uh, very much like to pretend that this is something that's never going to happen there, then you face a different problem. Say for example, there is a conflict in the eastern part of Europe, a NATO member that is under attack, the UK has obligations to be involved in that conflict under the North Atlantic Treaty. So what will Russia do? It'll try to coerce. Countries like the UK into not meeting their treaty obligations, or if they've already started, to duck out of the race. And that's where these extremely long-range means of causing damage come in. Whether it is missile strikes, whether it's mass coordinate cyber attacks, whether it is proxies carrying out sabotage and assassinations. All of the things that we've seen across Europe over the past years, but not as isolated pinpricks, but as mass coordinated attacks to sowe chaos. [00:20:14] Chris: Yeah. And there's a belief if Russia's successful in Ukraine that they might, you know, move on to, um, other countries. I mean, this idea that, uh, Putin wants to sort of rebuild the USSR et cetera. Is that likely? [00:20:26] Keir: Well, not so much the USSR as the Russian Empire as we were talking about a few minutes ago. The, it's more than a belief, it's a consistent, in fact, strikingly consistent assessment across the whole of NATO, including the United States under the previous administration with military intelligence chiefs and ministers of defense and senior military officers all looking at their open source and classified intelligence and all coming to the same assessment that Russia is looking to the next target, which will be a NATO nation. The only thing that they differ on is how soon Russia would actually be ready to make that move. And that assessment of the timescale has been shrinking very rapidly over time. Uh, this time last year, this time in 2024, the assessment was that Russia could take a decade or two to actually rebuild armed forces that were capable. But then, as we mentioned, people were taken by surprise, by just how rapidly Russia was reconstituting its military. And as a result, those timescales started dropping down and down. At the time I was writing the book, the consensus was around three to five years. The most recent thing we've heard is from the Danish Defense Intelligence Service, which says Russia could be ready to make a move against another neighbor in as little as six months. [00:21:41] Chris: Hmm. I've heard the year 2027 sort of banded about in circles about this could be the year, um, where it really kinda kicks off with Russia. I mean, is that, is that likely, do you think, in your assessment? [00:21:51] Keir: I think all of these forecasts are shifting all the time. So somebody that might have, uh, looked at the trends and said 2027, say, six months ago, might now look at them and say something entirely different. The complication, of course, comes, is that the United States has set itself the goal of being ready by 2027 for confrontation with China. And that of course is, was already consuming so much US energy even before Trump arrived and upset the apple cart. [00:22:17] Chris: Yeah, yeah. Well that's a good, um, segue for, uh, the US at the moment. So like the current political climate in the US seems to have an impact on sort of its commitment to European security. So what are the implications for this if America do sort of, uh, take a step back of European security? [00:22:36] Keir: It's worth make being clear about what we're talking about. In some ways, the United States has already taken a step back. In practical means, they have not. So yes, there is the verbal lack of commitment to European security that we hear from the Trump administration, but there haven't been actually the, the practical steps to remove that US presence from Europe or that underpinning support for NATO, both, uh, administratively and operationally of which the United States forms such a huge part. Now that for the time being, for as long as it lasts, is reassuring because the United States is there in place. However, uh, there are a couple of, um, alarming trends that, uh, that call that into doubt. First of all, the way in which the, the Trump-Musk administration is now destroying target after target within the US federal government, and also in the way in which the United States projects power abroad. It could simply be that they haven't got around to eliminating that, uh, extended reach of US military power and eventually they will. And the, the consequences could be just as swift and devastating as, for example, for USAID, for Voice of America, for all of the other elements of US power and protection of itself that they've already taken a fire axe to. And second, uh, there, there are things already going on within, um, the United States arms of power abroad, uh, it across the US government, uh, elements that actually are present in and support other countries that are severely restricting its functionality already. For example, the freeze on travel, which is an enormous problem if you have people that are dispersed across the world and actually need to move around. Uh, the, the elimination of, um, spending, uh, allowances on government spending cards, limiting them to $1 of allowed spending essentially means that a lot of the, the functions that have been normal and natural for US governments simply aren't happening anymore. And that's gonna have an increasingly corrosive effect on the United States' ability