[00:00:01] Due to the themes of this podcast, listen or discretion is advised.

[00:00:07] You know, I'm not surprised that these rallies would want to pull something off that would

[00:00:11] re-establish some form of dominance in that way, but then also kind of deal with,

[00:00:17] hey, Huzzball is not ten feet tall.

[00:00:19] Lock your doors.

[00:00:20] Close the blinds.

[00:00:21] Change your passwords.

[00:00:23] This is Secrets and Spies.

[00:00:38] Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics,

[00:00:44] and intrigue.

[00:00:45] This episode is presented by Matt Fulton, and produced by Chris Carr.

[00:00:50] Hello everyone, and welcome back to Secrets and Spies.

[00:00:52] On today's episode, Phillip Smyth, the guru for all things related to Iranian proxy groups,

[00:00:58] returns to the show to chat with me about the exploding pagers and radios that made thousands

[00:01:02] of Hezbollah members last week, and the following way of his really airstrikes targeting

[00:01:06] the group's long-range missile and drone forces.

[00:01:09] We discussed the implications for Hezbollah's communication networks and command structure,

[00:01:14] and the broader impact these events will have on the regional war that's now consumed

[00:01:17] the Middle East for a year.

[00:01:19] They also wanted to flag for listeners that we recorded this Thursday afternoon, so a little

[00:01:23] before Friday's IDF strike that targeted Hezbollah's headquarters compound in Beirut

[00:01:28] and Secretary General Hassan-Nasralla.

[00:01:30] As always, a couple of housekeeping notes first.

[00:01:32] If you enjoy the show, please leave a five star rating and review on your podcast streaming

[00:01:36] app of choice, and if you're not already, please consider supporting us on Patreon.

[00:01:41] It's super easy.

[00:01:42] Just go to patreon.com forward slash secrets and spies.

[00:01:45] Your generosity helps keep this podcast going.

[00:01:48] Thanks for listening, and I hope you enjoy our conversation.

[00:01:50] The opinions expressed by guests on secrets and spies do not necessarily represent those

[00:01:55] of the producers and sponsors of this podcast.

[00:02:13] Philips Mith.

[00:02:14] Welcome back on, sir.

[00:02:16] How are you?

[00:02:17] This fine.

[00:02:17] This fine afternoon.

[00:02:18] It couldn't be better.

[00:02:19] Yeah.

[00:02:20] Especially, it's got some more of a subject matter that I think we have now discussed

[00:02:23] so much that it could be a class in and of itself.

[00:02:28] I know.

[00:02:29] I know.

[00:02:30] Yeah.

[00:02:30] All right.

[00:02:30] Well, let's just get right into it.

[00:02:32] There's a lot to get through here.

[00:02:34] Let me give us some background notes to sort of get us started here, and then we'll

[00:02:37] be off to the races.

[00:02:38] So on September 17th and the 18th in two waves, thousands of pages in Walkytalkies distributed

[00:02:44] to Hasbola members exploded throughout Lebanon in Syria, killing 42 and entering over

[00:02:50] 3,500.

[00:02:52] Most of these explosions were concentrated in parts of Lebanon.

[00:02:55] Hasbola controls, including Barut Southern suburbs, south Lebanon, and the Bakal Valley.

[00:03:01] The pages were manufactured by a Taiwanese company, Gold Apollo, but distributed by the Budapest-based

[00:03:06] BAC consulting, which looks to be it's a front company could have some degree of control

[00:03:13] by Missaud, that sort of outstanding there.

[00:03:17] Hasbola began using the devices in February.

[00:03:20] Somewhere along the line they were intercepted by Israeli intelligence and booby trapped

[00:03:24] with three grams I believe of PETN that could be remotely detonated with the signal.

[00:03:30] So these all went off simultaneously on each day.

[00:03:33] On September 20th, and Israeli strike in Southern Bay Route killed Ibrahim Akil, commander

[00:03:38] of Hezbollah's Rod Wound Force and at least 45 others.

[00:03:42] Akil was a member of the Jihad Council, and won by the US for his role in the 1983 Bay Route

[00:03:47] embassy and Marine barracks bombings.

[00:03:50] On the 21st, the IDF claimed to have almost completely dismantled Hasbola's military

[00:03:55] chain to command.

[00:03:56] On the 23rd, the IDF conducted over 1,600 strikes in Lebanon just on that day alone, mostly

[00:04:03] focused in the south of the country and the Bakal Valley targeting the group's long-range

[00:04:07] rocket and missile capabilities at least 558 people were killed on the 23rd.

[00:04:13] The strikes have continued throughout the week since we're recording this little

[00:04:17] afternoon on the 26th.

[00:04:19] The IDF stated goal is to grade Hasbola's forces to the extent that the 60,000 Israelis

[00:04:25] who've been displaced from their homes near the Lebanese border since October 7th can

[00:04:29] return to those homes.

[00:04:31] A ground offensive into Lebanon is still possible last night.

[00:04:34] The US France and I believe the EU is well called for an immediate 21 day ceasefire.

[00:04:39] Just before we hopped on here, I believe I saw that the Israeli government rejected that.

[00:04:44] So we'll see what comes next.

[00:04:47] Fill up my friend.

[00:04:48] Good sir.

[00:04:50] Maybe a thinking to what would be interesting for the people.

[00:04:53] Maybe we start with sort of a condensed history of Hasbola's internal comms networks

[00:05:00] and why in this year of our Lord 2024 they were still using pages.

[00:05:07] I'm not going to go through the whole thing with Lebanese border.

[00:05:10] We start post 2006.

[00:05:13] So 2006 we had the so-called Summer War, the Hasbola Israel Summer War which oddly

[00:05:19] enough has a ton of parallels to the current we're going on right now.

[00:05:24] That's the side note.

[00:05:25] After that conflict, Lebanese has bologna realized that they could maintain more operational

[00:05:31] security and also essentially build their own internalized comms network.

[00:05:37] That's what they really aim to do.

[00:05:40] With doing so having pages or cell phones for a lot of these guys was an unworthy mode

[00:05:48] of communication.

[00:05:49] It's easier just to page someone and then pick up a pay phone and there are plenty

[00:05:54] of you use a little card for it and just buy it with cash and local bodega style place.

[00:06:00] It was easier for them to kind of operate in that way.

[00:06:04] I'm getting a specific sequence of numbers.

[00:06:06] I know that I'm supposed to go and do this.

[00:06:08] I'm supposed to go and do that.

[00:06:09] This is the signal that's being sent to me.

[00:06:12] Okay done.

[00:06:12] I need to mobilize and need to be in the back.

[00:06:14] I need to mobilize and need to be in the genupe and the southern Lebanon.

[00:06:18] That's generally how that was being used.

[00:06:20] And also given it was an older piece of technology that most people would say,

[00:06:25] oh, why are you using that?

[00:06:27] That's so strange.

[00:06:28] There is a certain cache to that.

[00:06:30] If you think about it in terms of cell phones, smartphones are markedly easier to hack

[00:06:35] and really get a lot of information out of.

[00:06:38] If you're in an opaque organization and you are security conscious, oh well this is something

[00:06:43] that's really I can put a code in and that's easy.

[00:06:46] That's not a problem.

[00:06:47] And I'm assuming, and again, we only know so much about why that was selected.

[00:06:51] But this generally makes the kind of sense of style of why they would do it.

[00:06:56] It makes a lot of sense to do that with an easy kind of numerical code set of numbers

[00:07:00] that you can have or contact numbers to route people through.

[00:07:04] And it's interesting because throughout the entire, what they call the Iranian threat

[00:07:09] network or through kind of all the Iranian back proxies.

[00:07:13] And I'm talking through Iraq and through Syria and through Lebanon.

[00:07:17] A lot of them were adopting central phone banks for recruitment.

[00:07:21] There was a lot of phone-based activity that was going on here, even with donations.

[00:07:25] You could call into certain things.

[00:07:27] I remember Katala Pazbolo, which is in Iraq, kind of the core loyalist group for the Iranians

[00:07:33] in that country not to be confused with Lebanese.

[00:07:36] Hasbolo even though they believe the same thing and operate together and cooperate all

[00:07:40] the time.

[00:07:40] But they are technically two different groups.

[00:07:42] They were running networks that were kind of like that.

[00:07:45] Not the page or network per se, but running the centralized phone banking networks.

[00:07:49] Running centralized recruitment networks.

[00:07:51] And then also there were other versions of this earlier on that the Iranians had learned

[00:07:55] from so for instance I get a ton of work on phone recruiting, phone-based recruiting.

[00:08:00] I think I called into pretty much every phone-based network to the point where one of

[00:08:04] the junior commanders recognized my voice and I was trying to disguise it in air.

[00:08:08] I was like, oh, I have to say, sorry.

[00:08:10] It was an interesting story when I was going through my research at a podium with a bunch

[00:08:16] of academics.

[00:08:18] But what I can tell you is it eventually trickle down where smaller groups that the Iranians

[00:08:22] are trying to use, like, hey, let's put the cell phone number up.

[00:08:25] You guys can call the cell phone number.

[00:08:27] Hey, you're interested in getting recruited.

[00:08:28] This is the office you go to.

[00:08:29] This is the paperwork that you fill out.

[00:08:31] These are the kind of people that we want for doing this operation in Syria.

[00:08:35] So you had that that had trickle down to really kind of the smallest network levels.

[00:08:40] Like this had just become, you know, integrated very much.

[00:08:42] And I think when you have that, you have rapid growth that was going on, particularly through

[00:08:46] 2012 to around 2016-17ish.

[00:08:51] There's kind of a push in pull.

[00:08:53] There's EBS and flows to how that works.

[00:08:55] You may have a lot of success pulling in recruits but it's also a security risk.

[00:08:59] And Lebanese has Bala, which is the crown jewel of the Iranian proxies.

[00:09:04] It's probably watching a lot of what was going on in Iraq.

[00:09:07] The watching it was going on in Syria and saying, yeah, well, there's a proper way.

[00:09:11] There's a new way that we can do this.

[00:09:12] There's a parallel method that we can utilize.

[00:09:14] And for them maintaining an internalized comms network felt secure.