to do stuff. [00:24:36] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed. And they seemed, with their negotiations with Putin, at this stage, they seem to not be willing to, um, guarantee any kind of Europe, uh, any security for Ukraine, which just strikes as a bizarre tactic in negotiations with Putin, because Putin seems to respect kind of force and to remove that as an option from negotiations at the beginning just seems like a very bizarre move. I don't quite understand it. [00:25:00] Keir: Well, we've heard a lot of people saying that they don't understand, and it's bizarre, it's baffling, it's incomprehensible, and so on. All of those things only apply if you assume that the aim of the Trump administration is not to facilitate Russian aims with regard to Ukraine, to Europe, and to the United States itself. As soon as you come over that mental hurdle of accepting that this does appear to be the long-term aim of the Trump administration, rolling back all of those levers of US power that obstructed Russia from doing whatever it wanted, then of course everything falls into place and there's a consistent pattern of behavior, uh, which is very much more comprehensive. [00:25:40] Chris: Mm. Trump's sort of motivations with, uh, with regards to Russia are just somewhat puzzling. And obviously there are people now speculating, you know, was he, uh, recruited by the Russians or he just a believer in Putin? I kind of fall into the camp if I see him as a man who seems to believe in Putin and somewhat admires him. Very, I, I dunno, I find their relationship very puzzling. [00:25:58] Keir: Well, people have not, are not just speculating about this now. Uh, one of the, the things that Trump relied on in coming back into power was collective amnesia about his first term in office. [00:26:08] Chris: Yeah. [00:26:08] Keir: When everybody at the time, uh, was that paid attention, uh, was in no doubt that he was pursuing Russia's policy objectives over those of the United States. And we had the same speculation. We had the same attempted investigation of why precisely he is doing Putin's bidding, whether it is consciously, unconsciously, under direct orders or just following the direction of travel. But the end result of all of those is the same. Now, there have been great thick books written about why exactly Trump is so beholden to Moscow. A speculation about whether it is financial entanglements or blackmail or compromising material, or that ideological sympathy that you are talking about, which has been exploited by Russia's intelligence service. We may just never actually know what the real reason is, but we have to deal with the results. [00:26:55] Chris: Yeah. Given Russia's history of exploiting divisions within Western societies, how concerned are you about the potential for far-right movements in Europe to destabilize governments and weaken a collective response to Russian aggression? [00:27:09] Keir: Less concerned than some of my colleagues who look closely at the far-right movements. And that, that's saying, that's seems like a strange thing to do because they should be the experts. But we should bear in mind that just because an organization or a political party is right-leaning, that does not necessarily mean that it is in bed with Putin. Because there are also with right-leaning organizations and parties across the continent that actually believe strongly in national defense and understand perfectly well that Putin is the enemy. So calling everything far-right, uh, it being in bed with Russia is a mistake because it, uh, it obscures what the real challenge is. Of course, it's all been overtaken by the fact that, uh, particularly in countries like the UK, that blanket use of the term far-right to describe basically anything at the moment that the Labour Party disapproves of really dilutes its use as a term. So it's a far more complicated picture than some of these, these very simplistic, um, descriptions of Russia's levers of power would actually have us believe. We shouldn't forget, of course, that Russia isn't restricted in terms of the, the political spectrum that it can exploit against host countries. Once upon a time, of course, they would just have gone for the hard left. Now they can spread their bets across the board. That includes not just right-wing parties, left-wing parties, but anybody that is naive or unscrupulous enough to be duped into working for Moscow. [00:28:30] Chris: Yeah. And this is because I find there's certainly people in the, uh, Make America Great Again movement, the MAGA movement who do seem to be very sympathetic to, um, sort of the Russian point of view of things because Russia sort of presents itself as the savior of the White Christian world. Um, so do you think it's more they're more people who are just on the sort of very fringes of those right-wing movements that are more susceptible to this than, should we say, mainstream right-wing figures? [00:28:57] Keir: It varies. And again, uh, what you describe as right-wing covers, such a wide range of, uh, of possible political views now that it's, it's really very hard to use that as a term. But yes, uh, Russia has exploited the, the ideological call, again, just like with communism, one that is entirely misleading and distant from reality. Just look at the, the lived experiences of those, um, refugees from liberalism who have moved to Russia, thinking that Russia actually believes in and in enacts this stuff, and discovered that the experience is almost as miserable as the communists and hard left-wingers that would move to the Soviet Union just with, uh, for the time being not, they had a danger of being thrown into the Gulag. So Russia's always done very well at portraying a picture of itself that people can latch onto if they don't care to look too hard at the facts. [00:29:49] Chris: Yeah, and you know, this is also the case for, I, I think in for the, um, anti-war far-left in Europe as well because they've certainly, you know, we just sort of spring it around to there, I've seen certainly, like in Germany in the past and in the UK, um, a lot of Russian talking points getting parroted by these sort of far-left movements as well. [00:30:07] Keir: That's exactly right. If you want to wage a war, but you don't want anybody to resist, then it makes sense to sponsor anti-war movements in the countries that you're trying to attack. [00:30:16] Chris: Yeah, and certainly there are, you know, there are cases from the Cold War where the CND, so there's been, you know, allegations which they deny or certain members do, but, um, certainly, you know, there were a lot of protests that were against of having nuclear weapons in Europe. [00:30:30] Keir: Well think back to what CND was actually doing at the time. Now there were a lot of very sincere, very principled, very intelligent people that were signed up with CND for the right reasons. But at the same time, think of uh, CND's campaigning, not just for nuclear disarmament, but also asking its members to collect information on any military facilities that were in their neighborhood, observe military movements, talk about the bases, and send that in for compilation by CND centrally. Now, if you combine that with the, the known fact that there were people within the CND who were working for and with Moscow, obviously it's an extremely effective method of collecting espionage material by Russia. [00:31:10] Chris: Yeah. [00:31:11] Keir: We also need to think about the way in which, at the end of the Soviet Union, when the funding flows were cut off, suddenly it wasn't just CND, but it was any number of a range of different movements that effectively disappeared very rapidly because they were no longer receiving that direct and indirect support. What happened to the Communist Party of Great Britain, for example? Does anybody remember them? [00:31:31] Chris: Yes. Yeah. Very good question. Um, and there's a really great show from Germany called Deutscheland 83, um, that sort of talks a little bit about the kind of Moscow connection to the anti-war movement back during the Cold War, which I thought was very good. Well, let's take a break and we'll be right back with more. Welcome back, everybody. So, um, Keir, in the context of Brexit and evolving global priorities, how can the UK effectively contribute to European defense to deter Russian aggression? [00:32:13] Keir: Where do we start? Uh, yes, there's a, a very depressing chapter in, in the book Who Will Defend Europe? about the, the extent to which, um, British capacity to actually use armed force for political ends has been gutted. And the, the enormous difference between the portrayal of the UK's armed forces and the reality. And the two phrases that came up again and again in conversations about this was, um, hollowed out and for show, partly because the, the, public presentation of the British Armed Forces, it consumes such a vast amount of its energy, but also conceals, uh, how much has actually been hollowed out behind the facade. And that's a real problem if you are, um, thinking back to your question about how does it contribute to European defense, if you are in the, the Nordic states or the Baltic states, there's been a, um, an impression of the British Armed Forces and of the UK as the military heavyweight that's going to come to the rescue in a crisis. And so the realization that's now spreading across those societies that have been allowed to believe this, that actually the UK isn't in a position to do this because of the gutting of its own armed forces, is coming as a very unpleasant shock, particularly to countries like Finland and Sweden, which have joined NATO on the premise that it's gonna have allies there to help it, and that even without the United States, there'd be somebody else in Western Europe that would be there to, to make good on their promises. [00:33:38] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed. And regarding sort of half promises and broken pledges within NATO, what specific steps need to be sort of taken to rebuild, trust and ensure a unified response to potential Russian threats? [00:33:51] Keir: Well, that is an enormous challenge when you have the, the core member of NATO, the key player, and the underpinning of so much of, of NATO effort and activity, which is actively destroying that trust. So inevitably it is going to be a, uh, a coalition of the willing that is not necessarily organized through NATO that actually gets anything done because even with, uh, apparent US commitment, there's always gonna be a question mark over the extent to which that commitment is durable for as long as we have a Trump administration in the White House. So the, what should have been happening over the last few weeks, couple of months in Western European militaries is actually inventorizing and cataloging what can be done without American support, and