[00:09:19] It maintained the opacity that they needed, not just against these railies, but also domestically

[00:09:24] in Lebanon.

[00:09:25] Getting tapped by a multitude of different foreign intelligence organizations.

[00:09:28] Now, fast forward a little bit.

[00:09:31] I haven't actually not fast forward, but fast backward.

[00:09:34] I rewind a little bit to 2008.

[00:09:38] So in May of 2008, there was a lot of commentary that started to pop up in Lebanon on about the Lebanese

[00:09:45] state.

[00:09:46] And at the time, Lebanese state was essentially dominated by the March 14th coalition.

[00:09:50] They were anti-Hazbola, how did he, his son was running almost stop ball, which is

[00:09:55] leading Sunday party.

[00:09:57] You had the Lebanese forces, Owat Al-Litaniy, you had a cateb, also Christian party.

[00:10:02] A lot of these guys had been had their own kind of political figures assassinated or targeted

[00:10:08] or threatened by Lebanese has balla in their allies.

[00:10:11] So you have that happen where one of the main leaders essentially called the Weather Vain

[00:10:15] of Lebanon, while Legion Blot, who was the head of the PSP, the progressive socialist

[00:10:20] party, his dream.

[00:10:21] He came up with his jersey.

[00:10:24] Considered kind of a major druze leader within Lebanon.

[00:10:28] And also a major druze leader in general for the Druze community as a whole, at least on

[00:10:32] a political side, not on the religious side.

[00:10:34] But he had come out and was making kind of fiery comments about how the Lebanese state needed

[00:10:40] to shut down this privatized constant network.

[00:10:43] This just needed to happen.

[00:10:44] And site hustling the sorola really came out and said, the site hustling the sorola is actually

[00:10:48] the head of Lebanese as balla, their secretary general.

[00:10:51] Pretty much said any threat to our internal communications network is a threat to Lebanese

[00:10:55] as balla.

[00:10:56] This is the precedence kind of the magnitude that it held within Lebanese as balla.

[00:11:01] It got to the point where you had these March 14 politicians saying, no, I think we have

[00:11:06] enough backing from the west.

[00:11:08] Yeah, we've failed essentially with enforcing UNSCR 1559 at 1701, which was essentially

[00:11:14] calling for the disarmament of Lebanese as balla, then pulling back away from the border

[00:11:19] with Israel and kind of acting like a normative political party, whatever that means in Lebanon.

[00:11:24] But a little bit more normal than what they actually are, you know, a state within a state

[00:11:28] with its own army and its own social networks and everything else.

[00:11:31] And eventually they said, you know, we might actually try and enforce this well Lebanese

[00:11:35] as balla jumped first.

[00:11:38] And with the assistance of how to cut Amal, which is another major shea party that's

[00:11:42] lied with Lebanese as balla, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which created in 1930s

[00:11:49] has a lot of symbolism that's quite similar and reminiscent of the Nazis.

[00:11:53] No, that's a whole other different discussion.

[00:11:55] But again, you can remember it by their symbol, which is like our red almost looks like

[00:12:00] our hurricane within a white circle and a black flag.

[00:12:02] It looks a lot like a massacre but like a little bit not like a swastika, but it's enough

[00:12:07] that it's it's very similar.

[00:12:09] Yeah, and Anton Saaday their founder was also a German professor at AUB, but that's another minor

[00:12:14] detail in the 19th year.

[00:12:17] Just influenced by German idealism.

[00:12:18] It's not a racial thing, promise.

[00:12:20] But he also thought that Jesus was not a Jew.

[00:12:23] I'm getting ahead of myself as it Eric Lebanese isn't.

[00:12:27] Anyway, so those parties essentially invaded West Bay route.

[00:12:33] They pretty much stopped right at the border where a colon quote East Bay route, the Christian

[00:12:36] section would be, but they stormed through pretty much dismantled the internal security

[00:12:41] apparatus from a stop ball, the Sunni Party.

[00:12:45] They capture a lot of their guys killed a lot of their guys.

[00:12:48] How to cut Amel did that as well, SSNP did that.

[00:12:50] Lebanese has ball of them decided, you know what?

[00:12:52] We're going to go into the Schulf, which is the mountain south of Bay Route, but closer

[00:12:56] to Daohia, meaning the main.

[00:12:59] It's always called Lebanese has ballad dominated sector of southern Bay Route, which technically

[00:13:03] it is.

[00:13:04] So they tried to get out of there and give some problems to the PSP and the Jews.

[00:13:08] Well, bad idea with that because the Jews are a rather martial population.

[00:13:14] And if we can remember back to the 70s when Camaljoan Blot will lead his father had an

[00:13:19] issue with the Marinites, he actually said that he would drink their blood from their skulls.

[00:13:23] Yes, this is actually what you get.

[00:13:26] But they felt as if their zone was threatened by Lebanese has ballad.

[00:13:30] They're actually reports of a number of Lebanese has ballad who were captured and potentially

[00:13:36] executed, similarly executed, even some claims that some had their heads cut off

[00:13:41] and these heads were dumped in Daohia by PSP forces.

[00:13:45] It was quite a amount of nasty fighting that was going on in the Schulf.

[00:13:51] And it did slow down Lebanese has ballad, but it did change the paradigm of things.

[00:13:55] Because after that Lebanese has ballad did demonstrate that, okay, you're going to mess

[00:13:59] with us, we will storm right into Bayot.

[00:14:01] We're going to take out kind of the major pieces of your, you're kind of political apparatus.

[00:14:08] We're going to weaken you and we're going to demonstrate that we actually hold power.

[00:14:12] And eventually what ended up happening was Lebanese has ballad then also got political power,

[00:14:16] not just through democratic voting process but also just through the acquiescence of certain

[00:14:21] parties that just realized, hey, you know, these are the guys who are running the show.

[00:14:24] And we simply don't have the arms and material to really keep up.

[00:14:28] We're not having the external support, but all of that really the kind of big thing

[00:14:34] that pushed that forward was the comms network, maintaining the communications network

[00:14:39] as a whole and making short with solid and making short as functional.

[00:14:43] So imagine these pages were operating within that internalized communications network.

[00:14:48] Well, this comms network was pretty sophisticated.

[00:14:51] At least historically it was in the past few years or so following the 2006 war included like

[00:14:59] their own internal fiber optic networks and stuff separate from the Lebanese state infrastructure.

[00:15:05] So these pages were part of that probably a low tech has ballads security organs thought less

[00:15:12] easily penetrated by Israeli and Western intelligence wasn't quite so.

[00:15:20] I mean, there were several thousand of these pages that were distributed across the group.

[00:15:24] What kind of a has ballad member would have been carrying around one of these one of these

[00:15:27] pages? Well, I based on the casualties and who was announced. And I mean, you essentially

[00:15:33] have to kind of draw conclusions based on was there in Israeli air strike that day?

[00:15:37] That's number one. Was there some kind of kinetic attack that was done that didn't

[00:15:41] potentially didn't involve the pages? Okay, we can kind of remove people who are like that from

[00:15:46] who was injured and who was killed for the two or three days that there were reports of both

[00:15:50] the Icom radios and then also the beepers that were that were hit. And it's interesting, a lot

[00:15:57] of them were middle to high level. You did have people that one could say, well, they're lower

[00:16:01] level, yeah, they're lower level but that only means so much. So if I'm in a village in the middle

[00:16:05] of nowhere on the back of, you know, some dusty village and I'm actually the rallying point

[00:16:11] for five other guys and we're going to drive down and we're going to meet with Lebanese

[00:16:14] Bolla and then kind of help with rocket logistics. Technically, I am not that low level but I

[00:16:20] am extraordinarily low level say compared to the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon who is acting as an

[00:16:26] IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps aid and kind of overseer for Lebanese has Bollet itself.

[00:16:34] He was also injured and you had a lot of other people, a lot of reports where

[00:16:39] you had high level people who are even trying to do interviews different places and

[00:16:42] they had issues, meaning the beepers blew up. It's interesting, some of the videos that came out.

[00:16:47] I always look for this because it's a real telltale thing. You look for older guys. You know,

[00:16:52] you look for kind of they've got the beard a little bit, they've got kind of the grizzled face like

[00:16:56] they look, you know, it was interesting. I knew a former militia in the areas like they would just

[00:17:01] look at these guys as a he's a veteran and it's kind of like yeah, he's a they had some fun in the 80s.

[00:17:06] Yeah, I mean it looks like that and it's interesting because we're tracking and I comment a lot

[00:17:10] about this on Twitter and I try to be good about my normal comments, but you look for the old hands

[00:17:17] who are there. You look for people who've had a lot of experience and they're trusted because there

[00:17:22] is loyalty there. They came up with the group when it was new. They've been able to establish

[00:17:27] power. I mean we're talking about at least three decades of experience and knowledge and and just

[00:17:34] basic interactions with again and I keep saying opaque, but that's exactly how this organization

[00:17:39] tries to work with an extraordinarily opaque organization. And when you're seeing these people like one of

[00:17:45] the videos was a guy and I think in a grocery store, a little grocery store and the pageur blows up

[00:17:50] and and price list and a most price list way ever there are a number of what looked like seen out

[00:17:55] so much $100 bills that are blowing out of his bag that he's also got with the pageur and he's

[00:18:00] still a messenger back they had on his side right he was right by the checkout. Yes, yeah. I'm

[00:18:09] felt that was a sign felt thing wasn't it? It was a little messenger back but you know he's still

[00:18:16] going to be like okay, sorry. Again jokes aside on this it's interesting that guy though was

[00:18:24] older yeah you could tell he was a little longer tooth kind of grain the beard well my assumption

[00:18:30] would be he is not going to be listed as Shahid al-Majahid when the martyrdom poster comes out he'll

[00:18:36] shahid al-Khide meaning you know if you're a mujahid it's not you know bad I mean you're a holy warrior

[00:18:42] but al-Khide you're commander and it's just interesting to kind of see that I mean there was a

[00:18:47] joke that was running in pro is real Twitter and I'm sorry I'm referencing a Twitter a lot but

[00:18:53] it's actually like prices to see a kind of real time where certain messaging strategies are coming

[00:18:57] from from all ends and one of them was can you imagine Lebanese husband Bola is now being run by

[00:19:02] guys who didn't get the pages. I mean it's if you're looking at this the casualty amounts we're

[00:19:09] talking almost 2000 people and even with the radios so the radios the way those were issued yeah

[00:19:15] you're getting some you know minor league types and maybe that's just to cause further confusion

[00:19:19] and and dissension and you know a lot of other issues within the ranks but these are for them

[00:19:25] kind of prized technological possessions and it's like it's priceless because when you parallel this there

[00:19:31] has been and I actually I talked to you I Robert Tolest who's over at the national and we tend

[00:19:37] to have these conversations about kind of you know is a reporter but kind of what was in

[00:19:42] Hussbullless head and part of what I was thinking was you have a lot of older figures who are

[00:19:47] there there's only so much technology that they're really going to have we've had a generational

[00:19:51] shift that's been literally overnight pretty much all over the place look at the technological

[00:19:55] changes that we are dealing with here in the United States and it's a bit like describing how

[00:20:00] TikTok account works to you know my mother you know she'll have very very strong opinions about it

[00:20:07] in terms of how the Chinese Communist Party might control it and it would be very serious about

[00:20:12] that but when you tell her you know when you ask her so what exactly are the types of things

[00:20:15] you put up on TikTok she probably would not be able to tell you so you have that disconnect

[00:20:20] internationally it's not you know and again I'm working off a few assumptions here but when you're

[00:20:27] dealing with this with younger members of the party who are very focused on this kind of

[00:20:32] tech stuff they're getting so much advice coming from Iran they have to work with the products

[00:20:39] that they can actually utilize and also that they can get supplied and they have to have something

[00:20:45] that's actually going to work for everyone well it's no shock that there's this mix of high-tech

[00:20:49] low tech and there are these holes that are in between that can be exploited by far and intelligence

[00:20:53] organizations like in this case and so I have a quote in his in a recent article that he did about

[00:20:59] that but of course you know was riffing quite a bit on kind of the breakdowns of those sorts of things

[00:21:04] you have to imagine this too in parallel with another incident that was going on a major incident

[00:21:09] which was the war in Syria right where a lot of the older figures the older mid-level commanders

[00:21:14] older senior commanders a lot of them got killed because they were fighting you had a lot of younger

[00:21:18] people who are coming up in the organization you had a lot of it speaking of dissension in the ranks you

[00:21:23] have a lot of other issues that were regarding Syria it just kind of regarding how things were rolling

[00:21:29] you know so you had issues with kind of the leadership there then you had this other infusion

[00:21:33] of new technology well we have drones now and we also have more advanced rockets and also he

[00:21:38] might have missiles with with advanced guidance systems I'm not saying that they're incapable

[00:21:42] of doing it but there's a shift now moving from an insertion organization that was using kind of asymmetric

[00:21:48] weapon systems where they've kind of upgraded a little bit and then upgraded a little bit

[00:21:54] and now they're having a position where they've had to upgrade white a bit quite quickly

[00:21:59] they've been fighting a war that they I'm not saying they weren't necessarily equipped for

[00:22:04] they did pretty well I mean because they did win the country back for a basherle usad

[00:22:09] and for the Iranians but you've had a shift in terms of that mindset you know they are they are now

[00:22:15] functioning like an army and acting like one and presenting themselves like one wouldn't be

[00:22:21] huge shock for me either that you know some of that propaganda brushes off and people take

[00:22:25] it seriously and oh well of course we're in a army now you know the evil Zionists are afraid of us

[00:22:30] and what then what ends up happening is you kind of have these stratus within the organization

[00:22:35] that will be understanding this new technological kind of thing that they can bring to the

[00:22:40] table and then others don't really understand it and then others that don't really understand

[00:22:43] how the bepher gets to the country I mean you need a better kind of logistical system

[00:22:48] and maybe there are some holes that were there and I think again those holes tended to occur

[00:22:53] when you have rapid change when you're trying to adopt all these systems and when you know

[00:22:58] the kind of pace of growth is is outpacing kind of leadership's ability to kind of handle that

[00:23:04] and I do think that that that I mean it happens in companies why wouldn't it happen in a foreign

[00:23:09] terrorist organization yeah so I mean there's there's an issue possibly there but again

[00:23:14] you also have to figure this you know these really get a vote in this you know in terms of

[00:23:19] they're trying to penetrate Lebanese has bow all the time they make it good really obvious that

[00:23:24] they're trying to do that yeah but when you present them with far more holes that you can jump into

[00:23:29] well you know it makes their job a bit easier especially when there's no real acknowledgement of that and

[00:23:34] you know it's a slow moving process and you know I'm not surprised that these really

[00:23:39] is want to pull something off that would re-establish some form of dominance in that in that way

[00:23:45] but then also kind of deal with hey has bowless not ten feet tall let's take a quick break

[00:23:50] and we'll be right back with more have you found anything in how you've followed this story

[00:24:11] of the past you know week a little bit more than that okay you have this

[00:24:16] the simultaneous waves of explosions it basically you know cripples the command and control

[00:24:23] structure for the organization followed then by two days later with this air strike on one of the

[00:24:30] last O.G.s on the Jihad Council Abraham Akil and then this opening up of a ton of air strikes

[00:24:40] targeting their long range missile capabilities is this kind of like is this coordinated or was

[00:24:47] there some sort of I don't know has ballagots suspicious and they were going to find the

[00:24:52] pages if they didn't act now so okay let's push the button and now okay we have this opening

[00:24:56] as well as kind of crippled let's go in and get these long range rockets while we can what what

[00:25:02] do you know about the strategy that was there if there was one well you know it was an outsider

[00:25:07] looking in I'd it's very easy to make the argument that this was all very calculated to have an

[00:25:12] end effect that would demonstrate that Lebanese his ballagot is not as safe as it thinks it is number one

[00:25:19] number two if it really wants to play this game and I've been thinking a lot about this in terms

[00:25:23] of when these really just decided you know what we've kind of had enough of this and you can kind

[00:25:29] of see there's this arc when they started targeting very specific people it was interesting to me

[00:25:34] I think it was that the soccer pitch with the with the Drew's children sort of was around

[00:25:40] well then well that was part of it that was that was part of it but I thought it well I would

[00:25:44] I'd make the argument that it actually happened earlier that in December the Iranian proxies and

[00:25:49] I'm talking everything everyone from Pij Hamas uh Lebanese has ballagot the Iraqi groups all of them

[00:25:55] started this new propaganda trend where they're not just talking about the unity of France and

[00:26:00] that's like a big thing with them but it was also kind of unity of operations and what types of

[00:26:05] operations are being launched and these sense for these rallies that not only are they going to be

[00:26:09] hit everywhere but now you know they have to worry about these huge mass drone strikes and you

[00:26:15] know missile attacks and there's gonna be a missile attack every other day and then you also have

[00:26:19] to look at northern Israel where you've had tens of thousands of people that have been displaced

[00:26:23] and cannot go back to their homes that's costing these rallies a ton of money especially given

[00:26:27] there is kind of general mobilization that happened after October 7th I mean you can imagine for

[00:26:33] a technologically advanced country that's you know well past the post-industrial you know thinking

[00:26:40] on things um this can't be the best for their economy for just the general psyche of the state

[00:26:46] so you know there has to be some kind of action so I'm thinking what actually happened was

[00:26:50] in January ish to February uh there was the thinking of no you know what we're gonna need to start

[00:26:57] hitting you know X and X type of target and when you look at that list of from like January on okay

[00:27:04] it's like today they they killed by destroying his apartment uh one of the Lebanese was

[00:27:09] Bola uh one of their rocket commanders and it's always interesting I almost feel like I'm in Al-Qaeda land

[00:27:14] in terms of this there number three you know this is another guy with the last name of al-suri

[00:27:19] but it's very similar where we're I think a lot of news news people and journalists are not really

[00:27:25] following up on who these guys really are but you know they've just heard about these people and

[00:27:29] essentially they're repeating back whatever they're told and saying yeah well we have the insight

[00:27:32] we totally talked to a guy in his balla yeah he's just confirming whatever the hell's out there it's

[00:27:36] like whatever I know like I follow this very very closely I can't tell you how help just totally

[00:27:41] and to use the word opaque again totally opaque Lebanese as Bola is on this all right uh which

[00:27:47] sends another shockwave through them but you're noticing what you can notice is it's the missile

[00:27:52] rocket forces the drone forces their command structure they're starting to get leadership yes that is

[00:27:59] the that is where Lebanese has Bola brings the most to play when it comes to fighting these

[00:28:05] rallies and causing problems for them and you know looking at that it's like okay you know

[00:28:10] it's easy to understand but it's also you look and you go wow this is a very incisive type of

[00:28:16] targeted kill light you know so that it causes a breakdown on this level and causes a breakdown

[00:28:21] on that level I mean at university of Maryland I actually this is many years ago but you still look

[00:28:25] at you know if you take out this leader and then this one you know comes in power you know how is that

[00:28:29] going to affect the group dynamic and I still kind of look at things in that way I'll be at I am

[00:28:34] far from a really cool super computer that can get at all that up but it's it is fascinating to

[00:28:40] kind of look at because over the past couple of months you keep seeing this degradation of the capabilities

[00:28:46] that Lebanese as Bola can bring based on leadership that's there and they're not necessarily

[00:28:50] the old hands that they're targeting a lot of these are younger guys coming up and they're quite

[00:28:55] skilled and they're quite good if you look at the targeted hit on on Alcale it's interesting because

[00:29:02] I always you know I look at it this way like we tend to think about things in the West

[00:29:08] at in terms of well the commander was killed and everything's going to break down from there but

[00:29:12] if you're looking at who else was killed that's kind of the bigger line and I I said this recently

[00:29:18] was speaking at the World Trade Center with a Sufon group is holding a meeting there and I was

[00:29:24] saying you know everybody remembers the Colson Solemani killing how many of you remember that Abu

[00:29:30] Mehdi al-Muhandis was also killed and how many of you here can tell me who that is or was