possibly even with active American opposition. And that is going to define the art of the possible in terms of trying to protect Europe rather than the, the theoretical capabilities of NATO as a whole. [00:34:50] Chris: Mm, yeah. Yeah. I, I this, yeah, it's been a big conversation really about what's, uh, European defenses could look like without American support. And I don't think at this time, I, I, you know, if we didn't have American support, I think Europe's in a lot of trouble. [00:35:04] Keir: Well, in part, those conversations are, are confidential because they should be. This is not something that should be aired out in public and not just for the sake of, uh, attempting by any means possible to keep the United States on side for as long as possible. Also, because this is highly useful information for our adversaries if you know which systems fall apart without US support, then you know where to target. [00:35:26] Chris: Yeah, indeed. And you know, our prime minister at the moment is making a, um, moves to try and create this coalition of the willing, I think is what this term does, to protect Ukraine if, um, America cannot provide sort of military support for Ukraine. Is that, do you think that's realistic? Can um, Europe sort of step in to protect Ukraine if America say, we're no longer gonna provide any military support? [00:35:48] Keir: Yes, it can, but in very, very limited ways. Uh, there's a, a report that I published, um, was actually put out about, uh, an hour ago now as we speak, [00:35:57] Chris: Oh, good timing for me. [00:35:59] Keir: Through the, uh, Baltic Defense College in Tartu in Estonia, where I was, uh, giving the keynote speech about a week ago, uh, about precisely this, talking about what Europe can do without US support and with Russian opposition and the limitations on what is actually feasible, but the way in which it's absolutely vital to step up now anyway if European countries are going to be relevant to the conversation about their future security. Because at the moment, all of this is happening between the United States and Russia over the heads, not just of Ukraine, but actually of Europe as well. So it's time to insert Europe into the conversation with whatever means it actually has possibly available. So that's, uh, that's a really complicated challenge and it's something which I'm sure, uh, today's Monday, we're looking forward to Thursday when there'll be a military conference on what can be supplied to this coalition of the willing, and that will probably determine the bounds of what is actually feasible in terms of supporting Ukraine. However, um, what we hear from different national leaders at the moment sometimes makes sense and sometimes really does not. You mentioned Keir Starmer's position. He's still making this contingent on, apparently, US support and Russian acquiescence and neither of those things is likely to happen. The US has ruled out backstop for this operation and Russia is never going to agree to it because the whole point of this operation is to oppose Russia. So, uh, why this is still part of the conversation is a little, a little baffling from the outside. [00:37:28] Chris: Yeah, indeed, indeed. So it doesn't look very hopeful really, because there are even talks of, um, because of America's position with Ukraine at the moment, of is there a way to create a peace plan that doesn't involve America? But I don't think that's even particularly likely either, is it? [00:37:42] Keir: That is extremely complicated, but, uh, let's think about the, the contours of what a peace might look like. We used to hear talk of, uh, a peace for Ukraine that is lasting and durable and just, and that word, just the fair peace has dropped off the menu already completely because it's so clear that the United States is trying to force through Russia's terms on Ukraine and is willing to use whatever leverage it has on Ukraine to actually force them to acquiesce and accept. So it's salvaging the, the least worst outcome when the United States is already, uh, bent on this course of action, which not just Ukraine, but Ukraine's neighbors have long understood is potentially disastrous. [00:38:21] Chris: Yeah. And do you think, I mean, there's, there's talk of a 30 day ceasefire at the moment. I mean, to me that seems more symbolic for the Trump administration than it does for any kind of real capability or, um, you know, or any sort real, um, steps towards ending this war. [00:38:37] Keir: That's entirely possible. Now, let's not rule out that it might be feasible to use a break in the fighting as a means to actually constructing a more durable peace settlement. But that doesn't seem to be the objective of the Trump administration at the moment, particularly because all of the preemptive concessions to Moscow that had already been made even before the negotiation started basically agreeing to, to some of Russia's key demands and then having the conversation, of course, at which point Russia is free to put forward additional demands. [00:39:07] Chris: Yeah, and this 30 day ceasefire, I mean, I just feel like it's an excuse for Trump administration to be able to sort of walk away from it. Say, well, we tried, you know, and that, that's what it to me looks like, but I could be wrong there. [00:39:19] Keir: Well, that wouldn't be surprising. Uh, one very likely outcome if this 30 day ceasefire does go ahead, is that without a monitoring and