[00:29:35] how many of you can tell me how many of the intermediate commanders from Kataba's Bola the

[00:29:41] Bottle organization and likely a multitude of other groups that were in the convoy meeting them

[00:29:46] how many of those who were killed it's interesting how they were kind of wiped from the roles

[00:29:49] afterwards like we you know it's very hard to find out who else was killed in that and that strike

[00:29:55] but people were killed and what kind of degradation that caused in the networks I mean I would say

[00:30:00] that Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis for their Iraqi leadership was far bigger killing than even

[00:30:05] cost him Solemani because he could delegate things out to him as kind of the junior vice-story in

[00:30:10] that area and have him handle stuff here you need to start a new group you do this so I look at

[00:30:15] like for the command structure of red one and this is another misconception red one isn't

[00:30:20] some like super army within Lebanese Huzbola and I'm sorry I'm getting ahead on on this stuff but

[00:30:26] you know talking about the elite red one unit well there there are red one he's like people who

[00:30:30] were in red one who recruited local Syrian she had a fight with them and a lot of the Lebanese

[00:30:35] core forces that were like with red one also got killed fighting in Syria they're not like super

[00:30:41] but they are markedly more advanced than your average husband Bologhi red one has offered people as

[00:30:48] core forces to start new she-amolishes in Syria or to start new militias that are pro-arron pro-Syria

[00:30:54] or pro-Pro-Pr. S.A.A.A. there they've also had more advanced guys who've done rocketry stuff

[00:31:01] they've had more advanced guys who've gone off and done you know advanced I like intermediate range

[00:31:06] ballistic missile work or guidance work or you've had them do other stuff like with drones but they

[00:31:12] are a more experienced unit doesn't always mean it the best to the best but they do kind of

[00:31:17] filter that cream so eventually it rises to the top but you know as they've increased in size

[00:31:22] because of Syria you don't always have like the best the creme delacrim but then again I mean one

[00:31:27] could make that argument about some special forces that are in the United States you know hey you know

[00:31:32] not gonna call anybody out in particular but you know it's not as if you know if you have units

[00:31:39] that are growing larger and larger and having you do many more tasks that they initially were not

[00:31:43] equipped to do you tend to run into that issue but again I don't want to get ahead of myself on this

[00:31:48] where you know we're forgetting the point that these really killed something like four of these

[00:31:52] red one battalion commanders well those guys didn't just rise to rise to their their ranks you know

[00:31:58] be by happenstance or because they have a familial connection in part some of them did but they

[00:32:03] had to demonstrate that they were pretty good in the battlefield what's really interesting is and

[00:32:08] when you really get down to and I'm assuming these realies are kind of using this this level of

[00:32:12] thinking on it Lebanese has bowler and a lot of the Iraqi shea militias are quite familial in how

[00:32:19] they are connected in the loyalty that's established and I'll give you a good example one of Nusrallah

[00:32:25] site has on the srallah one of his nephews was killed fighting in Iraq with Lebanese

[00:32:30] husband bullah but he was clearly part of a core force that was there and who's from Nusrallah's home

[00:32:36] town, your sword and looked at a sulther actually went and visited when he had the funeral

[00:32:42] went to Lebanon visited and paid his respects fascinating really interesting but what's really

[00:32:53] bad you know brothers in law you know people who are married into his family and married into

[00:33:00] other major families within Lebanese has bullah and that's kind of the leadership network we're

[00:33:06] talking about the shahad council jihad councils quite major for military affairs there is technically

[00:33:10] a military council but them and the jihad council are very very intertwined but imagine this I mean

[00:33:17] you only have so many loyal family members that you can draw from that's one two you only have

[00:33:22] so many experienced people that you can draw from that already rather small network and then

[00:33:28] only so many of them that you actually have years and years of experience with and again I think

[00:33:32] this speaks to these really kind of goal on this is kind of degradation degradation degradation

[00:33:36] degradation of Lebanese husband bullah internally and also with their trust in the kind of foundations

[00:33:42] of their institutions it's almost like these really like just pushed his bullah into a corner in

[00:33:47] a back alley and just just tried to just beat on him like his fastest they could as as hard as

[00:33:54] they could before the guy could get like get back up again I don't know if that's a decent analogy

[00:33:59] but you have the pages in the walkie talkie is going off like pretty much crippling command and control

[00:34:05] you have then these targeted hits on these old school very capable high to mid level commanders

[00:34:12] within the rot one force and then you had on the 23rd I believe it was and continuing to today

[00:34:19] like this rush of air strikes targeting their strike capability it seems as if these railies are

[00:34:26] trying to sort of surgically cut out parts of hezbollah's org chart to cripple their ability

[00:34:34] to project force over the Lebanese border into northern Israel without the IDF having to

[00:34:41] march to the Latani river to achieve that and for people listening who have a life unlike us the

[00:34:48] Latani river demarcates southern Lebanon from the rest of Lebanon it's not it,

[00:34:53] the Latani is not really the border with Israel or Lebanon right they use it as that point if you're

[00:34:58] saying I'm in southern Lebanon and you hit the Latani that's like that stop point well we hit the

[00:35:02] Latani but didn't go any further there there's the argument so this is the other thing and

[00:35:07] you get I actually tend to have problems with the journalists who kind of say this mockingly

[00:35:11] because their strategic the strategic thinking behind what they're doing two Lebanese has

[00:35:18] all it makes a lot of sense and actually it's I don't want to say it's distinct departures about

[00:35:24] to say that but it is a slight departure from kind of earlier thinking so they are doing this kind

[00:35:31] of escalate escalate escalate before things start to have to deescalate and what I think that

[00:35:36] is it's calling a run and Lebanese has well as bluffs and I think there there is something

[00:35:42] that's forgotten by a lot of people who will say oh they they have 30,000 armed demand and they

[00:35:47] have all these rockets and they have all the data data data but meanwhile a lot of this is

[00:35:51] smoke and mirrors it's kind of like an Iraq a rock the groups that are there there's a multitude

[00:35:56] of them they're all generally based on Lebanese has balla they have varying loyalty is

[00:36:00] I mean you name it there's a bunch of issues but you look at it and they're essentially

[00:36:04] based around that style of thinking it's very formulaic in terms of kind of how they project

[00:36:09] and what they project when you know who whose orders they're following and how and a lot of them

[00:36:14] know will kind of do the smoke and mirrors act look at them we sent up drones and we did it

[00:36:19] in tandem with this other organization because as you know we're totally autonomous you know

[00:36:23] we don't really listen to the Iranian sometimes wink but we totally love how many in a

[00:36:27] whole may need to don't worry it's that it's that kind of thing and I think these really

[00:36:31] is looking this and going you know what they're gonna call the bluff we're gonna call the bluff

[00:36:34] but then beyond that there are residual benefits residual benefits are are they going to

[00:36:39] probably continue to try to launch rockets yes they will continually try to do that however

[00:36:44] well they do it is effectively now not so much will eliminate major threat elements that will

[00:36:50] be rising through the ranks of Lebanese has balla later on absolutely will it damage leadership

[00:36:55] within the organization and damage the organization to the point where it'll take them years to

[00:37:00] regrow because they've decided to get involved in this and then involve themselves to an extent

[00:37:05] where we are so totally bothered by it that there's kind of like no going back and I see I mean

[00:37:12] teagig logic in it and I think you know all the you know let's commentary online well yeah

[00:37:18] escalate before they deescalate oh that's just so stupid you know you'll kind of see this attitude

[00:37:24] and you're gonna go no what they're doing is they are and I said this before they are degrading

[00:37:30] what has balla can do they are taking away certain options for them and I think the key thing here is

[00:37:37] one removing some of the leverage and two really getting the group so that it feels so uneasy

[00:37:42] when it has to rebuild and when it has to get these things done that it's just going to be very

[00:37:48] very hard to do so it's going to take an entire reinvention of thinking about security kind of

[00:37:54] decisions the paradigms they were originally following how they're they're getting their weapons in

[00:37:59] who do they go to for safety how do the Iranians control them or the Iranians going to have to put

[00:38:03] more IRGC with Lebanese Hezbollah where it is autonomy fall it's going to be a whole process there

[00:38:09] there are so many secondary and tertiary order effects that are here to this that it actually makes

[00:38:15] a lot of sense do you think that the page or attack the depth of penetration that it suggests that

[00:38:23] the Israelis have and the specific kind of injuries that those explosions created wink do you

[00:38:30] think that makes it more difficult for his balla to repopulate the ranks do attract more people

[00:38:36] to join in the future after this well it's who you're going to attract and who you're going to

[00:38:42] recruit how long that's going to take but I think if you look at it in general you know how

[00:38:46] a bunch of mained and wounded guys that costs a lot of money I mean again this is another secondary

[00:38:51] effect Lebanese Hezbollah spends a lot on their martyrdom fund and on their health funds because

[00:38:57] if they're operating their own social network well that's going to cost a lot especially when you

[00:39:01] have all these intermediate and high level people who are now all connected and roped in and expect

[00:39:05] good medical treatment and well they have to fly to Iran again well that's uncovered that again

[00:39:10] that it's not I mean it costs a pretty penny but also the injuries don't go away to pull people

[00:39:16] on well okay now we need another conflict to have more experienced people who can rise up well where

[00:39:21] we're going to find one you know because last time we had this issue with the Israelis we were

[00:39:25] not equipped we couldn't do what we needed to do and then we lost a bunch of these guys I mean I

[00:39:29] think in part one there is part of it where it's sending the signals in the cerola and I realize that

[00:39:34] this is kind of a regularly commented on kind of thing I mean Shakur when he was assassinated it was

[00:39:41] interesting because that was another signal I mean supposedly he was on the phone with nusraella

[00:39:45] or he was speaking with kind of senior Lebanese Hezbollah control in this apartment which only says

[00:39:51] hey nusraella we know exactly where you are if you're in Israelis yeah beyond that it it says a lot

[00:39:56] more about the organization these were some of the most hidden people that were within these ranks

[00:40:01] and now you're reaching out and hitting them now on the thing with a pager imagine they

[00:40:06] somebody had to have a team of people who's putting in you know three grams of ptn and making sure

[00:40:12] it's going to live behind battery you know so it explodes like a vape pen that's left in somebody's pocket

[00:40:17] you know it's I mean you think about that and that is a lot of calculated thinking to cause pain

[00:40:24] yeah to cause some level of destruction which if you're on the other side of that it is a holy

[00:40:29] shit moment there's the en psychological suffering yes but the psychological I think is

[00:40:34] markedly more important than just the physical absolutely this is literally what my commander would

[00:40:40] contact me on no matter where my rank I was some of the highest level people to some of the

[00:40:47] more intermediate level people had these pagers and they were given by Lebanese Hezbollah these

[00:40:52] were being handed out right up until the day that they went off same thing went with the radios

[00:40:58] with the radio systems so these were things that were approved by the security head hanshos within

[00:41:04] Lebanese Hezbollah they were gone through hey we're technologically advanced we can hack things hey

[00:41:09] we hacked into and is really drone at one point and killed a number of their their commandos

[00:41:14] I mean this is the same organization that was capable of doing that same organization the same

[00:41:18] backing like in a rock for instance kataba's bolo using the same style of thinking

[00:41:23] organization and structure got into american drones that were watching president Obama when he was

[00:41:29] getting off of air force one in Baghdad so think about that I mean that's another shock to the system

[00:41:34] oh wait I guess we're not on a leading edge of things or you know it maybe we just don't

[00:41:39] actually know everything that's going on if your Lebanese Hezbollah commander you're thinking oh god

[00:41:44] I'm in the cross here they must know who I am even if you've never really done all that much

[00:41:49] that will I mean it's kind of the fear of God being put into you and it will disrupt how a lot of

[00:41:55] things get done now does it hurt recruitment um i think from some lower level people who are

[00:42:01] some some more zealous figures you get young men you're always going to have some level of zealousy

[00:42:06] and some able as some ability to exploit that if you're an organization like this and Lebanese Hezbollah

[00:42:11] is very firmly wired into the Lebanese Shea community however that it's some of these other

[00:42:17] little cracks that start to develop over time and I like to look at a lot of the long term stuff

[00:42:22] the Syrian war caused a lot of interesting and kind of odd dissension within the ranks when people

[00:42:29] get injured when payments maybe didn't come through or maybe you know somebody's son

[00:42:34] didn't come back from the fighting there but then they hear stories about how their allies on the

[00:42:39] ground, special usuts forces are maybe you know stealing things and making Lebanese Hezbollah do it

[00:42:44] maybe Lebanese Hezbollah is commanding a bunch of Afghans they find out Afghans Shea that were taken

[00:42:49] out of prisons who are we're opium addicts like five minutes before that doesn't really look good when

[00:42:54] a theocratic type of governing structure and then also you have this ideology that's pushing for

[00:43:00] you know we are the holy people and we are doing this we're literally the party of God

[00:43:04] and the party of God represents absolutely Laitel Falki and the Wali Al Falki, Khamanae

[00:43:09] I mean you have those little pitfalls there's only so much you can say oh it's just western propaganda

[00:43:15] when a guy in your neighborhood literally has his arm blown off because his pager blew up like

[00:43:20] how that happened wait what yeah I mean it's another piece to that puzzle now throw in other

[00:43:25] elements of corruption and other issues that Lebanese Hezbollah has had to deal with over the years

[00:43:30] you know that stuff that people talk about in their homes so do what what I say that it's going

[00:43:34] to completely dissolve the organization there's gonna be other issues no but I mean what will happen is

[00:43:39] you now the organizational be treated a little bit less like a holy entity with site hustle in the

[00:43:49] seriously when he can't deliver real response number one number two all of his internal guys who

[00:43:55] all the the guys who internally were told to be protected and safe are now getting hit and having

[00:44:00] their arms and legs blown off I wanted to ask you about I mean we're almost a year away from October

[00:44:07] 7th the attack that started this whole regional war that we've been dealing with just wondering if

[00:44:13] you had I don't know reflecting back on the on the year that we've had sort of thoughts things

[00:44:19] you've been you've been surprised by with a clarity of a year behind us now what are you what are

[00:44:26] you thinking there's a lot that didn't surprise me and that's it's actually what bothered me

[00:44:30] more the stuff that didn't surprise me was constantly you know you get this in academic circles

[00:44:36] quite a bit particularly on loyalty from groups to Iran they don't understand how Iran internally

[00:44:42] kind of solves these issues and has their own kind of mechanisms to fix things so instead you get

[00:44:49] in typical academic fashion looking for nuance where there is none and then writing a paper on

[00:44:53] why there should be more nuance and you saw that with unsurallahu houthis where it was quite clear

[00:44:59] they were moving in the direction even if there were internal issues with the Iranians the US and

[00:45:05] an academic in the US and Europe totally missing the point yeah you know there are different type

[00:45:10] shea and that is not how it works okay okay cool you know there were lessons from Syria

[00:45:15] that also demonstrated there were different types of shea I put that in quotes that were

[00:45:20] oddly kind of adhering to certain ideological precepts but then also these people totally missing

[00:45:26] you know the ideological element and how it actually works the slow drip it's also the same argument

[00:45:31] and I wrote this thing for for West Point you know how do you maintain a proxy how do you do this

[00:45:37] and it's really weird kind of the paradigms that a lot of people were looking at it well there's

[00:45:42] sticks and carrots like with any other group you know with any other groups and any other kind

[00:45:47] of proxy relationship and not all proxies are ideologically fervent you know absolute liadial

[00:45:52] focus supporters but hey guess what this is what the Iranians do to do it and it's not it's quite

[00:45:57] formulaic but it's not always the same formula per group there are some similarities that are there

[00:46:03] some lessons that are learned and again what was really shocking was a lot of people just did

[00:46:07] not learn from past performances that the Iranians had done and I think it's because you know

[00:46:14] one wasn't in the news to just like there's no real focus on it and so that was it I'd say

[00:46:20] that's for me personally it was an annoyance it was an annoyance particularly when you write

[00:46:23] about stuff like this and you talk about it all the time and it's just like didn't it sink in like

[00:46:28] okay but anyway my ego is harmed sorry the other piece on this is it's also looking at kind of

[00:46:39] the balance of power in the Middle East as a whole the Iranians have looked at this and I think you know

[00:46:44] a lot of you get a lot of people who weren't really focused on it were saying well you know

[00:46:47] the Iranians because of their radical ideology you know that's really why they count care about

[00:46:51] the Palestinians I think many more people who are watching this are realizing and this is something

[00:46:57] they should have realized in a rock something they should have realized in Syria something

[00:47:01] you should have realized with Bahrain even in Lebanon too that Iran executes so that it can

[00:47:07] get a greater bang for the buck they could care less if Hamas is totally smashed in Gaza

[00:47:13] Palestinians are as well yes it's a tools they can get other strategic benefits and frankly I

[00:47:19] think they're getting a lot of strategic benefits out of this they have found a way to shut

[00:47:23] down another strategic waterway we're talking about the red sea yeah we're talking about

[00:47:27] hurting the Egyptians no one seems to talk about the strategic reality that's there Egypt gets a lot

[00:47:32] of its money from the Suez Canal Egypt is allied with the United States technically with these

[00:47:39] railies too in terms of the I don't know call it security pack but the peace agreements that they have

[00:47:44] so that puts a lot of harm on that interesting not a lot of comments on that so you get that you get

[00:47:50] the great power competition elements that now Iranian Iranians have been able to demonstrate we've

[00:47:56] got elements all around the region that can do pretty much whatever we want we have enough

[00:48:00] implausible plausible deniability as I like to call it that you'll know that it's us but also

[00:48:05] maybe the policymakers in Washington have decided that hey no they're gonna play you know academic

[00:48:10] theory game and decide well we just don't know if the Iranians are doing we just don't have no

[00:48:20] for what it actually is in terms of playing the United States let's ignore these railie elements

[00:48:26] on this I think these railies are quite realistic on a lot of deal a lot of their issues dealing

[00:48:30] with the Iranians I think the I think you also get Gulf states the Saudis and you know dealing

[00:48:37] with Bahrain UAE it's interesting how they're also taking from this and kind of watching what's

[00:48:42] going on even Jordan you know where does the US kind of put its foot down and deal with things

[00:48:48] and I think they're getting a lot of mixed messages a lot of mixed messages and I think you know

[00:48:53] it's interesting how seriously we take certain attacks with very little response and kind of

[00:48:59] roll that from there and kind of don't hit you know you kind of don't execute in a certain way

[00:49:03] and I think they see that because private communications between a lot of them is a little bit more

[00:49:07] gun the hoe than what I think US policy makers are are her saying so that's another part but then

[00:49:14] there's this whole other part that's been completely missed on this where what's fascinating to me is

[00:49:19] it's almost like we have now kind of seated the the Palestinian issue it's interesting you just

[00:49:26] kind of see this in domestic politics when you talk about the Palestinians now how many people are saying

[00:49:31] you know the PLO or Faktau or or the Palestinian Authority are really leading the Palestinians

[00:49:36] so this was like a slow burn and a drip drip to you know destruction it's a corrupt organization

[00:49:41] it's got a lot of other issues not very popular but now I think there's this kind of acceptance

[00:49:46] that these radical actors that the Iranians control yeah like that's a Palestinian there you go

[00:49:50] yeah they're the ones empowering you have to kind of negotiate through let's say Iran

[00:49:54] to get what you want which is exactly something that the Iranians want and yeah and I think you know

[00:50:00] it loses we the United States lose a lot of leverage from there it accepts their theory of the case

[00:50:06] yeah so look at the Iranian Proxy as sort of the the Avatar the Palestinian people

[00:50:14] the Palestinian cause but not just that it's also looking at them to use use your term the

[00:50:18] Avatar of Lebanon right to use them as symbolic of who is representing Iraq it's it's

[00:50:24] very fascinating yeah over time it's this attitude of what we're being realists you know we're

[00:50:30] using realist theory and they're the ones in power and we have to deal them okay cool just

[00:50:34] totally negate their ideology totally negate what they're trying to fight for totally negate the

[00:50:38] fact that they hate you you know and it's a bit like we can just do what Kissinger did with China I mean