enforcement regime in place, because that's gonna be an enormous task across an immensely long front line. [00:39:32] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:39:32] Keir: Russia breaks the ceasefire because just because there's a ceasefire doesn't mean Russia ceases firing, blames Ukraine for the ceasefire breaking down, uh, presents the facts to the facts as per the Kremlin to Trump, um, blaming Ukraine for the, this Trump's beautiful peace falling apart. Trump also blames Ukraine because he habitually listens to Putin over his own intelligence services and then cuts off aid to Ukraine altogether as a result because he says that Ukraine is not invested in peace and then Russia rolls forward at a time of its choosing. [00:40:03] Chris: Yeah. We, we did an interview not long ago with Shane Harris, um, from the US who's, uh, writes for The Atlantic and he mentioned that there is a, a feeling that Trump has a real sort of dislike for the Ukrainians and for Zelensky. And I dunno if you have any sort of thoughts on that. [00:40:21] Keir: Well, that's one part of the problem. Let's not forget, again, thinking back to, to Trump's first term in office, when he attempts to, uh, intimidate Zelensky and, um, basically blackmail him into supporting his own domestic political goals. This was the reason why Trump was impeached, uh, the first time around when there was something still resembling rule of law pertaining in, in the United States. So no wonder he harbors a grudge, but also layered on top of that, you have to bear in mind his beholdeness to Putin for whatever reason, his buying into Russia's great power narratives, his assumption that, uh, just as Putin says, Ukraine isn't really a country and doesn't really have any right to, to stand up to Russia, which is now reflected in his repeating more than once the idea that it was actually Russia that, um, sorry, excuse me, Ukraine, that started the war rather than Russia invading. [00:41:11] Chris: In the buildup to the American elections, I always felt that Trump was obviously gonna be a bad choice for Ukraine. I find it a little bit sort of puzzling that, um, that Trump people could perceive Trump as being, uh, positive Ukraine to build up the election? I dunno, sort of how you think on all of that. [00:41:28] Keir: Well, it's a central part of the Trump mythology that he's quote, tough on Russia unquote. And again, that relies on the collective amnesia. And that is not just, uh, looking at all of the ways that Trump facilitated Russian aims during his first term. But look at the, the specific instances where, um, the Trumpists present as examples of him being hard on Russia. They are either things that he had inherited from the previous administration, the Obama administration, or things that were done by the US government while Trump was in power, that when he found out about it, he was furious about them. So the, the dedication to that, uh, book I mentioned earlier, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West, written at the height of this in 2018. Uh, it read, um, this book is dedicated to all those US career civil servants who are doing their best to create and deliver a sensible policy on Russia while hoping that President Trump doesn't notice, because as soon as he noticed he would squash it. Now, the the arms supplies to Ukraine, this is the one thing that, uh, Trump has always come back to, and, uh, brandish as evidence that Trump isn't always Russia friendly. It's the supplies of Javelin missiles, which had previously been stalled. This was a long, ongoing process that rolled forward into the Trump administration until, we're told, trump finally gave the say so. Now, whether that's the case or not, whether he did in fact understand what was, what was being done by the US government, you need also to look at the conditions that were placed on delivery of these missiles that are supposedly the evidence that Trump is anti-Russia. They were, if delivered, to be kept in storage in Western Ukraine a thousand miles away from the fighting as opposed to actually being used. And then they were used as leverage in the blackmail, the extortion that Trump was trying to exert on, on Zelensky. So wherever you look at these examples of, um, Trump opposing Russia, as soon as you pick apart at it and look closely, they fall apart very rapidly. [00:43:26] Chris: And it feels like at the moment there are moves to force Zelensky out. I dunno if you have any sort of thoughts on, on that. [00:43:32] Keir: It's very likely. We, we should expect to hear this as one of the demands that comes from Russia and might well be resurrected in, uh, Trump's own language. You've heard him talking, speak of Zelensky as a dictator, uh, and somebody that needs to go. We shouldn't be surprised at all if that suddenly starts getting put forward as a demand, uh, to Ukraine for continued US support. [00:43:52] Chris: Yeah, and I, and I, and I think that'd be terrible for Ukraine, because I think Zelensky, in my opinion, I think he's been sort of fantastic in dealing with this crisis. And he's gone out of his way to really work with allies and build allies to get what Ukraine needs. And I, and I think Russia sees that. Um, and even if they don't necessarily replace Zelensky with, to say a pro-Russian president, I think just putting it, anybody else in charge is gonna put Ukraine on the back foot no matter what happens because of, of his