[00:50:44] the malice hated us too very very very different setups very very different you know just everything

[00:50:52] and you cut you just see this a lot from people who have not again it's a very academic view point

[00:50:59] and it's it's one that's informed by being an air conditioned lobbies of hotels and

[00:51:03] sipping coffee with the guy who's not wearing a tie you know in his little blazer and oh he's just so

[00:51:09] friendly and personable and we disagree on a lot but again it misses the point misses the point

[00:51:14] that you know they're also commanding guys who were sending forces into another country to

[00:51:19] kind of rape kill and blow stuff up yeah and they essentially provide the training weapons

[00:51:23] and equipment for that details but it's just I there's just this odd I don't know it feels

[00:51:30] weird but also feels like totally normal at the same time and that's kind of what makes me so

[00:51:35] uneasy about it I mean I would say that there has been and I don't I don't like it political here

[00:51:40] but I do think that politically speaking you can kind of see a very big difference in terms of kind

[00:51:46] of where kind of American political parties are going in terms of viewing the region and how they

[00:51:52] handle the issue and I think there's been kind of this move towards what they think is realism

[00:51:57] and a lot of it's really just pushed by domestic political constraints as opposed to

[00:52:03] dealing with the actual overseas issue and the threats that come back and what I'm saying is it's

[00:52:06] the let's pick the let's say for Democrats let's pick the opposite issue of Trump for Trump let's

[00:52:10] pick the opposite issue of whatever they're doing because it'll have better hit points for domestic

[00:52:15] audience we tend to make the far in the domestic here and kind of forget a lot of the other

[00:52:21] I don't want to call gamesmanship but kind of how things work overseas and who you're dealing with

[00:52:26] and why you're dealing with that there's just not a lot of long-term thinking and I think it's

[00:52:30] demonstrating itself quite a bit it takes a while to turn in your craft carrier

[00:52:49] I think as far as the US public and you know domestic considerations and how they

[00:52:57] affect how the administration responds to this I think a lot of it is the trauma from Iraq

[00:53:04] is still very real and will be for a long time to come or until a carrier sinks in the South

[00:53:10] China sea and then it's you know game over but sir there's that war weariness right from Iraq

[00:53:17] that is still very real that people are just allergic to even and I don't I don't blame them

[00:53:25] are allergic to the idea of a conflict in the Middle East it's not something that the American

[00:53:31] public wants to see on their TV screens right now it's not something they want to deal with

[00:53:36] I think the administration knows it's bad if they have to deal with it so it is

[00:53:43] perhaps it's easy to trick oneself into thinking that it's less of a problem than it actually is

[00:53:49] or it's easier to solve than it actually is if you act like you have rational good faith actors

[00:53:56] on the other side to have discourse with does that is that fair does that make sense?

[00:54:02] partially yes I agree with you it's much easier to manufacture this this sense that a

[00:54:08] country that is clearly and openly your foe actually has nuanced to it that you can negotiate with and come

[00:54:15] to a reasonable solution I mean this is what you get if you get a master's degree in conflict studies or

[00:54:21] sorry I'm sorry but I mean have these conversations with people it's kind of like have you

[00:54:26] actually talked to them do you read their stuff well no but you know theoretically I've actually heard

[00:54:32] that theoretically yeah but again I totally get that attitude again like with countries like

[00:54:39] Iran with the Islamic Republic of Iran even during the Iraq war I remember when they were piping

[00:54:44] in a lot of of munitions and doing a lot of other things it was easier to criticize bush for being

[00:54:49] a war-monger and saying and now we just wants to invade Iran no I mean that was a domestic political hit point

[00:54:57] that completely negated and ignored exactly what the Iranians were doing what why the Iranians

[00:55:02] were doing it and then all these other little pieces to read on really no I remember a bunch of

[00:55:06] these articles that come out this one has no relation to Iran where like cited a Wikipedia article

[00:55:12] that was like the wrong group to begin with because God forbid it doesn't matter I need to have

[00:55:16] a good nasty piece because bush is a douchebag kind of you know thinking and whenever I see that it's

[00:55:24] I'm noticing it more and more just because of polarization in the country with how we handle certain

[00:55:30] issues and it kind of hit its high point with Obama and Iran deal but I've also said it noticed

[00:55:36] that it's kind of hit another kind of arc going up and this time it's dealing with you know

[00:55:41] privately it's kind of like how do you deal with Lebanese has bolo wink wink maybe we should talk

[00:55:45] them on the side or maybe we should kind of deal them because well they are the power in Lebanon

[00:55:49] well why are they the power in Lebanon so there is that part then there's the other part too

[00:55:55] where yes I think the populist as a whole is sick of wars in the Middle East because the general

[00:56:00] attitude you'll get is these people are fighting over you know 14 square inches of sand and I don't

[00:56:06] care about that and it often misses the point but I can see the exhaustion that's there too

[00:56:11] but what I've noticed is that exhaustion leads to a lot of very very poor executions in terms

[00:56:17] of policy number one long term thinking number two and then what makes it even worse is if you're

[00:56:24] trying to fix the problem it's the well we had we couldn't do anything more so I just washed my hands

[00:56:28] of it yeah it's not always the best thing but it's it's it's the old church hill bit you know

[00:56:33] the Americans will try absolutely everything before they get to the right conclusion but you know

[00:56:40] it's something that kind of annoys me because I keep noticing it more and more and by the way

[00:56:43] I haven't even touched on other October 7th parts not even hostages or what's going on with

[00:56:48] Gaza or what's going on in Lebanon we're finally seeing the the lower grade regional war

[00:56:56] and you know this is one that the Iranians had threatened for well over 15 years

[00:57:02] it's the one that they had been building up for kind of but weren't really at that pace yet again

[00:57:07] these really get the vote no I'm serious yeah where I mean you're giving me this kind of look

[00:57:11] but I'm not saying they wanted it now I'm not saying they wanted it in these with these kinds

[00:57:15] of constraints but to add the general kind of behavior where it's the uh wow he's other groups

[00:57:22] are acting we just don't even know how this works and why is that the Iranians are involved it's

[00:57:25] almost like taken for granted which I find fascinating but then also we don't want this to hit a

[00:57:31] real regional war but it is it's just lower grade my my face I was making there it was

[00:57:38] I mean you said this is the this is the regional war that the Iranians have sort of

[00:57:44] wanted for like 15 years is it though I don't think they really planned for a has ball to get caught

[00:57:51] with their pants down like this and not really be able to respond at all it's it's not this exact

[00:57:57] conflict it's not this exact thing again I mean I've said this before to you it's they bit off

[00:58:01] more than they could show that was kind of catastrophic success but from different levels I mean

[00:58:08] I mean Hamask could say this was catastrophic success the Iranians can say well hey we

[00:58:13] great job guys but you know there's some other strategic concerns they're still getting certain

[00:58:18] levels of strategic benefit from extending this look you know it's like the I hate simplistic lines

[00:58:23] this well you know get just give back the hostages and you know and and has balla could stop

[00:58:28] attacking and the hoothees can stop attacking and then it's all just kind of go away

[00:58:31] but the Iranians keep going they keep going because yeah yeah you know but it's it's on top of

[00:58:38] of all of that it's the we still need to get something for this we have invested enough we have lost

[00:58:43] enough we still need something for it this is like a trade I and I hate this kind of annoying

[00:58:48] kind of stupid it's bizarre culture and they're negotiating it's like a carpet salesman I

[00:58:53] thought somebody say this that's for the carpet salesman that's pretty bad right but that's like

[00:58:58] but but point I'm getting to though is there is a trading mindset on this there is there is one where

[00:59:04] we have invested x y and z we are at a disadvantage obviously I'm gonna negotiate it with

[00:59:09] unquote harder to get what I want to get more than I want it's like negotiating for a chest of drawers

[00:59:15] I know the thing costs two grand person selling it for $300 I'm still gonna try to get another 50 bucks

[00:59:20] off of it you know just to kind of make sure we seal that deal that's the kind of thinking that you're

[00:59:25] dealing with here and I think we are we're forgetting a lot of this that you know the Iranians want to be

[00:59:32] the regional power they want that and this is another kind of glide path to getting there and we've

[00:59:38] essentially acquiesce to it and the thing is it is kind of paper tiger behavior it's interesting

[00:59:44] how much projection the Iranians have but it's paper tiger behavior that we are acquiescing to

[00:59:50] and when I say a misspoke just let me correct it here obviously I don't think they wanted

[00:59:57] October 7th and they can't foot that happen afterwards to you know be everything that it now is

[01:00:03] but I don't think that they're going to leave this without getting something they view as beneficial

[01:00:07] or something it can sell as beneficial and then use it in the long term for kind of benefiting

[01:00:14] there foreign policy goals they're ideological goals and kind of cementing control over a lot

[01:00:19] of things sometimes there are other internal national nations that are going on here and I

[01:00:23] mean I'm looking at this with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad let's say they're both crushed

[01:00:28] in Gaza you still have elements of them that are surviving in the West Bank probably being a little

[01:00:32] bit more covert but they're gonna have to kind of return to Lebanon and Syria and if you remember

[01:00:38] what happened to radical groups that were in Lebanon and Syria guess who gets to run them a little bit

[01:00:43] more closely earlier on it was it was the Syrians under Huffesal Assad and then afterwards now

[01:00:49] Lebanese Hasbola you know PFLP PFLP GC DFLP all of them now have markedly close to relationships with

[01:00:57] Iran because Iran has money Iran has physical control over their leadership that are now in these

[01:01:02] areas and it's harder for them to kind of trade horses and yeah maybe go to Qatar or go to Turkey

[01:01:07] or like whatever right so I looked at that way that this is you know there is a weird net gain

[01:01:12] for the Iranians maybe on that level we now run Hamas we now can splinter this group

[01:01:18] because that's essentially how they've run all their proxies before and interestingly we would not

[01:01:23] be having this conversation about a grand RMA of Iranian proxies like 20 years ago in the same way

[01:01:30] just but it was totally different discussion and here we are now discussing about the cellular

[01:01:36] replication of just Iranian you know proxie dumb and has bullet type groups you're talking about you know

[01:01:42] what the Iranians are gonna need to feel that they that they got something out of this right

[01:01:48] they can sell as a as a victory over the course of the last year rightly or wrongly I'm

[01:01:55] not saying this to make a judgment either way public perception of Israel around the world has

[01:02:03] plummeted tanked and I think we'll take a generation or more to even begin to maybe rebuild

[01:02:09] is that somewhat of a victory for for the Iranians in a very sort of twisted way

[01:02:15] they'll sell it is that they certainly will sell it is that and also I mean it's interesting

[01:02:21] popular perceptions where does that translate out to governing in in western countries yeah

[01:02:28] this is this mean that more people are elected who are just openly anti-Israel I mean you're already

[01:02:33] seeing this in a lot of left-wing parties oh yeah that are throughout Europe and the United States

[01:02:37] where now it's kind of an open thing you know to be well no we're more pro-Palestinians it's a bit like

[01:02:44] Jeremy Corbyn being picked as the leader for labor party you know this is Corbyn who you know

[01:02:51] has spoken at you know places with it's done speeches with has ball of flags and stuff in the

[01:02:56] background where would you have seen that you know how many years ago yeah where they just it

[01:03:02] just wouldn't happen but I mean I think there are I think it plays off of a lot of a lot of other

[01:03:08] kind of radical trends that are just going on in general and kind of the body politics so it's

[01:03:13] I don't want to call it parasitic but in a way it's just kind of its weedled its way in there it's like a

[01:03:17] cause lebra where you're seeing a lot of different political structures and spheres for people who are

[01:03:22] having a lot of consternation and anxiety about where politics is going in their home country

[01:03:27] it's weird I mean to use the term avatar again it can be used as an avatar in terms of kind of

[01:03:33] for a lot of different things I mean look at the Irish yeah I think that's why that's used I think

[01:03:37] for some corners of the classical left and part of the far left the past year with Israeli actions

[01:03:46] in Gaza have been deeply radicalizing in ways that will ripple in interesting ways for many

[01:03:54] years to come I don't think we've even begun to see the butterfly effect here yeah let's me

[01:03:59] think about this way it's also you can make the education argument you have a lot of far left

[01:04:03] educators who've already signed on to that there's a trickle and drip down of that

[01:04:07] I mean I've even heard the argument of more faring students in US universities you know where

[01:04:13] they're able to influence other members of their cohort and then eventually that just kind of

[01:04:17] turns into its own political body and of itself and you have you certain you know you can adopt certain

[01:04:23] tendencies and and lines of thinking from people like that I think there's a lot of different

[01:04:28] little push points I'm not trying to say that's like the soul thing now I'm just something

[01:04:31] I've read but in general I mean I think there are some market changes that are going on and for

[01:04:38] the Israelis you know it's going to be interesting with their maintenance of kind of how things

[01:04:44] gonna work but again I think these are trend lines that were kind of already there for a couple

[01:04:48] of decades that we're just going in this direction but I think for the Iranians because it's

[01:04:53] to go back to the main point the Iranians taking this as a positive well how many is already

[01:04:58] sold this as a positive you know look at everything that we've done in these American students

[01:05:02] you know the reason they're putting their graffiti putting graffiti on George Washington statues

[01:05:06] at GW you know the reason they're putting up Palestinian flags you know this is all because

[01:05:11] they understand the true wonder and glory of Iran you know it's not I mean he's literally

[01:05:17] says yeah it's it's it's consumption for a certain audience yeah yeah but I mean the question is

[01:05:24] how much do you buy it okay that's one part but the other part is kind of the the grander strategy

[01:05:29] of it how do you isolate and cut off these really it's kind of like how very few people focus on

[01:05:35] when she emelisha groups in a rock will target what they claim are American targets they were

[01:05:41] putting up the prices of the things they were targeting well for the Americans it's kind of like

[01:05:45] yeah who cares like 300 grand for you know peace of a home via whatever it doesn't really matter

[01:05:51] but you kind of look at it as well look we're slowly bleeding it's this is our this is our sense

[01:05:57] in terms of how to oppose them we're bleeding bleeding bleeding and look the blood blood blood

[01:06:02] them before and then they had to pull out and we'll keep doing this this will cause further

[01:06:07] problems I mean it is kind of a war of attrition and you have to think about the attrition long

[01:06:11] term set when you're dealing with entities that have demonstrated now that I mean tactically

[01:06:17] they're not always sound there are other elements of their strategy that are not always sound

[01:06:21] that they have other pieces like basic kind of security you know if it's male honeyy

[01:06:27] former head of Hamas is at an IRGC safe house and he gets blown up you know a lot of demonstrations

[01:06:32] of maybe the power isn't always there so where do you look to kind of refocus and just demonstrate

[01:06:37] that you've gotten something then where do you look to also get truly something from this and

[01:06:43] the kind of that that truly something I mean this is all kind of abstract you know what what

[01:06:47] somebody's opinion is on is real Palestine on Lebanon or whatever those are kind of abstractions

[01:06:52] not everyone's really going to vote on that a lot of people protest and forget what they were

[01:06:55] protesting five minutes ago I mean I think we all went to college here so it's but what I'm

[01:07:02] getting at is the tangible benefits from doing this we can look at this and say well Iran has now

[01:07:09] heckerically been accepted as a strategic player in the region for good or bad that they now have

[01:07:16] this kind of I don't want to use the octopus analogy but you know it's it's you know the octopus

[01:07:21] spreading its arms everywhere and kind of grabbing on and well you know they dominate this and

[01:07:25] they have this and this is their safe table and we can't really counter them there and really we should

[01:07:30] probably think about this more like containment of where this is going you know it they may not even

[01:07:34] like that you know it doesn't matter whatever or we'll just deal with them because in the most

[01:07:38] powerful element there and that's really the smart decision to do that line of change and abstract thinking

[01:07:44] I think is far more important than what the body politic is doing if they're saying hey you know

[01:07:49] I don't like in Israeli air strike that hit rafa I think that that's actually far more

[01:07:55] different and really changes the picture it's even when you have people who see the reality for what it is

[01:08:02] for what the Iranians are actually doing but then saying well I guess there's not much that we can do

[01:08:07] I mean I have my hands tied and it's kind of coming to those conclusions I think that are going

[01:08:12] to be far more distinct and different over the course of time into the future over the last week

[01:08:19] do you think the Iranians have been happy with the investment they've made in his bala

[01:08:24] yeah I mean they of course they've been happy with their investments in Lebanese as bala

[01:08:28] that's given them a real real projection element and it's also given them a lot of power I mean

[01:08:33] very long term couple of decades long lines of thinking for the Iranians for why it's so beneficial

[01:08:41] but I do think it's the how much autonomy have we given to Lebanese as bala which is a major thing

[01:08:47] given they are ideologically loyal they're kind of roped in they are one of us google google

[01:08:51] google google you know but see like in all seriousness that's how it is but it's the

[01:08:56] how much do we really need to control and how much are we penetrated how much is this not really

[01:09:01] working the way that we thought it was that there are paradigm shifts in terms of that thinking

[01:09:05] but I do think it's kind of the they've been a lot of news reports that have been out

[01:09:10] and these kind of annoying me because you're never going to actually know on the fly if you're

[01:09:15] analyzing excuse me um and and that the lacking ability is it's kind of like well there's internal

[01:09:21] dissension from Lebanese as bala itself that they really want to attack okay well maybe they were

[01:09:27] saying that or maybe they were leaking this out to the press to demonstrate to their followers

[01:09:31] that oh no see we're really being held back by Iran full well knowing that they're never going

[01:09:35] to actually split from Iran or have an issue with Iran you know how much of that is designed

[01:09:40] for your consumption so that we're now having this discussion of what happened I don't know if

[01:09:44] that was a beneficial investment you think it wasn't a beneficial investment here I'll give you some

[01:09:48] examples as to why it is Iraq Syria Yemen Lebanon yeah there's four big ones that Lebanese has bala

[01:09:56] either had a direct role having some control function and taking over and maintaining control

[01:10:03] for the Iranians or they've just done it themselves Lebanon I think bigger issue here is really

[01:10:09] what comes down to how the eventual deescalation that from this mass escalation he's using this

[01:10:17] terminology so annoying kind of the big time escalation escalating well again I don't I don't

[01:10:26] like the people who mock that that strategy because it's actually looking quite effective it

[01:10:31] it doesn't it doesn't sound good when you first hear it but it over the last week I'll give

[01:10:38] Iran it's right it's it's very rumsfeldian and it's in the way it sort of rings but over the last

[01:10:45] week what I've I've been kind of pleasantly surprised at how this is gone for these railies

[01:10:53] and just started the lack of any kind of coherent response from his bala I think probably that's

[01:11:00] because you know a lot of them are missing a few pieces parts that they had a week ago

[01:11:06] well there's it's again I come down to this in terms of my grandfather who was in the political realm

[01:11:13] for quite a while would always make this this point to me when it came to international politics

[01:11:19] politics anything it's about who has leverage and you know I look at what's the leverage not

[01:11:25] they don't follow the money now it's it's leverage sometimes leverage is money sometimes it's

[01:11:28] guns sometimes something else sometimes it's oil shipments whatever I'm looking at leverage right

[01:11:34] now well has bola Lebanese has bola had leverage quote unquote on its side when it was able to

[01:11:41] send a lot of rockets drones be accurate about it cause humongous problems for these railies where

[01:11:46] was able to kind of act outside of the box sometimes act as kind of cohesive body that could

[01:11:52] also rally around a bunch of other groups and kind of get other stuff working for them and act

[01:11:56] as Iran's you know primary primary what's called them ambassadors of violence when it came

[01:12:03] to a lot of the attacks going on there they have lost the leverage why because they looked

[01:12:09] weak in a way to not look weak they overdid it and tried to look very very strong which also

[01:12:15] called out the fact that maybe they don't have the same level of leverage that they were claiming

[01:12:21] here maybe there's some paper tiger behavior going on and then when their bluff was called

[01:12:26] the reaction to it was yeah I guess you're right guys like holding it down like looking