experience. [00:44:22] Keir: That's right. And that's not just because of Zelensky's personal qualities, but uh, it's worth thinking about what it will actually mean. It's Russia seeking regime change in a neighboring country and the United States facilitating it. [00:44:33] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed, indeed. Which is shockingly that the US would facilitate that, but, uh, not so shocking when we look at what's going on at the moment. Well, let's take a break and we'll be right back with more. What are the critical areas where European nations need to enhance their resilience to withstand potential Russian aggression? Um, including obviously as we talked about earlier, hybrid warfare. [00:45:08] Keir: Well, we spoke a little bit already about resilience, about societal protection, about making sure that people actually know how to, how to operate, how to live when their country is under attack, whether that's a direct invasion or if it's any of the long distance attacks that we talked about earlier. [00:45:24] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:45:25] Keir: But the simple question that, uh, people need to ask themselves, particularly in Western Europe, is if an attack of this kind takes place, not necessarily a missile attack that's, uh, that's destroying my, my home, my apartment, my house. Uh, but say for example, an attack on critical national infrastructure that's delivered remotely. I have no heat, no light, no power, no water, and my, my workplace is not functioning. Where do I go for, for shelter and warmth and feeding if the, uh, you know, food supply is broken down as well. If people don't know the answer to that or if, like, in the UK they do know the answer and the answer is, you are on your own because there is no centralized provision for evacuation, shelter, feeding, et cetera, then governments have failed in a fundamental duty to their citizens. [00:46:12] Chris: And do you think even, um, society as it stands at the moment, um, you know, we talk about early, about late-nineties thinking, which was my term, do you think even society right now are actually ready, um, for a conflict with Russia or even believe it's possible? Because I see a lot of people, I mean, I'm from the media, so I'm, I, I swing, I sort of swim in sort of more left-wing waters. And so I see a lot of people who have a very anti-war position and see any talk of increased defense spending or any potential conflict with Russia as just Western warmongering because they think of the Iraq War, et cetera. So, is society even ready to consider this, at least in the UK? [00:46:51] Keir: Well, in the UK of course, it's a very different picture again, from, uh, other parts of Europe. The frontline states understand this very clearly, not just because they, they look at Ukraine and they see how easily this could be turned against themselves as well, but also because they have within living memory that experience of being under Moscow's domination. So they understand what is happening to those millions of Ukrainians that are under that savage Russian military occupation in the south and east of the country. And that is why they are so determined that it is not going to happen to them themselves again. And that's why they support defense spending. But as always, the further west you go in Europe, the less that understanding is actually influencing public attitudes, and that's being exacerbated by the failure of successive leaderships to actually explain what the problem is and that the, their respective countries are themselves under threat. As we discussed earlier, leaders talking about, well, yes, we can say in this room that Russia is at war with us, but we can't say it outside because God forbid our publics, our electorates would understand that they're in danger. And the problem of that, of course, is that, uh, it's not just the lefties that you talk to, it's more broadly across society because democracies, by their nature, can't defend themselves against threats about which the majority of their voters are completely unaware because they will never vote to support the measures that are necessary, particularly the financial measures that are necessary. Leave aside, um, defense, leave aside rebuilding the armed forces, but just for protecting people against the impact of war coming to the homeland. That you would've thought should be something that everybody could agree on. [00:48:30] Chris: Yeah. And how can we improve messaging on this, do you think? [00:48:33] Keir: Honesty. Honesty, transparency, being upfront about what exactly the challenge is. And that's something that we've seen, uh, in a pattern across the previous, uh, let's see, the last 11 years, particularly since the, the seizure of Crimea in 2014. When national leaders, whether it's uh, prime minister, president, defense minister, whichever senior figure it is, when they are allowed to speak directly to their electorates and say, We have a problem, we are under threat from Russia. Here is how Russia is already attacking us on a day-to-day basis. That makes things happen. It starts the public conversation. It unlocks a lot of other things like government and society and media and public spaces actually being able to take defending themselves seriously. But for as long as you have that conspiracy of silence about what the problem is, none of those things can start. [00:49:23] Chris: Yeah. And how, and, and how do