[01:12:32] your cards and going yeah it wasn't actually a joke or it's yeah I don't really have a card

[01:12:39] but again I mean you kind of you can see that and again I think just kind of analyzing this

[01:12:47] I always look for well what can be the actual end response what's the long term response that

[01:12:52] might come from Lebanese as Bola well Lebanese as Bola now they're getting hit left and right

[01:12:58] they're losing senior commanders that are major old hands guys who who knew the business

[01:13:03] guys who knew no swirl of personally from the start who were roped into Iranian command and

[01:13:10] control another done and now you also had everything right down to the beepers for intermediate

[01:13:14] level commanders who were trying to buy apples getting you know blown up I look at that and it's

[01:13:21] kind of the oh god so what do we need to do to reestablish ourselves as a player what will the

[01:13:33] take this kind of long term approach it's interesting every time I brought this up to you a

[01:13:38] billion times it's it's this term subter that's from the Quran they talk about the subterranean

[01:13:44] patient ones subterpatients and it's very very big with the Iranians and they will put it up

[01:13:50] either when they're there they're proxy groups been completely screwed or it's one that eventually

[01:13:56] will rise again it's like it's odd it kind of reminds me of Dixie you know the Southful rise again

[01:14:02] but it's that close cause narrative but but no I mean in all seriousness it is reminiscent of

[01:14:08] that oh I didn't know that an insurgency was building you know outside of Charlottesville you know Virginia

[01:14:12] but they often will push that out and I'm noticing a lot of this I'm not seeing the commentary on

[01:14:18] yet yet but I do see the attitude that's kind of there look we cut our piece of the cake

[01:14:25] I think we're going to have to deal with this we have to think strategically and we're thinking

[01:14:28] properly and this is long term remember you know being patient is actually the best way going forward

[01:14:33] how many people that convinces I don't know but they've used it before for other essentially

[01:14:38] lost causes like Bahrain when they had a bunch of groups there I mean remember they released a

[01:14:43] music video telling everyone just be patient don't worry it'll be cool and then Bahrain is

[01:14:48] security forces like rolled all these guys up so they're looking for a raw framp right now

[01:14:53] I think it look frankly I think everyone is looking for some form of an offer yeah well yeah

[01:14:59] no well yeah well yeah who I would actually say has his own own off ramp that he's looking

[01:15:04] for I think everybody's is not necessarily what they're they're functioning not necessarily in what

[01:15:09] maybe the US or US analysts would say this is the proper way to have an offering it I mean the

[01:15:14] Iranians for instance you know what would be a great offering for them oh we just want the fighting

[01:15:18] stop that's not how they work that's also not what they're arguing for they want to demonstrate

[01:15:22] even when they don't have the power that they're actually the ones who ended occupation like they

[01:15:27] did this in a rock they did this in a bunch of other places it doesn't love it on it was the

[01:15:31] argument of we lit off a few i.e. days we did a few i-rams we did a few rocket attacks here and there

[01:15:37] and look we kicked the Americans out despite the fact that there was also a massive Sunni

[01:15:41] insurgency there was also a separate shea insurgency that they couldn't fully control

[01:15:46] and you're a bunch of other issues with American domestic politics but don't worry we'll take credit

[01:15:49] for that and keep saying it same thing goes with Lebanon where Lebanese clasbolla got full credit

[01:15:55] for kicking out the Israelis where they the most some the most active and some the most aggressive

[01:15:59] yes with a some the most violent yes however there are a lot of other parties and other groups

[01:16:04] that were doing things but but I think it's kind of how do you maintain the narrative structure

[01:16:10] that's one two it's what are you actually getting it they're getting out of it the tangible

[01:16:14] peace oh well they've exceeded to us running Yemen they've exceeded us to us to run a rock and

[01:16:21] run we have to go through if we're going to go to bay root we're not going to meet with anybody who is

[01:16:26] really you know an allied functionary within that government like let's say there's there's no

[01:16:34] any Americans are going to really deal with or support who's like let's say i don't know

[01:16:38] Lebanese forces like in a way to live in the need guy like no instead we'll just we'll meet

[01:16:42] privately and through the Europeans and deal with Lebanese has balla because we'll make sure it's

[01:16:47] all settled it's that kind of change it's also you know the pieces on the on the table you know

[01:16:53] what are you allowing for us and how how long can we run it and how long do we have to be quiet

[01:16:57] before we can ratchet things back up again there's like another piece there but I think a lot of

[01:17:01] it comes down to kind of what each party wants i think with the Israelis it's pretty straightforward

[01:17:06] where it's the you know their end to a conflict cannot come at the expense of their

[01:17:14] ability to deter and and really project their power i think a lot of Israeli these really power

[01:17:21] came from this threat of holy crap you know these guys have an advanced air force they have

[01:17:26] advanced technology they have an advanced military and October 7th in large part demonstrated

[01:17:31] that oh my god there were some gaping holes in that they were gaping holes in a lot

[01:17:38] and they're intelligence apparatus i know this is an argument that's now regularly made that you know

[01:17:43] by by giving these really so much control over kind of monitoring humass yeah we didn't see it

[01:17:49] yeah this is what caused this because there was kind of this lack of days ago approach to it which again

[01:17:55] notice what they're doing now with the pages and it's male hanyah it's the kind of going back on it

[01:18:00] and saying no no no we've regained that there we got it we've regained dominance it's that sense of

[01:18:05] think that they are really truly looking for anything else you'd like to talk about that we

[01:18:11] have a gotten to today do we have 10 more hours well okay so any any other any other comments on

[01:18:17] what we've talked about because I know yeah we could easily go for 10 more hours you give me a time

[01:18:21] frame so i don't know what you're doing alright you were at an hour 20 you got you got 10 minutes

[01:18:28] okay all right 10 minutes for this okay um i think one of the big things that's often forgotten about

[01:18:34] the Iranians and how they project power is how they're bringing new technology to the battle

[01:18:40] field and how they're testing it out and how they're using it and i think over time and i think

[01:18:45] Lebanese has bolo was this force that should have been watched a little more carefully on this

[01:18:50] Lebanese has bolo was projecting a lot from 2006 on with drones and i think it should have been very

[01:18:56] apparent that a drone type force uh the type of of targeting using drones uh the ease and availability

[01:19:04] of technology to kind of manufacture these and send them off i think it's going to become a bigger

[01:19:08] in bigger issue with a lot of Iran's proxies uh they've demonstrated that now a certain level

[01:19:14] and threshold has been crossed so that certain groups will be getting this stuff um and i do wonder

[01:19:19] as it becomes more advanced um and given they've had a lot of experience uh more like the AI controls

[01:19:26] and stuff and swarming tactics and everything yeah yes and it's also a lot of what the Russians

[01:19:31] it's is where kind of great power elements come into the uh come into the kind of formula

[01:19:36] the Russians have been utilizing shahed 129s in a variety of different Iranian drones

[01:19:42] from suicide drones to observation drones you know there's a lot of lessons learned from that

[01:19:48] and something bigger than just the guess Iran or even Russia if i were communist china

[01:19:55] i would totally have people on the ground in Ukraine i would totally have people on the ground

[01:19:59] maybe in Syria i bet they do i bet they do i'm a hundred percent sure that they probably

[01:20:04] i bet we got people pretty close to the front line i bet they do too on the other side of that front line

[01:20:10] yes and i i do wonder where these lessons that we're now watching what pressure points can

[01:20:16] you execute with maybe a drone attack from a rock where that's going to find itself if there's

[01:20:21] a potential conflict with Taiwan uh we've had involves Taiwan uh we're involved south china sea

[01:20:26] maybe involves another smaller state i mean philipines we at nom don't know but i kind of

[01:20:32] look at that and i see these are the building blocks going forward for when you actually have a

[01:20:39] a great power conflict if there is one hopefully there is not one but if that happens

[01:20:44] every lesson will be learned from this it'll be learned from how these these weapons were used

[01:20:50] in a form of brinksmanship um not even when they weren't actually used maybe it's just the

[01:20:55] employment of them maybe it's just one use and maybe it didn't hit anything but it was just

[01:21:00] that kind of thumbing their nose at something i mean for instance we recall when on sur Allah the

[01:21:05] hoothees launched a drone that flew over a televeave beach and crashed into a building you know

[01:21:10] a couple of meters away from the american uh consulate so i look at things like that and kind of

[01:21:15] look at like how do you send the signals and what are they pulling out of it how are they

[01:21:18] engineering the future for this and i think i whether it's the Iranian the Russians of chinese

[01:21:24] i do think a lot of these lessons are being learned from this conflict and i don't think a

[01:21:29] lot of people were initially expecting that they're probably expecting it more from the Ukraine front but

[01:21:32] i do think on the other side from the Russians the Chinese from the Iranians this has been

[01:21:40] golden even if they failed many many times you know you learn a lot from failure you know the

[01:21:44] founding fathers wrote a lot about uh about Greek city states as a negative example uh and how

[01:21:50] democratic order was structured as a negative example and because of that that's how they structure

[01:21:55] partially what we have now right and i always think about that it's you know you learn a lot more from

[01:21:59] failing yeah it's great place to leave it for now fill up thank you my friend as always it is a

[01:22:05] wonderful to speak to you about these issues as we have who got six or seven times now i think this

[01:22:11] is seven over the last year that lucky oh maybe i don't know hopefully it's sort of like

[01:22:18] i hope we don't have to keep talking about it for another year but at the same point like i

[01:22:21] like having you on stalking that i mean of course it doesn't mean that like this issue goes away

[01:22:25] if the war stops but uh so that means you'll have me on more i will yes i love being in demand

[01:22:32] i told everyone that she and militias were growth industry no one listened to me no yeah it's like

[01:22:37] uh i don't know everyone saying don't take Arabic and college or uh Russian you know that was sort

[01:22:43] of a dying like why would you do that silly we don't know criminal criminology yeah it does that

[01:22:50] how could that be used domestically no i'll i'll stop there we will have all of your your social

[01:22:55] media where folks can find your writing's and stuff um in the show notes as we always do

[01:23:00] until next time sir thank you thank you for having me on thanks for listening this is secrets and spies