you think, um, how do you think sort of, uh, European government should put that message out, too? Because there's a lot of cynicism, um, or, uh, around sort of, uh, government messaging, uh, official government messaging, and at the same time, like we saw with the American elections, um, traditional media is not really as, as effective anymore, um, as social media is. [00:49:44] Keir: Well, this isn't a new problem, fortunately. So people have put a deal of effort into understanding how to reach audiences in this new media environment, particularly when the information space, as you say, has been already so poisoned and has become so cynical as a result of the, the efforts of some of the far-right, far-left, and general loony influences that we've seen so far. [00:50:04] Chris: Yes. [00:50:05] Keir: Um, there, it shouldn't be a secret how to do this. It needs to be coordinated, not just across governments at the top level so this is a unified message. It is coming to, for example, publics in Europe, not just from their own national governments, from the EU, from supranational organizations, but it's also got to come through channels that actually resonate with the audiences. And that's where you need public figures that are more trusted than politicians, which isn't a very high bar to reach, I know, but public figures that are, are actually are able to deliver messages that will resonate with the audiences that they talk to, all of which will be quite disparate because of this fragmented media space that we have at the moment. You have a very different, uh, requirement for somebody that can talk to 20-year-olds, to somebody that can talk to 50-year-olds and be listened to, but they all need to be activated in a coordinated manner. [00:50:56] Chris: Yeah. Yeah. And what are your thoughts on the current generation of European leaders' understanding of the Russian threat and their willingness to take decisive action to counter it? [00:51:05] Keir: Same problem. It depends where you look. Uh, the European countries, the countries of Europe have really, uh, performed pretty much according to stereotype for most of the period that Ukraine has been under this full-scale invasion. You have this arc of countries, uh, uh, that are neighboring Russia, and then across the top to the UK that understands what the challenge is, knows how to face it with a bit of a wobble from the UK lately, because, uh, right up until very recently, neither the previous government nor this one has actually been willing to, to grip the problem and reinvest in defense. All of those, of course, have been at least saying the right things. And then in the middle you've got the blob. You've got France, Germany, Spain, Italy, that, uh, is very much likely to think it's somebody else's problem. The exception has been France under Macron, because Emmanuel Macron has been, uh, as one of his colleagues, put it radicalized by disappointment in dealing with Russia. He's tried, as so many European politicians before have tried, to build a bridge with Moscow to look for a cooperative solution. He's seen the results and as a consequence of that, he's now one of the hardest line Russia opposers within Europe. It's Macron at the moment that is saying that this coalition of the willing, if and when it forms, has to go into Ukraine, regardless of whether Russia likes it or not, because that's the whole point of being there. We haven't heard Starmer saying that yet, because Starmer hasn't been sufficiently radicalized yet. [00:52:32] Chris: No, no, no. Well, he is only been in power for less than a year, so we'll give him some time, but, but he should be, uh, better informed on that. [00:52:39] Keir: Actually, that's a, that's a really good point. This process usually takes two to three years, and we've seen it so repetitively with European leaders that come in, but also people in positions of dealing with Russia, whether it's government, or it's business, or it's military. You have people arriving in a post that has a Russia responsibility and they think, Well, all these people before me have failed to get the relationship right, but I am gonna succeed because I am special. [00:53:05] Chris: Yeah. [00:53:05] Keir: And different, and the process from there to actually arriving at an understanding of what they're up against is generally, fairly predictably, two to three years. So yeah, Starmer hasn't quite got that yet. [00:53:15] Chris: No. And I, and I have memories of the, uh, reset relationship with Russia from the Obama administration or that big red button, et cetera. [00:53:23] Keir: That said, Overload in Russian, yeah. [00:53:27] Chris: Oh, dear. Well, I'm, I, I've got one big last big question for you, um, because conscious of time. So obviously there are people out there who argue that increased military spending and a focus on deterrence could provoke Russia and escalate tension. So how would you respond to that concern? [00:53:41] Keir: Fortunately, we don't hear that quite so much anymore. Because, uh, the, the logical fallacies in it are, are pretty clear to most people that decide to give it some thought. So most of the people who were saying this naively have stopped saying it because they understand that the consequences of leaving yourself undefended is that the damage that's caused by Russia attacking is all the greater. So who's left? It's the ones that are saying it unscrupulously. They know perfectly well what the implications of this are, but for whatever reason, continue to say it. Defense spending is presented as a provocation to Russia in the same way that NATO accepting more member states in Eastern Europe to protect them from Russia was presented as provocative. Of course, it's a problem for Russia because it prevents Russia doing what it wants to do, unopposed. [00:54:29] Chris: Mm-hmm. [00:54:30] Keir: Now, if you want Russia to do what it wants to do unopposed, and if you want to share the fate of those people that are under Russia's thumb now in Eastern Ukraine, that's fine. But if you want another choice, then you need to be able to defend yourself. [00:54:42] Chris: Yeah, indeed. Is there anything else you'd like to add that's important to you that we haven't covered today? Which could be a very open question. [00:54:49] Keir: It's extremely, there's, everything's important, unfortunately. Um, the one thing that I would say is that you mentioned cause for optimism in some of the books and the, the one thing that, um, has been absolutely consistent over the course of the three books that I described in that sequence of saying, here's what's gonna go wrong if nothing is done, then nothing is done, then it goes wrong, is that, uh, there's always been an element of optimism in some of them about how it might be possible to salvage the situation. That's usually the part of the book that turns out to be completely wrong. [00:55:19] Chris: Okay. [00:55:20] Keir: In the first one, it was the publishers that, uh, insisted on it because they said, no, this is a very depressing book, we've gotta have a happy ending. And of course, that was wildly wrong. Uh, in this one, it was the hope that, um, based on what our current secretary of defence, John Healey was saying, in opposition, when we had a new government here in the UK, they would take defense seriously and start seriously investing in it. That turned out to be wildly wrong as well. And we still have a situation now where part of the claimed increases in, uh, in defense spending, are actually just an accounting fudge, which betrays the instincts of the government to pretend that something is happening as opposed to actually making it happen. The former secretary of defence, uh, Ben Wallace describes, uh, the, the UK's defense accounting as quote blatant fraud unquote, and he's quite happy to reel off examples of this. And that's, that's something again I go into in the depressing chapter on the UK here. The problem is, the challenge is not an accounting one, it is actually a very real problem that the UK needs to face as a matter of urgency. So the time to move from pretending to actually doing is now. [00:56:28] Chris: Yeah, indeed. Is there anything listeners can do such as contact local politicians, et cetera, that you would recommend? [00:56:34] Keir: Always. One of the, um, series of conversations I wasn't expecting to have this year was with new Labour MPs who've just arrived in the job less than a year ago. And, um, they, uh, came to me as somebody that has written about British defense and about Russia, asking why, what they were being told by the Ministry of Defense, now they're in their new position, was so very different from what they could observe with their own eyes. Now there's an understanding across MPs. In fact, I'm gonna see a, a group of them, uh, later on this evening, uh, traveling down to London, God help me for, uh, for meeting up and talking about all of this stuff. There's an understanding among the political level, which is short of Number 10 and Number 11 Downing Street of what the challenge is and what needs to be done about it, despite the obfuscation that comes from central government and the MoD helping people in positions of power and able to make decisions to feel empowered to actually do that because there is public support would be a contribution to this, however small. So yes, write to your elected representatives, write to your MPs, agitate for the government to actually protect people in this country up against the threat that we all know is coming. [00:57:47] Chris: Thank you for that. Where can listeners find out more about you and your work? [00:57:50] Keir: I am, uh, I'm really quite easy to find, see I have two, uh, what you might call institutional presences. I work with the Chatham House think tank, uh, in London. It's a, um, international affairs think tank. It's chatham house dot org. A lot of the stuff that I've written previously is available free to air. They're free to download also through various NATO centers of excellence, through NATO Defense College, uh, in fact, I seem to spread myself around quite a lot. Um, any search online for me will come up with a few of these, uh, these different free things to read if people are interested in any of the stuff that I've said. Um, plus of course, as we've mentioned possibly enough times throughout this podcast, I've read quite a few books. [00:58:31] Chris: Yes. Well, I recommend people go out and seek out your books, and I certainly, I'll be looking at some of your older books and I'd love to have you back on again in the near future. Um, let's hope it's a cheery topic, but I doubt it'll be [00:58:43] Keir: Well, we'll see. We can all hope. [00:58:44] Chris: Yes, indeed. Well, thank you very much for joining me today, Keir. [00:58:46] Keir: Thanks for having me. [00:59:21] Announcer: Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.